From: yongduan yongduan@tencent.com
commit 060423bfdee3f8bc6e2c1bac97de24d5415e2bc4 upstream.
The code assumes log_num < in_num everywhere, and that is true as long as in_num is incremented by descriptor iov count, and log_num by 1. However this breaks if there's a zero sized descriptor.
As a result, if a malicious guest creates a vring desc with desc.len = 0, it may cause the host kernel to crash by overflowing the log array. This bug can be triggered during the VM migration.
There's no need to log when desc.len = 0, so just don't increment log_num in this case.
Fixes: 3a4d5c94e959 ("vhost_net: a kernel-level virtio server") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: Lidong Chen lidongchen@tencent.com Signed-off-by: ruippan ruippan@tencent.com Signed-off-by: yongduan yongduan@tencent.com Acked-by: Michael S. Tsirkin mst@redhat.com Reviewed-by: Tyler Hicks tyhicks@canonical.com Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin mst@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org
--- drivers/vhost/vhost.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
--- a/drivers/vhost/vhost.c +++ b/drivers/vhost/vhost.c @@ -2074,7 +2074,7 @@ static int get_indirect(struct vhost_vir /* If this is an input descriptor, increment that count. */ if (access == VHOST_ACCESS_WO) { *in_num += ret; - if (unlikely(log)) { + if (unlikely(log && ret)) { log[*log_num].addr = vhost64_to_cpu(vq, desc.addr); log[*log_num].len = vhost32_to_cpu(vq, desc.len); ++*log_num; @@ -2217,7 +2217,7 @@ int vhost_get_vq_desc(struct vhost_virtq /* If this is an input descriptor, * increment that count. */ *in_num += ret; - if (unlikely(log)) { + if (unlikely(log && ret)) { log[*log_num].addr = vhost64_to_cpu(vq, desc.addr); log[*log_num].len = vhost32_to_cpu(vq, desc.len); ++*log_num;