On Wed, Nov 14, 2018 at 10:55 PM Eric Biggers ebiggers@kernel.org wrote:
From: Eric Biggers ebiggers@google.com
When a UHID_CREATE command is written to the uhid char device, a copy_from_user() is done from a user pointer embedded in the command. When the address limit is KERNEL_DS, e.g. as is the case during sys_sendfile(), this can read from kernel memory. Alternatively, information can be leaked from a setuid binary that is tricked to write to the file descriptor. Therefore, forbid UHID_CREATE in these cases.
No other commands in uhid_char_write() are affected by this bug and UHID_CREATE is marked as "obsolete", so apply the restriction to UHID_CREATE only rather than to uhid_char_write() entirely.
Thanks to Dmitry Vyukov for adding uhid definitions to syzkaller and to Jann Horn for commit 9da3f2b740544 ("x86/fault: BUG() when uaccess helpers fault on kernel addresses"), allowing this bug to be found.
Reported-by: syzbot+72473edc9bf4eb1c6556@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Fixes: d365c6cfd337 ("HID: uhid: add UHID_CREATE and UHID_DESTROY events") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v3.6+ Cc: Jann Horn jannh@google.com Cc: Andy Lutomirski luto@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers ebiggers@google.com
Reviewed-by: Jann Horn jannh@google.com
drivers/hid/uhid.c | 12 ++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+)
diff --git a/drivers/hid/uhid.c b/drivers/hid/uhid.c index 3c55073136064..051639c09f728 100644 --- a/drivers/hid/uhid.c +++ b/drivers/hid/uhid.c @@ -12,6 +12,7 @@
#include <linux/atomic.h> #include <linux/compat.h> +#include <linux/cred.h> #include <linux/device.h> #include <linux/fs.h> #include <linux/hid.h> @@ -722,6 +723,17 @@ static ssize_t uhid_char_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buffer,
switch (uhid->input_buf.type) { case UHID_CREATE:
/** 'struct uhid_create_req' contains a __user pointer which is* copied from, so it's unsafe to allow this with elevated* privileges (e.g. from a setuid binary) or via kernel_write().*/if (file->f_cred != current_cred() || uaccess_kernel()) {pr_err_once("UHID_CREATE from different security context by process %d (%s), this is not allowed.\n",task_tgid_vnr(current), current->comm);ret = -EACCES;goto unlock;} ret = uhid_dev_create(uhid, &uhid->input_buf); break; case UHID_CREATE2:-- 2.19.1.930.g4563a0d9d0-goog