6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
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From: Rick Edgecombe rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com
commit a9d9c33132d49329ada647e4514d210d15e31d81 upstream.
The x86 shadow stack support has its own set of registers. Those registers are XSAVE-managed, but they are "supervisor state components" which means that userspace can not touch them with XSAVE/XRSTOR. It also means that they are not accessible from the existing ptrace ABI for XSAVE state. Thus, there is a new ptrace get/set interface for it.
The regset code that ptrace uses provides an ->active() handler in addition to the get/set ones. For shadow stack this ->active() handler verifies that shadow stack is enabled via the ARCH_SHSTK_SHSTK bit in the thread struct. The ->active() handler is checked from some call sites of the regset get/set handlers, but not the ptrace ones. This was not understood when shadow stack support was put in place.
As a result, both the set/get handlers can be called with XFEATURE_CET_USER in its init state, which would cause get_xsave_addr() to return NULL and trigger a WARN_ON(). The ssp_set() handler luckily has an ssp_active() check to avoid surprising the kernel with shadow stack behavior when the kernel is not ready for it (ARCH_SHSTK_SHSTK==0). That check just happened to avoid the warning.
But the ->get() side wasn't so lucky. It can be called with shadow stacks disabled, triggering the warning in practice, as reported by Christina Schimpe:
WARNING: CPU: 5 PID: 1773 at arch/x86/kernel/fpu/regset.c:198 ssp_get+0x89/0xa0 [...] Call Trace: <TASK> ? show_regs+0x6e/0x80 ? ssp_get+0x89/0xa0 ? __warn+0x91/0x150 ? ssp_get+0x89/0xa0 ? report_bug+0x19d/0x1b0 ? handle_bug+0x46/0x80 ? exc_invalid_op+0x1d/0x80 ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1f/0x30 ? __pfx_ssp_get+0x10/0x10 ? ssp_get+0x89/0xa0 ? ssp_get+0x52/0xa0 __regset_get+0xad/0xf0 copy_regset_to_user+0x52/0xc0 ptrace_regset+0x119/0x140 ptrace_request+0x13c/0x850 ? wait_task_inactive+0x142/0x1d0 ? do_syscall_64+0x6d/0x90 arch_ptrace+0x102/0x300 [...]
Ensure that shadow stacks are active in a thread before looking them up in the XSAVE buffer. Since ARCH_SHSTK_SHSTK and user_ssp[SHSTK_EN] are set at the same time, the active check ensures that there will be something to find in the XSAVE buffer.
[ dhansen: changelog/subject tweaks ]
Fixes: 2fab02b25ae7 ("x86: Add PTRACE interface for shadow stack") Reported-by: Christina Schimpe christina.schimpe@intel.com Signed-off-by: Rick Edgecombe rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen dave.hansen@linux.intel.com Tested-by: Christina Schimpe christina.schimpe@intel.com Cc:stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20250107233056.235536-1-rick.p.edgecombe%40intel... Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org --- arch/x86/kernel/fpu/regset.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/regset.c b/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/regset.c index 6bc1eb2a21bd..887b0b8e21e3 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/regset.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/regset.c @@ -190,7 +190,8 @@ int ssp_get(struct task_struct *target, const struct user_regset *regset, struct fpu *fpu = &target->thread.fpu; struct cet_user_state *cetregs;
- if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_USER_SHSTK)) + if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_USER_SHSTK) || + !ssp_active(target, regset)) return -ENODEV;
sync_fpstate(fpu);