diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst index 6bd97cd50d62..7e061ed449aa 100644 --- a/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst @@ -422,6 +422,14 @@ The possible values in this file are: 'RSB filling' Protection of RSB on context switch enabled ============= ===========================================
+ - EIBRS Post-barrier Return Stack Buffer (PBRSB) protection status: + + =========================== ======================================================= + 'PBRSB-eIBRS: SW sequence' CPU is affected and protection of RSB on VMEXIT enabled + 'PBRSB-eIBRS: Vulnerable' CPU is vulnerable + 'PBRSB-eIBRS: Not affected' CPU is not affected by PBRSB + =========================== ======================================================= + Full mitigation might require a microcode update from the CPU vendor. When the necessary microcode is not available, the kernel will report vulnerability. diff --git a/Makefile b/Makefile index 5f4dbcb43307..1730698124c7 100644 --- a/Makefile +++ b/Makefile @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ # SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 VERSION = 5 PATCHLEVEL = 10 -SUBLEVEL = 135 +SUBLEVEL = 136 EXTRAVERSION = NAME = Dare mighty things
diff --git a/arch/arm64/crypto/poly1305-glue.c b/arch/arm64/crypto/poly1305-glue.c index 01e22fe40823..9f4599014854 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/crypto/poly1305-glue.c +++ b/arch/arm64/crypto/poly1305-glue.c @@ -52,7 +52,7 @@ static void neon_poly1305_blocks(struct poly1305_desc_ctx *dctx, const u8 *src, { if (unlikely(!dctx->sset)) { if (!dctx->rset) { - poly1305_init_arch(dctx, src); + poly1305_init_arm64(&dctx->h, src); src += POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE; len -= POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE; dctx->rset = 1; diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig index 16c045906b2a..159646da3c6b 100644 --- a/arch/x86/Kconfig +++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig @@ -2447,7 +2447,7 @@ config RETPOLINE config RETHUNK bool "Enable return-thunks" depends on RETPOLINE && CC_HAS_RETURN_THUNK - default y + default y if X86_64 help Compile the kernel with the return-thunks compiler option to guard against kernel-to-user data leaks by avoiding return speculation. @@ -2456,21 +2456,21 @@ config RETHUNK
config CPU_UNRET_ENTRY bool "Enable UNRET on kernel entry" - depends on CPU_SUP_AMD && RETHUNK + depends on CPU_SUP_AMD && RETHUNK && X86_64 default y help Compile the kernel with support for the retbleed=unret mitigation.
config CPU_IBPB_ENTRY bool "Enable IBPB on kernel entry" - depends on CPU_SUP_AMD + depends on CPU_SUP_AMD && X86_64 default y help Compile the kernel with support for the retbleed=ibpb mitigation.
config CPU_IBRS_ENTRY bool "Enable IBRS on kernel entry" - depends on CPU_SUP_INTEL + depends on CPU_SUP_INTEL && X86_64 default y help Compile the kernel with support for the spectre_v2=ibrs mitigation. diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h index 2a51ee2f5a0f..37ba0cdf99aa 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h @@ -299,6 +299,7 @@ #define X86_FEATURE_RETHUNK (11*32+14) /* "" Use REturn THUNK */ #define X86_FEATURE_UNRET (11*32+15) /* "" AMD BTB untrain return */ #define X86_FEATURE_USE_IBPB_FW (11*32+16) /* "" Use IBPB during runtime firmware calls */ +#define X86_FEATURE_RSB_VMEXIT_LITE (11*32+17) /* "" Fill RSB on VM exit when EIBRS is enabled */
/* Intel-defined CPU features, CPUID level 0x00000007:1 (EAX), word 12 */ #define X86_FEATURE_AVX512_BF16 (12*32+ 5) /* AVX512 BFLOAT16 instructions */ @@ -429,5 +430,6 @@ #define X86_BUG_SRBDS X86_BUG(24) /* CPU may leak RNG bits if not mitigated */ #define X86_BUG_MMIO_STALE_DATA X86_BUG(25) /* CPU is affected by Processor MMIO Stale Data vulnerabilities */ #define X86_BUG_RETBLEED X86_BUG(26) /* CPU is affected by RETBleed */ +#define X86_BUG_EIBRS_PBRSB X86_BUG(27) /* EIBRS is vulnerable to Post Barrier RSB Predictions */
#endif /* _ASM_X86_CPUFEATURES_H */ diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h index 407de670cd60..144dc164b759 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h @@ -148,6 +148,10 @@ * are restricted to targets in * kernel. */ +#define ARCH_CAP_PBRSB_NO BIT(24) /* + * Not susceptible to Post-Barrier + * Return Stack Buffer Predictions. + */
#define MSR_IA32_FLUSH_CMD 0x0000010b #define L1D_FLUSH BIT(0) /* diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h index c3e8e50633ea..0acd99329923 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h @@ -60,7 +60,9 @@ 774: \ add $(BITS_PER_LONG/8) * 2, sp; \ dec reg; \ - jnz 771b; + jnz 771b; \ + /* barrier for jnz misprediction */ \ + lfence;
#ifdef __ASSEMBLY__
@@ -118,13 +120,28 @@ #endif .endm
+.macro ISSUE_UNBALANCED_RET_GUARD + ANNOTATE_INTRA_FUNCTION_CALL + call .Lunbalanced_ret_guard_@ + int3 +.Lunbalanced_ret_guard_@: + add $(BITS_PER_LONG/8), %_ASM_SP + lfence +.endm + /* * A simpler FILL_RETURN_BUFFER macro. Don't make people use the CPP * monstrosity above, manually. */ -.macro FILL_RETURN_BUFFER reg:req nr:req ftr:req +.macro FILL_RETURN_BUFFER reg:req nr:req ftr:req ftr2 +.ifb \ftr2 ALTERNATIVE "jmp .Lskip_rsb_@", "", \ftr +.else + ALTERNATIVE_2 "jmp .Lskip_rsb_@", "", \ftr, "jmp .Lunbalanced_@", \ftr2 +.endif __FILL_RETURN_BUFFER(\reg,\nr,%_ASM_SP) +.Lunbalanced_@: + ISSUE_UNBALANCED_RET_GUARD .Lskip_rsb_@: .endm
