From: Waiman Long longman@redhat.com
commit 87ca4f9efbd7cc649ff43b87970888f2812945b8 upstream.
Since commit 07ec77a1d4e8 ("sched: Allow task CPU affinity to be restricted on asymmetric systems"), the setting and clearing of user_cpus_ptr are done under pi_lock for arm64 architecture. However, dup_user_cpus_ptr() accesses user_cpus_ptr without any lock protection. Since sched_setaffinity() can be invoked from another process, the process being modified may be undergoing fork() at the same time. When racing with the clearing of user_cpus_ptr in __set_cpus_allowed_ptr_locked(), it can lead to user-after-free and possibly double-free in arm64 kernel.
Commit 8f9ea86fdf99 ("sched: Always preserve the user requested cpumask") fixes this problem as user_cpus_ptr, once set, will never be cleared in a task's lifetime. However, this bug was re-introduced in commit 851a723e45d1 ("sched: Always clear user_cpus_ptr in do_set_cpus_allowed()") which allows the clearing of user_cpus_ptr in do_set_cpus_allowed(). This time, it will affect all arches.
Fix this bug by always clearing the user_cpus_ptr of the newly cloned/forked task before the copying process starts and check the user_cpus_ptr state of the source task under pi_lock.
Note to stable, this patch won't be applicable to stable releases. Just copy the new dup_user_cpus_ptr() function over.
Fixes: 07ec77a1d4e8 ("sched: Allow task CPU affinity to be restricted on asymmetric systems") Fixes: 851a723e45d1 ("sched: Always clear user_cpus_ptr in do_set_cpus_allowed()") Reported-by: David Wang 王标 wangbiao3@xiaomi.com Signed-off-by: Waiman Long longman@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar mingo@kernel.org Reviewed-by: Peter Zijlstra peterz@infradead.org Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221231041120.440785-2-longman@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org --- kernel/sched/core.c | 37 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---- 1 file changed, 33 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
--- a/kernel/sched/core.c +++ b/kernel/sched/core.c @@ -2501,14 +2501,43 @@ void do_set_cpus_allowed(struct task_str int dup_user_cpus_ptr(struct task_struct *dst, struct task_struct *src, int node) { - if (!src->user_cpus_ptr) + cpumask_t *user_mask; + unsigned long flags; + + /* + * Always clear dst->user_cpus_ptr first as their user_cpus_ptr's + * may differ by now due to racing. + */ + dst->user_cpus_ptr = NULL; + + /* + * This check is racy and losing the race is a valid situation. + * It is not worth the extra overhead of taking the pi_lock on + * every fork/clone. + */ + if (data_race(!src->user_cpus_ptr)) return 0;
- dst->user_cpus_ptr = kmalloc_node(cpumask_size(), GFP_KERNEL, node); - if (!dst->user_cpus_ptr) + user_mask = kmalloc_node(cpumask_size(), GFP_KERNEL, node); + if (!user_mask) return -ENOMEM;
- cpumask_copy(dst->user_cpus_ptr, src->user_cpus_ptr); + /* + * Use pi_lock to protect content of user_cpus_ptr + * + * Though unlikely, user_cpus_ptr can be reset to NULL by a concurrent + * do_set_cpus_allowed(). + */ + raw_spin_lock_irqsave(&src->pi_lock, flags); + if (src->user_cpus_ptr) { + swap(dst->user_cpus_ptr, user_mask); + cpumask_copy(dst->user_cpus_ptr, src->user_cpus_ptr); + } + raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore(&src->pi_lock, flags); + + if (unlikely(user_mask)) + kfree(user_mask); + return 0; }