Re: FAILED: patch "[PATCH] s390/archrandom: simplify back to earlier design and" failed to apply to 5.4-stable tree

On 2022-07-04 09:37, gregkh@linuxfoundation.org wrote:

The patch below does not apply to the 5.4-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to stable@vger.kernel.org.

thanks,

greg k-h

------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------

From e4f74400308cb8abde5fdc9cad609c2aba32110c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" Jason@zx2c4.com Date: Sat, 11 Jun 2022 00:20:23 +0200 Subject: [PATCH] s390/archrandom: simplify back to earlier design and initialize earlier

s390x appears to present two RNG interfaces:

• a "TRNG" that gathers entropy using some hardware function; and
• a "DRBG" that takes in a seed and expands it.

Previously, the TRNG was wired up to arch_get_random_{long,int}(), but it was observed that this was being called really frequently, resulting in high overhead. So it was changed to be wired up to arch_get_random_ seed_{long,int}(), which was a reasonable decision. Later on, the DRBG was then wired up to arch_get_random_{long,int}(), with a complicated buffer filling thread, to control overhead and rate.

Fortunately, none of the performance issues matter much now. The RNG always attempts to use arch_get_random_seed_{long,int}() first, which means a complicated implementation of arch_get_random_{long,int}() isn't really valuable or useful to have around. And it's only used when reseeding, which means it won't hit the high throughput complications that were faced before.

So this commit returns to an earlier design of just calling the TRNG in arch_get_random_seed_{long,int}(), and returning false in arch_get_ random_{long,int}().

Part of what makes the simplification possible is that the RNG now seeds itself using the TRNG at bootup. But this only works if the TRNG is detected early in boot, before random_init() is called. So this commit also causes that check to happen in setup_arch().

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Harald Freudenberger freude@linux.ibm.com Cc: Ingo Franzki ifranzki@linux.ibm.com Cc: Juergen Christ jchrist@linux.ibm.com Cc: Heiko Carstens hca@linux.ibm.com Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld Jason@zx2c4.com Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220610222023.378448-1-Jason@zx2c4.com Reviewed-by: Harald Freudenberger freude@linux.ibm.com Acked-by: Heiko Carstens hca@linux.ibm.com Signed-off-by: Alexander Gordeev agordeev@linux.ibm.com

diff --git a/arch/s390/crypto/arch_random.c b/arch/s390/crypto/arch_random.c index 56007c763902..1f2d40993c4d 100644 --- a/arch/s390/crypto/arch_random.c +++ b/arch/s390/crypto/arch_random.c @@ -4,232 +4,15 @@

• Copyright IBM Corp. 2017, 2020
• Author(s): Harald Freudenberger

• • The s390_arch_random_generate() function may be called from

random.c

• • in interrupt context. So this implementation does the best to be

very

• • fast. There is a buffer of random data which is asynchronously

checked

• • and filled by a workqueue thread.
• • If there are enough bytes in the buffer the

s390_arch_random_generate()

• • just delivers these bytes. Otherwise false is returned until the
• • worker thread refills the buffer.
• • The worker fills the rng buffer by pulling fresh entropy from the
• • high quality (but slow) true hardware random generator. This

entropy

• • is then spread over the buffer with an pseudo random generator

PRNG.

• • As the arch_get_random_seed_long() fetches 8 bytes and the calling
• • function add_interrupt_randomness() counts this as 1 bit entropy

the

• • distribution needs to make sure there is in fact 1 bit entropy

contained

• • in 8 bytes of the buffer. The current values pull 32 byte entropy
• • and scatter this into a 2048 byte buffer. So 8 byte in the buffer
• • will contain 1 bit of entropy.
• • The worker thread is rescheduled based on the charge level of the
• • buffer but at least with 500 ms delay to avoid too much CPU

consumption.

• • So the max. amount of rng data delivered via arch_get_random_seed

is

• • limited to 4k bytes per second.
  */

#include <linux/kernel.h> #include <linux/atomic.h> #include <linux/random.h> -#include <linux/slab.h> #include <linux/static_key.h> -#include <linux/workqueue.h> -#include <linux/moduleparam.h> #include <asm/cpacf.h>

DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(s390_arch_random_available);

atomic64_t s390_arch_random_counter = ATOMIC64_INIT(0); EXPORT_SYMBOL(s390_arch_random_counter);

-#define ARCH_REFILL_TICKS (HZ/2) -#define ARCH_PRNG_SEED_SIZE 32 -#define ARCH_RNG_BUF_SIZE 2048

-static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(arch_rng_lock); -static u8 *arch_rng_buf; -static unsigned int arch_rng_buf_idx;

-static void arch_rng_refill_buffer(struct work_struct *); -static DECLARE_DELAYED_WORK(arch_rng_work, arch_rng_refill_buffer);

-bool s390_arch_random_generate(u8 *buf, unsigned int nbytes) -{

• /* max hunk is ARCH_RNG_BUF_SIZE */
• if (nbytes > ARCH_RNG_BUF_SIZE)

• return false;
  

• /* lock rng buffer */
• if (!spin_trylock(&arch_rng_lock))

