This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled
[Variant 2/Spectre-v2] arm64: Add skeleton to harden the branch predictor against aliasing attacks
to the 4.14-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git%3Ba=su...
The filename of the patch is: arm64-add-skeleton-to-harden-the-branch-predictor-against-aliasing-attacks.patch and it can be found in the queue-4.14 subdirectory.
If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let stable@vger.kernel.org know about it.
From foo@baz Wed Feb 14 14:44:54 CET 2018
From: Will Deacon will.deacon@arm.com Date: Wed, 3 Jan 2018 11:17:58 +0000 Subject: [Variant 2/Spectre-v2] arm64: Add skeleton to harden the branch predictor against aliasing attacks
From: Will Deacon will.deacon@arm.com
Commit 0f15adbb2861 upstream.
Aliasing attacks against CPU branch predictors can allow an attacker to redirect speculative control flow on some CPUs and potentially divulge information from one context to another.
This patch adds initial skeleton code behind a new Kconfig option to enable implementation-specific mitigations against these attacks for CPUs that are affected.
Co-developed-by: Marc Zyngier marc.zyngier@arm.com Signed-off-by: Will Deacon will.deacon@arm.com Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas catalin.marinas@arm.com Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org --- arch/arm64/Kconfig | 17 ++++++++ arch/arm64/include/asm/cpucaps.h | 3 + arch/arm64/include/asm/mmu.h | 37 +++++++++++++++++++ arch/arm64/include/asm/sysreg.h | 1 arch/arm64/kernel/Makefile | 4 ++ arch/arm64/kernel/bpi.S | 55 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c | 74 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c | 1 arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S | 8 ++-- arch/arm64/mm/context.c | 2 + arch/arm64/mm/fault.c | 17 ++++++++ 11 files changed, 215 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) create mode 100644 arch/arm64/kernel/bpi.S
--- a/arch/arm64/Kconfig +++ b/arch/arm64/Kconfig @@ -818,6 +818,23 @@ config UNMAP_KERNEL_AT_EL0
If unsure, say Y.
+config HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR + bool "Harden the branch predictor against aliasing attacks" if EXPERT + default y + help + Speculation attacks against some high-performance processors rely on + being able to manipulate the branch predictor for a victim context by + executing aliasing branches in the attacker context. Such attacks + can be partially mitigated against by clearing internal branch + predictor state and limiting the prediction logic in some situations. + + This config option will take CPU-specific actions to harden the + branch predictor against aliasing attacks and may rely on specific + instruction sequences or control bits being set by the system + firmware. + + If unsure, say Y. + menuconfig ARMV8_DEPRECATED bool "Emulate deprecated/obsolete ARMv8 instructions" depends on COMPAT --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/cpucaps.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/cpucaps.h @@ -41,7 +41,8 @@ #define ARM64_WORKAROUND_CAVIUM_30115 20 #define ARM64_HAS_DCPOP 21 #define ARM64_UNMAP_KERNEL_AT_EL0 23 +#define ARM64_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR 24
-#define ARM64_NCAPS 24 +#define ARM64_NCAPS 25