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c index 2e5762faf774..859a3f59526c 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c @@ -1291,6 +1291,53 @@ static void __init spec_ctrl_disable_kernel_rrsba(void) } }
+static void __init spectre_v2_determine_rsb_fill_type_at_vmexit(enum spectre_v2_mitigation mode) +{ + /* + * Similar to context switches, there are two types of RSB attacks + * after VM exit: + * + * 1) RSB underflow + * + * 2) Poisoned RSB entry + * + * When retpoline is enabled, both are mitigated by filling/clearing + * the RSB. + * + * When IBRS is enabled, while #1 would be mitigated by the IBRS branch + * prediction isolation protections, RSB still needs to be cleared + * because of #2. Note that SMEP provides no protection here, unlike + * user-space-poisoned RSB entries. + * + * eIBRS should protect against RSB poisoning, but if the EIBRS_PBRSB + * bug is present then a LITE version of RSB protection is required, + * just a single call needs to retire before a RET is executed. + */ + switch (mode) { + case SPECTRE_V2_NONE: + return; + + case SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_LFENCE: + case SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS: + if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_EIBRS_PBRSB)) { + setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RSB_VMEXIT_LITE); + pr_info("Spectre v2 / PBRSB-eIBRS: Retire a single CALL on VMEXIT\n"); + } + return; + + case SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_RETPOLINE: + case SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE: + case SPECTRE_V2_LFENCE: + case SPECTRE_V2_IBRS: + setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RSB_VMEXIT); + pr_info("Spectre v2 / SpectreRSB : Filling RSB on VMEXIT\n"); + return; + } + + pr_warn_once("Unknown Spectre v2 mode, disabling RSB mitigation at VM exit"); + dump_stack(); +} + static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void) { enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd cmd = spectre_v2_parse_cmdline(); @@ -1441,28 +1488,7 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void) setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RSB_CTXSW); pr_info("Spectre v2 / SpectreRSB mitigation: Filling RSB on context switch\n");
- /* - * Similar to context switches, there are two types of RSB attacks - * after vmexit: - * - * 1) RSB underflow - * - * 2) Poisoned RSB entry - * - * When retpoline is enabled, both are mitigated by filling/clearing - * the RSB. - * - * When IBRS is enabled, while #1 would be mitigated by the IBRS branch - * prediction isolation protections, RSB still needs to be cleared - * because of #2. Note that SMEP provides no protection here, unlike - * user-space-poisoned RSB entries. - * - * eIBRS, on the other hand, has RSB-poisoning protections, so it - * doesn't need RSB clearing after vmexit. - */ - if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE) || - boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_KERNEL_IBRS)) - setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RSB_VMEXIT); + spectre_v2_determine_rsb_fill_type_at_vmexit(mode);
/* * Retpoline protects the kernel, but doesn't protect firmware. IBRS @@ -2215,6 +2241,19 @@ static char *ibpb_state(void) return ""; }
+static char *pbrsb_eibrs_state(void) +{ + if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_EIBRS_PBRSB)) { + if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RSB_VMEXIT_LITE) || + boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RSB_VMEXIT)) + return ", PBRSB-eIBRS: SW sequence"; + else + return ", PBRSB-eIBRS: Vulnerable"; + } else { + return ", PBRSB-eIBRS: Not affected"; + } +} + static ssize_t spectre_v2_show_state(char *buf) { if (spectre_v2_enabled == SPECTRE_V2_LFENCE) @@ -2227,12 +2266,13 @@ static ssize_t spectre_v2_show_state(char *buf) spectre_v2_enabled == SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_LFENCE) return sprintf(buf, "Vulnerable: eIBRS+LFENCE with unprivileged eBPF and SMT\n");
- return sprintf(buf, "%s%s%s%s%s%s\n", + return sprintf(buf, "%s%s%s%s%s%s%s\n", spectre_v2_strings[spectre_v2_enabled], ibpb_state(), boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_USE_IBRS_FW) ? ", IBRS_FW" : "", stibp_state(), boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RSB_CTXSW) ? ", RSB filling" : "", + pbrsb_eibrs_state(), spectre_v2_module_string()); }
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c index 901352bd3b42..9fc91482e85e 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c @@ -1024,6 +1024,7 @@ static void identify_cpu_without_cpuid(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) #define NO_SWAPGS BIT(6) #define NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT BIT(7) #define NO_SPECTRE_V2 BIT(8) +#define NO_EIBRS_PBRSB BIT(9)
#define VULNWL(vendor, family, model, whitelist) \ X86_MATCH_VENDOR_FAM_MODEL(vendor, family, model, whitelist) @@ -1064,7 +1065,7 @@ static const __initconst struct x86_cpu_id cpu_vuln_whitelist[] = {
VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_GOLDMONT, NO_MDS | NO_L1TF | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT), VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_GOLDMONT_D, NO_MDS | NO_L1TF | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT), - VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_GOLDMONT_PLUS, NO_MDS | NO_L1TF | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT), + VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_GOLDMONT_PLUS, NO_MDS | NO_L1TF | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT | NO_EIBRS_PBRSB),
