A kernel daemon should not rely on the current thread, which is unknown and might be malicious. Before this security fix, ksmbd_override_fsids() didn't correctly override FS UID/GID which means that arbitrary user space threads could trick the kernel to impersonate arbitrary users or groups for file system access checks, leading to file system access bypass.
This was found while investigating truncate support for Landlock: https://lore.kernel.org/r/CAKYAXd8fpMJ7guizOjHgxEyyjoUwPsx3jLOPZP=wPYcbhkVXq...
Fixes: e2f34481b24d ("cifsd: add server-side procedures for SMB3") Cc: Hyunchul Lee hyc.lee@gmail.com Cc: Namjae Jeon linkinjeon@kernel.org Cc: Steve French smfrench@gmail.com Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün mic@digikod.net Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220929100447.108468-1-mic@digikod.net --- fs/ksmbd/smb_common.c | 6 ++++-- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/ksmbd/smb_common.c b/fs/ksmbd/smb_common.c index 7f8ab14fb8ec..d96da872d70a 100644 --- a/fs/ksmbd/smb_common.c +++ b/fs/ksmbd/smb_common.c @@ -4,6 +4,8 @@ * Copyright (C) 2018 Namjae Jeon linkinjeon@kernel.org */
+#include <linux/user_namespace.h> + #include "smb_common.h" #include "server.h" #include "misc.h" @@ -625,8 +627,8 @@ int ksmbd_override_fsids(struct ksmbd_work *work) if (!cred) return -ENOMEM;
- cred->fsuid = make_kuid(current_user_ns(), uid); - cred->fsgid = make_kgid(current_user_ns(), gid); + cred->fsuid = make_kuid(&init_user_ns, uid); + cred->fsgid = make_kgid(&init_user_ns, gid);
gi = groups_alloc(0); if (!gi) {
base-commit: f76349cf41451c5c42a99f18a9163377e4b364ff