From: Lorenzo Stoakes lorenzo.stoakes@oracle.com
[ Upstream commit 8ec396d05d1b737c87311fb7311f753b02c2a6b1 ]
Patch series "mm: reinstate ability to map write-sealed memfd mappings read-only".
In commit 158978945f31 ("mm: perform the mapping_map_writable() check after call_mmap()") (and preceding changes in the same series) it became possible to mmap() F_SEAL_WRITE sealed memfd mappings read-only.
Commit 5de195060b2e ("mm: resolve faulty mmap_region() error path behaviour") unintentionally undid this logic by moving the mapping_map_writable() check before the shmem_mmap() hook is invoked, thereby regressing this change.
This series reworks how we both permit write-sealed mappings being mapped read-only and disallow mprotect() from undoing the write-seal, fixing this regression.
We also add a regression test to ensure that we do not accidentally regress this in future.
Thanks to Julian Orth for reporting this regression.
This patch (of 2):
In commit 158978945f31 ("mm: perform the mapping_map_writable() check after call_mmap()") (and preceding changes in the same series) it became possible to mmap() F_SEAL_WRITE sealed memfd mappings read-only.
This was previously unnecessarily disallowed, despite the man page documentation indicating that it would be, thereby limiting the usefulness of F_SEAL_WRITE logic.
We fixed this by adapting logic that existed for the F_SEAL_FUTURE_WRITE seal (one which disallows future writes to the memfd) to also be used for F_SEAL_WRITE.
For background - the F_SEAL_FUTURE_WRITE seal clears VM_MAYWRITE for a read-only mapping to disallow mprotect() from overriding the seal - an operation performed by seal_check_write(), invoked from shmem_mmap(), the f_op->mmap() hook used by shmem mappings.
By extending this to F_SEAL_WRITE and critically - checking mapping_map_writable() to determine if we may map the memfd AFTER we invoke shmem_mmap() - the desired logic becomes possible. This is because mapping_map_writable() explicitly checks for VM_MAYWRITE, which we will have cleared.
Commit 5de195060b2e ("mm: resolve faulty mmap_region() error path behaviour") unintentionally undid this logic by moving the mapping_map_writable() check before the shmem_mmap() hook is invoked, thereby regressing this change.
We reinstate this functionality by moving the check out of shmem_mmap() and instead performing it in do_mmap() at the point at which VMA flags are being determined, which seems in any case to be a more appropriate place in which to make this determination.
In order to achieve this we rework memfd seal logic to allow us access to this information using existing logic and eliminate the clearing of VM_MAYWRITE from seal_check_write() which we are performing in do_mmap() instead.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/99fc35d2c62bd2e05571cf60d9f8b843c56069e0.173280477... Fixes: 5de195060b2e ("mm: resolve faulty mmap_region() error path behaviour") Signed-off-by: Lorenzo Stoakes lorenzo.stoakes@oracle.com Reported-by: Julian Orth ju.orth@gmail.com Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/CAHijbEUMhvJTN9Xw1GmbM266FXXv=U7s4L_Jem5x3AaPZxr... Cc: Jann Horn jannh@google.com Cc: Liam R. Howlett Liam.Howlett@Oracle.com Cc: Linus Torvalds torvalds@linux-foundation.org Cc: Shuah Khan shuah@kernel.org Cc: Vlastimil Babka vbabka@suse.cz Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton akpm@linux-foundation.org Signed-off-by: Isaac J. Manjarres isaacmanjarres@google.com --- include/linux/memfd.h | 14 +++++++++++ include/linux/mm.h | 58 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------- mm/memfd.c | 2 +- mm/mmap.c | 4 +++ 4 files changed, 59 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/memfd.h b/include/linux/memfd.h index 4f1600413f91..5d06bba9d7e5 100644 --- a/include/linux/memfd.h +++ b/include/linux/memfd.h @@ -6,11 +6,25 @@
#ifdef CONFIG_MEMFD_CREATE extern long memfd_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg); +unsigned int *memfd_file_seals_ptr(struct file *file); #else static inline long memfd_fcntl(struct file *f, unsigned int c, unsigned long a) { return -EINVAL; } + +static inline unsigned int *memfd_file_seals_ptr(struct file *file) +{ + return NULL; +} #endif
