6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Eduard Zingerman eddyz87@gmail.com
commit 977bc146d4eb7070118d8a974919b33bb52732b4 upstream.
This change prepares syncookie_{tc,xdp} for update in callbakcs verification logic. To allow bpf_loop() verification converge when multiple callback itreations are considered: - track offset inside TCP payload explicitly, not as a part of the pointer; - make sure that offset does not exceed MAX_PACKET_OFF enforced by verifier; - make sure that offset is tracked as unbound scalar between iterations, otherwise verifier won't be able infer that bpf_loop callback reaches identical states.
Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko andrii@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Eduard Zingerman eddyz87@gmail.com Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231121020701.26440-2-eddyz87@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov ast@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org --- tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/xdp_synproxy_kern.c | 84 +++++++++++------- 1 file changed, 52 insertions(+), 32 deletions(-)
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/xdp_synproxy_kern.c +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/xdp_synproxy_kern.c @@ -53,6 +53,8 @@ #define DEFAULT_TTL 64 #define MAX_ALLOWED_PORTS 8
+#define MAX_PACKET_OFF 0xffff + #define swap(a, b) \ do { typeof(a) __tmp = (a); (a) = (b); (b) = __tmp; } while (0)
@@ -183,63 +185,76 @@ static __always_inline __u32 tcp_time_st }
struct tcpopt_context { - __u8 *ptr; - __u8 *end; + void *data; void *data_end; __be32 *tsecr; __u8 wscale; bool option_timestamp; bool option_sack; + __u32 off; };
-static int tscookie_tcpopt_parse(struct tcpopt_context *ctx) +static __always_inline u8 *next(struct tcpopt_context *ctx, __u32 sz) { - __u8 opcode, opsize; + __u64 off = ctx->off; + __u8 *data;
- if (ctx->ptr >= ctx->end) - return 1; - if (ctx->ptr >= ctx->data_end) - return 1; + /* Verifier forbids access to packet when offset exceeds MAX_PACKET_OFF */ + if (off > MAX_PACKET_OFF - sz) + return NULL; + + data = ctx->data + off; + barrier_var(data); + if (data + sz >= ctx->data_end) + return NULL;
- opcode = ctx->ptr[0]; + ctx->off += sz; + return data; +}
- if (opcode == TCPOPT_EOL) - return 1; - if (opcode == TCPOPT_NOP) { - ++ctx->ptr; - return 0; - } +static int tscookie_tcpopt_parse(struct tcpopt_context *ctx) +{ + __u8 *opcode, *opsize, *wscale, *tsecr; + __u32 off = ctx->off;
- if (ctx->ptr + 1 >= ctx->end) + opcode = next(ctx, 1); + if (!opcode) return 1; - if (ctx->ptr + 1 >= ctx->data_end) - return 1; - opsize = ctx->ptr[1]; - if (opsize < 2) + + if (*opcode == TCPOPT_EOL) return 1; + if (*opcode == TCPOPT_NOP) + return 0;
- if (ctx->ptr + opsize > ctx->end) + opsize = next(ctx, 1); + if (!opsize || *opsize < 2) return 1;
- switch (opcode) { + switch (*opcode) { case TCPOPT_WINDOW: - if (opsize == TCPOLEN_WINDOW && ctx->ptr + TCPOLEN_WINDOW <= ctx->data_end) - ctx->wscale = ctx->ptr[2] < TCP_MAX_WSCALE ? ctx->ptr[2] : TCP_MAX_WSCALE; + wscale = next(ctx, 1); + if (!wscale) + return 1; + if (*opsize == TCPOLEN_WINDOW) + ctx->wscale = *wscale < TCP_MAX_WSCALE ? *wscale : TCP_MAX_WSCALE; break; case TCPOPT_TIMESTAMP: - if (opsize == TCPOLEN_TIMESTAMP && ctx->ptr + TCPOLEN_TIMESTAMP <= ctx->data_end) { + tsecr = next(ctx, 4); + if (!tsecr) + return 1; + if (*opsize == TCPOLEN_TIMESTAMP) { ctx->option_timestamp = true; /* Client's tsval becomes our tsecr. */ - *ctx->tsecr = get_unaligned((__be32 *)(ctx->ptr + 2)); + *ctx->tsecr = get_unaligned((__be32 *)tsecr); } break; case TCPOPT_SACK_PERM: - if (opsize == TCPOLEN_SACK_PERM) + if (*opsize == TCPOLEN_SACK_PERM) ctx->option_sack = true; break; }
- ctx->ptr += opsize; + ctx->off = off + *opsize;
return 0; } @@ -256,16 +271,21 @@ static int tscookie_tcpopt_parse_batch(_
static __always_inline bool tscookie_init(struct tcphdr *tcp_header, __u16 tcp_len, __be32 *tsval, - __be32 *tsecr, void *data_end) + __be32 *tsecr, void *data, void *data_end) { struct tcpopt_context loop_ctx = { - .ptr = (__u8 *)(tcp_header + 1), - .end = (__u8 *)tcp_header + tcp_len, + .data = data, .data_end = data_end, .tsecr = tsecr, .wscale = TS_OPT_WSCALE_MASK, .option_timestamp = false, .option_sack = false, + /* Note: currently verifier would track .off as unbound scalar. + * In case if verifier would at some point get smarter and + * compute bounded value for this var, beware that it might + * hinder bpf_loop() convergence validation. + */ + .off = (__u8 *)(tcp_header + 1) - (__u8 *)data, }; u32 cookie;
@@ -635,7 +655,7 @@ static __always_inline int syncookie_han cookie = (__u32)value;
if (tscookie_init((void *)hdr->tcp, hdr->tcp_len, - &tsopt_buf[0], &tsopt_buf[1], data_end)) + &tsopt_buf[0], &tsopt_buf[1], data, data_end)) tsopt = tsopt_buf;
/* Check that there is enough space for a SYNACK. It also covers