6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
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From: Ondrej Mosnacek omosnace@redhat.com
[ Upstream commit 189e5deb944a6f9c7992355d60bffd8ec2e54a9c ]
Analogically to the x86 commit 881a9c9cb785 ("bpf: Do not audit capability check in do_jit()"), change the capable() call to ns_capable_noaudit() in order to avoid spurious SELinux denials in audit log.
The commit log from that commit applies here as well: """ The failure of this check only results in a security mitigation being applied, slightly affecting performance of the compiled BPF program. It doesn't result in a failed syscall, an thus auditing a failed LSM permission check for it is unwanted. For example with SELinux, it causes a denial to be reported for confined processes running as root, which tends to be flagged as a problem to be fixed in the policy. Yet dontauditing or allowing CAP_SYS_ADMIN to the domain may not be desirable, as it would allow/silence also other checks - either going against the principle of least privilege or making debugging potentially harder.
Fix it by changing it from capable() to ns_capable_noaudit(), which instructs the LSMs to not audit the resulting denials. """
Fixes: f300769ead03 ("arm64: bpf: Only mitigate cBPF programs loaded by unprivileged users") Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek omosnace@redhat.com Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20251204125916.441021-1-omosnace@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov ast@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- arch/arm64/net/bpf_jit_comp.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/arch/arm64/net/bpf_jit_comp.c b/arch/arm64/net/bpf_jit_comp.c index 0c9a50a1e73e7..0dfefeedfe56c 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/net/bpf_jit_comp.c +++ b/arch/arm64/net/bpf_jit_comp.c @@ -1004,7 +1004,7 @@ static void __maybe_unused build_bhb_mitigation(struct jit_ctx *ctx) arm64_get_spectre_v2_state() == SPECTRE_VULNERABLE) return;
- if (capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) + if (ns_capable_noaudit(&init_user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) return;
if (supports_clearbhb(SCOPE_SYSTEM)) {