On 3/6/25 19:37, Alexey Kardashevskiy wrote:
Compared to the SNP Guest Request, the "Extended" version adds data pages for receiving certificates. If not enough pages provided, the HV can report to the VM how much is needed so the VM can reallocate and repeat.
Commit ae596615d93d ("virt: sev-guest: Reduce the scope of SNP command mutex") moved handling of the allocated/desired pages number out of scope of said mutex and create a possibility for a race (multiple instances trying to trigger Extended request in a VM) as there is just one instance of snp_msg_desc per /dev/sev-guest and no locking other than snp_cmd_mutex.
Fix the issue by moving the data blob/size and the GHCB input struct (snp_req_data) into snp_guest_req which is allocated on stack now and accessed by the GHCB caller under that mutex.
Stop allocating SEV_FW_BLOB_MAX_SIZE in snp_msg_alloc() as only one of four callers needs it. Free the received blob in get_ext_report() right after it is copied to the userspace. Possible future users of snp_send_guest_request() are likely to have different ideas about the buffer size anyways.
Fixes: ae596615d93d ("virt: sev-guest: Reduce the scope of SNP command mutex") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Nikunj A Dadhania nikunj@amd.com Signed-off-by: Alexey Kardashevskiy aik@amd.com
arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h | 6 ++-- arch/x86/coco/sev/core.c | 23 +++++-------- drivers/virt/coco/sev-guest/sev-guest.c | 34 ++++++++++++++++---- 3 files changed, 39 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h index 1581246491b5..ba7999f66abe 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h @@ -203,6 +203,9 @@ struct snp_guest_req { unsigned int vmpck_id; u8 msg_version; u8 msg_type;
- struct snp_req_data input;
- void *certs_data;
}; /* @@ -263,9 +266,6 @@ struct snp_msg_desc { struct snp_guest_msg secret_request, secret_response; struct snp_secrets_page *secrets;
- struct snp_req_data input;
- void *certs_data;
struct aesgcm_ctx *ctx; diff --git a/arch/x86/coco/sev/core.c b/arch/x86/coco/sev/core.c index 82492efc5d94..d02eea5e3d50 100644 --- a/arch/x86/coco/sev/core.c +++ b/arch/x86/coco/sev/core.c @@ -2853,19 +2853,8 @@ struct snp_msg_desc *snp_msg_alloc(void) if (!mdesc->response) goto e_free_request;
- mdesc->certs_data = alloc_shared_pages(SEV_FW_BLOB_MAX_SIZE);
- if (!mdesc->certs_data)
goto e_free_response;- /* initial the input address for guest request */
- mdesc->input.req_gpa = __pa(mdesc->request);
- mdesc->input.resp_gpa = __pa(mdesc->response);
- mdesc->input.data_gpa = __pa(mdesc->certs_data);
- return mdesc;
-e_free_response:
- free_shared_pages(mdesc->response, sizeof(struct snp_guest_msg));
e_free_request: free_shared_pages(mdesc->request, sizeof(struct snp_guest_msg)); e_unmap: @@ -2885,7 +2874,6 @@ void snp_msg_free(struct snp_msg_desc *mdesc) kfree(mdesc->ctx); free_shared_pages(mdesc->response, sizeof(struct snp_guest_msg)); free_shared_pages(mdesc->request, sizeof(struct snp_guest_msg));
- free_shared_pages(mdesc->certs_data, SEV_FW_BLOB_MAX_SIZE); iounmap((__force void __iomem *)mdesc->secrets);
memset(mdesc, 0, sizeof(*mdesc)); @@ -3054,7 +3042,7 @@ static int __handle_guest_request(struct snp_msg_desc *mdesc, struct snp_guest_r * sequence number must be incremented or the VMPCK must be deleted to * prevent reuse of the IV. */
- rc = snp_issue_guest_request(req, &mdesc->input, rio);
- rc = snp_issue_guest_request(req, &req->input, rio); switch (rc) { case -ENOSPC: /*
@@ -3064,7 +3052,7 @@ static int __handle_guest_request(struct snp_msg_desc *mdesc, struct snp_guest_r * order to increment the sequence number and thus avoid * IV reuse. */
override_npages = mdesc->input.data_npages;
override_npages = req->input.data_npages;/* @@ -3120,7 +3108,7 @@ static int __handle_guest_request(struct snp_msg_desc *mdesc, struct snp_guest_r } if (override_npages)
mdesc->input.data_npages = override_npages;
req->input.data_npages = override_npages;return rc; } @@ -3158,6 +3146,11 @@ int snp_send_guest_request(struct snp_msg_desc *mdesc, struct snp_guest_req *req */ memcpy(mdesc->request, &mdesc->secret_request, sizeof(mdesc->secret_request));
