6.17-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
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From: Navaneeth K knavaneeth786@gmail.com
commit 154828bf9559b9c8421fc2f0d7f7f76b3683aaed upstream.
The Information Element (IE) parser rtw_get_ie() trusted the length byte of each IE without validating that the IE body (len bytes after the 2-byte header) fits inside the remaining frame buffer. A malformed frame can advertise an IE length larger than the available data, causing the parser to increment its pointer beyond the buffer end. This results in out-of-bounds reads or, depending on the pattern, an infinite loop.
Fix by validating that (offset + 2 + len) does not exceed the limit before accepting the IE or advancing to the next element.
This prevents OOB reads and ensures the parser terminates safely on malformed frames.
Signed-off-by: Navaneeth K knavaneeth786@gmail.com Cc: stable stable@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org --- drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/core/rtw_ieee80211.c | 14 ++++++++------ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
--- a/drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/core/rtw_ieee80211.c +++ b/drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/core/rtw_ieee80211.c @@ -140,22 +140,24 @@ u8 *rtw_get_ie(u8 *pbuf, signed int inde signed int tmp, i; u8 *p;
- if (limit < 1) + if (limit < 2) return NULL;
p = pbuf; i = 0; *len = 0; - while (1) { + while (i + 2 <= limit) { + tmp = *(p + 1); + if (i + 2 + tmp > limit) + break; + if (*p == index) { - *len = *(p + 1); + *len = tmp; return p; } - tmp = *(p + 1); + p += (tmp + 2); i += (tmp + 2); - if (i >= limit) - break; } return NULL; }