3.16.72-rc1 review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
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From: "Gustavo A. R. Silva" gustavo@embeddedor.com
commit 2b1d9c8f87235f593826b9cf46ec10247741fff9 upstream.
info->stream is indirectly controlled by user-space, hence leading to a potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability.
This issue was detected with the help of Smatch:
sound/core/rawmidi.c:604 __snd_rawmidi_info_select() warn: potential spectre issue 'rmidi->streams' [r] (local cap)
Fix this by sanitizing info->stream before using it to index rmidi->streams.
Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be completed with a dependent load/store [1].
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20180423164740.GY17484@dhcp22.suse.cz/
Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva gustavo@embeddedor.com Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai tiwai@suse.de [bwh: Backported to 3.16: adjust context] Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings ben@decadent.org.uk --- sound/core/rawmidi.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
--- a/sound/core/rawmidi.c +++ b/sound/core/rawmidi.c @@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ #include <linux/mutex.h> #include <linux/module.h> #include <linux/delay.h> +#include <linux/nospec.h> #include <sound/rawmidi.h> #include <sound/info.h> #include <sound/control.h> @@ -601,6 +602,7 @@ static int __snd_rawmidi_info_select(str return -ENXIO; if (info->stream < 0 || info->stream > 1) return -EINVAL; + info->stream = array_index_nospec(info->stream, 2); pstr = &rmidi->streams[info->stream]; if (pstr->substream_count == 0) return -ENOENT;