4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
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From: Darren Kenny darren.kenny@oracle.com
(cherry picked from commit af189c95a371b59f493dbe0f50c0a09724868881)
Fixes: 117cc7a908c83 ("x86/retpoline: Fill return stack buffer on vmexit") Signed-off-by: Darren Kenny darren.kenny@oracle.com Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner tglx@linutronix.de Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk konrad.wilk@oracle.com Cc: Tom Lendacky thomas.lendacky@amd.com Cc: Andi Kleen ak@linux.intel.com Cc: Borislav Petkov bp@alien8.de Cc: Masami Hiramatsu mhiramat@kernel.org Cc: Arjan van de Ven arjan@linux.intel.com Cc: David Woodhouse dwmw@amazon.co.uk Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180202191220.blvgkgutojecxr3b@starbug-vm.ie.orac... Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse dwmw@amazon.co.uk Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org --- arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h @@ -150,7 +150,7 @@ extern char __indirect_thunk_end[]; * On VMEXIT we must ensure that no RSB predictions learned in the guest * can be followed in the host, by overwriting the RSB completely. Both * retpoline and IBRS mitigations for Spectre v2 need this; only on future - * CPUs with IBRS_ATT *might* it be avoided. + * CPUs with IBRS_ALL *might* it be avoided. */ static inline void vmexit_fill_RSB(void) {