6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Li Zhijian lizhijian@fujitsu.com
[ Upstream commit 7f7b850689ac06a62befe26e1fd1806799e7f152 ]
It's observed that a crash occurs during hot-remove a memory device, in which user is accessing the hugetlb. See calltrace as following:
------------[ cut here ]------------ WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 14045 at arch/x86/mm/fault.c:1278 do_user_addr_fault+0x2a0/0x790 Modules linked in: kmem device_dax cxl_mem cxl_pmem cxl_port cxl_pci dax_hmem dax_pmem nd_pmem cxl_acpi nd_btt cxl_core crc32c_intel nvme virtiofs fuse nvme_core nfit libnvdimm dm_multipath scsi_dh_rdac scsi_dh_emc s mirror dm_region_hash dm_log dm_mod CPU: 1 PID: 14045 Comm: daxctl Not tainted 6.10.0-rc2-lizhijian+ #492 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.16.3-0-ga6ed6b701f0a-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:do_user_addr_fault+0x2a0/0x790 Code: 48 8b 00 a8 04 0f 84 b5 fe ff ff e9 1c ff ff ff 4c 89 e9 4c 89 e2 be 01 00 00 00 bf 02 00 00 00 e8 b5 ef 24 00 e9 42 fe ff ff <0f> 0b 48 83 c4 08 4c 89 ea 48 89 ee 4c 89 e7 5b 5d 41 5c 41 5d 41 RSP: 0000:ffffc90000a575f0 EFLAGS: 00010046 RAX: ffff88800c303600 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 0000000000001000 RSI: ffffffff82504162 RDI: ffffffff824b2c36 RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffffc90000a57658 R13: 0000000000001000 R14: ffff88800bc2e040 R15: 0000000000000000 FS: 00007f51cb57d880(0000) GS:ffff88807fd00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000000001000 CR3: 00000000072e2004 CR4: 00000000001706f0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: <TASK> ? __warn+0x8d/0x190 ? do_user_addr_fault+0x2a0/0x790 ? report_bug+0x1c3/0x1d0 ? handle_bug+0x3c/0x70 ? exc_invalid_op+0x14/0x70 ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x16/0x20 ? do_user_addr_fault+0x2a0/0x790 ? exc_page_fault+0x31/0x200 exc_page_fault+0x68/0x200 <...snip...> BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: 0000000000001000 #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page PGD 800000000ad92067 P4D 800000000ad92067 PUD 7677067 PMD 0 Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: 0000000000001000 #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page PGD 800000000ad92067 P4D 800000000ad92067 PUD 7677067 PMD 0 Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI CPU: 1 PID: 14045 Comm: daxctl Kdump: loaded Tainted: G W 6.10.0-rc2-lizhijian+ #492 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.16.3-0-ga6ed6b701f0a-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:dentry_name+0x1f4/0x440 <...snip...> ? dentry_name+0x2fa/0x440 vsnprintf+0x1f3/0x4f0 vprintk_store+0x23a/0x540 vprintk_emit+0x6d/0x330 _printk+0x58/0x80 dump_mapping+0x10b/0x1a0 ? __pfx_free_object_rcu+0x10/0x10 __dump_page+0x26b/0x3e0 ? vprintk_emit+0xe0/0x330 ? _printk+0x58/0x80 ? dump_page+0x17/0x50 dump_page+0x17/0x50 do_migrate_range+0x2f7/0x7f0 ? do_migrate_range+0x42/0x7f0 ? offline_pages+0x2f4/0x8c0 offline_pages+0x60a/0x8c0 memory_subsys_offline+0x9f/0x1c0 ? lockdep_hardirqs_on+0x77/0x100 ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x38/0x60 device_offline+0xe3/0x110 state_store+0x6e/0xc0 kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x143/0x200 vfs_write+0x39f/0x560 ksys_write+0x65/0xf0 do_syscall_64+0x62/0x130
Previously, some sanity check have been done in dump_mapping() before the print facility parsing '%pd' though, it's still possible to run into an invalid dentry.d_name.name.
Since dump_mapping() only needs to dump the filename only, retrieve it by itself in a safer way to prevent an unnecessary crash.
Note that either retrieving the filename with '%pd' or strncpy_from_kernel_nofault(), the filename could be unreliable.
Signed-off-by: Li Zhijian lizhijian@fujitsu.com Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240826055503.1522320-1-lizhijian@fujitsu.com Reviewed-by: Jan Kara jack@suse.cz Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner brauner@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org [Xiangyu: Bp to fix CVE: CVE-2024-49934, modified strscpy step due to 6.1/6.6 need pass the max len to strscpy] Signed-off-by: Xiangyu Chen xiangyu.chen@windriver.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- fs/inode.c | 10 +++++++--- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/inode.c b/fs/inode.c index 9cafde77e2b03..030e07b169c27 100644 --- a/fs/inode.c +++ b/fs/inode.c @@ -593,6 +593,7 @@ void dump_mapping(const struct address_space *mapping) struct hlist_node *dentry_first; struct dentry *dentry_ptr; struct dentry dentry; + char fname[64] = {}; unsigned long ino;
/* @@ -628,11 +629,14 @@ void dump_mapping(const struct address_space *mapping) return; }
+ if (strncpy_from_kernel_nofault(fname, dentry.d_name.name, 63) < 0) + strscpy(fname, "<invalid>", 63); /* - * if dentry is corrupted, the %pd handler may still crash, - * but it's unlikely that we reach here with a corrupt mapping + * Even if strncpy_from_kernel_nofault() succeeded, + * the fname could be unreliable */ - pr_warn("aops:%ps ino:%lx dentry name:"%pd"\n", a_ops, ino, &dentry); + pr_warn("aops:%ps ino:%lx dentry name(?):"%s"\n", + a_ops, ino, fname); }
void clear_inode(struct inode *inode)