From: Liu Shixin <liushixin2(a)huawei.com>
commit f1897f2f08b28ae59476d8b73374b08f856973af upstream.
syzkaller reported such a BUG_ON():
------------[ cut here ]------------
kernel BUG at mm/khugepaged.c:1835!
Internal error: Oops - BUG: 00000000f2000800 [#1] SMP
...
CPU: 6 UID: 0 PID: 8009 Comm: syz.15.106 Kdump: loaded Tainted: G W 6.13.0-rc6 #22
Tainted: [W]=WARN
Hardware name: QEMU KVM Virtual Machine, BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015
pstate: 00400005 (nzcv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
pc : collapse_file+0xa44/0x1400
lr : collapse_file+0x88/0x1400
sp : ffff80008afe3a60
...
Call trace:
collapse_file+0xa44/0x1400 (P)
hpage_collapse_scan_file+0x278/0x400
madvise_collapse+0x1bc/0x678
madvise_vma_behavior+0x32c/0x448
madvise_walk_vmas.constprop.0+0xbc/0x140
do_madvise.part.0+0xdc/0x2c8
__arm64_sys_madvise+0x68/0x88
invoke_syscall+0x50/0x120
el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0xc8/0xf0
do_el0_svc+0x24/0x38
el0_svc+0x34/0x128
el0t_64_sync_handler+0xc8/0xd0
el0t_64_sync+0x190/0x198
This indicates that the pgoff is unaligned. After analysis, I confirm the
vma is mapped to /dev/zero. Such a vma certainly has vm_file, but it is
set to anonymous by mmap_zero(). So even if it's mmapped by 2m-unaligned,
it can pass the check in thp_vma_allowable_order() as it is an
anonymous-mmap, but then be collapsed as a file-mmap.
It seems the problem has existed for a long time, but actually, since we
have khugepaged_max_ptes_none check before, we will skip collapse it as it
is /dev/zero and so has no present page. But commit d8ea7cc8547c limit
the check for only khugepaged, so the BUG_ON() can be triggered by
madvise_collapse().
Add vma_is_anonymous() check to make such vma be processed by
hpage_collapse_scan_pmd().
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20250111034511.2223353-1-liushixin2@huawei.com
Fixes: d8ea7cc8547c ("mm/khugepaged: add flag to predicate khugepaged-only behavior")
Signed-off-by: Liu Shixin <liushixin2(a)huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Yang Shi <yang(a)os.amperecomputing.com>
Acked-by: David Hildenbrand <david(a)redhat.com>
Cc: Chengming Zhou <chengming.zhou(a)linux.dev>
Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes(a)cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Kefeng Wang <wangkefeng.wang(a)huawei.com>
Cc: Mattew Wilcox <willy(a)infradead.org>
Cc: Muchun Song <muchun.song(a)linux.dev>
Cc: Nanyong Sun <sunnanyong(a)huawei.com>
Cc: Qi Zheng <zhengqi.arch(a)bytedance.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm(a)linux-foundation.org>
[acsjakub: backport, clean apply]
Cc: Jakub Acs <acsjakub(a)amazon.de>
Cc: linux-mm(a)kvack.org
---
Ran into the crash with syzkaller, backporting this patch works - the
reproducer no longer crashes.
Please let me know if there was a reason not to backport.
mm/khugepaged.c | 4 ++--
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/mm/khugepaged.c b/mm/khugepaged.c
index b538c3d48386..abd5764e4864 100644
--- a/mm/khugepaged.c
+++ b/mm/khugepaged.c
@@ -2404,7 +2404,7 @@ static unsigned int khugepaged_scan_mm_slot(unsigned int pages, int *result,
VM_BUG_ON(khugepaged_scan.address < hstart ||
khugepaged_scan.address + HPAGE_PMD_SIZE >
hend);
- if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SHMEM) && vma->vm_file) {
+ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SHMEM) && !vma_is_anonymous(vma)) {
struct file *file = get_file(vma->vm_file);
pgoff_t pgoff = linear_page_index(vma,
khugepaged_scan.address);
@@ -2750,7 +2750,7 @@ int madvise_collapse(struct vm_area_struct *vma, struct vm_area_struct **prev,
mmap_assert_locked(mm);
memset(cc->node_load, 0, sizeof(cc->node_load));
nodes_clear(cc->alloc_nmask);
- if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SHMEM) && vma->vm_file) {
+ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SHMEM) && !vma_is_anonymous(vma)) {
struct file *file = get_file(vma->vm_file);
pgoff_t pgoff = linear_page_index(vma, addr);
--
2.47.3
Amazon Web Services Development Center Germany GmbH
Tamara-Danz-Str. 13
10243 Berlin
Geschaeftsfuehrung: Christian Schlaeger, Jonathan Weiss
Eingetragen am Amtsgericht Charlottenburg unter HRB 257764 B
Sitz: Berlin
Ust-ID: DE 365 538 597
From: Liu Shixin <liushixin2(a)huawei.com>
commit f1897f2f08b28ae59476d8b73374b08f856973af upstream.
