The patch below does not apply to the 5.18-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to stable@vger.kernel.org.
thanks,
greg k-h
------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------
From 4496a6f9b45e8cd83343ad86a3984d614e22cf54 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Sean Christopherson seanjc@google.com Date: Fri, 22 Jul 2022 22:44:08 +0000 Subject: [PATCH] KVM: nVMX: Attempt to load PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL on nVMX xfer iff it exists
Attempt to load PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL during nested VM-Enter/VM-Exit if and only if the MSR exists (according to the guest vCPU model). KVM has very misguided handling of VM_{ENTRY,EXIT}_LOAD_IA32_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL and attempts to force the nVMX MSR settings to match the vPMU model, i.e. to hide/expose the control based on whether or not the MSR exists from the guest's perspective.
KVM's modifications fail to handle the scenario where the vPMU is hidden from the guest _after_ being exposed to the guest, e.g. by userspace doing multiple KVM_SET_CPUID2 calls, which is allowed if done before any KVM_RUN. nested_vmx_pmu_refresh() is called if and only if there's a recognized vPMU, i.e. KVM will leave the bits in the allow state and then ultimately reject the MSR load and WARN.
KVM should not force the VMX MSRs in the first place. KVM taking control of the MSRs was a misguided attempt at mimicking what commit 5f76f6f5ff96 ("KVM: nVMX: Do not expose MPX VMX controls when guest MPX disabled", 2018-10-01) did for MPX. However, the MPX commit was a workaround for another KVM bug and not something that should be imitated (and it should never been done in the first place).
In other words, KVM's ABI _should_ be that userspace has full control over the MSRs, at which point triggering the WARN that loading the MSR must not fail is trivial.
The intent of the WARN is still valid; KVM has consistency checks to ensure that vmcs12->{guest,host}_ia32_perf_global_ctrl is valid. The problem is that '0' must be considered a valid value at all times, and so the simple/obvious solution is to just not actually load the MSR when it does not exist. It is userspace's responsibility to provide a sane vCPU model, i.e. KVM is well within its ABI and Intel's VMX architecture to skip the loads if the MSR does not exist.
Fixes: 03a8871add95 ("KVM: nVMX: Expose load IA32_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL VM-{Entry,Exit} control") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson seanjc@google.com Message-Id: 20220722224409.1336532-5-seanjc@google.com Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini pbonzini@redhat.com
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c index c1c85fd75d42..819cfd926954 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c @@ -2623,6 +2623,7 @@ static int prepare_vmcs02(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct vmcs12 *vmcs12, }
if ((vmcs12->vm_entry_controls & VM_ENTRY_LOAD_IA32_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL) && + intel_pmu_has_perf_global_ctrl(vcpu_to_pmu(vcpu)) && WARN_ON_ONCE(kvm_set_msr(vcpu, MSR_CORE_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL, vmcs12->guest_ia32_perf_global_ctrl))) { *entry_failure_code = ENTRY_FAIL_DEFAULT; @@ -4333,7 +4334,8 @@ static void load_vmcs12_host_state(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, vmcs_write64(GUEST_IA32_PAT, vmcs12->host_ia32_pat); vcpu->arch.pat = vmcs12->host_ia32_pat; } - if (vmcs12->vm_exit_controls & VM_EXIT_LOAD_IA32_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL) + if ((vmcs12->vm_exit_controls & VM_EXIT_LOAD_IA32_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL) && + intel_pmu_has_perf_global_ctrl(vcpu_to_pmu(vcpu))) WARN_ON_ONCE(kvm_set_msr(vcpu, MSR_CORE_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL, vmcs12->host_ia32_perf_global_ctrl));