/* * Technically, swapgs isn't serializing on AMD (despite it previously @@ -1074,7 +1075,9 @@ static const __initconst struct x86_cpu_id cpu_vuln_whitelist[] = { * good enough for our purposes. */
- VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_TREMONT_D, NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT), + VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_TREMONT, NO_EIBRS_PBRSB), + VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_TREMONT_L, NO_EIBRS_PBRSB), + VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_TREMONT_D, NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT | NO_EIBRS_PBRSB),
/* AMD Family 0xf - 0x12 */ VULNWL_AMD(0x0f, NO_MELTDOWN | NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT), @@ -1252,6 +1255,11 @@ static void __init cpu_set_bug_bits(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_RETBLEED); }
+ if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_IBRS_ENHANCED) && + !cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_EIBRS_PBRSB) && + !(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_PBRSB_NO)) + setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_EIBRS_PBRSB); + if (cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_MELTDOWN)) return;
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmenter.S b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmenter.S index 857fa0fc49fa..982138bebb70 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmenter.S +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmenter.S @@ -197,11 +197,13 @@ SYM_INNER_LABEL(vmx_vmexit, SYM_L_GLOBAL) * entries and (in some cases) RSB underflow. * * eIBRS has its own protection against poisoned RSB, so it doesn't - * need the RSB filling sequence. But it does need to be enabled - * before the first unbalanced RET. + * need the RSB filling sequence. But it does need to be enabled, and a + * single call to retire, before the first unbalanced RET. */
- FILL_RETURN_BUFFER %_ASM_CX, RSB_CLEAR_LOOPS, X86_FEATURE_RSB_VMEXIT + FILL_RETURN_BUFFER %_ASM_CX, RSB_CLEAR_LOOPS, X86_FEATURE_RSB_VMEXIT,\ + X86_FEATURE_RSB_VMEXIT_LITE +
pop %_ASM_ARG2 /* @flags */ pop %_ASM_ARG1 /* @vmx */ diff --git a/drivers/acpi/apei/bert.c b/drivers/acpi/apei/bert.c index 598fd19b65fa..45973aa6e06d 100644 --- a/drivers/acpi/apei/bert.c +++ b/drivers/acpi/apei/bert.c @@ -29,16 +29,26 @@
#undef pr_fmt #define pr_fmt(fmt) "BERT: " fmt + +#define ACPI_BERT_PRINT_MAX_RECORDS 5 #define ACPI_BERT_PRINT_MAX_LEN 1024
static int bert_disable;
+/* + * Print "all" the error records in the BERT table, but avoid huge spam to + * the console if the BIOS included oversize records, or too many records. + * Skipping some records here does not lose anything because the full + * data is available to user tools in: + * /sys/firmware/acpi/tables/data/BERT + */ static void __init bert_print_all(struct acpi_bert_region *region, unsigned int region_len) { struct acpi_hest_generic_status *estatus = (struct acpi_hest_generic_status *)region; int remain = region_len; + int printed = 0, skipped = 0; u32 estatus_len;
while (remain >= sizeof(struct acpi_bert_region)) { @@ -46,24 +56,26 @@ static void __init bert_print_all(struct acpi_bert_region *region, if (remain < estatus_len) { pr_err(FW_BUG "Truncated status block (length: %u).\n", estatus_len); - return; + break; }
/* No more error records. */ if (!estatus->block_status) - return; + break;
if (cper_estatus_check(estatus)) { pr_err(FW_BUG "Invalid error record.\n"); - return; + break; }
- pr_info_once("Error records from previous boot:\n"); - if (region_len < ACPI_BERT_PRINT_MAX_LEN) + if (estatus_len < ACPI_BERT_PRINT_MAX_LEN && + printed < ACPI_BERT_PRINT_MAX_RECORDS) { + pr_info_once("Error records from previous boot:\n"); cper_estatus_print(KERN_INFO HW_ERR, estatus); - else - pr_info_once("Max print length exceeded, table data is available at:\n" - "/sys/firmware/acpi/tables/data/BERT"); + printed++; + } else { + skipped++; + }
/* * Because the boot error source is "one-time polled" type, @@ -75,6 +87,9 @@ static void __init bert_print_all(struct acpi_bert_region *region, estatus = (void *)estatus + estatus_len; remain -= estatus_len; } + + if (skipped) + pr_info(HW_ERR "Skipped %d error records\n", skipped); }
static int __init setup_bert_disable(char *str) diff --git a/drivers/acpi/video_detect.c b/drivers/acpi/video_detect.c index 7b9793cb55c5..e39d59ad6496 100644 --- a/drivers/acpi/video_detect.c +++ b/drivers/acpi/video_detect.c @@ -424,7 +424,6 @@ static const struct dmi_system_id video_detect_dmi_table[] = { .callback = video_detect_force_native, .ident = "Clevo NL5xRU", .matches = { - DMI_MATCH(DMI_SYS_VENDOR, "TUXEDO"), DMI_MATCH(DMI_BOARD_NAME, "NL5xRU"), }, }, @@ -432,59 +431,75 @@ static const struct dmi_system_id video_detect_dmi_table[] = { .callback = video_detect_force_native, .ident = "Clevo NL5xRU", .matches = { - DMI_MATCH(DMI_SYS_VENDOR, "SchenkerTechnologiesGmbH"), - DMI_MATCH(DMI_BOARD_NAME, "NL5xRU"), + DMI_MATCH(DMI_SYS_VENDOR, "TUXEDO"), + DMI_MATCH(DMI_BOARD_NAME, "AURA1501"), }, }, { .callback = video_detect_force_native, .ident = "Clevo NL5xRU", .matches = { - DMI_MATCH(DMI_SYS_VENDOR, "Notebook"), - DMI_MATCH(DMI_BOARD_NAME, "NL5xRU"), + DMI_MATCH(DMI_SYS_VENDOR, "TUXEDO"), + DMI_MATCH(DMI_BOARD_NAME, "EDUBOOK1502"), }, }, { .callback = video_detect_force_native, - .ident = "Clevo NL5xRU", + .ident = "Clevo NL5xNU", .matches = { - DMI_MATCH(DMI_SYS_VENDOR, "TUXEDO"), - DMI_MATCH(DMI_BOARD_NAME, "AURA1501"), + DMI_MATCH(DMI_BOARD_NAME, "NL5xNU"), }, }, + /* + * The TongFang PF5PU1G, PF4NU1F, PF5NU1G, and PF5LUXG/TUXEDO BA15 Gen10, + * Pulse 14/15 Gen1, and Pulse 15 Gen2 have the same problem as the Clevo + * NL5xRU and NL5xNU/TUXEDO Aura 15 Gen1 and Gen2. See the description + * above. + */ { .callback = video_detect_force_native, - .ident = "Clevo NL5xRU", + .ident = "TongFang PF5PU1G", .matches = { - DMI_MATCH(DMI_SYS_VENDOR, "TUXEDO"), - DMI_MATCH(DMI_BOARD_NAME, "EDUBOOK1502"), + DMI_MATCH(DMI_BOARD_NAME, "PF5PU1G"), }, }, { .callback = video_detect_force_native, - .ident = "Clevo NL5xNU", + .ident = "TongFang PF4NU1F", + .matches = { + DMI_MATCH(DMI_BOARD_NAME, "PF4NU1F"), + }, + }, + { + .callback = video_detect_force_native, + .ident = "TongFang PF4NU1F", .matches = { DMI_MATCH(DMI_SYS_VENDOR, "TUXEDO"), - DMI_MATCH(DMI_BOARD_NAME, "NL5xNU"), + DMI_MATCH(DMI_BOARD_NAME, "PULSE1401"), }, }, { .callback = video_detect_force_native, - .ident = "Clevo NL5xNU", + .ident = "TongFang PF5NU1G", .matches = { - DMI_MATCH(DMI_SYS_VENDOR, "SchenkerTechnologiesGmbH"), - DMI_MATCH(DMI_BOARD_NAME, "NL5xNU"), + DMI_MATCH(DMI_BOARD_NAME, "PF5NU1G"), }, }, { .callback = video_detect_force_native, - .ident = "Clevo NL5xNU", + .ident = "TongFang PF5NU1G", .matches = { - DMI_MATCH(DMI_SYS_VENDOR, "Notebook"), - DMI_MATCH(DMI_BOARD_NAME, "NL5xNU"), + DMI_MATCH(DMI_SYS_VENDOR, "TUXEDO"), + DMI_MATCH(DMI_BOARD_NAME, "PULSE1501"), + }, + }, + { + .callback = video_detect_force_native, + .ident = "TongFang PF5LUXG", + .matches = { + DMI_MATCH(DMI_BOARD_NAME, "PF5LUXG"), }, }, - /* * Desktops which falsely report a backlight and which our heuristics * for this do not catch. diff --git a/drivers/bluetooth/btbcm.c b/drivers/bluetooth/btbcm.c index 1b9743b7f2ef..d263eac784da 100644 --- a/drivers/bluetooth/btbcm.c +++ b/drivers/bluetooth/btbcm.c @@ -401,6 +401,8 @@ static const struct bcm_subver_table bcm_uart_subver_table[] = { { 0x6606, "BCM4345C5" }, /* 003.006.006 */ { 0x230f, "BCM4356A2" }, /* 001.003.015 */ { 0x220e, "BCM20702A1" }, /* 001.002.014 */ + { 0x420d, "BCM4349B1" }, /* 002.002.013 */ + { 0x420e, "BCM4349B1" }, /* 002.002.014 */ { 0x4217, "BCM4329B1" }, /* 002.002.023 */ { 0x6106, "BCM4359C0" }, /* 003.001.006 */ { 0x4106, "BCM4335A0" }, /* 002.001.006 */ diff --git a/drivers/bluetooth/btusb.c b/drivers/bluetooth/btusb.c index 538232b4c42a..a699e6166aef 100644 --- a/drivers/bluetooth/btusb.c +++ b/drivers/bluetooth/btusb.c @@ -399,6 +399,18 @@ static const struct usb_device_id blacklist_table[] = { { USB_DEVICE(0x0bda, 0xc822), .driver_info = BTUSB_REALTEK | BTUSB_WIDEBAND_SPEECH },
+ /* Realtek 8852CE Bluetooth devices */ + { USB_DEVICE(0x04ca, 0x4007), .driver_info = BTUSB_REALTEK | + BTUSB_WIDEBAND_SPEECH }, + { USB_DEVICE(0x04c5, 0x1675), .driver_info = BTUSB_REALTEK | + BTUSB_WIDEBAND_SPEECH }, + { USB_DEVICE(0x0cb8, 0xc558), .driver_info = BTUSB_REALTEK | + BTUSB_WIDEBAND_SPEECH }, + { USB_DEVICE(0x13d3, 0x3587), .driver_info = BTUSB_REALTEK | + BTUSB_WIDEBAND_SPEECH }, + { USB_DEVICE(0x13d3, 0x3586), .driver_info = BTUSB_REALTEK | + BTUSB_WIDEBAND_SPEECH }, + /* Realtek Bluetooth devices */ { USB_VENDOR_AND_INTERFACE_INFO(0x0bda, 0xe0, 0x01, 0x01), .driver_info = BTUSB_REALTEK }, @@ -416,6 +428,9 @@ static const struct usb_device_id blacklist_table[] = { { USB_DEVICE(0x0489, 0xe0d9), .driver_info = BTUSB_MEDIATEK | BTUSB_WIDEBAND_SPEECH | BTUSB_VALID_LE_STATES }, + { USB_DEVICE(0x13d3, 0x3568), .driver_info = BTUSB_MEDIATEK | + BTUSB_WIDEBAND_SPEECH | + BTUSB_VALID_LE_STATES },
/* Additional Realtek 8723AE Bluetooth devices */ { USB_DEVICE(0x0930, 0x021d), .driver_info = BTUSB_REALTEK }, diff --git a/drivers/bluetooth/hci_bcm.c b/drivers/bluetooth/hci_bcm.c index 259a643377c2..3f6e96a4e114 100644 --- a/drivers/bluetooth/hci_bcm.c +++ b/drivers/bluetooth/hci_bcm.c @@ -1489,8 +1489,10 @@ static const struct of_device_id bcm_bluetooth_of_match[] = { { .compatible = "brcm,bcm4345c5" }, { .compatible = "brcm,bcm4330-bt" }, { .compatible = "brcm,bcm43438-bt", .data = &bcm43438_device_data }, + { .compatible = "brcm,bcm4349-bt", .data = &bcm43438_device_data }, { .compatible = "brcm,bcm43540-bt", .data = &bcm4354_device_data }, { .compatible = "brcm,bcm4335a0" }, + { .compatible = "infineon,cyw55572-bt" }, { }, }; MODULE_DEVICE_TABLE(of, bcm_bluetooth_of_match); diff --git a/drivers/macintosh/adb.c b/drivers/macintosh/adb.c index 73b396189039..afb0942ccc29 100644 --- a/drivers/macintosh/adb.c +++ b/drivers/macintosh/adb.c @@ -647,7 +647,7 @@ do_adb_query(struct adb_request *req)
switch(req->data[1]) { case ADB_QUERY_GETDEVINFO: - if (req->nbytes < 3) + if (req->nbytes < 3 || req->data[2] >= 16) break; mutex_lock(&adb_handler_mutex); req->reply[0] = adb_handler[req->data[2]].original_address; diff --git a/drivers/net/tun.c b/drivers/net/tun.c index be9ff6a74ecc..a643b2f2f4de 100644 --- a/drivers/net/tun.c +++ b/drivers/net/tun.c @@ -220,6 +220,9 @@ struct tun_struct { struct tun_prog __rcu *steering_prog; struct tun_prog __rcu *filter_prog; struct ethtool_link_ksettings link_ksettings; + /* init args */ + struct file *file; + struct ifreq *ifr; };
struct veth { @@ -227,6 +230,9 @@ struct veth { __be16 h_vlan_TCI; };
+static void tun_flow_init(struct tun_struct *tun); +static void tun_flow_uninit(struct tun_struct *tun); + static int tun_napi_receive(struct napi_struct *napi, int budget) { struct tun_file *tfile = container_of(napi, struct tun_file, napi); @@ -975,6 +981,49 @@ static int check_filter(struct tap_filter *filter, const struct sk_buff *skb)
