6.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
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From: Florian Westphal fw@strlen.de
[ Upstream commit 2d72afb340657f03f7261e9243b44457a9228ac7 ]
A crash in conntrack was reported while trying to unlink the conntrack entry from the hash bucket list: [exception RIP: __nf_ct_delete_from_lists+172] [..] #7 [ff539b5a2b043aa0] nf_ct_delete at ffffffffc124d421 [nf_conntrack] #8 [ff539b5a2b043ad0] nf_ct_gc_expired at ffffffffc124d999 [nf_conntrack] #9 [ff539b5a2b043ae0] __nf_conntrack_find_get at ffffffffc124efbc [nf_conntrack] [..]
The nf_conn struct is marked as allocated from slab but appears to be in a partially initialised state:
ct hlist pointer is garbage; looks like the ct hash value (hence crash). ct->status is equal to IPS_CONFIRMED|IPS_DYING, which is expected ct->timeout is 30000 (=30s), which is unexpected.
Everything else looks like normal udp conntrack entry. If we ignore ct->status and pretend its 0, the entry matches those that are newly allocated but not yet inserted into the hash: - ct hlist pointers are overloaded and store/cache the raw tuple hash - ct->timeout matches the relative time expected for a new udp flow rather than the absolute 'jiffies' value.
If it were not for the presence of IPS_CONFIRMED, __nf_conntrack_find_get() would have skipped the entry.
Theory is that we did hit following race:
cpu x cpu y cpu z found entry E found entry E E is expired <preemption> nf_ct_delete() return E to rcu slab init_conntrack E is re-inited, ct->status set to 0 reply tuplehash hnnode.pprev stores hash value.
cpu y found E right before it was deleted on cpu x. E is now re-inited on cpu z. cpu y was preempted before checking for expiry and/or confirm bit.
->refcnt set to 1 E now owned by skb ->timeout set to 30000
If cpu y were to resume now, it would observe E as expired but would skip E due to missing CONFIRMED bit.
nf_conntrack_confirm gets called sets: ct->status |= CONFIRMED This is wrong: E is not yet added to hashtable.
cpu y resumes, it observes E as expired but CONFIRMED: <resumes> nf_ct_expired() -> yes (ct->timeout is 30s) confirmed bit set.
cpu y will try to delete E from the hashtable: nf_ct_delete() -> set DYING bit __nf_ct_delete_from_lists
Even this scenario doesn't guarantee a crash: cpu z still holds the table bucket lock(s) so y blocks:
wait for spinlock held by z
CONFIRMED is set but there is no guarantee ct will be added to hash: "chaintoolong" or "clash resolution" logic both skip the insert step. reply hnnode.pprev still stores the hash value.
unlocks spinlock return NF_DROP <unblocks, then crashes on hlist_nulls_del_rcu pprev>
In case CPU z does insert the entry into the hashtable, cpu y will unlink E again right away but no crash occurs.
Without 'cpu y' race, 'garbage' hlist is of no consequence: ct refcnt remains at 1, eventually skb will be free'd and E gets destroyed via: nf_conntrack_put -> nf_conntrack_destroy -> nf_ct_destroy.
To resolve this, move the IPS_CONFIRMED assignment after the table insertion but before the unlock.
Pablo points out that the confirm-bit-store could be reordered to happen before hlist add resp. the timeout fixup, so switch to set_bit and before_atomic memory barrier to prevent this.
It doesn't matter if other CPUs can observe a newly inserted entry right before the CONFIRMED bit was set:
Such event cannot be distinguished from above "E is the old incarnation" case: the entry will be skipped.
Also change nf_ct_should_gc() to first check the confirmed bit.
The gc sequence is: 1. Check if entry has expired, if not skip to next entry 2. Obtain a reference to the expired entry. 3. Call nf_ct_should_gc() to double-check step 1.
nf_ct_should_gc() is thus called only for entries that already failed an expiry check. After this patch, once the confirmed bit check passes ct->timeout has been altered to reflect the absolute 'best before' date instead of a relative time. Step 3 will therefore not remove the entry.
Without this change to nf_ct_should_gc() we could still get this sequence:
1. Check if entry has expired. 2. Obtain a reference. 3. Call nf_ct_should_gc() to double-check step 1: 4 - entry is still observed as expired 5 - meanwhile, ct->timeout is corrected to absolute value on other CPU and confirm bit gets set 6 - confirm bit is seen 7 - valid entry is removed again
First do check 6), then 4) so the gc expiry check always picks up either confirmed bit unset (entry gets skipped) or expiry re-check failure for re-inited conntrack objects.
