5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
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From: Oliver Neukum oneukum@suse.com
commit 8d2b1a1ec9f559d30b724877da4ce592edc41fdc upstream.
A broken device may give an extreme offset like 0xFFF0 and a reasonable length for a fragment. In the sanity check as formulated now, this will create an integer overflow, defeating the sanity check. Both offset and offset + len need to be checked in such a manner that no overflow can occur. And those quantities should be unsigned.
Signed-off-by: Oliver Neukum oneukum@suse.com Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org Signed-off-by: David S. Miller davem@davemloft.net Signed-off-by: Bruno VERNAY bruno.vernay@se.com Signed-off-by: Hugo SIMELIERE hsimeliere.opensource@witekio.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org --- drivers/net/usb/cdc_ncm.c | 8 ++++---- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
--- a/drivers/net/usb/cdc_ncm.c +++ b/drivers/net/usb/cdc_ncm.c @@ -1707,10 +1707,10 @@ int cdc_ncm_rx_fixup(struct usbnet *dev, { struct sk_buff *skb; struct cdc_ncm_ctx *ctx = (struct cdc_ncm_ctx *)dev->data[0]; - int len; + unsigned int len; int nframes; int x; - int offset; + unsigned int offset; union { struct usb_cdc_ncm_ndp16 *ndp16; struct usb_cdc_ncm_ndp32 *ndp32; @@ -1782,8 +1782,8 @@ next_ndp: break; }
- /* sanity checking */ - if (((offset + len) > skb_in->len) || + /* sanity checking - watch out for integer wrap*/ + if ((offset > skb_in->len) || (len > skb_in->len - offset) || (len > ctx->rx_max) || (len < ETH_HLEN)) { netif_dbg(dev, rx_err, dev->net, "invalid frame detected (ignored) offset[%u]=%u, length=%u, skb=%p\n",