6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
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From: Adrian Ratiu adrian.ratiu@collabora.com
[ Upstream commit 41e8149c8892ed1962bd15350b3c3e6e90cba7f4 ]
This adds a Kconfig option and boot param to allow removing the FOLL_FORCE flag from /proc/pid/mem write calls because it can be abused.
The traditional forcing behavior is kept as default because it can break GDB and some other use cases.
Previously we tried a more sophisticated approach allowing distributions to fine-tune /proc/pid/mem behavior, however that got NAK-ed by Linus [1], who prefers this simpler approach with semantics also easier to understand for users.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAHk-=wiGWLChxYmUA5HrT5aopZrB7_2VTa0NLZcxORgkUe... [1] Cc: Doug Anderson dianders@chromium.org Cc: Jeff Xu jeffxu@google.com Cc: Jann Horn jannh@google.com Cc: Kees Cook kees@kernel.org Cc: Ard Biesheuvel ardb@kernel.org Cc: Christian Brauner brauner@kernel.org Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds torvalds@linux-foundation.org Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds torvalds@linux-foundation.org Signed-off-by: Adrian Ratiu adrian.ratiu@collabora.com Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240802080225.89408-1-adrian.ratiu@collabora.com Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner brauner@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- .../admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 10 +++ fs/proc/base.c | 61 ++++++++++++++++++- security/Kconfig | 32 ++++++++++ 3 files changed, 102 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt index a7fe113897361..d83a3f47e2007 100644 --- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt @@ -4639,6 +4639,16 @@ printk.time= Show timing data prefixed to each printk message line Format: <bool> (1/Y/y=enable, 0/N/n=disable)
+ proc_mem.force_override= [KNL] + Format: {always | ptrace | never} + Traditionally /proc/pid/mem allows memory permissions to be + overridden without restrictions. This option may be set to + restrict that. Can be one of: + - 'always': traditional behavior always allows mem overrides. + - 'ptrace': only allow mem overrides for active ptracers. + - 'never': never allow mem overrides. + If not specified, default is the CONFIG_PROC_MEM_* choice. + processor.max_cstate= [HW,ACPI] Limit processor to maximum C-state max_cstate=9 overrides any DMI blacklist limit. diff --git a/fs/proc/base.c b/fs/proc/base.c index 6e61d93ffa552..699f085d4de7d 100644 --- a/fs/proc/base.c +++ b/fs/proc/base.c @@ -85,6 +85,7 @@ #include <linux/elf.h> #include <linux/pid_namespace.h> #include <linux/user_namespace.h> +#include <linux/fs_parser.h> #include <linux/fs_struct.h> #include <linux/slab.h> #include <linux/sched/autogroup.h> @@ -116,6 +117,40 @@ static u8 nlink_tid __ro_after_init; static u8 nlink_tgid __ro_after_init;
+enum proc_mem_force { + PROC_MEM_FORCE_ALWAYS, + PROC_MEM_FORCE_PTRACE, + PROC_MEM_FORCE_NEVER +}; + +static enum proc_mem_force proc_mem_force_override __ro_after_init = + IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_PROC_MEM_NO_FORCE) ? PROC_MEM_FORCE_NEVER : + IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_PROC_MEM_FORCE_PTRACE) ? PROC_MEM_FORCE_PTRACE : + PROC_MEM_FORCE_ALWAYS; + +static const struct constant_table proc_mem_force_table[] __initconst = { + { "always", PROC_MEM_FORCE_ALWAYS }, + { "ptrace", PROC_MEM_FORCE_PTRACE }, + { "never", PROC_MEM_FORCE_NEVER }, + { } +}; + +static int __init early_proc_mem_force_override(char *buf) +{ + if (!buf) + return -EINVAL; + + /* + * lookup_constant() defaults to proc_mem_force_override to preseve + * the initial Kconfig choice in case an invalid param gets passed. + */ + proc_mem_force_override = lookup_constant(proc_mem_force_table, + buf, proc_mem_force_override); + + return 0; +} +early_param("proc_mem.force_override", early_proc_mem_force_override); + struct pid_entry { const char *name; unsigned int len; @@ -834,6 +869,28 @@ static int mem_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file) return ret; }
+static bool proc_mem_foll_force(struct file *file, struct mm_struct *mm) +{ + struct task_struct *task; + bool ptrace_active = false; + + switch (proc_mem_force_override) { + case PROC_MEM_FORCE_NEVER: + return false; + case PROC_MEM_FORCE_PTRACE: + task = get_proc_task(file_inode(file)); + if (task) { + ptrace_active = READ_ONCE(task->ptrace) && + READ_ONCE(task->mm) == mm && + READ_ONCE(task->parent) == current; + put_task_struct(task); + } + return ptrace_active; + default: + return true; + } +} + static ssize_t mem_rw(struct file *file, char __user *buf, size_t count, loff_t *ppos, int write) { @@ -854,7 +911,9 @@ static ssize_t mem_rw(struct file *file, char __user *buf, if (!mmget_not_zero(mm)) goto free;
- flags = FOLL_FORCE | (write ? FOLL_WRITE : 0); + flags = write ? FOLL_WRITE : 0; + if (proc_mem_foll_force(file, mm)) + flags |= FOLL_FORCE;
while (count > 0) { size_t this_len = min_t(size_t, count, PAGE_SIZE); diff --git a/security/Kconfig b/security/Kconfig index 52c9af08ad35d..39af8b8696efb 100644 --- a/security/Kconfig +++ b/security/Kconfig @@ -19,6 +19,38 @@ config SECURITY_DMESG_RESTRICT
If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
+choice + prompt "Allow /proc/pid/mem access override" + default PROC_MEM_ALWAYS_FORCE + help + Traditionally /proc/pid/mem allows users to override memory + permissions for users like ptrace, assuming they have ptrace + capability. + + This allows people to limit that - either never override, or + require actual active ptrace attachment. + + Defaults to the traditional behavior (for now) + +config PROC_MEM_ALWAYS_FORCE + bool "Traditional /proc/pid/mem behavior" + help + This allows /proc/pid/mem accesses to override memory mapping + permissions if you have ptrace access rights. + +config PROC_MEM_FORCE_PTRACE + bool "Require active ptrace() use for access override" + help + This allows /proc/pid/mem accesses to override memory mapping + permissions for active ptracers like gdb. + +config PROC_MEM_NO_FORCE + bool "Never" + help + Never override memory mapping permissions + +endchoice + config SECURITY bool "Enable different security models" depends on SYSFS