From: Michal Suchanek msuchanek@suse.de
This reverts commit 0b6cf6b97b7ef1fa3c7fefab0cac897a1c4a3400 to avoid following crash:
BUG: Kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0x00000012 Faulting instruction address: 0xc000000000897908 Oops: Kernel access of bad area, sig: 11 [#1] LE PAGE_SIZE=64K MMU=Hash SMP NR_CPUS=2048 NUMA pSeries Modules linked in: CPU: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 5.2.0-rc6-2.gf99f70b-default #1 openSUSE Tumbleweed (unreleased) NIP: c000000000897908 LR: c000000000897860 CTR: 0000000000000009 REGS: c000000004eb7550 TRAP: 0380 Not tainted (5.2.0-rc6-2.gf99f70b-default) MSR: 800000010280b033 <SF,VEC,VSX,EE,FP,ME,IR,DR,RI,LE,TM[E]> CR: 88000224 XER: 20040001 CFAR: c000000000c4e964 IRQMASK: 0 GPR00: c000000000897860 c000000004eb77e0 c0000000015ced00 0000000000000000 GPR04: 0000000000000003 0000000000000001 0000000022000000 000000000000000e GPR08: c0000005b46b0000 0000000000010000 0000000000000022 0000000010325476 GPR12: 0000000048000222 c0000000019a0000 c000000000010b70 0000000000000000 GPR16: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 GPR20: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 GPR24: c000000000eded00 c0000000014ecb60 c000000000ccedf8 c0000005b5c9d000 GPR28: 000000000000000a 0000000000000012 c000000000f01180 c00c0000016d1ac0 NIP [c000000000897908] tpm1_pcr_extend+0x118/0x1d0 LR [c000000000897860] tpm1_pcr_extend+0x70/0x1d0 Call Trace: [c000000004eb77e0] [c000000000897860] tpm1_pcr_extend+0x70/0x1d0 (unreliable) [c000000004eb7890] [c0000000008964e4] tpm_pcr_extend+0xe4/0x170 [c000000004eb78d0] [c000000000667bac] ima_add_template_entry+0x1ac/0x350 [c000000004eb79b0] [c00000000066ad04] ima_store_template+0xc4/0x150 [c000000004eb7a30] [c000000001021a4c] ima_add_boot_aggregate+0xec/0x17c [c000000004eb7b30] [c000000001021b70] ima_init+0x94/0xbc [c000000004eb7b90] [c000000001021ce0] init_ima+0x44/0xec [c000000004eb7c10] [c000000000010694] do_one_initcall+0x64/0x2b0 [c000000004eb7ce0] [c000000000fd445c] kernel_init_freeable+0x2e4/0x3cc [c000000004eb7db0] [c000000000010b94] kernel_init+0x2c/0x148 [c000000004eb7e20] [c00000000000bc54] ret_from_kernel_thread+0x5c/0x68 Instruction dump: 90c80002 81410070 714a0001 e9010078 39480002 7d40542c 79470020 4082003c 394a0014 7c0a4840 41810090 5546c03e <e87d0000> e89d0008 80bd0010 7d283a14 ---[ end trace 786ebab24be797a3 ]---
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Roberto Sassu roberto.sassu@huawei.com Fixes: 0b6cf6b97b7e ("tpm: pass an array of tpm_extend_digest structures to tpm_pcr_extend()") Signed-off-by: Michal Suchanek msuchanek@suse.de Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com --- v2: Took Michal's patch and added the mandatory tags and fixed a trivial checkpatch.pl error in the commit message. drivers/char/tpm/tpm-interface.c | 30 +++++++++++++-------- drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h | 2 +- drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c | 10 ++++--- include/linux/tpm.h | 5 ++-- security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 1 - security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c | 4 --- security/integrity/ima/ima_queue.c | 27 +------------------ security/keys/trusted.c | 42 ++++++------------------------ 8 files changed, 38 insertions(+), 83 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-interface.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-interface.c index 1b4f95c13e00..dda742184ce2 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-interface.c +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-interface.c @@ -303,34 +303,42 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_pcr_read); * tpm_pcr_extend - extend a PCR value in SHA1 bank. * @chip: a &struct tpm_chip instance, %NULL for the default chip * @pcr_idx: the PCR to be retrieved - * @digests: array of tpm_digest structures used to extend PCRs + * @hash: the hash value used to extend the PCR value * - * Note: callers must pass a digest for every allocated PCR bank, in the same - * order of the banks in chip->allocated_banks. + * Note: with TPM 2.0 extends also those banks for which no digest was + * specified in order to prevent malicious use of those PCR banks. * * Return: same as with tpm_transmit_cmd() */ -int tpm_pcr_extend(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 pcr_idx, - struct tpm_digest *digests) +int tpm_pcr_extend(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 pcr_idx, const u8 *hash) { int rc; + struct tpm_digest *digest_list; int i;
