The patch below does not apply to the 4.14-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to stable@vger.kernel.org.
thanks,
greg k-h
------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------
From e504e74cc3a2c092b05577ce3e8e013fae7d94e6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Josh Poimboeuf jpoimboe@redhat.com Date: Fri, 5 Feb 2021 08:24:02 -0600 Subject: [PATCH] x86/unwind/orc: Disable KASAN checking in the ORC unwinder, part 2
KASAN reserves "redzone" areas between stack frames in order to detect stack overruns. A read or write to such an area triggers a KASAN "stack-out-of-bounds" BUG.
Normally, the ORC unwinder stays in-bounds and doesn't access the redzone. But sometimes it can't find ORC metadata for a given instruction. This can happen for code which is missing ORC metadata, or for generated code. In such cases, the unwinder attempts to fall back to frame pointers, as a best-effort type thing.
This fallback often works, but when it doesn't, the unwinder can get confused and go off into the weeds into the KASAN redzone, triggering the aforementioned KASAN BUG.
But in this case, the unwinder's confusion is actually harmless and working as designed. It already has checks in place to prevent off-stack accesses, but those checks get short-circuited by the KASAN BUG. And a BUG is a lot more disruptive than a harmless unwinder warning.
Disable the KASAN checks by using READ_ONCE_NOCHECK() for all stack accesses. This finishes the job started by commit 881125bfe65b ("x86/unwind: Disable KASAN checking in the ORC unwinder"), which only partially fixed the issue.
Fixes: ee9f8fce9964 ("x86/unwind: Add the ORC unwinder") Reported-by: Ivan Babrou ivan@cloudflare.com Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf jpoimboe@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) peterz@infradead.org Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov bp@suse.de Reviewed-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) rostedt@goodmis.org Tested-by: Ivan Babrou ivan@cloudflare.com Cc: stable@kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/9583327904ebbbeda399eca9c56d6c7085ac20fe.161253464...
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/unwind_orc.c b/arch/x86/kernel/unwind_orc.c index 2a1d47f47eee..1bcc14c870ab 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/unwind_orc.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/unwind_orc.c @@ -367,8 +367,8 @@ static bool deref_stack_regs(struct unwind_state *state, unsigned long addr, if (!stack_access_ok(state, addr, sizeof(struct pt_regs))) return false;
- *ip = regs->ip; - *sp = regs->sp; + *ip = READ_ONCE_NOCHECK(regs->ip); + *sp = READ_ONCE_NOCHECK(regs->sp); return true; }
@@ -380,8 +380,8 @@ static bool deref_stack_iret_regs(struct unwind_state *state, unsigned long addr if (!stack_access_ok(state, addr, IRET_FRAME_SIZE)) return false;
- *ip = regs->ip; - *sp = regs->sp; + *ip = READ_ONCE_NOCHECK(regs->ip); + *sp = READ_ONCE_NOCHECK(regs->sp); return true; }
@@ -402,12 +402,12 @@ static bool get_reg(struct unwind_state *state, unsigned int reg_off, return false;
if (state->full_regs) { - *val = ((unsigned long *)state->regs)[reg]; + *val = READ_ONCE_NOCHECK(((unsigned long *)state->regs)[reg]); return true; }
if (state->prev_regs) { - *val = ((unsigned long *)state->prev_regs)[reg]; + *val = READ_ONCE_NOCHECK(((unsigned long *)state->prev_regs)[reg]); return true; }