6.1-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Dan Carpenter dan.carpenter@linaro.org
[ Upstream commit 5fe71fda89745fc3cd95f70d06e9162b595c3702 ]
On a 32bit system the "keylen + sizeof(struct tipc_aead_key)" math could have an integer wrapping issue. It doesn't matter because the "keylen" is checked on the next line, but just to make life easier for static analysis tools, let's re-order these conditions and avoid the integer overflow.
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter dan.carpenter@linaro.org Reviewed-by: Simon Horman horms@kernel.org Signed-off-by: David S. Miller davem@davemloft.net Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- net/tipc/crypto.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/tipc/crypto.c b/net/tipc/crypto.c index 65f59739a041a..25c18f8783ce9 100644 --- a/net/tipc/crypto.c +++ b/net/tipc/crypto.c @@ -2293,8 +2293,8 @@ static bool tipc_crypto_key_rcv(struct tipc_crypto *rx, struct tipc_msg *hdr) keylen = ntohl(*((__be32 *)(data + TIPC_AEAD_ALG_NAME)));
/* Verify the supplied size values */ - if (unlikely(size != keylen + sizeof(struct tipc_aead_key) || - keylen > TIPC_AEAD_KEY_SIZE_MAX)) { + if (unlikely(keylen > TIPC_AEAD_KEY_SIZE_MAX || + size != keylen + sizeof(struct tipc_aead_key))) { pr_debug("%s: invalid MSG_CRYPTO key size\n", rx->name); goto exit; }