chip = tpm_find_get_ops(chip); if (!chip) return -ENODEV;
- for (i = 0; i < chip->nr_allocated_banks; i++) - if (digests[i].alg_id != chip->allocated_banks[i].alg_id) - return -EINVAL; - if (chip->flags & TPM_CHIP_FLAG_TPM2) { - rc = tpm2_pcr_extend(chip, pcr_idx, digests); + digest_list = kcalloc(chip->nr_allocated_banks, + sizeof(*digest_list), GFP_KERNEL); + if (!digest_list) + return -ENOMEM; + + for (i = 0; i < chip->nr_allocated_banks; i++) { + digest_list[i].alg_id = chip->allocated_banks[i].alg_id; + memcpy(digest_list[i].digest, hash, TPM_DIGEST_SIZE); + } + + rc = tpm2_pcr_extend(chip, pcr_idx, chip->nr_allocated_banks, + digest_list); + kfree(digest_list); tpm_put_ops(chip); return rc; }
- rc = tpm1_pcr_extend(chip, pcr_idx, digests[0].digest, + rc = tpm1_pcr_extend(chip, pcr_idx, hash, "attempting extend a PCR value"); tpm_put_ops(chip); return rc; diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h index e503ffc3aa39..3cf8ed290305 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h @@ -436,7 +436,7 @@ static inline u32 tpm2_rc_value(u32 rc) int tpm2_get_timeouts(struct tpm_chip *chip); int tpm2_pcr_read(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 pcr_idx, struct tpm_digest *digest, u16 *digest_size_ptr); -int tpm2_pcr_extend(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 pcr_idx, +int tpm2_pcr_extend(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 pcr_idx, u32 count, struct tpm_digest *digests); int tpm2_get_random(struct tpm_chip *chip, u8 *dest, size_t max); void tpm2_flush_context(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 handle); diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c index d103545e4055..b700817ebd63 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c @@ -242,11 +242,12 @@ struct tpm2_null_auth_area { * * @chip: TPM chip to use. * @pcr_idx: index of the PCR. + * @count: number of digests passed. * @digests: list of pcr banks and corresponding digest values to extend. * * Return: Same as with tpm_transmit_cmd. */ -int tpm2_pcr_extend(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 pcr_idx, +int tpm2_pcr_extend(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 pcr_idx, u32 count, struct tpm_digest *digests) { struct tpm_buf buf; @@ -254,6 +255,9 @@ int tpm2_pcr_extend(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 pcr_idx, int rc; int i;
+ if (count > chip->nr_allocated_banks) + return -EINVAL; + rc = tpm_buf_init(&buf, TPM2_ST_SESSIONS, TPM2_CC_PCR_EXTEND); if (rc) return rc; @@ -268,9 +272,9 @@ int tpm2_pcr_extend(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 pcr_idx, tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, sizeof(struct tpm2_null_auth_area)); tpm_buf_append(&buf, (const unsigned char *)&auth_area, sizeof(auth_area)); - tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, chip->nr_allocated_banks); + tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, count);
- for (i = 0; i < chip->nr_allocated_banks; i++) { + for (i = 0; i < count; i++) { tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, digests[i].alg_id); tpm_buf_append(&buf, (const unsigned char *)&digests[i].digest, chip->allocated_banks[i].digest_size); diff --git a/include/linux/tpm.h b/include/linux/tpm.h index 53c0ea9ec9df..d4516164dc9f 100644 --- a/include/linux/tpm.h +++ b/include/linux/tpm.h @@ -166,8 +166,7 @@ struct tpm_chip { extern int tpm_is_tpm2(struct tpm_chip *chip); extern int tpm_pcr_read(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 pcr_idx, struct tpm_digest *digest); -extern int tpm_pcr_extend(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 pcr_idx, - struct tpm_digest *digests); +extern int tpm_pcr_extend(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 pcr_idx, const u8 *hash); extern int tpm_send(struct tpm_chip *chip, void *cmd, size_t buflen); extern int tpm_get_random(struct tpm_chip *chip, u8 *data, size_t max); extern int tpm_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip, @@ -190,7 +189,7 @@ static inline int tpm_pcr_read(struct tpm_chip *chip, int pcr_idx, }
static inline int tpm_pcr_extend(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 pcr_idx, - struct tpm_digest *digests) + const u8 *hash) { return -ENODEV; } diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h index ca10917b5f89..bf7178ef1619 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h @@ -149,7 +149,6 @@ int ima_measurements_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v); unsigned long ima_get_binary_runtime_size(void); int ima_init_template(void); void ima_init_template_list(void); -int __init ima_init_digests(void);
