On Fri, May 06, 2022 at 11:01:17AM +0100, Giovanni Cabiddu wrote:
On Fri, May 06, 2022 at 11:23:50AM +0200, Greg KH wrote:
On Fri, May 06, 2022 at 09:23:22AM +0100, Giovanni Cabiddu wrote:
Set to zero the DH context buffers containing the DH key before they are freed.
That says what, but not why.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: c9839143ebbf ("crypto: qat - Add DH support") Signed-off-by: Giovanni Cabiddu giovanni.cabiddu@intel.com Reviewed-by: Adam Guerin adam.guerin@intel.com Reviewed-by: Wojciech Ziemba wojciech.ziemba@intel.com
drivers/crypto/qat/qat_common/qat_asym_algs.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/qat/qat_common/qat_asym_algs.c b/drivers/crypto/qat/qat_common/qat_asym_algs.c index d75eb77c9fb9..2fec89b8a188 100644 --- a/drivers/crypto/qat/qat_common/qat_asym_algs.c +++ b/drivers/crypto/qat/qat_common/qat_asym_algs.c @@ -421,14 +421,17 @@ static int qat_dh_set_params(struct qat_dh_ctx *ctx, struct dh *params) static void qat_dh_clear_ctx(struct device *dev, struct qat_dh_ctx *ctx) { if (ctx->g) {
memzero_explicit(ctx->g, ctx->p_size);Why is a memset() not sufficient here?
Based on the previous conversation a memset() should be sufficient.
And what is this solving? Who would get this stale data?
This is to make sure the buffer containing sensitive data (i.e. a key) is not leaked out by a subsequent allocation.
But as all sane distros have CONFIG_INIT_ON_ALLOC_DEFAULT_ON enabled, right? That should handle any worries you have with secrets being on the heap. But even then, are you trying to protect yourself against other kernel modules? Think this through...
thanks,
greg k-h