6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
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From: Josh Poimboeuf jpoimboe@kernel.org
[ Upstream commit dc6306ad5b0dda040baf1fde3cfd458e6abfc4da ]
The SRSO default safe-ret mitigation is reported as "mitigated" even if microcode hasn't been updated. That's wrong because userspace may still be vulnerable to SRSO attacks due to IBPB not flushing branch type predictions.
Report the safe-ret + !microcode case as vulnerable.
Also report the microcode-only case as vulnerable as it leaves the kernel open to attacks.
Fixes: fb3bd914b3ec ("x86/srso: Add a Speculative RAS Overflow mitigation") Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf jpoimboe@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar mingo@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) bp@alien8.de Acked-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) bp@alien8.de Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/a8a14f97d1b0e03ec255c81637afdf4cf0ae9c99.169388998... Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/srso.rst | 24 ++++++++++----- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 36 +++++++++++++--------- 2 files changed, 39 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-)
diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/srso.rst b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/srso.rst index b6cfb51cb0b46..e715bfc09879a 100644 --- a/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/srso.rst +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/srso.rst @@ -46,12 +46,22 @@ The possible values in this file are:
The processor is not vulnerable
- * 'Vulnerable: no microcode': +* 'Vulnerable': + + The processor is vulnerable and no mitigations have been applied. + + * 'Vulnerable: No microcode':
The processor is vulnerable, no microcode extending IBPB functionality to address the vulnerability has been applied.
- * 'Mitigation: microcode': + * 'Vulnerable: Safe RET, no microcode': + + The "Safe RET" mitigation (see below) has been applied to protect the + kernel, but the IBPB-extending microcode has not been applied. User + space tasks may still be vulnerable. + + * 'Vulnerable: Microcode, no safe RET':
Extended IBPB functionality microcode patch has been applied. It does not address User->Kernel and Guest->Host transitions protection but it @@ -72,11 +82,11 @@ The possible values in this file are:
(spec_rstack_overflow=microcode)
- * 'Mitigation: safe RET': + * 'Mitigation: Safe RET':
- Software-only mitigation. It complements the extended IBPB microcode - patch functionality by addressing User->Kernel and Guest->Host - transitions protection. + Combined microcode/software mitigation. It complements the + extended IBPB microcode patch functionality by addressing + User->Kernel and Guest->Host transitions protection.
Selected by default or by spec_rstack_overflow=safe-ret
@@ -129,7 +139,7 @@ an indrect branch prediction barrier after having applied the required microcode patch for one's system. This mitigation comes also at a performance cost.
-Mitigation: safe RET +Mitigation: Safe RET --------------------
The mitigation works by ensuring all RET instructions speculate to diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c index d5db0baca2f14..a55a3864df1c9 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c @@ -2353,6 +2353,8 @@ early_param("l1tf", l1tf_cmdline);
enum srso_mitigation { SRSO_MITIGATION_NONE, + SRSO_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED, + SRSO_MITIGATION_SAFE_RET_UCODE_NEEDED, SRSO_MITIGATION_MICROCODE, SRSO_MITIGATION_SAFE_RET, SRSO_MITIGATION_IBPB, @@ -2368,11 +2370,13 @@ enum srso_mitigation_cmd { };
static const char * const srso_strings[] = { - [SRSO_MITIGATION_NONE] = "Vulnerable", - [SRSO_MITIGATION_MICROCODE] = "Mitigation: microcode", - [SRSO_MITIGATION_SAFE_RET] = "Mitigation: safe RET", - [SRSO_MITIGATION_IBPB] = "Mitigation: IBPB", - [SRSO_MITIGATION_IBPB_ON_VMEXIT] = "Mitigation: IBPB on VMEXIT only" + [SRSO_MITIGATION_NONE] = "Vulnerable", + [SRSO_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED] = "Vulnerable: No microcode", + [SRSO_MITIGATION_SAFE_RET_UCODE_NEEDED] = "Vulnerable: Safe RET, no microcode", + [SRSO_MITIGATION_MICROCODE] = "Vulnerable: Microcode, no safe RET", + [SRSO_MITIGATION_SAFE_RET] = "Mitigation: Safe RET", + [SRSO_MITIGATION_IBPB] = "Mitigation: IBPB", + [SRSO_MITIGATION_IBPB_ON_VMEXIT] = "Mitigation: IBPB on VMEXIT only" };
static enum srso_mitigation srso_mitigation __ro_after_init = SRSO_MITIGATION_NONE; @@ -2409,10 +2413,7 @@ static void __init srso_select_mitigation(void) if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SRSO) || cpu_mitigations_off()) goto pred_cmd;
- if (!has_microcode) { - pr_warn("IBPB-extending microcode not applied!\n"); - pr_warn(SRSO_NOTICE); - } else { + if (has_microcode) { /* * Zen1/2 with SMT off aren't vulnerable after the right * IBPB microcode has been applied. @@ -2428,6 +2429,12 @@ static void __init srso_select_mitigation(void) srso_mitigation = SRSO_MITIGATION_IBPB; goto out; } + } else { + pr_warn("IBPB-extending microcode not applied!\n"); + pr_warn(SRSO_NOTICE); + + /* may be overwritten by SRSO_CMD_SAFE_RET below */ + srso_mitigation = SRSO_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED; }
switch (srso_cmd) { @@ -2457,7 +2464,10 @@ static void __init srso_select_mitigation(void) setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SRSO); x86_return_thunk = srso_return_thunk; } - srso_mitigation = SRSO_MITIGATION_SAFE_RET; + if (has_microcode) + srso_mitigation = SRSO_MITIGATION_SAFE_RET; + else + srso_mitigation = SRSO_MITIGATION_SAFE_RET_UCODE_NEEDED; } else { pr_err("WARNING: kernel not compiled with CPU_SRSO.\n"); goto pred_cmd; @@ -2493,7 +2503,7 @@ static void __init srso_select_mitigation(void) }
out: - pr_info("%s%s\n", srso_strings[srso_mitigation], has_microcode ? "" : ", no microcode"); + pr_info("%s\n", srso_strings[srso_mitigation]);
pred_cmd: if ((!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SRSO) || srso_cmd == SRSO_CMD_OFF) && @@ -2704,9 +2714,7 @@ static ssize_t srso_show_state(char *buf) if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SRSO_NO)) return sysfs_emit(buf, "Mitigation: SMT disabled\n");
- return sysfs_emit(buf, "%s%s\n", - srso_strings[srso_mitigation], - boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBPB_BRTYPE) ? "" : ", no microcode"); + return sysfs_emit(buf, "%s\n", srso_strings[srso_mitigation]); }
static ssize_t gds_show_state(char *buf)