syzkaller reported such a BUG_ON():
------------[ cut here ]------------
kernel BUG at mm/khugepaged.c:1835!
Internal error: Oops - BUG: 00000000f2000800 [#1] SMP
...
CPU: 6 UID: 0 PID: 8009 Comm: syz.15.106 Kdump: loaded Tainted: G W 6.13.0-rc6 #22
Tainted: [W]=WARN
Hardware name: QEMU KVM Virtual Machine, BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015
pstate: 00400005 (nzcv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
pc : collapse_file+0xa44/0x1400
lr : collapse_file+0x88/0x1400
sp : ffff80008afe3a60
...
Call trace:
collapse_file+0xa44/0x1400 (P)
hpage_collapse_scan_file+0x278/0x400
madvise_collapse+0x1bc/0x678
madvise_vma_behavior+0x32c/0x448
madvise_walk_vmas.constprop.0+0xbc/0x140
do_madvise.part.0+0xdc/0x2c8
__arm64_sys_madvise+0x68/0x88
invoke_syscall+0x50/0x120
el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0xc8/0xf0
do_el0_svc+0x24/0x38
el0_svc+0x34/0x128
el0t_64_sync_handler+0xc8/0xd0
el0t_64_sync+0x190/0x198
This indicates that the pgoff is unaligned. After analysis, I confirm the
vma is mapped to /dev/zero. Such a vma certainly has vm_file, but it is
set to anonymous by mmap_zero(). So even if it's mmapped by 2m-unaligned,
it can pass the check in thp_vma_allowable_order() as it is an
anonymous-mmap, but then be collapsed as a file-mmap.
It seems the problem has existed for a long time, but actually, since we
have khugepaged_max_ptes_none check before, we will skip collapse it as it
is /dev/zero and so has no present page. But commit d8ea7cc8547c limit
the check for only khugepaged, so the BUG_ON() can be triggered by
madvise_collapse().
Add vma_is_anonymous() check to make such vma be processed by
hpage_collapse_scan_pmd().
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20250111034511.2223353-1-liushixin2@huawei.com
Fixes: d8ea7cc8547c ("mm/khugepaged: add flag to predicate khugepaged-only behavior")
Signed-off-by: Liu Shixin <liushixin2(a)huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Yang Shi <yang(a)os.amperecomputing.com>
Acked-by: David Hildenbrand <david(a)redhat.com>
Cc: Chengming Zhou <chengming.zhou(a)linux.dev>
Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes(a)cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Kefeng Wang <wangkefeng.wang(a)huawei.com>
Cc: Mattew Wilcox <willy(a)infradead.org>
Cc: Muchun Song <muchun.song(a)linux.dev>
Cc: Nanyong Sun <sunnanyong(a)huawei.com>
Cc: Qi Zheng <zhengqi.arch(a)bytedance.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm(a)linux-foundation.org>
[acsjakub: backport, clean apply]
Cc: Jakub Acs <acsjakub(a)amazon.de>
Cc: linux-mm(a)kvack.org
---
Ran into the crash with syzkaller, backporting this patch works - the
reproducer no longer crashes.