/* * used to protect h_table and sha_table diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c index 1e47c1026471..cf7a2f58077e 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c @@ -119,12 +119,8 @@ int __init ima_init(void) if (rc != 0) return rc;
- /* It can be called before ima_init_digests(), it does not use TPM. */ ima_load_kexec_buffer();
- rc = ima_init_digests(); - if (rc != 0) - return rc; rc = ima_add_boot_aggregate(); /* boot aggregate must be first entry */ if (rc != 0) return rc; diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_queue.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_queue.c index 1ce8b1701566..03afa67c2e04 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_queue.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_queue.c @@ -23,9 +23,6 @@
#define AUDIT_CAUSE_LEN_MAX 32
-/* pre-allocated array of tpm_digest structures to extend a PCR */ -static struct tpm_digest *digests; - LIST_HEAD(ima_measurements); /* list of all measurements */ #ifdef CONFIG_IMA_KEXEC static unsigned long binary_runtime_size; @@ -139,15 +136,11 @@ unsigned long ima_get_binary_runtime_size(void) static int ima_pcr_extend(const u8 *hash, int pcr) { int result = 0; - int i;
if (!ima_tpm_chip) return result;
- for (i = 0; i < ima_tpm_chip->nr_allocated_banks; i++) - memcpy(digests[i].digest, hash, TPM_DIGEST_SIZE); - - result = tpm_pcr_extend(ima_tpm_chip, pcr, digests); + result = tpm_pcr_extend(ima_tpm_chip, pcr, hash); if (result != 0) pr_err("Error Communicating to TPM chip, result: %d\n", result); return result; @@ -214,21 +207,3 @@ int ima_restore_measurement_entry(struct ima_template_entry *entry) mutex_unlock(&ima_extend_list_mutex); return result; } - -int __init ima_init_digests(void) -{ - int i; - - if (!ima_tpm_chip) - return 0; - - digests = kcalloc(ima_tpm_chip->nr_allocated_banks, sizeof(*digests), - GFP_NOFS); - if (!digests) - return -ENOMEM; - - for (i = 0; i < ima_tpm_chip->nr_allocated_banks; i++) - digests[i].alg_id = ima_tpm_chip->allocated_banks[i].alg_id; - - return 0; -} diff --git a/security/keys/trusted.c b/security/keys/trusted.c index 9a94672e7adc..287553039f0f 100644 --- a/security/keys/trusted.c +++ b/security/keys/trusted.c @@ -32,7 +32,6 @@ static const char hmac_alg[] = "hmac(sha1)"; static const char hash_alg[] = "sha1"; static struct tpm_chip *chip; -static struct tpm_digest *digests;
struct sdesc { struct shash_desc shash; @@ -386,10 +385,15 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(trusted_tpm_send); */ static int pcrlock(const int pcrnum) { + unsigned char hash[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE]; + int ret; + if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) return -EPERM; - - return tpm_pcr_extend(chip, pcrnum, digests) ? -EINVAL : 0; + ret = tpm_get_random(chip, hash, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE); + if (ret != SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE) + return ret; + return tpm_pcr_extend(chip, pcrnum, hash) ? -EINVAL : 0; }
/* @@ -1226,29 +1230,6 @@ static int __init trusted_shash_alloc(void) return ret; }
-static int __init init_digests(void) -{ - u8 digest[TPM_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE]; - int ret; - int i; - - ret = tpm_get_random(chip, digest, TPM_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE); - if (ret < 0) - return ret; - if (ret < TPM_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE) - return -EFAULT; - - digests = kcalloc(chip->nr_allocated_banks, sizeof(*digests), - GFP_KERNEL); - if (!digests) - return -ENOMEM; - - for (i = 0; i < chip->nr_allocated_banks; i++) - memcpy(digests[i].digest, digest, TPM_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE); - - return 0; -} - static int __init init_trusted(void) { int ret; @@ -1259,21 +1240,15 @@ static int __init init_trusted(void) chip = tpm_default_chip(); if (!chip) return 0; - - ret = init_digests(); - if (ret < 0) - goto err_put; ret = trusted_shash_alloc(); if (ret < 0) - goto err_free; + goto err_put; ret = register_key_type(&key_type_trusted); if (ret < 0) goto err_release; return 0; err_release: trusted_shash_release(); -err_free: - kfree(digests); err_put: put_device(&chip->dev); return ret; @@ -1283,7 +1258,6 @@ static void __exit cleanup_trusted(void) { if (chip) { put_device(&chip->dev); - kfree(digests); trusted_shash_release(); unregister_key_type(&key_type_trusted); }