• return false;
  

• /* try to resolve the requested amount of bytes from the buffer */
• arch_rng_buf_idx -= nbytes;
• if (arch_rng_buf_idx < ARCH_RNG_BUF_SIZE) {

• memcpy(buf, arch_rng_buf + arch_rng_buf_idx, nbytes);
  

• atomic64_add(nbytes, &s390_arch_random_counter);
  

• spin_unlock(&arch_rng_lock);
  

• return true;
  

• }
• /* not enough bytes in rng buffer, refill is done asynchronously */
• spin_unlock(&arch_rng_lock);
• return false;

-} -EXPORT_SYMBOL(s390_arch_random_generate);

-static void arch_rng_refill_buffer(struct work_struct *unused) -{

• unsigned int delay = ARCH_REFILL_TICKS;
• spin_lock(&arch_rng_lock);
• if (arch_rng_buf_idx > ARCH_RNG_BUF_SIZE) {

• /* buffer is exhausted and needs refill */
  

• u8 seed[ARCH_PRNG_SEED_SIZE];
  

• u8 prng_wa[240];
  

• /* fetch ARCH_PRNG_SEED_SIZE bytes of entropy */
  

• cpacf_trng(NULL, 0, seed, sizeof(seed));
  

• /* blow this entropy up to ARCH_RNG_BUF_SIZE with PRNG */
  

• memset(prng_wa, 0, sizeof(prng_wa));
  

• cpacf_prno(CPACF_PRNO_SHA512_DRNG_SEED,
  

• 	   &prng_wa, NULL, 0, seed, sizeof(seed));
  

• cpacf_prno(CPACF_PRNO_SHA512_DRNG_GEN,
  

• 	   &prng_wa, arch_rng_buf, ARCH_RNG_BUF_SIZE, NULL, 0);
  

• arch_rng_buf_idx = ARCH_RNG_BUF_SIZE;
  

• }
• delay += (ARCH_REFILL_TICKS * arch_rng_buf_idx) / ARCH_RNG_BUF_SIZE;
• spin_unlock(&arch_rng_lock);
• /* kick next check */
• queue_delayed_work(system_long_wq, &arch_rng_work, delay);

-}

-/*

• • Here follows the implementation of s390_arch_get_random_long().
• • The random longs to be pulled by arch_get_random_long() are
• • prepared in an 4K buffer which is filled from the NIST 800-90
• • compliant s390 drbg. By default the random long buffer is refilled
• • 256 times before the drbg itself needs a reseed. The reseed of the
• • drbg is done with 32 bytes fetched from the high quality (but slow)
• • trng which is assumed to deliver 100% entropy. So the 32 * 8 = 256
• • bits of entropy are spread over 256 * 4KB = 1MB serving 131072
• • arch_get_random_long() invocations before reseeded.
• • How often the 4K random long buffer is refilled with the drbg
• • before the drbg is reseeded can be adjusted. There is a module
• • parameter 's390_arch_rnd_long_drbg_reseed' accessible via
• • /sys/module/arch_random/parameters/rndlong_drbg_reseed
• • or as kernel command line parameter
• • arch_random.rndlong_drbg_reseed=<value>
• • This parameter tells how often the drbg fills the 4K buffer before
• • it is re-seeded by fresh entropy from the trng.
• • A value of 16 results in reseeding the drbg at every 16 * 4 KB = 64
• • KB with 32 bytes of fresh entropy pulled from the trng. So a value
• • of 16 would result in 256 bits entropy per 64 KB.
• • A value of 256 results in 1MB of drbg output before a reseed of the
• • drbg is done. So this would spread the 256 bits of entropy among

1MB.

• • Setting this parameter to 0 forces the reseed to take place every
• • time the 4K buffer is depleted, so the entropy rises to 256 bits
• • entropy per 4K or 0.5 bit entropy per arch_get_random_long(). With
• • setting this parameter to negative values all this effort is
• • disabled, arch_get_random long() returns false and thus indicating
• • that the arch_get_random_long() feature is disabled at all.
• */

-static unsigned long rndlong_buf[512]; -static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(rndlong_lock); -static int rndlong_buf_index;

-static int rndlong_drbg_reseed = 256; -module_param_named(rndlong_drbg_reseed, rndlong_drbg_reseed, int, 0600); -MODULE_PARM_DESC(rndlong_drbg_reseed, "s390 arch_get_random_long() drbg reseed");

-static inline void refill_rndlong_buf(void) -{

• static u8 prng_ws[240];
• static int drbg_counter;
• if (--drbg_counter < 0) {

• /* need to re-seed the drbg */
  

• u8 seed[32];
  

• /* fetch seed from trng */
  

• cpacf_trng(NULL, 0, seed, sizeof(seed));
  

• /* seed drbg */
  

• memset(prng_ws, 0, sizeof(prng_ws));
  

• cpacf_prno(CPACF_PRNO_SHA512_DRNG_SEED,
  

• 	   &prng_ws, NULL, 0, seed, sizeof(seed));
  

• /* re-init counter for drbg */
  

• drbg_counter = rndlong_drbg_reseed;
  

