From: Magnus Karlsson magnus.karlsson@intel.com
commit 99e3a236dd43d06c65af0a2ef9cb44306aef6e02 upstream.
Add a check that the headroom cannot be larger than the available space in the chunk. In the current code, a malicious user can set the headroom to a value larger than the chunk size minus the fixed XDP headroom. That way packets with a length larger than the supported size in the umem could get accepted and result in an out-of-bounds write.
Fixes: c0c77d8fb787 ("xsk: add user memory registration support sockopt") Reported-by: Bui Quang Minh minhquangbui99@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Magnus Karlsson magnus.karlsson@intel.com Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann daniel@iogearbox.net Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=207225 Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/1586849715-23490-1-git-send-email-magnus.karlsso... Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org
--- net/xdp/xdp_umem.c | 5 ++--- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
--- a/net/xdp/xdp_umem.c +++ b/net/xdp/xdp_umem.c @@ -343,7 +343,7 @@ static int xdp_umem_reg(struct xdp_umem u32 chunk_size = mr->chunk_size, headroom = mr->headroom; unsigned int chunks, chunks_per_page; u64 addr = mr->addr, size = mr->len; - int size_chk, err; + int err;
if (chunk_size < XDP_UMEM_MIN_CHUNK_SIZE || chunk_size > PAGE_SIZE) { /* Strictly speaking we could support this, if: @@ -382,8 +382,7 @@ static int xdp_umem_reg(struct xdp_umem return -EINVAL; }
- size_chk = chunk_size - headroom - XDP_PACKET_HEADROOM; - if (size_chk < 0) + if (headroom >= chunk_size - XDP_PACKET_HEADROOM) return -EINVAL;
umem->address = (unsigned long)addr;