The patch titled Subject: mm/usercopy.c: no check page span for stack objects has been removed from the -mm tree. Its filename was usercopy-no-check-page-span-for-stack-objects.patch
This patch was dropped because it was merged into mainline or a subsystem tree
------------------------------------------------------ From: Qian Cai cai@lca.pw Subject: mm/usercopy.c: no check page span for stack objects
It is easy to trigger this with CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY_PAGESPAN=y,
usercopy: Kernel memory overwrite attempt detected to spans multiple pages (offset 0, size 23)! kernel BUG at mm/usercopy.c:102!
For example,
print_worker_info char name[WQ_NAME_LEN] = { }; char desc[WORKER_DESC_LEN] = { }; probe_kernel_read(name, wq->name, sizeof(name) - 1); probe_kernel_read(desc, worker->desc, sizeof(desc) - 1); __copy_from_user_inatomic check_object_size check_heap_object check_page_span
This is because on-stack variables could cross PAGE_SIZE boundary, and failed this check,
if (likely(((unsigned long)ptr & (unsigned long)PAGE_MASK) == ((unsigned long)end & (unsigned long)PAGE_MASK)))
ptr = FFFF889007D7EFF8 end = FFFF889007D7F00E
Hence, fix it by checking if it is a stack object first.
[keescook@chromium.org: improve comments after reorder] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190103165151.GA32845@beast Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181231030254.99441-1-cai@lca.pw Signed-off-by: Qian Cai cai@lca.pw Signed-off-by: Kees Cook keescook@chromium.org Acked-by: Kees Cook keescook@chromium.org Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton akpm@linux-foundation.org ---
mm/usercopy.c | 9 +++++---- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
--- a/mm/usercopy.c~usercopy-no-check-page-span-for-stack-objects +++ a/mm/usercopy.c @@ -247,7 +247,8 @@ static DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE_RO(bypass /* * Validates that the given object is: * - not bogus address - * - known-safe heap or stack object + * - fully contained by stack (or stack frame, when available) + * - fully within SLAB object (or object whitelist area, when available) * - not in kernel text */ void __check_object_size(const void *ptr, unsigned long n, bool to_user) @@ -262,9 +263,6 @@ void __check_object_size(const void *ptr /* Check for invalid addresses. */ check_bogus_address((const unsigned long)ptr, n, to_user);
- /* Check for bad heap object. */ - check_heap_object(ptr, n, to_user); - /* Check for bad stack object. */ switch (check_stack_object(ptr, n)) { case NOT_STACK: @@ -282,6 +280,9 @@ void __check_object_size(const void *ptr usercopy_abort("process stack", NULL, to_user, 0, n); }
+ /* Check for bad heap object. */ + check_heap_object(ptr, n, to_user); + /* Check for object in kernel to avoid text exposure. */ check_kernel_text_object((const unsigned long)ptr, n, to_user); } _
Patches currently in -mm which might be from cai@lca.pw are
mm-page_owner-fix-for-deferred-struct-page-init.patch page_poison-plays-nicely-with-kasan.patch signal-allow-the-null-signal-in-rt_sigqueueinfo.patch