static const struct ethtool_ops tun_ethtool_ops;
+static int tun_net_init(struct net_device *dev) +{ + struct tun_struct *tun = netdev_priv(dev); + struct ifreq *ifr = tun->ifr; + int err; + + tun->pcpu_stats = netdev_alloc_pcpu_stats(struct tun_pcpu_stats); + if (!tun->pcpu_stats) + return -ENOMEM; + + spin_lock_init(&tun->lock); + + err = security_tun_dev_alloc_security(&tun->security); + if (err < 0) { + free_percpu(tun->pcpu_stats); + return err; + } + + tun_flow_init(tun); + + dev->hw_features = NETIF_F_SG | NETIF_F_FRAGLIST | + TUN_USER_FEATURES | NETIF_F_HW_VLAN_CTAG_TX | + NETIF_F_HW_VLAN_STAG_TX; + dev->features = dev->hw_features | NETIF_F_LLTX; + dev->vlan_features = dev->features & + ~(NETIF_F_HW_VLAN_CTAG_TX | + NETIF_F_HW_VLAN_STAG_TX); + + tun->flags = (tun->flags & ~TUN_FEATURES) | + (ifr->ifr_flags & TUN_FEATURES); + + INIT_LIST_HEAD(&tun->disabled); + err = tun_attach(tun, tun->file, false, ifr->ifr_flags & IFF_NAPI, + ifr->ifr_flags & IFF_NAPI_FRAGS, false); + if (err < 0) { + tun_flow_uninit(tun); + security_tun_dev_free_security(tun->security); + free_percpu(tun->pcpu_stats); + return err; + } + return 0; +} + /* Net device detach from fd. */ static void tun_net_uninit(struct net_device *dev) { @@ -1216,6 +1265,7 @@ static int tun_net_change_carrier(struct net_device *dev, bool new_carrier) }
static const struct net_device_ops tun_netdev_ops = { + .ndo_init = tun_net_init, .ndo_uninit = tun_net_uninit, .ndo_open = tun_net_open, .ndo_stop = tun_net_close, @@ -1296,6 +1346,7 @@ static int tun_xdp_tx(struct net_device *dev, struct xdp_buff *xdp) }
static const struct net_device_ops tap_netdev_ops = { + .ndo_init = tun_net_init, .ndo_uninit = tun_net_uninit, .ndo_open = tun_net_open, .ndo_stop = tun_net_close, @@ -1336,7 +1387,7 @@ static void tun_flow_uninit(struct tun_struct *tun) #define MAX_MTU 65535
/* Initialize net device. */ -static void tun_net_init(struct net_device *dev) +static void tun_net_initialize(struct net_device *dev) { struct tun_struct *tun = netdev_priv(dev);
@@ -2268,10 +2319,6 @@ static void tun_free_netdev(struct net_device *dev) BUG_ON(!(list_empty(&tun->disabled)));
free_percpu(tun->pcpu_stats); - /* We clear pcpu_stats so that tun_set_iff() can tell if - * tun_free_netdev() has been called from register_netdevice(). - */ - tun->pcpu_stats = NULL;
tun_flow_uninit(tun); security_tun_dev_free_security(tun->security); @@ -2784,41 +2831,16 @@ static int tun_set_iff(struct net *net, struct file *file, struct ifreq *ifr) tun->rx_batched = 0; RCU_INIT_POINTER(tun->steering_prog, NULL);
- tun->pcpu_stats = netdev_alloc_pcpu_stats(struct tun_pcpu_stats); - if (!tun->pcpu_stats) { - err = -ENOMEM; - goto err_free_dev; - } + tun->ifr = ifr; + tun->file = file;
- spin_lock_init(&tun->lock); - - err = security_tun_dev_alloc_security(&tun->security); - if (err < 0) - goto err_free_stat; - - tun_net_init(dev); - tun_flow_init(tun); - - dev->hw_features = NETIF_F_SG | NETIF_F_FRAGLIST | - TUN_USER_FEATURES | NETIF_F_HW_VLAN_CTAG_TX | - NETIF_F_HW_VLAN_STAG_TX; - dev->features = dev->hw_features | NETIF_F_LLTX; - dev->vlan_features = dev->features & - ~(NETIF_F_HW_VLAN_CTAG_TX | - NETIF_F_HW_VLAN_STAG_TX); - - tun->flags = (tun->flags & ~TUN_FEATURES) | - (ifr->ifr_flags & TUN_FEATURES); - - INIT_LIST_HEAD(&tun->disabled); - err = tun_attach(tun, file, false, ifr->ifr_flags & IFF_NAPI, - ifr->ifr_flags & IFF_NAPI_FRAGS, false); - if (err < 0) - goto err_free_flow; + tun_net_initialize(dev);
err = register_netdevice(tun->dev); - if (err < 0) - goto err_detach; + if (err < 0) { + free_netdev(dev); + return err; + } /* free_netdev() won't check refcnt, to aovid race * with dev_put() we need publish tun after registration. */ @@ -2835,24 +2857,6 @@ static int tun_set_iff(struct net *net, struct file *file, struct ifreq *ifr)
strcpy(ifr->ifr_name, tun->dev->name); return 0; - -err_detach: - tun_detach_all(dev); - /* We are here because register_netdevice() has failed. - * If register_netdevice() already called tun_free_netdev() - * while dealing with the error, tun->pcpu_stats has been cleared. - */ - if (!tun->pcpu_stats) - goto err_free_dev; - -err_free_flow: - tun_flow_uninit(tun); - security_tun_dev_free_security(tun->security); -err_free_stat: - free_percpu(tun->pcpu_stats); -err_free_dev: - free_netdev(dev); - return err; }
static void tun_get_iff(struct tun_struct *tun, struct ifreq *ifr) diff --git a/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath9k/htc.h b/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath9k/htc.h index 0a1634238e67..6b45e63fae4b 100644 --- a/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath9k/htc.h +++ b/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath9k/htc.h @@ -281,6 +281,7 @@ struct ath9k_htc_rxbuf { struct ath9k_htc_rx { struct list_head rxbuf; spinlock_t rxbuflock; + bool initialized; };
#define ATH9K_HTC_TX_CLEANUP_INTERVAL 50 /* ms */ @@ -305,6 +306,7 @@ struct ath9k_htc_tx { DECLARE_BITMAP(tx_slot, MAX_TX_BUF_NUM); struct timer_list cleanup_timer; spinlock_t tx_lock; + bool initialized; };
