On 2/9/22 19:56, Sasha Levin wrote:
From: Sean Christopherson seanjc@google.com
[ Upstream commit b9bed78e2fa9571b7c983b20666efa0009030c71 ]
Acked-by: Paolo Bonzini pbonzini@redhat.com
Paolo
Set vmcs.GUEST_PENDING_DBG_EXCEPTIONS.BS, a.k.a. the pending single-step breakpoint flag, when re-injecting a #DB with RFLAGS.TF=1, and STI or MOVSS blocking is active. Setting the flag is necessary to make VM-Entry consistency checks happy, as VMX has an invariant that if RFLAGS.TF is set and STI/MOVSS blocking is true, then the previous instruction must have been STI or MOV/POP, and therefore a single-step #DB must be pending since the RFLAGS.TF cannot have been set by the previous instruction, i.e. the one instruction delay after setting RFLAGS.TF must have already expired.
Normally, the CPU sets vmcs.GUEST_PENDING_DBG_EXCEPTIONS.BS appropriately when recording guest state as part of a VM-Exit, but #DB VM-Exits intentionally do not treat the #DB as "guest state" as interception of the #DB effectively makes the #DB host-owned, thus KVM needs to manually set PENDING_DBG.BS when forwarding/re-injecting the #DB to the guest.
Note, although this bug can be triggered by guest userspace, doing so requires IOPL=3, and guest userspace running with IOPL=3 has full access to all I/O ports (from the guest's perspective) and can crash/reboot the guest any number of ways. IOPL=3 is required because STI blocking kicks in if and only if RFLAGS.IF is toggled 0=>1, and if CPL>IOPL, STI either takes a #GP or modifies RFLAGS.VIF, not RFLAGS.IF.
MOVSS blocking can be initiated by userspace, but can be coincident with a #DB if and only if DR7.GD=1 (General Detect enabled) and a MOV DR is executed in the MOVSS shadow. MOV DR #GPs at CPL>0, thus MOVSS blocking is problematic only for CPL0 (and only if the guest is crazy enough to access a DR in a MOVSS shadow). All other sources of #DBs are either suppressed by MOVSS blocking (single-step, code fetch, data, and I/O), are mutually exclusive with MOVSS blocking (T-bit task switch), or are already handled by KVM (ICEBP, a.k.a. INT1).
This bug was originally found by running tests[1] created for XSA-308[2]. Note that Xen's userspace test emits ICEBP in the MOVSS shadow, which is presumably why the Xen bug was deemed to be an exploitable DOS from guest userspace. KVM already handles ICEBP by skipping the ICEBP instruction and thus clears MOVSS blocking as a side effect of its "emulation".
[1] http://xenbits.xenproject.org/docs/xtf/xsa-308_2main_8c_source.html [2] https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-308.html
Reported-by: David Woodhouse dwmw2@infradead.org Reported-by: Alexander Graf graf@amazon.de Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson seanjc@google.com Message-Id: 20220120000624.655815-1-seanjc@google.com Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini pbonzini@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c | 25 +++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 25 insertions(+)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c index 7f4e6f625abcf..fe4a36c984460 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c @@ -4811,8 +4811,33 @@ static int handle_exception_nmi(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) dr6 = vmx_get_exit_qual(vcpu); if (!(vcpu->guest_debug & (KVM_GUESTDBG_SINGLESTEP | KVM_GUESTDBG_USE_HW_BP))) {
/** If the #DB was due to ICEBP, a.k.a. INT1, skip the* instruction. ICEBP generates a trap-like #DB, but* despite its interception control being tied to #DB,* is an instruction intercept, i.e. the VM-Exit occurs* on the ICEBP itself. Note, skipping ICEBP also* clears STI and MOVSS blocking.** For all other #DBs, set vmcs.PENDING_DBG_EXCEPTIONS.BS* if single-step is enabled in RFLAGS and STI or MOVSS* blocking is active, as the CPU doesn't set the bit* on VM-Exit due to #DB interception. VM-Entry has a* consistency check that a single-step #DB is pending* in this scenario as the previous instruction cannot* have toggled RFLAGS.TF 0=>1 (because STI and POP/MOV* don't modify RFLAGS), therefore the one instruction* delay when activating single-step breakpoints must* have already expired. Note, the CPU sets/clears BS* as appropriate for all other VM-Exits types.*/ if (is_icebp(intr_info)) WARN_ON(!skip_emulated_instruction(vcpu));else if ((vmx_get_rflags(vcpu) & X86_EFLAGS_TF) &&(vmcs_read32(GUEST_INTERRUPTIBILITY_INFO) &(GUEST_INTR_STATE_STI | GUEST_INTR_STATE_MOV_SS)))vmcs_writel(GUEST_PENDING_DBG_EXCEPTIONS,vmcs_readl(GUEST_PENDING_DBG_EXCEPTIONS) | DR6_BS);kvm_queue_exception_p(vcpu, DB_VECTOR, dr6); return 1;