#endif /* __ASM_CPUCAPS_H */ --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/mmu.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/mmu.h @@ -41,6 +41,43 @@ static inline bool arm64_kernel_unmapped cpus_have_const_cap(ARM64_UNMAP_KERNEL_AT_EL0); }
+typedef void (*bp_hardening_cb_t)(void); + +struct bp_hardening_data { + int hyp_vectors_slot; + bp_hardening_cb_t fn; +}; + +#ifdef CONFIG_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR +extern char __bp_harden_hyp_vecs_start[], __bp_harden_hyp_vecs_end[]; + +DECLARE_PER_CPU_READ_MOSTLY(struct bp_hardening_data, bp_hardening_data); + +static inline struct bp_hardening_data *arm64_get_bp_hardening_data(void) +{ + return this_cpu_ptr(&bp_hardening_data); +} + +static inline void arm64_apply_bp_hardening(void) +{ + struct bp_hardening_data *d; + + if (!cpus_have_const_cap(ARM64_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR)) + return; + + d = arm64_get_bp_hardening_data(); + if (d->fn) + d->fn(); +} +#else +static inline struct bp_hardening_data *arm64_get_bp_hardening_data(void) +{ + return NULL; +} + +static inline void arm64_apply_bp_hardening(void) { } +#endif /* CONFIG_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR */ + extern void paging_init(void); extern void bootmem_init(void); extern void __iomem *early_io_map(phys_addr_t phys, unsigned long virt); --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/sysreg.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/sysreg.h @@ -333,6 +333,7 @@
/* id_aa64pfr0 */ #define ID_AA64PFR0_CSV3_SHIFT 60 +#define ID_AA64PFR0_CSV2_SHIFT 56 #define ID_AA64PFR0_GIC_SHIFT 24 #define ID_AA64PFR0_ASIMD_SHIFT 20 #define ID_AA64PFR0_FP_SHIFT 16 --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/Makefile +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/Makefile @@ -55,6 +55,10 @@ arm64-obj-$(CONFIG_ARM64_RELOC_TEST) += arm64-reloc-test-y := reloc_test_core.o reloc_test_syms.o arm64-obj-$(CONFIG_CRASH_DUMP) += crash_dump.o
+ifeq ($(CONFIG_KVM),y) +arm64-obj-$(CONFIG_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR) += bpi.o +endif + obj-y += $(arm64-obj-y) vdso/ probes/ obj-m += $(arm64-obj-m) head-y := head.o --- /dev/null +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/bpi.S @@ -0,0 +1,55 @@ +/* + * Contains CPU specific branch predictor invalidation sequences + * + * Copyright (C) 2018 ARM Ltd. + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 as + * published by the Free Software Foundation. + * + * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the + * GNU General Public License for more details. + * + * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License + * along with this program. If not, see http://www.gnu.org/licenses/. + */ + +#include <linux/linkage.h> + +.macro ventry target + .rept 31 + nop + .endr + b \target +.endm + +.macro vectors target + ventry \target + 0x000 + ventry \target + 0x080 + ventry \target + 0x100 + ventry \target + 0x180 + + ventry \target + 0x200 + ventry \target + 0x280 + ventry \target + 0x300 + ventry \target + 0x380 + + ventry \target + 0x400 + ventry \target + 0x480 + ventry \target + 0x500 + ventry \target + 0x580 + + ventry \target + 0x600 + ventry \target + 0x680 + ventry \target + 0x700 + ventry \target + 0x780 +.endm + + .align 11 +ENTRY(__bp_harden_hyp_vecs_start) + .rept 4 + vectors __kvm_hyp_vector + .endr +ENTRY(__bp_harden_hyp_vecs_end) --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c @@ -60,6 +60,80 @@ static int cpu_enable_trap_ctr_access(vo return 0; }