struct ath9k_htc_tx_ctl { diff --git a/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath9k/htc_drv_txrx.c b/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath9k/htc_drv_txrx.c index 30ddf333e04d..43a743ec9d9e 100644 --- a/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath9k/htc_drv_txrx.c +++ b/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath9k/htc_drv_txrx.c @@ -808,6 +808,11 @@ int ath9k_tx_init(struct ath9k_htc_priv *priv) skb_queue_head_init(&priv->tx.data_vi_queue); skb_queue_head_init(&priv->tx.data_vo_queue); skb_queue_head_init(&priv->tx.tx_failed); + + /* Allow ath9k_wmi_event_tasklet(WMI_TXSTATUS_EVENTID) to operate. */ + smp_wmb(); + priv->tx.initialized = true; + return 0; }
@@ -1133,6 +1138,10 @@ void ath9k_htc_rxep(void *drv_priv, struct sk_buff *skb, struct ath9k_htc_rxbuf *rxbuf = NULL, *tmp_buf = NULL; unsigned long flags;
+ /* Check if ath9k_rx_init() completed. */ + if (!data_race(priv->rx.initialized)) + goto err; + spin_lock_irqsave(&priv->rx.rxbuflock, flags); list_for_each_entry(tmp_buf, &priv->rx.rxbuf, list) { if (!tmp_buf->in_process) { @@ -1188,6 +1197,10 @@ int ath9k_rx_init(struct ath9k_htc_priv *priv) list_add_tail(&rxbuf->list, &priv->rx.rxbuf); }
+ /* Allow ath9k_htc_rxep() to operate. */ + smp_wmb(); + priv->rx.initialized = true; + return 0;
err: diff --git a/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath9k/wmi.c b/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath9k/wmi.c index fe29ad4b9023..f315c54bd3ac 100644 --- a/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath9k/wmi.c +++ b/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath9k/wmi.c @@ -169,6 +169,10 @@ void ath9k_wmi_event_tasklet(struct tasklet_struct *t) &wmi->drv_priv->fatal_work); break; case WMI_TXSTATUS_EVENTID: + /* Check if ath9k_tx_init() completed. */ + if (!data_race(priv->tx.initialized)) + break; + spin_lock_bh(&priv->tx.tx_lock); if (priv->tx.flags & ATH9K_HTC_OP_TX_DRAIN) { spin_unlock_bh(&priv->tx.tx_lock); diff --git a/tools/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h b/tools/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h index 54ba20492ad1..ec53f52a06a5 100644 --- a/tools/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h +++ b/tools/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h @@ -296,6 +296,7 @@ #define X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_LFENCE (11*32+13) /* "" Use LFENCE for Spectre variant 2 */ #define X86_FEATURE_RETHUNK (11*32+14) /* "" Use REturn THUNK */ #define X86_FEATURE_UNRET (11*32+15) /* "" AMD BTB untrain return */ +#define X86_FEATURE_RSB_VMEXIT_LITE (11*32+17) /* "" Fill RSB on VM-Exit when EIBRS is enabled */
/* Intel-defined CPU features, CPUID level 0x00000007:1 (EAX), word 12 */ #define X86_FEATURE_AVX512_BF16 (12*32+ 5) /* AVX512 BFLOAT16 instructions */ diff --git a/tools/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h b/tools/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h index 407de670cd60..144dc164b759 100644 --- a/tools/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h +++ b/tools/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h @@ -148,6 +148,10 @@ * are restricted to targets in * kernel. */ +#define ARCH_CAP_PBRSB_NO BIT(24) /* + * Not susceptible to Post-Barrier + * Return Stack Buffer Predictions. + */
#define MSR_IA32_FLUSH_CMD 0x0000010b #define L1D_FLUSH BIT(0) /* diff --git a/tools/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h b/tools/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h index b9ee2ded381a..7943e748916d 100644 --- a/tools/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h +++ b/tools/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h @@ -4180,7 +4180,8 @@ struct bpf_sock { __u32 src_ip4; __u32 src_ip6[4]; __u32 src_port; /* host byte order */ - __u32 dst_port; /* network byte order */ + __be16 dst_port; /* network byte order */ + __u16 :16; /* zero padding */ __u32 dst_ip4; __u32 dst_ip6[4]; __u32 state; diff --git a/tools/kvm/kvm_stat/kvm_stat b/tools/kvm/kvm_stat/kvm_stat index b0bf56c5f120..a1efcfbd8b9e 100755 --- a/tools/kvm/kvm_stat/kvm_stat +++ b/tools/kvm/kvm_stat/kvm_stat @@ -1646,7 +1646,8 @@ Press any other key to refresh statistics immediately. .format(values)) if len(pids) > 1: sys.exit('Error: Multiple processes found (pids: {}). Use "-p"' - ' to specify the desired pid'.format(" ".join(pids))) + ' to specify the desired pid' + .format(" ".join(map(str, pids)))) namespace.pid = pids[0]
argparser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description=description_text, diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/sock_fields.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/sock_fields.c index af87118e748e..e8b5bf707cd4 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/sock_fields.c +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/sock_fields.c @@ -1,9 +1,11 @@ // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 /* Copyright (c) 2019 Facebook */
+#define _GNU_SOURCE #include <netinet/in.h> #include <arpa/inet.h> #include <unistd.h> +#include <sched.h> #include <stdlib.h> #include <string.h> #include <errno.h> @@ -21,6 +23,7 @@ enum bpf_linum_array_idx { EGRESS_LINUM_IDX, INGRESS_LINUM_IDX, + READ_SK_DST_PORT_LINUM_IDX, __NR_BPF_LINUM_ARRAY_IDX, };
@@ -43,8 +46,16 @@ static __u64 child_cg_id; static int linum_map_fd; static __u32 duration;
-static __u32 egress_linum_idx = EGRESS_LINUM_IDX; -static __u32 ingress_linum_idx = INGRESS_LINUM_IDX; +static bool create_netns(void) +{ + if (!ASSERT_OK(unshare(CLONE_NEWNET), "create netns")) + return false; + + if (!ASSERT_OK(system("ip link set dev lo up"), "bring up lo")) + return false; + + return true; +}
