From: Zhang Xiaoxu zhangxiaoxu5@huawei.com
commit 513dc792d6060d5ef572e43852683097a8420f56 upstream.
When syzkaller tests, there is a UAF: BUG: KASan: use after free in vgacon_invert_region+0x9d/0x110 at addr ffff880000100000 Read of size 2 by task syz-executor.1/16489 page:ffffea0000004000 count:0 mapcount:-127 mapping: (null) index:0x0 page flags: 0xfffff00000000() page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected CPU: 1 PID: 16489 Comm: syz-executor.1 Not tainted Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.9.3-0-ge2fc41e-prebuilt.qemu-project.org 04/01/2014 Call Trace: [<ffffffffb119f309>] dump_stack+0x1e/0x20 [<ffffffffb04af957>] kasan_report+0x577/0x950 [<ffffffffb04ae652>] __asan_load2+0x62/0x80 [<ffffffffb090f26d>] vgacon_invert_region+0x9d/0x110 [<ffffffffb0a39d95>] invert_screen+0xe5/0x470 [<ffffffffb0a21dcb>] set_selection+0x44b/0x12f0 [<ffffffffb0a3bfae>] tioclinux+0xee/0x490 [<ffffffffb0a1d114>] vt_ioctl+0xff4/0x2670 [<ffffffffb0a0089a>] tty_ioctl+0x46a/0x1a10 [<ffffffffb052db3d>] do_vfs_ioctl+0x5bd/0xc40 [<ffffffffb052e2f2>] SyS_ioctl+0x132/0x170 [<ffffffffb11c9b1b>] system_call_fastpath+0x22/0x27 Memory state around the buggy address: ffff8800000fff00: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ffff8800000fff80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 >ffff880000100000: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff
It can be reproduce in the linux mainline by the program: #include <stdio.h> #include <stdlib.h> #include <unistd.h> #include <fcntl.h> #include <sys/types.h> #include <sys/stat.h> #include <sys/ioctl.h> #include <linux/vt.h>
struct tiocl_selection { unsigned short xs; /* X start */ unsigned short ys; /* Y start */ unsigned short xe; /* X end */ unsigned short ye; /* Y end */ unsigned short sel_mode; /* selection mode */ };
#define TIOCL_SETSEL 2 struct tiocl { unsigned char type; unsigned char pad; struct tiocl_selection sel; };
int main() { int fd = 0; const char *dev = "/dev/char/4:1";
struct vt_consize v = {0}; struct tiocl tioc = {0};
fd = open(dev, O_RDWR, 0);
v.v_rows = 3346; ioctl(fd, VT_RESIZEX, &v);
tioc.type = TIOCL_SETSEL; ioctl(fd, TIOCLINUX, &tioc);
return 0; }
When resize the screen, update the 'vc->vc_size_row' to the new_row_size, but when 'set_origin' in 'vgacon_set_origin', vgacon use 'vga_vram_base' for 'vc_origin' and 'vc_visible_origin', not 'vc_screenbuf'. It maybe smaller than 'vc_screenbuf'. When TIOCLINUX, use the new_row_size to calc the offset, it maybe larger than the vga_vram_size in vgacon driver, then bad access. Also, if set an larger screenbuf firstly, then set an more larger screenbuf, when copy old_origin to new_origin, a bad access may happen.
So, If the screen size larger than vga_vram, resize screen should be failed. This alse fix CVE-2020-8649 and CVE-2020-8647.
Linus pointed out that overflow checking seems absent. We're saved by the existing bounds checks in vc_do_resize() with rather strict limits:
if (cols > VC_RESIZE_MAXCOL || lines > VC_RESIZE_MAXROW) return -EINVAL;
Fixes: 0aec4867dca14 ("[PATCH] SVGATextMode fix") Reference: CVE-2020-8647 and CVE-2020-8649 Reported-by: Hulk Robot hulkci@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Zhang Xiaoxu zhangxiaoxu5@huawei.com [danvet: augment commit message to point out overflow safety] Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Daniel Vetter daniel.vetter@ffwll.ch Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20200304022429.37738-1-zhangxi... Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org
--- drivers/video/console/vgacon.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
--- a/drivers/video/console/vgacon.c +++ b/drivers/video/console/vgacon.c @@ -1323,6 +1323,9 @@ static int vgacon_font_get(struct vc_dat static int vgacon_resize(struct vc_data *c, unsigned int width, unsigned int height, unsigned int user) { + if ((width << 1) * height > vga_vram_size) + return -EINVAL; + if (width % 2 || width > screen_info.orig_video_cols || height > (screen_info.orig_video_lines * vga_default_font_height)/ c->vc_font.height)