- /* initial the input address for guest request */
- req->input.req_gpa = __pa(mdesc->request);
- req->input.resp_gpa = __pa(mdesc->response);
- req->input.data_gpa = req->certs_data ? __pa(req->certs_data) : 0;
- rc = __handle_guest_request(mdesc, req, rio); if (rc) { if (rc == -EIO &&
diff --git a/drivers/virt/coco/sev-guest/sev-guest.c b/drivers/virt/coco/sev-guest/sev-guest.c index 4699fdc9ed44..cf3fb61f4d5b 100644 --- a/drivers/virt/coco/sev-guest/sev-guest.c +++ b/drivers/virt/coco/sev-guest/sev-guest.c @@ -177,6 +177,7 @@ static int get_ext_report(struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev, struct snp_guest_reques struct snp_guest_req req = {}; int ret, npages = 0, resp_len; sockptr_t certs_address;
- struct page *page;
if (sockptr_is_null(io->req_data) || sockptr_is_null(io->resp_data)) return -EINVAL; @@ -210,8 +211,20 @@ static int get_ext_report(struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev, struct snp_guest_reques * the host. If host does not supply any certs in it, then copy * zeros to indicate that certificate data was not provided. */
- memset(mdesc->certs_data, 0, report_req->certs_len); npages = report_req->certs_len >> PAGE_SHIFT;
- page = alloc_pages(GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT | __GFP_ZERO,
get_order(report_req->certs_len));
Not sure if it is worth using alloc_pages_exact() (and free_pages_exact()) here instead, since you only end up performing set_memory_decrypted() against npages vs the actual number allocated. It's not an issue, just looks a bit odd to my eye.
- if (!page)
return -ENOMEM;- req.certs_data = page_address(page);
- ret = set_memory_decrypted((unsigned long)req.certs_data, npages);
- if (ret) {
pr_err("failed to mark page shared, ret=%d\n", ret);__free_pages(page, get_order(report_req->certs_len));
You can't be sure at what stage the failure occurred, so you need to leak the pages, just like below where you call set_memory_encrypted().
And similar to below, maybe do a WARN_ONCE() instead of pr_err()?
return -EFAULT;- }
cmd: /* * The intermediate response buffer is used while decrypting the @@ -220,10 +233,12 @@ static int get_ext_report(struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev, struct snp_guest_reques */ resp_len = sizeof(report_resp->data) + mdesc->ctx->authsize; report_resp = kzalloc(resp_len, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
- if (!report_resp)
return -ENOMEM;
- if (!report_resp) {
ret = -ENOMEM;goto e_free_data;- }
- mdesc->input.data_npages = npages;
- req.input.data_npages = npages;
req.msg_version = arg->msg_version; req.msg_type = SNP_MSG_REPORT_REQ; @@ -238,7 +253,7 @@ static int get_ext_report(struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev, struct snp_guest_reques /* If certs length is invalid then copy the returned length */ if (arg->vmm_error == SNP_GUEST_VMM_ERR_INVALID_LEN) {
report_req->certs_len = mdesc->input.data_npages << PAGE_SHIFT;
report_req->certs_len = req.input.data_npages << PAGE_SHIFT;if (copy_to_sockptr(io->req_data, report_req, sizeof(*report_req))) ret = -EFAULT; @@ -247,7 +262,7 @@ static int get_ext_report(struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev, struct snp_guest_reques if (ret) goto e_free;
- if (npages && copy_to_sockptr(certs_address, mdesc->certs_data, report_req->certs_len)) {
- if (npages && copy_to_sockptr(certs_address, req.certs_data, report_req->certs_len)) { ret = -EFAULT; goto e_free; }
@@ -257,6 +272,13 @@ static int get_ext_report(struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev, struct snp_guest_reques e_free: kfree(report_resp); +e_free_data:
- if (npages) {
if (set_memory_encrypted((unsigned long)req.certs_data, npages))WARN_ONCE(ret, "failed to restore encryption mask (leak it)\n");else__free_pages(page, get_order(report_req->certs_len));
Can't report_req->certs_len have been updated with a new value at this point (from the "if (arg->vmm_error == SNP_GUEST_VMM_ERR_INVALID_LEN)") check and you'll attempt to possibly free more than you allocated?
This would be covered if you stick with npages and use alloc_pages_exact() and free_pages_exact() using npages.
Thanks, Tom
- } return ret;
}