static void print_sk(const struct bpf_sock *sk, const char *prefix) { @@ -92,19 +103,24 @@ static void check_result(void) { struct bpf_tcp_sock srv_tp, cli_tp, listen_tp; struct bpf_sock srv_sk, cli_sk, listen_sk; - __u32 ingress_linum, egress_linum; + __u32 idx, ingress_linum, egress_linum, linum; int err;
- err = bpf_map_lookup_elem(linum_map_fd, &egress_linum_idx, - &egress_linum); + idx = EGRESS_LINUM_IDX; + err = bpf_map_lookup_elem(linum_map_fd, &idx, &egress_linum); CHECK(err == -1, "bpf_map_lookup_elem(linum_map_fd)", "err:%d errno:%d\n", err, errno);
- err = bpf_map_lookup_elem(linum_map_fd, &ingress_linum_idx, - &ingress_linum); + idx = INGRESS_LINUM_IDX; + err = bpf_map_lookup_elem(linum_map_fd, &idx, &ingress_linum); CHECK(err == -1, "bpf_map_lookup_elem(linum_map_fd)", "err:%d errno:%d\n", err, errno);
+ idx = READ_SK_DST_PORT_LINUM_IDX; + err = bpf_map_lookup_elem(linum_map_fd, &idx, &linum); + ASSERT_OK(err, "bpf_map_lookup_elem(linum_map_fd, READ_SK_DST_PORT_IDX)"); + ASSERT_EQ(linum, 0, "failure in read_sk_dst_port on line"); + memcpy(&srv_sk, &skel->bss->srv_sk, sizeof(srv_sk)); memcpy(&srv_tp, &skel->bss->srv_tp, sizeof(srv_tp)); memcpy(&cli_sk, &skel->bss->cli_sk, sizeof(cli_sk)); @@ -263,7 +279,7 @@ static void test(void) char buf[DATA_LEN];
/* Prepare listen_fd */ - listen_fd = start_server(AF_INET6, SOCK_STREAM, "::1", 0, 0); + listen_fd = start_server(AF_INET6, SOCK_STREAM, "::1", 0xcafe, 0); /* start_server() has logged the error details */ if (CHECK_FAIL(listen_fd == -1)) goto done; @@ -331,8 +347,12 @@ static void test(void)
void test_sock_fields(void) { - struct bpf_link *egress_link = NULL, *ingress_link = NULL; int parent_cg_fd = -1, child_cg_fd = -1; + struct bpf_link *link; + + /* Use a dedicated netns to have a fixed listen port */ + if (!create_netns()) + return;
/* Create a cgroup, get fd, and join it */ parent_cg_fd = test__join_cgroup(PARENT_CGROUP); @@ -353,17 +373,20 @@ void test_sock_fields(void) if (CHECK(!skel, "test_sock_fields__open_and_load", "failed\n")) goto done;
- egress_link = bpf_program__attach_cgroup(skel->progs.egress_read_sock_fields, - child_cg_fd); - if (CHECK(IS_ERR(egress_link), "attach_cgroup(egress)", "err:%ld\n", - PTR_ERR(egress_link))) + link = bpf_program__attach_cgroup(skel->progs.egress_read_sock_fields, child_cg_fd); + if (!ASSERT_OK_PTR(link, "attach_cgroup(egress_read_sock_fields)")) + goto done; + skel->links.egress_read_sock_fields = link; + + link = bpf_program__attach_cgroup(skel->progs.ingress_read_sock_fields, child_cg_fd); + if (!ASSERT_OK_PTR(link, "attach_cgroup(ingress_read_sock_fields)")) goto done; + skel->links.ingress_read_sock_fields = link;
- ingress_link = bpf_program__attach_cgroup(skel->progs.ingress_read_sock_fields, - child_cg_fd); - if (CHECK(IS_ERR(ingress_link), "attach_cgroup(ingress)", "err:%ld\n", - PTR_ERR(ingress_link))) + link = bpf_program__attach_cgroup(skel->progs.read_sk_dst_port, child_cg_fd); + if (!ASSERT_OK_PTR(link, "attach_cgroup(read_sk_dst_port")) goto done; + skel->links.read_sk_dst_port = link;
linum_map_fd = bpf_map__fd(skel->maps.linum_map); sk_pkt_out_cnt_fd = bpf_map__fd(skel->maps.sk_pkt_out_cnt); @@ -372,8 +395,7 @@ void test_sock_fields(void) test();
done: - bpf_link__destroy(egress_link); - bpf_link__destroy(ingress_link); + test_sock_fields__detach(skel); test_sock_fields__destroy(skel); if (child_cg_fd != -1) close(child_cg_fd); diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_sock_fields.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_sock_fields.c index 7967348b11af..43b31aa1fcf7 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_sock_fields.c +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_sock_fields.c @@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ enum bpf_linum_array_idx { EGRESS_LINUM_IDX, INGRESS_LINUM_IDX, + READ_SK_DST_PORT_LINUM_IDX, __NR_BPF_LINUM_ARRAY_IDX, };
@@ -250,4 +251,48 @@ int ingress_read_sock_fields(struct __sk_buff *skb) return CG_OK; }
+static __noinline bool sk_dst_port__load_word(struct bpf_sock *sk) +{ + __u32 *word = (__u32 *)&sk->dst_port; + return word[0] == bpf_htonl(0xcafe0000); +} + +static __noinline bool sk_dst_port__load_half(struct bpf_sock *sk) +{ + __u16 *half = (__u16 *)&sk->dst_port; + return half[0] == bpf_htons(0xcafe); +} + +static __noinline bool sk_dst_port__load_byte(struct bpf_sock *sk) +{ + __u8 *byte = (__u8 *)&sk->dst_port; + return byte[0] == 0xca && byte[1] == 0xfe; +} + +SEC("cgroup_skb/egress") +int read_sk_dst_port(struct __sk_buff *skb) +{ + __u32 linum, linum_idx; + struct bpf_sock *sk; + + linum_idx = READ_SK_DST_PORT_LINUM_IDX; + + sk = skb->sk; + if (!sk) + RET_LOG(); + + /* Ignore everything but the SYN from the client socket */ + if (sk->state != BPF_TCP_SYN_SENT) + return CG_OK; + + if (!sk_dst_port__load_word(sk)) + RET_LOG(); + if (!sk_dst_port__load_half(sk)) + RET_LOG(); + if (!sk_dst_port__load_byte(sk)) + RET_LOG(); + + return CG_OK; +} + char _license[] SEC("license") = "GPL"; diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/sock.