• }
• /* fill the arch_get_random_long buffer from drbg */
• cpacf_prno(CPACF_PRNO_SHA512_DRNG_GEN, &prng_ws,

•    (u8 *) rndlong_buf, sizeof(rndlong_buf),
  

•    NULL, 0);
  

-}

-bool s390_arch_get_random_long(unsigned long *v) -{

• bool rc = false;
• unsigned long flags;
• /* arch_get_random_long() disabled ? */
• if (rndlong_drbg_reseed < 0)

• return false;
  

• /* try to lock the random long lock */
• if (!spin_trylock_irqsave(&rndlong_lock, flags))

• return false;
  

• if (--rndlong_buf_index >= 0) {

• /* deliver next long value from the buffer */
  

• *v = rndlong_buf[rndlong_buf_index];
  

• rc = true;
  

• goto out;
  

• }
• /* buffer is depleted and needs refill */
• if (in_interrupt()) {

• /* delay refill in interrupt context to next caller */
  

• rndlong_buf_index = 0;
  

• goto out;
  

• }
• /* refill random long buffer */
• refill_rndlong_buf();
• rndlong_buf_index = ARRAY_SIZE(rndlong_buf);
• /* and provide one random long */
• *v = rndlong_buf[--rndlong_buf_index];
• rc = true;

-out:

• spin_unlock_irqrestore(&rndlong_lock, flags);
• return rc;

-} -EXPORT_SYMBOL(s390_arch_get_random_long);

-static int __init s390_arch_random_init(void) -{

• /* all the needed PRNO subfunctions available ? */
• if (cpacf_query_func(CPACF_PRNO, CPACF_PRNO_TRNG) &&

•    cpacf_query_func(CPACF_PRNO, CPACF_PRNO_SHA512_DRNG_GEN)) {
  

• /* alloc arch random working buffer */
  

• arch_rng_buf = kmalloc(ARCH_RNG_BUF_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
  

• if (!arch_rng_buf)
  

• 	return -ENOMEM;
  

• /* kick worker queue job to fill the random buffer */
  

• queue_delayed_work(system_long_wq,
  

• 		   &arch_rng_work, ARCH_REFILL_TICKS);
  

• /* enable arch random to the outside world */
  

• static_branch_enable(&s390_arch_random_available);
  

• }
• return 0;

-} -arch_initcall(s390_arch_random_init); diff --git a/arch/s390/include/asm/archrandom.h b/arch/s390/include/asm/archrandom.h index 5dc712fde3c7..2c6e1c6ecbe7 100644 --- a/arch/s390/include/asm/archrandom.h +++ b/arch/s390/include/asm/archrandom.h @@ -15,17 +15,13 @@

#include <linux/static_key.h> #include <linux/atomic.h> +#include <asm/cpacf.h>

DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(s390_arch_random_available); extern atomic64_t s390_arch_random_counter;

-bool s390_arch_get_random_long(unsigned long *v); -bool s390_arch_random_generate(u8 *buf, unsigned int nbytes);

static inline bool __must_check arch_get_random_long(unsigned long *v) {

• if (static_branch_likely(&s390_arch_random_available))

• return s390_arch_get_random_long(v);
  

  return false;

}

@@ -37,7 +33,9 @@ static inline bool __must_check arch_get_random_int(unsigned int *v) static inline bool __must_check arch_get_random_seed_long(unsigned long *v) { if (static_branch_likely(&s390_arch_random_available)) {

• return s390_arch_random_generate((u8 *)v, sizeof(*v));
  

• cpacf_trng(NULL, 0, (u8 *)v, sizeof(*v));
  

• atomic64_add(sizeof(*v), &s390_arch_random_counter);
  

• return true;
  

  } return false;

} @@ -45,7 +43,9 @@ static inline bool __must_check arch_get_random_seed_long(unsigned long *v) static inline bool __must_check arch_get_random_seed_int(unsigned int *v) { if (static_branch_likely(&s390_arch_random_available)) {

• return s390_arch_random_generate((u8 *)v, sizeof(*v));
  

• cpacf_trng(NULL, 0, (u8 *)v, sizeof(*v));
  

• atomic64_add(sizeof(*v), &s390_arch_random_counter);
  

• return true;
  

  } return false;

} diff --git a/arch/s390/kernel/setup.c b/arch/s390/kernel/setup.c index 8d91eccc0963..0a37f5de2863 100644 --- a/arch/s390/kernel/setup.c +++ b/arch/s390/kernel/setup.c @@ -875,6 +875,11 @@ static void __init setup_randomness(void) if (stsi(vmms, 3, 2, 2) == 0 && vmms->count) add_device_randomness(&vmms->vm, sizeof(vmms->vm[0]) * vmms->count); memblock_free(vmms, PAGE_SIZE);

+#ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_RANDOM

• if (cpacf_query_func(CPACF_PRNO, CPACF_PRNO_TRNG))

• static_branch_enable(&s390_arch_random_available);
  

+#endif }

/*

Fine with me. Skip this patch for kernels <= 5.10. Thanks, Harald Freudenberger