+#ifdef CONFIG_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR +#include <asm/mmu_context.h> +#include <asm/cacheflush.h> + +DEFINE_PER_CPU_READ_MOSTLY(struct bp_hardening_data, bp_hardening_data); + +#ifdef CONFIG_KVM +static void __copy_hyp_vect_bpi(int slot, const char *hyp_vecs_start, + const char *hyp_vecs_end) +{ + void *dst = lm_alias(__bp_harden_hyp_vecs_start + slot * SZ_2K); + int i; + + for (i = 0; i < SZ_2K; i += 0x80) + memcpy(dst + i, hyp_vecs_start, hyp_vecs_end - hyp_vecs_start); + + flush_icache_range((uintptr_t)dst, (uintptr_t)dst + SZ_2K); +} + +static void __install_bp_hardening_cb(bp_hardening_cb_t fn, + const char *hyp_vecs_start, + const char *hyp_vecs_end) +{ + static int last_slot = -1; + static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(bp_lock); + int cpu, slot = -1; + + spin_lock(&bp_lock); + for_each_possible_cpu(cpu) { + if (per_cpu(bp_hardening_data.fn, cpu) == fn) { + slot = per_cpu(bp_hardening_data.hyp_vectors_slot, cpu); + break; + } + } + + if (slot == -1) { + last_slot++; + BUG_ON(((__bp_harden_hyp_vecs_end - __bp_harden_hyp_vecs_start) + / SZ_2K) <= last_slot); + slot = last_slot; + __copy_hyp_vect_bpi(slot, hyp_vecs_start, hyp_vecs_end); + } + + __this_cpu_write(bp_hardening_data.hyp_vectors_slot, slot); + __this_cpu_write(bp_hardening_data.fn, fn); + spin_unlock(&bp_lock); +} +#else +static void __install_bp_hardening_cb(bp_hardening_cb_t fn, + const char *hyp_vecs_start, + const char *hyp_vecs_end) +{ + __this_cpu_write(bp_hardening_data.fn, fn); +} +#endif /* CONFIG_KVM */ + +static void install_bp_hardening_cb(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry, + bp_hardening_cb_t fn, + const char *hyp_vecs_start, + const char *hyp_vecs_end) +{ + u64 pfr0; + + if (!entry->matches(entry, SCOPE_LOCAL_CPU)) + return; + + pfr0 = read_cpuid(ID_AA64PFR0_EL1); + if (cpuid_feature_extract_unsigned_field(pfr0, ID_AA64PFR0_CSV2_SHIFT)) + return; + + __install_bp_hardening_cb(fn, hyp_vecs_start, hyp_vecs_end); +} +#endif /* CONFIG_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR */ + #define MIDR_RANGE(model, min, max) \ .def_scope = SCOPE_LOCAL_CPU, \ .matches = is_affected_midr_range, \ --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c @@ -126,6 +126,7 @@ static const struct arm64_ftr_bits ftr_i
static const struct arm64_ftr_bits ftr_id_aa64pfr0[] = { ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_HIDDEN, FTR_NONSTRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, ID_AA64PFR0_CSV3_SHIFT, 4, 0), + ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_HIDDEN, FTR_NONSTRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, ID_AA64PFR0_CSV2_SHIFT, 4, 0), ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_HIDDEN, FTR_STRICT, FTR_EXACT, ID_AA64PFR0_GIC_SHIFT, 4, 0), S_ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_VISIBLE, FTR_STRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, ID_AA64PFR0_ASIMD_SHIFT, 4, ID_AA64PFR0_ASIMD_NI), S_ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_VISIBLE, FTR_STRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, ID_AA64PFR0_FP_SHIFT, 4, ID_AA64PFR0_FP_NI), --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S @@ -724,13 +724,15 @@ el0_ia: * Instruction abort handling */ mrs x26, far_el1 - // enable interrupts before calling the main handler - enable_dbg_and_irq + enable_dbg +#ifdef CONFIG_TRACE_IRQFLAGS + bl trace_hardirqs_off +#endif ct_user_exit mov x0, x26 mov x1, x25 mov x2, sp - bl do_mem_abort + bl do_el0_ia_bp_hardening b ret_to_user el0_fpsimd_acc: /* --- a/arch/arm64/mm/context.c +++ b/arch/arm64/mm/context.c @@ -242,6 +242,8 @@ asmlinkage void post_ttbr_update_workaro "ic iallu; dsb nsh; isb", ARM64_WORKAROUND_CAVIUM_27456, CONFIG_CAVIUM_ERRATUM_27456)); + + arm64_apply_bp_hardening(); }
