From: Willy Tarreau w@1wt.eu
[ Upstream commit 4c2c8f03a5ab7cb04ec64724d7d176d00bcc91e5 ]
Moshe Kol, Amit Klein, and Yossi Gilad reported being able to accurately identify a client by forcing it to emit only 40 times more connections than there are entries in the table_perturb[] table. The previous two improvements consisting in resalting the secret every 10s and adding randomness to each port selection only slightly improved the situation, and the current value of 2^8 was too small as it's not very difficult to make a client emit 10k connections in less than 10 seconds.
Thus we're increasing the perturb table from 2^8 to 2^16 so that the same precision now requires 2.6M connections, which is more difficult in this time frame and harder to hide as a background activity. The impact is that the table now uses 256 kB instead of 1 kB, which could mostly affect devices making frequent outgoing connections. However such components usually target a small set of destinations (load balancers, database clients, perf assessment tools), and in practice only a few entries will be visited, like before.
A live test at 1 million connections per second showed no performance difference from the previous value.
Reported-by: Moshe Kol moshe.kol@mail.huji.ac.il Reported-by: Yossi Gilad yossi.gilad@mail.huji.ac.il Reported-by: Amit Klein aksecurity@gmail.com Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet edumazet@google.com Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau w@1wt.eu Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski kuba@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- net/ipv4/inet_hashtables.c | 9 +++++---- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/ipv4/inet_hashtables.c b/net/ipv4/inet_hashtables.c index 48ca07853068..cc5f66328b47 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/inet_hashtables.c +++ b/net/ipv4/inet_hashtables.c @@ -726,11 +726,12 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(inet_unhash); * Note that we use 32bit integers (vs RFC 'short integers') * because 2^16 is not a multiple of num_ephemeral and this * property might be used by clever attacker. - * RFC claims using TABLE_LENGTH=10 buckets gives an improvement, - * we use 256 instead to really give more isolation and - * privacy, this only consumes 1 KB of kernel memory. + * RFC claims using TABLE_LENGTH=10 buckets gives an improvement, though + * attacks were since demonstrated, thus we use 65536 instead to really + * give more isolation and privacy, at the expense of 256kB of kernel + * memory. */ -#define INET_TABLE_PERTURB_SHIFT 8 +#define INET_TABLE_PERTURB_SHIFT 16 #define INET_TABLE_PERTURB_SIZE (1 << INET_TABLE_PERTURB_SHIFT) static u32 *table_perturb;