6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
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From: Trond Myklebust trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com
[ Upstream commit e1ff7aa34dec7e650159fd7ca8ec6af7cc428d9f ]
Loosen the permission check on forced umount to allow users holding CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileges in namespaces that are privileged with respect to the userns that originally mounted the filesystem.
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/12f212d4ef983714d065a6bb372fbb378753bf4c.174231519... Acked-by: "Eric W. Biederman" ebiederm@xmission.com Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner brauner@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- fs/namespace.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/fs/namespace.c b/fs/namespace.c index 73da51ac5a034..f898de3a6f705 100644 --- a/fs/namespace.c +++ b/fs/namespace.c @@ -1986,6 +1986,7 @@ static void warn_mandlock(void) static int can_umount(const struct path *path, int flags) { struct mount *mnt = real_mount(path->mnt); + struct super_block *sb = path->dentry->d_sb;
if (!may_mount()) return -EPERM; @@ -1995,7 +1996,7 @@ static int can_umount(const struct path *path, int flags) return -EINVAL; if (mnt->mnt.mnt_flags & MNT_LOCKED) /* Check optimistically */ return -EINVAL; - if (flags & MNT_FORCE && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) + if (flags & MNT_FORCE && !ns_capable(sb->s_user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) return -EPERM; return 0; }