+/* Retrieve memfd seals associated with the file, if any. */ +static inline unsigned int memfd_file_seals(struct file *file) +{ + unsigned int *sealsp = memfd_file_seals_ptr(file); + + return sealsp ? *sealsp : 0; +} + #endif /* __LINUX_MEMFD_H */ diff --git a/include/linux/mm.h b/include/linux/mm.h index 61874611d0e4..3598925561b1 100644 --- a/include/linux/mm.h +++ b/include/linux/mm.h @@ -3286,6 +3286,37 @@ void mem_dump_obj(void *object); static inline void mem_dump_obj(void *object) {} #endif
+static inline bool is_write_sealed(int seals) +{ + return seals & (F_SEAL_WRITE | F_SEAL_FUTURE_WRITE); +} + +/** + * is_readonly_sealed - Checks whether write-sealed but mapped read-only, + * in which case writes should be disallowing moving + * forwards. + * @seals: the seals to check + * @vm_flags: the VMA flags to check + * + * Returns whether readonly sealed, in which case writess should be disallowed + * going forward. + */ +static inline bool is_readonly_sealed(int seals, vm_flags_t vm_flags) +{ + /* + * Since an F_SEAL_[FUTURE_]WRITE sealed memfd can be mapped as + * MAP_SHARED and read-only, take care to not allow mprotect to + * revert protections on such mappings. Do this only for shared + * mappings. For private mappings, don't need to mask + * VM_MAYWRITE as we still want them to be COW-writable. + */ + if (is_write_sealed(seals) && + ((vm_flags & (VM_SHARED | VM_WRITE)) == VM_SHARED)) + return true; + + return false; +} + /** * seal_check_write - Check for F_SEAL_WRITE or F_SEAL_FUTURE_WRITE flags and * handle them. @@ -3297,24 +3328,15 @@ static inline void mem_dump_obj(void *object) {} */ static inline int seal_check_write(int seals, struct vm_area_struct *vma) { - if (seals & (F_SEAL_WRITE | F_SEAL_FUTURE_WRITE)) { - /* - * New PROT_WRITE and MAP_SHARED mmaps are not allowed when - * write seals are active. - */ - if ((vma->vm_flags & VM_SHARED) && (vma->vm_flags & VM_WRITE)) - return -EPERM; - - /* - * Since an F_SEAL_[FUTURE_]WRITE sealed memfd can be mapped as - * MAP_SHARED and read-only, take care to not allow mprotect to - * revert protections on such mappings. Do this only for shared - * mappings. For private mappings, don't need to mask - * VM_MAYWRITE as we still want them to be COW-writable. - */ - if (vma->vm_flags & VM_SHARED) - vma->vm_flags &= ~(VM_MAYWRITE); - } + if (!is_write_sealed(seals)) + return 0; + + /* + * New PROT_WRITE and MAP_SHARED mmaps are not allowed when + * write seals are active. + */ + if ((vma->vm_flags & VM_SHARED) && (vma->vm_flags & VM_WRITE)) + return -EPERM;
return 0; } diff --git a/mm/memfd.c b/mm/memfd.c index a73af8be9c28..6a6bbc4477a9 100644 --- a/mm/memfd.c +++ b/mm/memfd.c @@ -133,7 +133,7 @@ static int memfd_wait_for_pins(struct address_space *mapping) return error; }
-static unsigned int *memfd_file_seals_ptr(struct file *file) +unsigned int *memfd_file_seals_ptr(struct file *file) { if (shmem_file(file)) return &SHMEM_I(file_inode(file))->seals; diff --git a/mm/mmap.c b/mm/mmap.c index e1dada58788f..273e06dad3c6 100644 --- a/mm/mmap.c +++ b/mm/mmap.c @@ -47,6 +47,7 @@ #include <linux/pkeys.h> #include <linux/oom.h> #include <linux/sched/mm.h> +#include <linux/memfd.h>
#include <linux/uaccess.h> #include <asm/cacheflush.h> @@ -1486,6 +1487,7 @@ unsigned long do_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long addr,
if (file) { struct inode *inode = file_inode(file); + unsigned int seals = memfd_file_seals(file); unsigned long flags_mask;
if (!file_mmap_ok(file, inode, pgoff, len)) @@ -1524,6 +1526,8 @@ unsigned long do_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long addr, vm_flags |= VM_SHARED | VM_MAYSHARE; if (!(file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE)) vm_flags &= ~(VM_MAYWRITE | VM_SHARED); + else if (is_readonly_sealed(seals, vm_flags)) + vm_flags &= ~VM_MAYWRITE; fallthrough; case MAP_PRIVATE: if (!(file->f_mode & FMODE_READ))