Please let me know if there was a reason not to backport.
mm/khugepaged.c | 4 ++--
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/mm/khugepaged.c b/mm/khugepaged.c
index b538c3d48386..abd5764e4864 100644
--- a/mm/khugepaged.c
+++ b/mm/khugepaged.c
@@ -2404,7 +2404,7 @@ static unsigned int khugepaged_scan_mm_slot(unsigned int pages, int *result,
VM_BUG_ON(khugepaged_scan.address < hstart ||
khugepaged_scan.address + HPAGE_PMD_SIZE >
hend);
- if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SHMEM) && vma->vm_file) {
+ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SHMEM) && !vma_is_anonymous(vma)) {
struct file *file = get_file(vma->vm_file);
pgoff_t pgoff = linear_page_index(vma,
khugepaged_scan.address);
@@ -2750,7 +2750,7 @@ int madvise_collapse(struct vm_area_struct *vma, struct vm_area_struct **prev,
mmap_assert_locked(mm);
memset(cc->node_load, 0, sizeof(cc->node_load));
nodes_clear(cc->alloc_nmask);
- if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SHMEM) && vma->vm_file) {
+ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SHMEM) && !vma_is_anonymous(vma)) {
struct file *file = get_file(vma->vm_file);
pgoff_t pgoff = linear_page_index(vma, addr);
--
2.47.3
Amazon Web Services Development Center Germany GmbH
Tamara-Danz-Str. 13
10243 Berlin
Geschaeftsfuehrung: Christian Schlaeger, Jonathan Weiss
Eingetragen am Amtsgericht Charlottenburg unter HRB 257764 B
Sitz: Berlin
Ust-ID: DE 365 538 597
From: Ming Lei <ming.lei(a)redhat.com>
[ Upstream commit a647a524a46736786c95cdb553a070322ca096e3 ]
rq_qos framework is only applied on request based driver, so:
1) rq_qos_done_bio() needn't to be called for bio based driver
2) rq_qos_done_bio() needn't to be called for bio which isn't tracked,
such as bios ended from error handling code.
Especially in bio_endio():
1) request queue is referred via bio->bi_bdev->bd_disk->queue, which
may be gone since request queue refcount may not be held in above two
cases
2) q->rq_qos may be freed in blk_cleanup_queue() when calling into
__rq_qos_done_bio()
Fix the potential kernel panic by not calling rq_qos_ops->done_bio if
the bio isn't tracked. This way is safe because both ioc_rqos_done_bio()
and blkcg_iolatency_done_bio() are nop if the bio isn't tracked.
Reported-by: Yu Kuai <yukuai3(a)huawei.com>
Cc: tj(a)kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ming Lei <ming.lei(a)redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch(a)lst.de>
Acked-by: Tejun Heo <tj(a)kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210924110704.1541818-1-ming.lei@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe(a)kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org>
[Shivani: Modified to apply on 5.10.y]
Signed-off-by: Shivani Agarwal <shivani.agarwal(a)broadcom.com>
---
block/bio.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/block/bio.c b/block/bio.c
index 88a09c31095f..7851f54edc76 100644
--- a/block/bio.c
+++ b/block/bio.c
@@ -1430,7 +1430,7 @@ void bio_endio(struct bio *bio)
if (!bio_integrity_endio(bio))
return;
- if (bio->bi_disk)
+ if (bio->bi_disk && bio_flagged(bio, BIO_TRACKED))
rq_qos_done_bio(bio->bi_disk->queue, bio);
/*
--
2.40.4
From: Srinivasan Shanmugam <srinivasan.shanmugam(a)amd.com>
commit ac2140449184a26eac99585b7f69814bd3ba8f2d upstream.
This commit addresses a potential null pointer dereference issue in the
`dcn32_acquire_idle_pipe_for_head_pipe_in_layer` function. The issue
could occur when `head_pipe` is null.
The fix adds a check to ensure `head_pipe` is not null before asserting
it. If `head_pipe` is null, the function returns NULL to prevent a
potential null pointer dereference.
Reported by smatch:
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/../display/dc/resource/dcn32/dcn32_resource.c:2690 dcn32_acquire_idle_pipe_for_head_pipe_in_layer() error: we previously assumed 'head_pipe' could be null (see line 2681)
Cc: Tom Chung <chiahsuan.chung(a)amd.com>
Cc: Rodrigo Siqueira <Rodrigo.Siqueira(a)amd.com>
Cc: Roman Li <roman.li(a)amd.com>
Cc: Alex Hung <alex.hung(a)amd.com>
Cc: Aurabindo Pillai <aurabindo.pillai(a)amd.com>
Cc: Harry Wentland <harry.wentland(a)amd.com>
Cc: Hamza Mahfooz <hamza.mahfooz(a)amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Srinivasan Shanmugam <srinivasan.shanmugam(a)amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Tom Chung <chiahsuan.chung(a)amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher(a)amd.com>
[ Daniil: dcn32 was moved from drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc to
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/resource since commit
8b8eed05a1c6 ("drm/amd/display: Refactor resource into component directory").
