4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
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From: Dan Williams dan.j.williams@intel.com
(cherry picked from commit edfbae53dab8348fca778531be9f4855d2ca0360)
Reflect the presence of get_user(), __get_user(), and 'syscall' protections in sysfs. The expectation is that new and better tooling will allow the kernel to grow more usages of array_index_nospec(), for now, only claim mitigation for __user pointer de-references.
Reported-by: Jiri Slaby jslaby@suse.cz Signed-off-by: Dan Williams dan.j.williams@intel.com Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner tglx@linutronix.de Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com Cc: gregkh@linuxfoundation.org Cc: torvalds@linux-foundation.org Cc: alan@linux.intel.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/151727420158.33451.11658324346540434635.stgit@dwil... Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse dwmw@amazon.co.uk Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org --- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c @@ -296,7 +296,7 @@ ssize_t cpu_show_spectre_v1(struct devic { if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V1)) return sprintf(buf, "Not affected\n"); - return sprintf(buf, "Vulnerable\n"); + return sprintf(buf, "Mitigation: __user pointer sanitization\n"); }
ssize_t cpu_show_spectre_v2(struct device *dev,