From: Roberto Sassu roberto.sassu@huawei.com
commit 9eea2904292c2d8fa98df141d3bf7c41ec9dc1b5 upstream.
evm_inode_init_security() requires an HMAC key to calculate the HMAC on initial xattrs provided by LSMs. However, it checks generically whether a key has been loaded, including also public keys, which is not correct as public keys are not suitable to calculate the HMAC.
Originally, support for signature verification was introduced to verify a possibly immutable initial ram disk, when no new files are created, and to switch to HMAC for the root filesystem. By that time, an HMAC key should have been loaded and usable to calculate HMACs for new files.
More recently support for requiring an HMAC key was removed from the kernel, so that signature verification can be used alone. Since this is a legitimate use case, evm_inode_init_security() should not return an error when no HMAC key has been loaded.
This patch fixes this problem by replacing the evm_key_loaded() check with a check of the EVM_INIT_HMAC flag in evm_initialized.
Fixes: 26ddabfe96b ("evm: enable EVM when X509 certificate is loaded") Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu roberto.sassu@huawei.com Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.5.x Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar zohar@linux.ibm.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org
--- security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c | 5 +++-- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
--- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c +++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c @@ -520,7 +520,7 @@ void evm_inode_post_setattr(struct dentr }
/* - * evm_inode_init_security - initializes security.evm + * evm_inode_init_security - initializes security.evm HMAC value */ int evm_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, const struct xattr *lsm_xattr, @@ -529,7 +529,8 @@ int evm_inode_init_security(struct inode struct evm_xattr *xattr_data; int rc;
- if (!evm_key_loaded() || !evm_protected_xattr(lsm_xattr->name)) + if (!(evm_initialized & EVM_INIT_HMAC) || + !evm_protected_xattr(lsm_xattr->name)) return 0;
xattr_data = kzalloc(sizeof(*xattr_data), GFP_NOFS);