static int asids_init(void) --- a/arch/arm64/mm/fault.c +++ b/arch/arm64/mm/fault.c @@ -751,6 +751,23 @@ asmlinkage void __exception do_mem_abort arm64_notify_die("", regs, &info, esr); }
+asmlinkage void __exception do_el0_ia_bp_hardening(unsigned long addr, + unsigned int esr, + struct pt_regs *regs) +{ + /* + * We've taken an instruction abort from userspace and not yet + * re-enabled IRQs. If the address is a kernel address, apply + * BP hardening prior to enabling IRQs and pre-emption. + */ + if (addr > TASK_SIZE) + arm64_apply_bp_hardening(); + + local_irq_enable(); + do_mem_abort(addr, esr, regs); +} + + /* * Handle stack alignment exceptions. */
Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from will.deacon@arm.com are
queue-4.14/arm64-make-user_ds-an-inclusive-limit.patch queue-4.14/arm64-mm-remove-pre_ttbr0_update_workaround-for-falkor-erratum-e1003.patch queue-4.14/arm64-uaccess-don-t-bother-eliding-access_ok-checks-in-__-get-put-_user.patch queue-4.14/arm64-cpufeature-pass-capability-structure-to-enable-callback.patch queue-4.14/arm64-uaccess-mask-__user-pointers-for-__arch_-clear-copy_-_user.patch queue-4.14/arm64-mm-add-arm64_kernel_unmapped_at_el0-helper.patch queue-4.14/arm64-entry-reword-comment-about-post_ttbr_update_workaround.patch queue-4.14/arm64-kaslr-put-kernel-vectors-address-in-separate-data-page.patch queue-4.14/arm-arm64-smccc-make-function-identifiers-an-unsigned-quantity.patch queue-4.14/arm64-move-bp-hardening-to-check_and_switch_context.patch queue-4.14/arm-arm64-kvm-advertise-smccc-v1.1.patch queue-4.14/arm64-move-post_ttbr_update_workaround-to-c-code.patch queue-4.14/arm64-turn-on-kpti-only-on-cpus-that-need-it.patch queue-4.14/firmware-psci-expose-psci-conduit.patch queue-4.14/arm64-force-kpti-to-be-disabled-on-cavium-thunderx.patch queue-4.14/arm64-entry-apply-bp-hardening-for-high-priority-synchronous-exceptions.patch queue-4.14/arm64-kpti-fix-the-interaction-between-asid-switching-and-software-pan.patch queue-4.14/firmware-psci-expose-smccc-version-through-psci_ops.patch queue-4.14/arm64-mm-permit-transitioning-from-global-to-non-global-without-bbm.patch queue-4.14/arm64-mm-allocate-asids-in-pairs.patch queue-4.14/arm64-tls-avoid-unconditional-zeroing-of-tpidrro_el0-for-native-tasks.patch queue-4.14/arm64-use-ret-instruction-for-exiting-the-trampoline.patch queue-4.14/arm64-futex-mask-__user-pointers-prior-to-dereference.patch queue-4.14/arm64-entry-explicitly-pass-exception-level-to-kernel_ventry-macro.patch queue-4.14/arm64-implement-branch-predictor-hardening-for-affected-cortex-a-cpus.patch queue-4.14/arm64-kpti-make-use-of-ng-dependent-on-arm64_kernel_unmapped_at_el0.patch queue-4.14/arm-arm64-kvm-add-psci_version-helper.patch queue-4.14/arm64-kill-psci_get_version-as-a-variant-2-workaround.patch queue-4.14/arm64-entry-ensure-branch-through-syscall-table-is-bounded-under-speculation.patch queue-4.14/arm64-mm-use-non-global-mappings-for-kernel-space.patch