From: Pawan Gupta pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com
commit ba6e31af2be96c4d0536f2152ed6f7b6c11bca47 upstream.
RSB fill sequence does not have any protection for miss-prediction of conditional branch at the end of the sequence. CPU can speculatively execute code immediately after the sequence, while RSB filling hasn't completed yet.
#define __FILL_RETURN_BUFFER(reg, nr, sp) \ mov $(nr/2), reg; \ 771: \ ANNOTATE_INTRA_FUNCTION_CALL; \ call 772f; \ 773: /* speculation trap */ \ UNWIND_HINT_EMPTY; \ pause; \ lfence; \ jmp 773b; \ 772: \ ANNOTATE_INTRA_FUNCTION_CALL; \ call 774f; \ 775: /* speculation trap */ \ UNWIND_HINT_EMPTY; \ pause; \ lfence; \ jmp 775b; \ 774: \ add $(BITS_PER_LONG/8) * 2, sp; \ dec reg; \ jnz 771b; <----- CPU can miss-predict here.
Before RSB is filled, RETs that come in program order after this macro can be executed speculatively, making them vulnerable to RSB-based attacks.
Mitigate it by adding an LFENCE after the conditional branch to prevent speculation while RSB is being filled.
Suggested-by: Andrew Cooper andrew.cooper3@citrix.com Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov bp@suse.de Signed-off-by: Daniel Sneddon daniel.sneddon@linux.intel.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org --- arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h @@ -60,7 +60,9 @@ 774: \ add $(BITS_PER_LONG/8) * 2, sp; \ dec reg; \ - jnz 771b; + jnz 771b; \ + /* barrier for jnz misprediction */ \ + lfence;
#ifdef __ASSEMBLY__