From: Alejandro Jimenez alejandro.j.jimenez@oracle.com
commit c1f7fec1eb6a2c86d01bc22afce772c743451d88 upstream.
The bits set in x86_spec_ctrl_mask are used to calculate the guest's value of SPEC_CTRL that is written to the MSR before VMENTRY, and control which mitigations the guest can enable. In the case of SSBD, unless the host has enabled SSBD always on mode (by passing "spec_store_bypass_disable=on" in the kernel parameters), the SSBD bit is not set in the mask and the guest can not properly enable the SSBD always on mitigation mode.
This has been confirmed by running the SSBD PoC on a guest using the SSBD always on mitigation mode (booted with kernel parameter "spec_store_bypass_disable=on"), and verifying that the guest is vulnerable unless the host is also using SSBD always on mode. In addition, the guest OS incorrectly reports the SSB vulnerability as mitigated.
Always set the SSBD bit in x86_spec_ctrl_mask when the host CPU supports it, allowing the guest to use SSBD whether or not the host has chosen to enable the mitigation in any of its modes.
Fixes: be6fcb5478e9 ("x86/bugs: Rework spec_ctrl base and mask logic") Signed-off-by: Alejandro Jimenez alejandro.j.jimenez@oracle.com Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner tglx@linutronix.de Reviewed-by: Liam Merwick liam.merwick@oracle.com Reviewed-by: Mark Kanda mark.kanda@oracle.com Reviewed-by: Paolo Bonzini pbonzini@redhat.com Cc: bp@alien8.de Cc: rkrcmar@redhat.com Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1560187210-11054-1-git-send-email-alejandro.j.jime... Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org
--- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 11 ++++++++++- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c @@ -829,6 +829,16 @@ static enum ssb_mitigation __init __ssb_ }
/* + * If SSBD is controlled by the SPEC_CTRL MSR, then set the proper + * bit in the mask to allow guests to use the mitigation even in the + * case where the host does not enable it. + */ + if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL_SSBD) || + static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AMD_SSBD)) { + x86_spec_ctrl_mask |= SPEC_CTRL_SSBD; + } + + /* * We have three CPU feature flags that are in play here: * - X86_BUG_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS - CPU is susceptible. * - X86_FEATURE_SSBD - CPU is able to turn off speculative store bypass @@ -845,7 +855,6 @@ static enum ssb_mitigation __init __ssb_ x86_amd_ssb_disable(); } else { x86_spec_ctrl_base |= SPEC_CTRL_SSBD; - x86_spec_ctrl_mask |= SPEC_CTRL_SSBD; wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, x86_spec_ctrl_base); } }