[ commit 9d7eceede769f90b66cfa06ad5b357140d5141ed upstream ]
For unknown scalars of mixed signed bounds, meaning their smin_value is negative and their smax_value is positive, we need to reject arithmetic with pointer to map value. For unprivileged the goal is to mask every map pointer arithmetic and this cannot reliably be done when it is unknown at verification time whether the scalar value is negative or positive. Given this is a corner case, the likelihood of breaking should be very small.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann daniel@iogearbox.net Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov ast@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov ast@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann daniel@iogearbox.net --- kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 8 +++++++- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c index 8480004255f1..ca48c6046d45 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c @@ -2712,8 +2712,8 @@ static int adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, smin_ptr = ptr_reg->smin_value, smax_ptr = ptr_reg->smax_value; u64 umin_val = off_reg->umin_value, umax_val = off_reg->umax_value, umin_ptr = ptr_reg->umin_value, umax_ptr = ptr_reg->umax_value; + u32 dst = insn->dst_reg, src = insn->src_reg; u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insn->code); - u32 dst = insn->dst_reg;
dst_reg = ®s[dst];
@@ -2749,6 +2749,12 @@ static int adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, dst); return -EACCES; } + if (ptr_reg->type == PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE && + !env->allow_ptr_leaks && !known && (smin_val < 0) != (smax_val < 0)) { + verbose(env, "R%d has unknown scalar with mixed signed bounds, pointer arithmetic with it prohibited for !root\n", + off_reg == dst_reg ? dst : src); + return -EACCES; + }
/* In case of 'scalar += pointer', dst_reg inherits pointer type and id. * The id may be overwritten later if we create a new variable offset.