4.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
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From: Gustavo A. R. Silva gustavo@embeddedor.com
commit a3671a4f973ee9d9621d60166cc3b037c397d604 upstream.
hdr.cmd can be indirectly controlled by user-space, hence leading to a potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability.
This issue was detected with the help of Smatch:
drivers/infiniband/core/ucma.c:1686 ucma_write() warn: potential spectre issue 'ucma_cmd_table' [r] (local cap)
Fix this by sanitizing hdr.cmd before using it to index ucm_cmd_table.
Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be completed with a dependent load/store [1].
[1] https://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=152449131114778&w=2
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva gustavo@embeddedor.com Signed-off-by: Doug Ledford dledford@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org
--- drivers/infiniband/core/ucma.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
--- a/drivers/infiniband/core/ucma.c +++ b/drivers/infiniband/core/ucma.c @@ -44,6 +44,8 @@ #include <linux/module.h> #include <linux/nsproxy.h>
+#include <linux/nospec.h> + #include <rdma/rdma_user_cm.h> #include <rdma/ib_marshall.h> #include <rdma/rdma_cm.h> @@ -1676,6 +1678,7 @@ static ssize_t ucma_write(struct file *f
if (hdr.cmd >= ARRAY_SIZE(ucma_cmd_table)) return -EINVAL; + hdr.cmd = array_index_nospec(hdr.cmd, ARRAY_SIZE(ucma_cmd_table));
if (hdr.in + sizeof(hdr) > len) return -EINVAL;