The path is changed accordingly to apply the patch on 6.1.y. and 6.6.y ]
Signed-off-by: Daniil Dulov <d.dulov(a)aladdin.ru>
---
Backport fix for CVE-2024-49918
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/dcn32/dcn32_resource.c | 4 +++-
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/dcn32/dcn32_resource.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/dcn32/dcn32_resource.c
index 1b1534ffee9f..591c3166a468 100644
--- a/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/dcn32/dcn32_resource.c
+++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/dcn32/dcn32_resource.c
@@ -2563,8 +2563,10 @@ struct pipe_ctx *dcn32_acquire_idle_pipe_for_head_pipe_in_layer(
struct resource_context *old_ctx = &stream->ctx->dc->current_state->res_ctx;
int head_index;
- if (!head_pipe)
+ if (!head_pipe) {
ASSERT(0);
+ return NULL;
+ }
/*
* Modified from dcn20_acquire_idle_pipe_for_layer
--
2.34.1
The patch below does not apply to the 5.4-stable tree.
If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm
tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit
id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>.
To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands:
git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-5.4.y
git checkout FETCH_HEAD
git cherry-pick -x 4ff12d82dac119b4b99b5a78b5af3bf2474c0a36
# <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.>
git commit -s
git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2025072801-game-appendix-1d20@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 5.4.y' HEAD^..
Possible dependencies:
thanks,
greg k-h
------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------
From 4ff12d82dac119b4b99b5a78b5af3bf2474c0a36 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Haoxiang Li <haoxiang_li2024(a)163.com>
Date: Thu, 3 Jul 2025 17:52:32 +0800
Subject: [PATCH] ice: Fix a null pointer dereference in
ice_copy_and_init_pkg()
Add check for the return value of devm_kmemdup()
to prevent potential null pointer dereference.
Fixes: c76488109616 ("ice: Implement Dynamic Device Personalization (DDP) download")
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Haoxiang Li <haoxiang_li2024(a)163.com>
Reviewed-by: Michal Swiatkowski <michal.swiatkowski(a)linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Aleksandr Loktionov <aleksandr.loktionov(a)intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <horms(a)kernel.org>
Tested-by: Rinitha S <sx.rinitha(a)intel.com> (A Contingent worker at Intel)
Signed-off-by: Tony Nguyen <anthony.l.nguyen(a)intel.com>
diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_ddp.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_ddp.c
index 59323c019544..351824dc3c62 100644
--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_ddp.c
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_ddp.c
@@ -2301,6 +2301,8 @@ enum ice_ddp_state ice_copy_and_init_pkg(struct ice_hw *hw, const u8 *buf,
return ICE_DDP_PKG_ERR;
buf_copy = devm_kmemdup(ice_hw_to_dev(hw), buf, len, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!buf_copy)
+ return ICE_DDP_PKG_ERR;
state = ice_init_pkg(hw, buf_copy, len);
if (!ice_is_init_pkg_successful(state)) {
The patch below does not apply to the 5.10-stable tree.
If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm
tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit
id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>.
To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands:
git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-5.10.y
git checkout FETCH_HEAD
git cherry-pick -x 4ff12d82dac119b4b99b5a78b5af3bf2474c0a36
# <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.>
git commit -s
git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2025072801-groove-marauding-e4a9@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 5.10.y' HEAD^..
Possible dependencies:
thanks,
greg k-h
------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------
From 4ff12d82dac119b4b99b5a78b5af3bf2474c0a36 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Haoxiang Li <haoxiang_li2024(a)163.com>
Date: Thu, 3 Jul 2025 17:52:32 +0800
Subject: [PATCH] ice: Fix a null pointer dereference in
ice_copy_and_init_pkg()
Add check for the return value of devm_kmemdup()
to prevent potential null pointer dereference.