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/sock.c index ce13ece08d51..8c224eac93df 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/sock.c +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/sock.c @@ -121,7 +121,25 @@ .result = ACCEPT, }, { - "sk_fullsock(skb->sk): sk->dst_port [narrow load]", + "sk_fullsock(skb->sk): sk->dst_port [word load] (backward compatibility)", + .insns = { + BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_1, offsetof(struct __sk_buff, sk)), + BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JNE, BPF_REG_1, 0, 2), + BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0), + BPF_EXIT_INSN(), + BPF_EMIT_CALL(BPF_FUNC_sk_fullsock), + BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JNE, BPF_REG_0, 0, 2), + BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0), + BPF_EXIT_INSN(), + BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_W, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_0, offsetof(struct bpf_sock, dst_port)), + BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0), + BPF_EXIT_INSN(), + }, + .prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SKB, + .result = ACCEPT, +}, +{ + "sk_fullsock(skb->sk): sk->dst_port [half load]", .insns = { BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_1, offsetof(struct __sk_buff, sk)), BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JNE, BPF_REG_1, 0, 2), @@ -139,7 +157,64 @@ .result = ACCEPT, }, { - "sk_fullsock(skb->sk): sk->dst_port [load 2nd byte]", + "sk_fullsock(skb->sk): sk->dst_port [half load] (invalid)", + .insns = { + BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_1, offsetof(struct __sk_buff, sk)), + BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JNE, BPF_REG_1, 0, 2), + BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0), + BPF_EXIT_INSN(), + BPF_EMIT_CALL(BPF_FUNC_sk_fullsock), + BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JNE, BPF_REG_0, 0, 2), + BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0), + BPF_EXIT_INSN(), + BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_H, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_0, offsetof(struct bpf_sock, dst_port) + 2), + BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0), + BPF_EXIT_INSN(), + }, + .prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SKB, + .result = REJECT, + .errstr = "invalid sock access", +}, +{ + "sk_fullsock(skb->sk): sk->dst_port [byte load]", + .insns = { + BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_1, offsetof(struct __sk_buff, sk)), + BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JNE, BPF_REG_1, 0, 2), + BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0), + BPF_EXIT_INSN(), + BPF_EMIT_CALL(BPF_FUNC_sk_fullsock), + BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JNE, BPF_REG_0, 0, 2), + BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0), + BPF_EXIT_INSN(), + BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_B, BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_0, offsetof(struct bpf_sock, dst_port)), + BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_B, BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_0, offsetof(struct bpf_sock, dst_port) + 1), + BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0), + BPF_EXIT_INSN(), + }, + .prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SKB, + .result = ACCEPT, +}, +{ + "sk_fullsock(skb->sk): sk->dst_port [byte load] (invalid)", + .insns = { + BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_1, offsetof(struct __sk_buff, sk)), + BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JNE, BPF_REG_1, 0, 2), + BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0), + BPF_EXIT_INSN(), + BPF_EMIT_CALL(BPF_FUNC_sk_fullsock), + BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JNE, BPF_REG_0, 0, 2), + BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0), + BPF_EXIT_INSN(), + BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_B, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_0, offsetof(struct bpf_sock, dst_port) + 2), + BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0), + BPF_EXIT_INSN(), + }, + .prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SKB, + .result = REJECT, + .errstr = "invalid sock access", +}, +{ + "sk_fullsock(skb->sk): past sk->dst_port [half load] (invalid)", .insns = { BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_1, offsetof(struct __sk_buff, sk)), BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JNE, BPF_REG_1, 0, 2), @@ -149,7 +224,7 @@ BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JNE, BPF_REG_0, 0, 2), BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0), BPF_EXIT_INSN(), - BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_B, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_0, offsetof(struct bpf_sock, dst_port) + 1), + BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_H, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_0, offsetofend(struct bpf_sock, dst_port)), BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0), BPF_EXIT_INSN(), }, diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/aarch64/ucall.c b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/aarch64/ucall.c index 2f37b90ee1a9..f600311fdc6a 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/aarch64/ucall.c +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/aarch64/ucall.c @@ -73,20 +73,19 @@ void ucall_uninit(struct kvm_vm *vm)
void ucall(uint64_t cmd, int nargs, ...) { - struct ucall uc = { - .cmd = cmd, - }; + struct ucall uc = {}; va_list va; int i;
+ WRITE_ONCE(uc.cmd, cmd); nargs = nargs <= UCALL_MAX_ARGS ? nargs : UCALL_MAX_ARGS;
va_start(va, nargs); for (i = 0; i < nargs; ++i) - uc.args[i] = va_arg(va, uint64_t); + WRITE_ONCE(uc.args[i], va_arg(va, uint64_t)); va_end(va);
- *ucall_exit_mmio_addr = (vm_vaddr_t)&uc; + WRITE_ONCE(*ucall_exit_mmio_addr, (vm_vaddr_t)&uc); }
uint64_t get_ucall(struct kvm_vm *vm, uint32_t vcpu_id, struct ucall *uc)