From: Pawan Gupta pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com
commit 51802186158c74a0304f51ab963e7c2b3a2b046f upstream
Processor MMIO Stale Data is a class of vulnerabilities that may expose data after an MMIO operation. For more details please refer to Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/processor_mmio_stale_data.rst
Add the Processor MMIO Stale Data bug enumeration. A microcode update adds new bits to the MSR IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES, define them.
Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov bp@suse.de Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner tglx@linutronix.de [cascardo: adapted family names to the ones in v4.19] Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo cascardo@canonical.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org --- arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 1 arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h | 19 ++++++++++++++++ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 43 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-- 3 files changed, 61 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h @@ -394,5 +394,6 @@ #define X86_BUG_TAA X86_BUG(22) /* CPU is affected by TSX Async Abort(TAA) */ #define X86_BUG_ITLB_MULTIHIT X86_BUG(23) /* CPU may incur MCE during certain page attribute changes */ #define X86_BUG_SRBDS X86_BUG(24) /* CPU may leak RNG bits if not mitigated */ +#define X86_BUG_MMIO_STALE_DATA X86_BUG(25) /* CPU is affected by Processor MMIO Stale Data vulnerabilities */
#endif /* _ASM_X86_CPUFEATURES_H */ --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h @@ -96,6 +96,25 @@ * Not susceptible to * TSX Async Abort (TAA) vulnerabilities. */ +#define ARCH_CAP_SBDR_SSDP_NO BIT(13) /* + * Not susceptible to SBDR and SSDP + * variants of Processor MMIO stale data + * vulnerabilities. + */ +#define ARCH_CAP_FBSDP_NO BIT(14) /* + * Not susceptible to FBSDP variant of + * Processor MMIO stale data + * vulnerabilities. + */ +#define ARCH_CAP_PSDP_NO BIT(15) /* + * Not susceptible to PSDP variant of + * Processor MMIO stale data + * vulnerabilities. + */ +#define ARCH_CAP_FB_CLEAR BIT(17) /* + * VERW clears CPU fill buffer + * even on MDS_NO CPUs. + */
#define MSR_IA32_FLUSH_CMD 0x0000010b #define L1D_FLUSH BIT(0) /* --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c @@ -1019,18 +1019,39 @@ static const __initconst struct x86_cpu_ X86_FEATURE_ANY, issues)
#define SRBDS BIT(0) +/* CPU is affected by X86_BUG_MMIO_STALE_DATA */ +#define MMIO BIT(1)
static const struct x86_cpu_id cpu_vuln_blacklist[] __initconst = { VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(IVYBRIDGE, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS), VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(HASWELL_CORE, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS), VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(HASWELL_ULT, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS), VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(HASWELL_GT3E, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(HASWELL_X, BIT(2) | BIT(4), MMIO), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(BROADWELL_XEON_D,X86_STEPPINGS(0x3, 0x5), MMIO), VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(BROADWELL_GT3E, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(BROADWELL_X, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO), VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(BROADWELL_CORE, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(SKYLAKE_MOBILE, X86_STEPPINGS(0x3, 0x3), SRBDS | MMIO), VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(SKYLAKE_MOBILE, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(SKYLAKE_X, BIT(3) | BIT(4) | BIT(6) | + BIT(7) | BIT(0xB), MMIO), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(SKYLAKE_DESKTOP, X86_STEPPINGS(0x3, 0x3), SRBDS | MMIO), VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(SKYLAKE_DESKTOP, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS), - VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(KABYLAKE_MOBILE, X86_STEPPINGS(0x0, 0xC), SRBDS), - VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(KABYLAKE_DESKTOP,X86_STEPPINGS(0x0, 0xD), SRBDS), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(KABYLAKE_MOBILE, X86_STEPPINGS(0x9, 0xC), SRBDS | MMIO), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(KABYLAKE_MOBILE, X86_STEPPINGS(0x0, 0x8), SRBDS), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(KABYLAKE_DESKTOP,X86_STEPPINGS(0x9, 0xD), SRBDS | MMIO), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(KABYLAKE_DESKTOP,X86_STEPPINGS(0x0, 0x8), SRBDS), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ICELAKE_MOBILE, X86_STEPPINGS(0x5, 0x5), MMIO), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ICELAKE_XEON_D, X86_STEPPINGS(0x1, 0x1), MMIO), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ICELAKE_X, X86_STEPPINGS(0x4, 0x6), MMIO), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(COMETLAKE, BIT(2) | BIT(3) | BIT(5), MMIO), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(COMETLAKE_L, X86_STEPPINGS(0x0, 0x1), MMIO), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(LAKEFIELD, X86_STEPPINGS(0x1, 0x1), MMIO), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ROCKETLAKE, X86_STEPPINGS(0x1, 0x1), MMIO), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ATOM_TREMONT, X86_STEPPINGS(0x1, 0x1), MMIO), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ATOM_TREMONT_X, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ATOM_TREMONT_L, X86_STEPPINGS(0x0, 0x0), MMIO), {} };
@@ -1051,6 +1072,13 @@ u64 x86_read_arch_cap_msr(void) return ia32_cap; }
+static bool arch_cap_mmio_immune(u64 ia32_cap) +{ + return (ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_FBSDP_NO && + ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_PSDP_NO && + ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_SBDR_SSDP_NO); +} + static void __init cpu_set_bug_bits(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) { u64 ia32_cap = x86_read_arch_cap_msr(); @@ -1108,6 +1136,17 @@ static void __init cpu_set_bug_bits(stru cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_blacklist, SRBDS)) setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SRBDS);
+ /* + * Processor MMIO Stale Data bug enumeration + * + * Affected CPU list is generally enough to enumerate the vulnerability, + * but for virtualization case check for ARCH_CAP MSR bits also, VMM may + * not want the guest to enumerate the bug. + */ + if (cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_blacklist, MMIO) && + !arch_cap_mmio_immune(ia32_cap)) + setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_MMIO_STALE_DATA); + if (cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_MELTDOWN)) return;