On Fri, Nov 10, 2017 at 11:28:51AM -0800, Eric Biggers wrote:
commit a3c812f7cfd80cf51e8f5b7034f7418f6beb56c1 upstream. [Please apply to 3.18-stable.]
When calling keyctl_read() on a key of type "trusted", if the user-supplied buffer was too small, the kernel ignored the buffer length and just wrote past the end of the buffer, potentially corrupting userspace memory. Fix it by instead returning the size required, as per the documentation for keyctl_read().
We also don't even fill the buffer at all in this case, as this is slightly easier to implement than doing a short read, and either behavior appears to be permitted. It also makes it match the behavior of the "encrypted" key type.
Fixes: d00a1c72f7f4 ("keys: add new trusted key-type") Reported-by: Ben Hutchings ben@decadent.org.uk Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v2.6.38+ Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers ebiggers@google.com Signed-off-by: David Howells dhowells@redhat.com Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com Reviewed-by: James Morris james.l.morris@oracle.com Signed-off-by: James Morris james.l.morris@oracle.com
security/keys/trusted.c | 23 ++++++++++++----------- 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
Thanks for both of these, now queued up.
greg k-h