From: Pawan Gupta pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com
commit 22cac9c677c95f3ac5c9244f8ca0afdc7c8afb19 upstream
Currently, Linux disables SRBDS mitigation on CPUs not affected by MDS and have the TSX feature disabled. On such CPUs, secrets cannot be extracted from CPU fill buffers using MDS or TAA. Without SRBDS mitigation, Processor MMIO Stale Data vulnerabilities can be used to extract RDRAND, RDSEED, and EGETKEY data.
Do not disable SRBDS mitigation by default when CPU is also affected by Processor MMIO Stale Data vulnerabilities.
Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov bp@suse.de Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner tglx@linutronix.de Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org --- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 8 +++++--- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c @@ -578,11 +578,13 @@ static void __init srbds_select_mitigati return;
/* - * Check to see if this is one of the MDS_NO systems supporting - * TSX that are only exposed to SRBDS when TSX is enabled. + * Check to see if this is one of the MDS_NO systems supporting TSX that + * are only exposed to SRBDS when TSX is enabled or when CPU is affected + * by Processor MMIO Stale Data vulnerability. */ ia32_cap = x86_read_arch_cap_msr(); - if ((ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_MDS_NO) && !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RTM)) + if ((ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_MDS_NO) && !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RTM) && + !boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MMIO_STALE_DATA)) srbds_mitigation = SRBDS_MITIGATION_TSX_OFF; else if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_HYPERVISOR)) srbds_mitigation = SRBDS_MITIGATION_HYPERVISOR;