On 2/8/2024 7:59 PM, Mukesh Ojha wrote:
On 2/8/2024 6:05 PM, Auditya Bhattaram wrote:
hash_index is evaluated by looping phdrs till QCOM_MDT_TYPE_HASH is found. Add an upperbound check to phdrs to access within elf size.
Fixes: 64fb5eb87d58 ("soc: qcom: mdt_loader: Allow hash to reside in any segment") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Auditya Bhattaram quic_audityab@quicinc.com
Changes in v3: - Corrected wrong patch versioning in the Subject. - Added error prints for Invalid access. Link to v2 https://lore.kernel.org/linux-arm-msm/9773d189-c896-d5c5-804c-e086c24987b4@q... Link to v1 https://lore.kernel.org/linux-arm-msm/5d7a3b97-d840-4863-91a0-32c1d8e7532f@l...
drivers/soc/qcom/mdt_loader.c | 5 +++++ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
diff --git a/drivers/soc/qcom/mdt_loader.c b/drivers/soc/qcom/mdt_loader.c index 6f177e46fa0f..61e2377cc5c3 100644 --- a/drivers/soc/qcom/mdt_loader.c +++ b/drivers/soc/qcom/mdt_loader.c @@ -145,6 +145,11 @@ void *qcom_mdt_read_metadata(const struct firmware *fw, size_t *data_len, if (phdrs[0].p_type == PT_LOAD) return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
+ if (((size_t)(phdrs + ehdr->e_phnum)) > ((size_t)ehdr + fw->size)) {
This change is valid only if somehow, ehdr->e_phnum gets corrupted or changed via some engineering means and results in out-of-bounds access.
Acked-by: Mukesh Ojha quic_mojha@quicinc.com
+ dev_err(dev, "Invalid phdrs access: %s\n", fw_name);
Should it print ehdr->e_phnum as well to be more valid?
-Mukesh
Sure, planning to add fw->size as well. dev_err(dev, "Invalid phdrs access for fw: %s, e_phnum: %hu, fw->size: %zu \n", fw_name, ehdr->e_phnum, fw->size);
+ return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); + }
for (i = 1; i < ehdr->e_phnum; i++) { if ((phdrs[i].p_flags & QCOM_MDT_TYPE_MASK) == QCOM_MDT_TYPE_HASH) { hash_segment = i; -- 2.17.1