Fixes: c76488109616 ("ice: Implement Dynamic Device Personalization (DDP) download")
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Haoxiang Li <haoxiang_li2024(a)163.com>
Reviewed-by: Michal Swiatkowski <michal.swiatkowski(a)linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Aleksandr Loktionov <aleksandr.loktionov(a)intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <horms(a)kernel.org>
Tested-by: Rinitha S <sx.rinitha(a)intel.com> (A Contingent worker at Intel)
Signed-off-by: Tony Nguyen <anthony.l.nguyen(a)intel.com>
diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_ddp.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_ddp.c
index 59323c019544..351824dc3c62 100644
--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_ddp.c
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_ddp.c
@@ -2301,6 +2301,8 @@ enum ice_ddp_state ice_copy_and_init_pkg(struct ice_hw *hw, const u8 *buf,
return ICE_DDP_PKG_ERR;
buf_copy = devm_kmemdup(ice_hw_to_dev(hw), buf, len, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!buf_copy)
+ return ICE_DDP_PKG_ERR;
state = ice_init_pkg(hw, buf_copy, len);
if (!ice_is_init_pkg_successful(state)) {
The patch below does not apply to the 5.15-stable tree.
If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm
tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit
id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>.
To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands:
git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-5.15.y
git checkout FETCH_HEAD
git cherry-pick -x 4ff12d82dac119b4b99b5a78b5af3bf2474c0a36
# <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.>
git commit -s
git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2025072858-pentagon-gumball-b400@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 5.15.y' HEAD^..
Possible dependencies:
thanks,
greg k-h
------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------
From 4ff12d82dac119b4b99b5a78b5af3bf2474c0a36 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Haoxiang Li <haoxiang_li2024(a)163.com>
Date: Thu, 3 Jul 2025 17:52:32 +0800
Subject: [PATCH] ice: Fix a null pointer dereference in
ice_copy_and_init_pkg()
Add check for the return value of devm_kmemdup()
to prevent potential null pointer dereference.
Fixes: c76488109616 ("ice: Implement Dynamic Device Personalization (DDP) download")
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Haoxiang Li <haoxiang_li2024(a)163.com>
Reviewed-by: Michal Swiatkowski <michal.swiatkowski(a)linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Aleksandr Loktionov <aleksandr.loktionov(a)intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <horms(a)kernel.org>
Tested-by: Rinitha S <sx.rinitha(a)intel.com> (A Contingent worker at Intel)
Signed-off-by: Tony Nguyen <anthony.l.nguyen(a)intel.com>
diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_ddp.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_ddp.c
index 59323c019544..351824dc3c62 100644
--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_ddp.c
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_ddp.c
@@ -2301,6 +2301,8 @@ enum ice_ddp_state ice_copy_and_init_pkg(struct ice_hw *hw, const u8 *buf,
return ICE_DDP_PKG_ERR;
buf_copy = devm_kmemdup(ice_hw_to_dev(hw), buf, len, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!buf_copy)
+ return ICE_DDP_PKG_ERR;
state = ice_init_pkg(hw, buf_copy, len);
if (!ice_is_init_pkg_successful(state)) {
The patch below does not apply to the 6.1-stable tree.
If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm
tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit
id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>.
To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands:
git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-6.1.y
git checkout FETCH_HEAD
git cherry-pick -x 9e0c433d0c05fde284025264b89eaa4ad59f0a3e
# <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.>
git commit -s
git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2025072852-brewing-moonrise-04ac@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 6.1.y' HEAD^..
Possible dependencies:
thanks,
greg k-h
------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------
From 9e0c433d0c05fde284025264b89eaa4ad59f0a3e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: =?UTF-8?q?Ville=20Syrj=C3=A4l=C3=A4?= <ville.syrjala(a)linux.intel.com>
Date: Thu, 10 Jul 2025 23:17:12 +0300
Subject: [PATCH] drm/i915/dp: Fix 2.7 Gbps DP_LINK_BW value on g4x
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
On g4x we currently use the 96MHz non-SSC refclk, which can't actually
generate an exact 2.7 Gbps link rate. In practice we end up with 2.688
Gbps which seems to be close enough to actually work, but link training
is currently failing due to miscalculating the DP_LINK_BW value (we
calcualte it directly from port_clock which reflects the actual PLL
outpout frequency).
Ideas how to fix this:
- nudge port_clock back up to 270000 during PLL computation/readout
- track port_clock and the nominal link rate separately so they might
differ a bit
- switch to the 100MHz refclk, but that one should be SSC so perhaps
not something we want
While we ponder about a better solution apply some band aid to the
immediate issue of miscalculated DP_LINK_BW value. With this
I can again use 2.7 Gbps link rate on g4x.
