4.14-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
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commit c571fe24d243bfe7017f0e67fe800b3cc2a1d1f7 upstream.
Will be used for decrypting the server challenge which is only preceded by ceph_x_encrypt_header.
Drop struct_v check to allow for extending ceph_x_encrypt_header in the future.
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov idryomov@gmail.com Reviewed-by: Sage Weil sage@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- net/ceph/auth_x.c | 33 ++++++++++++++++++++++++--------- 1 file changed, 24 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/ceph/auth_x.c b/net/ceph/auth_x.c index 2f4a1baf5f52..9cac05239346 100644 --- a/net/ceph/auth_x.c +++ b/net/ceph/auth_x.c @@ -70,25 +70,40 @@ static int ceph_x_encrypt(struct ceph_crypto_key *secret, void *buf, return sizeof(u32) + ciphertext_len; }
+static int __ceph_x_decrypt(struct ceph_crypto_key *secret, void *p, + int ciphertext_len) +{ + struct ceph_x_encrypt_header *hdr = p; + int plaintext_len; + int ret; + + ret = ceph_crypt(secret, false, p, ciphertext_len, ciphertext_len, + &plaintext_len); + if (ret) + return ret; + + if (le64_to_cpu(hdr->magic) != CEPHX_ENC_MAGIC) { + pr_err("%s bad magic\n", __func__); + return -EINVAL; + } + + return plaintext_len - sizeof(*hdr); +} + static int ceph_x_decrypt(struct ceph_crypto_key *secret, void **p, void *end) { - struct ceph_x_encrypt_header *hdr = *p + sizeof(u32); - int ciphertext_len, plaintext_len; + int ciphertext_len; int ret;
ceph_decode_32_safe(p, end, ciphertext_len, e_inval); ceph_decode_need(p, end, ciphertext_len, e_inval);
- ret = ceph_crypt(secret, false, *p, end - *p, ciphertext_len, - &plaintext_len); - if (ret) + ret = __ceph_x_decrypt(secret, *p, ciphertext_len); + if (ret < 0) return ret;
- if (hdr->struct_v != 1 || le64_to_cpu(hdr->magic) != CEPHX_ENC_MAGIC) - return -EPERM; - *p += ciphertext_len; - return plaintext_len - sizeof(struct ceph_x_encrypt_header); + return ret;
e_inval: return -EINVAL;