queue-4.14/arm64-entry-apply-bp-hardening-for-suspicious-interrupts-from-el0.patch queue-4.14/arm64-capabilities-handle-duplicate-entries-for-a-capability.patch queue-4.14/arm64-entry-hook-up-entry-trampoline-to-exception-vectors.patch queue-4.14/arm64-branch-predictor-hardening-for-cavium-thunderx2.patch queue-4.14/arm64-uaccess-prevent-speculative-use-of-the-current-addr_limit.patch queue-4.14/.arm64-add-software-workaround-for-falkor-erratum-1041.patch.swp queue-4.14/arm64-use-pointer-masking-to-limit-uaccess-speculation.patch queue-4.14/arm64-add-arm_smccc_arch_workaround_1-bp-hardening-support.patch queue-4.14/arm64-erratum-work-around-falkor-erratum-e1003-in-trampoline-code.patch queue-4.14/arm64-mm-fix-and-re-enable-arm64_sw_ttbr0_pan.patch queue-4.14/arm64-mm-invalidate-both-kernel-and-user-asids-when-performing-tlbi.patch queue-4.14/drivers-firmware-expose-psci_get_version-through-psci_ops-structure.patch queue-4.14/arm64-mm-rename-post_ttbr0_update_workaround.patch queue-4.14/arm64-mm-map-entry-trampoline-into-trampoline-and-kernel-page-tables.patch queue-4.14/arm-arm64-kvm-turn-kvm_psci_version-into-a-static-inline.patch queue-4.14/arm-arm64-kvm-implement-psci-1.0-support.patch queue-4.14/arm64-move-task_-definitions-to-asm-processor.h.patch queue-4.14/arm64-kconfig-reword-unmap_kernel_at_el0-kconfig-entry.patch queue-4.14/arm64-mm-move-asid-from-ttbr0-to-ttbr1.patch queue-4.14/arm64-mm-introduce-ttbr_asid_mask-for-getting-at-the-asid-in-the-ttbr.patch queue-4.14/arm64-kvm-add-smccc_arch_workaround_1-fast-handling.patch queue-4.14/arm64-take-into-account-id_aa64pfr0_el1.csv3.patch queue-4.14/arm64-cputype-add-missing-midr-values-for-cortex-a72-and-cortex-a75.patch queue-4.14/arm64-kvm-report-smccc_arch_workaround_1-bp-hardening-support.patch queue-4.14/arm64-barrier-add-csdb-macros-to-control-data-value-prediction.patch queue-4.14/arm-arm64-smccc-implement-smccc-v1.1-inline-primitive.patch queue-4.14/arm64-implement-branch-predictor-hardening-for-falkor.patch queue-4.14/arm64-kconfig-add-config_unmap_kernel_at_el0.patch queue-4.14/arm64-add-software-workaround-for-falkor-erratum-1041.patch queue-4.14/arm64-idmap-use-awx-flags-for-.idmap.text-.pushsection-directives.patch queue-4.14/arm64-run-enable-method-for-errata-work-arounds-on-late-cpus.patch queue-4.14/arm64-mm-temporarily-disable-arm64_sw_ttbr0_pan.patch queue-4.14/arm64-entry-add-exception-trampoline-page-for-exceptions-from-el0.patch queue-4.14/arm64-kvm-make-psci_version-a-fast-path.patch queue-4.14/arm64-cpufeature-__this_cpu_has_cap-shouldn-t-stop-early.patch queue-4.14/arm64-implement-array_index_mask_nospec.patch queue-4.14/arm64-kpti-add-enable-callback-to-remap-swapper-using-ng-mappings.patch queue-4.14/arm-arm64-kvm-consolidate-the-psci-include-files.patch queue-4.14/arm64-add-skeleton-to-harden-the-branch-predictor-against-aliasing-attacks.patch queue-4.14/arm64-define-cputype-macros-for-falkor-cpu.patch queue-4.14/arm64-cpu_errata-add-kryo-to-falkor-1003-errata.patch queue-4.14/arm-arm64-kvm-add-smccc-accessors-to-psci-code.patch queue-4.14/arm64-entry-add-fake-cpu-feature-for-unmapping-the-kernel-at-el0.patch queue-4.14/arm64-kvm-use-per-cpu-vector-when-bp-hardening-is-enabled.patch queue-4.14/arm64-cputype-add-midr-values-for-cavium-thunderx2-cpus.patch queue-4.14/arm64-kvm-increment-pc-after-handling-an-smc-trap.patch