This change cannot be backported to releases before 5.19. Without commit 8a75a2c17410 ("netfilter: conntrack: remove unconfirmed list") |= IPS_CONFIRMED line cannot be moved without further changes.
Cc: Razvan Cojocaru rzvncj@gmail.com Link: https://lore.kernel.org/netfilter-devel/20250627142758.25664-1-fw@strlen.de/ Link: https://lore.kernel.org/netfilter-devel/4239da15-83ff-4ca4-939d-faef283471bb... Fixes: 1397af5bfd7d ("netfilter: conntrack: remove the percpu dying list") Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal fw@strlen.de Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso pablo@netfilter.org Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- include/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack.h | 15 +++++++++++++-- net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_core.c | 26 ++++++++++++++++++++------ 2 files changed, 33 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack.h b/include/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack.h index 3f02a45773e81..ca26274196b99 100644 --- a/include/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack.h +++ b/include/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack.h @@ -306,8 +306,19 @@ static inline bool nf_ct_is_expired(const struct nf_conn *ct) /* use after obtaining a reference count */ static inline bool nf_ct_should_gc(const struct nf_conn *ct) { - return nf_ct_is_expired(ct) && nf_ct_is_confirmed(ct) && - !nf_ct_is_dying(ct); + if (!nf_ct_is_confirmed(ct)) + return false; + + /* load ct->timeout after is_confirmed() test. + * Pairs with __nf_conntrack_confirm() which: + * 1. Increases ct->timeout value + * 2. Inserts ct into rcu hlist + * 3. Sets the confirmed bit + * 4. Unlocks the hlist lock + */ + smp_acquire__after_ctrl_dep(); + + return nf_ct_is_expired(ct) && !nf_ct_is_dying(ct); }
#define NF_CT_DAY (86400 * HZ) diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_core.c b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_core.c index 7f8b245e287ae..e720505177607 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_core.c +++ b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_core.c @@ -1121,6 +1121,12 @@ static int nf_ct_resolve_clash_harder(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 repl_idx)
hlist_nulls_add_head_rcu(&loser_ct->tuplehash[IP_CT_DIR_REPLY].hnnode, &nf_conntrack_hash[repl_idx]); + /* confirmed bit must be set after hlist add, not before: + * loser_ct can still be visible to other cpu due to + * SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU. + */ + smp_mb__before_atomic(); + set_bit(IPS_CONFIRMED_BIT, &loser_ct->status);
NF_CT_STAT_INC(net, clash_resolve); return NF_ACCEPT; @@ -1257,8 +1263,6 @@ __nf_conntrack_confirm(struct sk_buff *skb) * user context, else we insert an already 'dead' hash, blocking * further use of that particular connection -JM. */ - ct->status |= IPS_CONFIRMED; - if (unlikely(nf_ct_is_dying(ct))) { NF_CT_STAT_INC(net, insert_failed); goto dying; @@ -1290,7 +1294,7 @@ __nf_conntrack_confirm(struct sk_buff *skb) } }
- /* Timer relative to confirmation time, not original + /* Timeout is relative to confirmation time, not original setting time, otherwise we'd get timer wrap in weird delay cases. */ ct->timeout += nfct_time_stamp; @@ -1298,11 +1302,21 @@ __nf_conntrack_confirm(struct sk_buff *skb) __nf_conntrack_insert_prepare(ct);
/* Since the lookup is lockless, hash insertion must be done after - * starting the timer and setting the CONFIRMED bit. The RCU barriers - * guarantee that no other CPU can find the conntrack before the above - * stores are visible. + * setting ct->timeout. The RCU barriers guarantee that no other CPU + * can find the conntrack before the above stores are visible. */ __nf_conntrack_hash_insert(ct, hash, reply_hash); + + /* IPS_CONFIRMED unset means 'ct not (yet) in hash', conntrack lookups + * skip entries that lack this bit. This happens when a CPU is looking + * at a stale entry that is being recycled due to SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU + * or when another CPU encounters this entry right after the insertion + * but before the set-confirm-bit below. This bit must not be set until + * after __nf_conntrack_hash_insert(). + */ + smp_mb__before_atomic(); + set_bit(IPS_CONFIRMED_BIT, &ct->status); + nf_conntrack_double_unlock(hash, reply_hash); local_bh_enable();