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 665a7b04092c ("drm/i915: Feed the DPLL output freq back into crtc_state")
Signed-off-by: Ville Syrjälä <ville.syrjala(a)linux.intel.com>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20250710201718.25310-2-ville.…
Reviewed-by: Imre Deak <imre.deak(a)intel.com>
(cherry picked from commit a8b874694db5cae7baaf522756f87acd956e6e66)
Signed-off-by: Rodrigo Vivi <rodrigo.vivi(a)intel.com>
diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/display/intel_dp.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/display/intel_dp.c
index 640c43bf62d4..724de7ed3c04 100644
--- a/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/display/intel_dp.c
+++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/display/intel_dp.c
@@ -1604,6 +1604,12 @@ int intel_dp_rate_select(struct intel_dp *intel_dp, int rate)
void intel_dp_compute_rate(struct intel_dp *intel_dp, int port_clock,
u8 *link_bw, u8 *rate_select)
{
+ struct intel_display *display = to_intel_display(intel_dp);
+
+ /* FIXME g4x can't generate an exact 2.7GHz with the 96MHz non-SSC refclk */
+ if (display->platform.g4x && port_clock == 268800)
+ port_clock = 270000;
+
/* eDP 1.4 rate select method. */
if (intel_dp->use_rate_select) {
*link_bw = 0;
Revert kvec msg iterator before trying to process a TLS alert
when possible.
In nvmet_tcp_try_recv_data(), it's assumed that no msg control
message buffer is set prior to sock_recvmsg(). If no control
message structure is setup, kTLS layer will read and process
TLS data record types. As soon as it encounters a TLS control
message, it would return an error. At that point, we setup a kvec
backed control buffer and read in the control message such as
a TLS alert. Msg can advance the kvec pointer as a part of the
copy process thus we need to revert the iterator before calling
into the tls_alert_recv.
Fixes: a1c5dd8355b1 ("nvmet-tcp: control messages for recvmsg()")
Cc: <Stable(a)vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Olga Kornievskaia <okorniev(a)redhat.com>
---
drivers/nvme/target/tcp.c | 48 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------
1 file changed, 38 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/nvme/target/tcp.c b/drivers/nvme/target/tcp.c
index 688033b88d38..cf3336ddc9a3 100644
--- a/drivers/nvme/target/tcp.c
+++ b/drivers/nvme/target/tcp.c
@@ -1161,6 +1161,7 @@ static int nvmet_tcp_try_recv_pdu(struct nvmet_tcp_queue *queue)
if (unlikely(len < 0))
return len;
if (queue->tls_pskid) {
+ iov_iter_revert(&msg.msg_iter, len);
ret = nvmet_tcp_tls_record_ok(queue, &msg, cbuf);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
@@ -1218,18 +1219,47 @@ static int nvmet_tcp_try_recv_data(struct nvmet_tcp_queue *queue)
{
struct nvmet_tcp_cmd *cmd = queue->cmd;
int len, ret;
+ union {
+ struct cmsghdr cmsg;
+ u8 buf[CMSG_SPACE(sizeof(u8))];
+ } u;
+ u8 alert[2];
+ struct kvec alert_kvec = {
+ .iov_base = alert,
+ .iov_len = sizeof(alert),
+ };
+ struct msghdr msg = {
+ .msg_control = &u,
+ .msg_controllen = sizeof(u),
+ };
while (msg_data_left(&cmd->recv_msg)) {
+ /* assumed that cmg->recv_msg's control buffer is not setup
+ */
+ WARN_ON_ONCE(cmd->recv_msg.msg_controllen > 0);
+
len = sock_recvmsg(cmd->queue->sock, &cmd->recv_msg,
cmd->recv_msg.msg_flags);
+ if (cmd->recv_msg.msg_flags & MSG_CTRUNC) {
+ cmd->recv_msg.msg_flags &= ~(MSG_CTRUNC | MSG_EOF);
+ if (len == 0 || len == -EIO) {
+ iov_iter_kvec(&msg.msg_iter, ITER_DEST, &alert_kvec,
+ 1, alert_kvec.iov_len);
+ len = sock_recvmsg(cmd->queue->sock, &msg,
+ MSG_DONTWAIT);
+ if (len > 0 &&
+ tls_get_record_type(cmd->queue->sock->sk,
+ &u.cmsg) == TLS_RECORD_TYPE_ALERT) {
+ iov_iter_revert(&msg.msg_iter, len);
+ ret = nvmet_tcp_tls_record_ok(cmd->queue,
+ &msg, u.buf);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return ret;
+ }
+ }
+ }
if (len <= 0)
return len;
- if (queue->tls_pskid) {
- ret = nvmet_tcp_tls_record_ok(cmd->queue,
- &cmd->recv_msg, cmd->recv_cbuf);
- if (ret < 0)
- return ret;
- }
cmd->pdu_recv += len;
cmd->rbytes_done += len;
@@ -1267,6 +1297,7 @@ static int nvmet_tcp_try_recv_ddgst(struct nvmet_tcp_queue *queue)
if (unlikely(len < 0))
return len;
if (queue->tls_pskid) {
+ iov_iter_revert(&msg.msg_iter, len);
