4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
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From: Florian Westphal fw@strlen.de
commit b71812168571fa55e44cdd0254471331b9c4c4c6 upstream.
We need to make sure the offsets are not out of range of the total size. Also check that they are in ascending order.
The WARN_ON triggered by syzkaller (it sets panic_on_warn) is changed to also bail out, no point in continuing parsing.
Briefly tested with simple ruleset of -A INPUT --limit 1/s' --log plus jump to custom chains using 32bit ebtables binary.
Reported-by: syzbot+845a53d13171abf8bf29@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal fw@strlen.de Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso pablo@netfilter.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org
--- net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c | 13 ++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c +++ b/net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c @@ -2031,7 +2031,9 @@ static int ebt_size_mwt(struct compat_eb if (match_kern) match_kern->match_size = ret;
- WARN_ON(type == EBT_COMPAT_TARGET && size_left); + if (WARN_ON(type == EBT_COMPAT_TARGET && size_left)) + return -EINVAL; + match32 = (struct compat_ebt_entry_mwt *) buf; }
@@ -2087,6 +2089,15 @@ static int size_entry_mwt(struct ebt_ent * * offsets are relative to beginning of struct ebt_entry (i.e., 0). */ + for (i = 0; i < 4 ; ++i) { + if (offsets[i] >= *total) + return -EINVAL; + if (i == 0) + continue; + if (offsets[i-1] > offsets[i]) + return -EINVAL; + } + for (i = 0, j = 1 ; j < 4 ; j++, i++) { struct compat_ebt_entry_mwt *match32; unsigned int size;