From: Vladis Dronov vdronov@redhat.com
commit 286d3250c9d6437340203fb64938bea344729a0e upstream.
There is a race and a buffer overflow corrupting a kernel memory while reading an EFI variable with a size more than 1024 bytes via the older sysfs method. This happens because accessing struct efi_variable in efivar_{attr,size,data}_read() and friends is not protected from a concurrent access leading to a kernel memory corruption and, at best, to a crash. The race scenario is the following:
CPU0: CPU1: efivar_attr_read() var->DataSize = 1024; efivar_entry_get(... &var->DataSize) down_interruptible(&efivars_lock) efivar_attr_read() // same EFI var var->DataSize = 1024; efivar_entry_get(... &var->DataSize) down_interruptible(&efivars_lock) virt_efi_get_variable() // returns EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL but // var->DataSize is set to a real // var size more than 1024 bytes up(&efivars_lock) virt_efi_get_variable() // called with var->DataSize set // to a real var size, returns // successfully and overwrites // a 1024-bytes kernel buffer up(&efivars_lock)
This can be reproduced by concurrent reading of an EFI variable which size is more than 1024 bytes:
ts# for cpu in $(seq 0 $(nproc --ignore=1)); do ( taskset -c $cpu \ cat /sys/firmware/efi/vars/KEKDefault*/size & ) ; done
Fix this by using a local variable for a var's data buffer size so it does not get overwritten.
Fixes: e14ab23dde12b80d ("efivars: efivar_entry API") Reported-by: Bob Sanders bob.sanders@hpe.com and the LTP testsuite Signed-off-by: Vladis Dronov vdronov@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel ardb@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar mingo@kernel.org Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200305084041.24053-2-vdronov@redhat.com Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200308080859.21568-24-ardb@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org
--- drivers/firmware/efi/efivars.c | 29 ++++++++++++++++++++--------- 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
--- a/drivers/firmware/efi/efivars.c +++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/efivars.c @@ -139,13 +139,16 @@ static ssize_t efivar_attr_read(struct efivar_entry *entry, char *buf) { struct efi_variable *var = &entry->var; + unsigned long size = sizeof(var->Data); char *str = buf; + int ret;
if (!entry || !buf) return -EINVAL;
- var->DataSize = 1024; - if (efivar_entry_get(entry, &var->Attributes, &var->DataSize, var->Data)) + ret = efivar_entry_get(entry, &var->Attributes, &size, var->Data); + var->DataSize = size; + if (ret) return -EIO;
if (var->Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE) @@ -172,13 +175,16 @@ static ssize_t efivar_size_read(struct efivar_entry *entry, char *buf) { struct efi_variable *var = &entry->var; + unsigned long size = sizeof(var->Data); char *str = buf; + int ret;
if (!entry || !buf) return -EINVAL;
- var->DataSize = 1024; - if (efivar_entry_get(entry, &var->Attributes, &var->DataSize, var->Data)) + ret = efivar_entry_get(entry, &var->Attributes, &size, var->Data); + var->DataSize = size; + if (ret) return -EIO;
str += sprintf(str, "0x%lx\n", var->DataSize); @@ -189,12 +195,15 @@ static ssize_t efivar_data_read(struct efivar_entry *entry, char *buf) { struct efi_variable *var = &entry->var; + unsigned long size = sizeof(var->Data); + int ret;
if (!entry || !buf) return -EINVAL;
- var->DataSize = 1024; - if (efivar_entry_get(entry, &var->Attributes, &var->DataSize, var->Data)) + ret = efivar_entry_get(entry, &var->Attributes, &size, var->Data); + var->DataSize = size; + if (ret) return -EIO;
memcpy(buf, var->Data, var->DataSize); @@ -314,14 +323,16 @@ efivar_show_raw(struct efivar_entry *ent { struct efi_variable *var = &entry->var; struct compat_efi_variable *compat; + unsigned long datasize = sizeof(var->Data); size_t size; + int ret;
if (!entry || !buf) return 0;
- var->DataSize = 1024; - if (efivar_entry_get(entry, &entry->var.Attributes, - &entry->var.DataSize, entry->var.Data)) + ret = efivar_entry_get(entry, &var->Attributes, &datasize, var->Data); + var->DataSize = datasize; + if (ret) return -EIO;
if (is_compat()) {