ret = nvmet_tcp_tls_record_ok(queue, &msg, cbuf);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
@@ -1453,10 +1484,6 @@ static int nvmet_tcp_alloc_cmd(struct nvmet_tcp_queue *queue,
if (!c->r2t_pdu)
goto out_free_data;
- if (queue->state == NVMET_TCP_Q_TLS_HANDSHAKE) {
- c->recv_msg.msg_control = c->recv_cbuf;
- c->recv_msg.msg_controllen = sizeof(c->recv_cbuf);
- }
c->recv_msg.msg_flags = MSG_DONTWAIT | MSG_NOSIGNAL;
list_add_tail(&c->entry, &queue->free_list);
@@ -1736,6 +1763,7 @@ static int nvmet_tcp_try_peek_pdu(struct nvmet_tcp_queue *queue)
return len;
}
+ iov_iter_revert(&msg.msg_iter, len);
ret = nvmet_tcp_tls_record_ok(queue, &msg, cbuf);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
--
2.47.1
The patch below does not apply to the 6.6-stable tree.
If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm
tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit
id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>.
To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands:
git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-6.6.y
git checkout FETCH_HEAD
git cherry-pick -x 9e0c433d0c05fde284025264b89eaa4ad59f0a3e
# <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.>
git commit -s
git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2025072822-armrest-dominoes-7934@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 6.6.y' HEAD^..
Possible dependencies:
thanks,
greg k-h
------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------
From 9e0c433d0c05fde284025264b89eaa4ad59f0a3e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: =?UTF-8?q?Ville=20Syrj=C3=A4l=C3=A4?= <ville.syrjala(a)linux.intel.com>
Date: Thu, 10 Jul 2025 23:17:12 +0300
Subject: [PATCH] drm/i915/dp: Fix 2.7 Gbps DP_LINK_BW value on g4x
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
On g4x we currently use the 96MHz non-SSC refclk, which can't actually
generate an exact 2.7 Gbps link rate. In practice we end up with 2.688
Gbps which seems to be close enough to actually work, but link training
is currently failing due to miscalculating the DP_LINK_BW value (we
calcualte it directly from port_clock which reflects the actual PLL
outpout frequency).
Ideas how to fix this:
- nudge port_clock back up to 270000 during PLL computation/readout
- track port_clock and the nominal link rate separately so they might
differ a bit
- switch to the 100MHz refclk, but that one should be SSC so perhaps
not something we want
While we ponder about a better solution apply some band aid to the
immediate issue of miscalculated DP_LINK_BW value. With this
I can again use 2.7 Gbps link rate on g4x.
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 665a7b04092c ("drm/i915: Feed the DPLL output freq back into crtc_state")
Signed-off-by: Ville Syrjälä <ville.syrjala(a)linux.intel.com>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20250710201718.25310-2-ville.…
Reviewed-by: Imre Deak <imre.deak(a)intel.com>
(cherry picked from commit a8b874694db5cae7baaf522756f87acd956e6e66)
Signed-off-by: Rodrigo Vivi <rodrigo.vivi(a)intel.com>
diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/display/intel_dp.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/display/intel_dp.c
index 640c43bf62d4..724de7ed3c04 100644
--- a/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/display/intel_dp.c
+++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/display/intel_dp.c
@@ -1604,6 +1604,12 @@ int intel_dp_rate_select(struct intel_dp *intel_dp, int rate)
void intel_dp_compute_rate(struct intel_dp *intel_dp, int port_clock,
u8 *link_bw, u8 *rate_select)
{
+ struct intel_display *display = to_intel_display(intel_dp);
+
+ /* FIXME g4x can't generate an exact 2.7GHz with the 96MHz non-SSC refclk */
+ if (display->platform.g4x && port_clock == 268800)
+ port_clock = 270000;
+
/* eDP 1.4 rate select method. */
if (intel_dp->use_rate_select) {
*link_bw = 0;
Scott Mayhew discovered a security exploit in NFS over TLS in
tls_alert_recv() due to its assumption it can read data from
the msg iterator's kvec..
kTLS implementation splits TLS non-data record payload between
the control message buffer (which includes the type such as TLS
aler or TLS cipher change) and the rest of the payload (say TLS
alert's level/description) which goes into the msg payload buffer.
This patch proposes to rework how control messages are setup and
used by sock_recvmsg().
If no control message structure is setup, kTLS layer will read and
process TLS data record types. As soon as it encounters a TLS control
message, it would return an error. At that point, NFS can setup a
kvec backed msg buffer and read in the control message such as a
TLS alert. Msg iterator can advance the kvec pointer as a part of
the copy process thus we need to revert the iterator before calling
into the tls_alert_recv.
Reported-by: Scott Mayhew <smayhew(a)redhat.com>
Fixes: 5e052dda121e ("SUNRPC: Recognize control messages in server-side TCP socket code")
Suggested-by: Trond Myklebust <trondmy(a)hammerspace.com>
Cc: <Stable(a)vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Olga Kornievskaia <okorniev(a)redhat.com>
---
net/sunrpc/svcsock.c | 43 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------
1 file changed, 35 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/sunrpc/svcsock.c b/net/sunrpc/svcsock.c
index 46c156b121db..e2c5e0e626f9 100644
--- a/net/sunrpc/svcsock.c
+++ b/net/sunrpc/svcsock.c
@@ -257,20 +257,47 @@ svc_tcp_sock_process_cmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
}
static int
-svc_tcp_sock_recv_cmsg(struct svc_sock *svsk, struct msghdr *msg)
+svc_tcp_sock_recv_cmsg(struct socket *sock, unsigned int *msg_flags)
{
union {
struct cmsghdr cmsg;
u8 buf[CMSG_SPACE(sizeof(u8))];
} u;
- struct socket *sock = svsk->sk_sock;
+ u8 alert[2];
+ struct kvec alert_kvec = {
+ .iov_base = alert,
+ .iov_len = sizeof(alert),
+ };
+ struct msghdr msg = {
+ .msg_flags = *msg_flags,
+ .msg_control = &u,
+ .msg_controllen = sizeof(u),
+ };
+ int ret;
+
+ iov_iter_kvec(&msg.msg_iter, ITER_DEST, &alert_kvec, 1,
+ alert_kvec.iov_len);
+ ret = sock_recvmsg(sock, &msg, MSG_DONTWAIT);
+ if (ret > 0 &&
+ tls_get_record_type(sock->sk, &u.cmsg) == TLS_RECORD_TYPE_ALERT) {
+ iov_iter_revert(&msg.msg_iter, ret);
+ ret = svc_tcp_sock_process_cmsg(sock, &msg, &u.cmsg, -EAGAIN);
+ }
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int
+svc_tcp_sock_recvmsg(struct svc_sock *svsk, struct msghdr *msg)
+{
int ret;
+ struct socket *sock = svsk->sk_sock;
- msg->msg_control = &u;
- msg->msg_controllen = sizeof(u);
ret = sock_recvmsg(sock, msg, MSG_DONTWAIT);
- if (unlikely(msg->msg_controllen != sizeof(u)))
- ret = svc_tcp_sock_process_cmsg(sock, msg, &u.cmsg, ret);
+ if (msg->msg_flags & MSG_CTRUNC) {
+ msg->msg_flags &= ~(MSG_CTRUNC | MSG_EOR);
+ if (ret == 0 || ret == -EIO)
+ ret = svc_tcp_sock_recv_cmsg(sock, &msg->msg_flags);
+ }
return ret;
}
@@ -321,7 +348,7 @@ static ssize_t svc_tcp_read_msg(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, size_t buflen,
iov_iter_advance(&msg.msg_iter, seek);
buflen -= seek;
}
- len = svc_tcp_sock_recv_cmsg(svsk, &msg);
+ len = svc_tcp_sock_recvmsg(svsk, &msg);
if (len > 0)
svc_flush_bvec(bvec, len, seek);
@@ -1018,7 +1045,7 @@ static ssize_t svc_tcp_read_marker(struct svc_sock *svsk,
iov.iov_base = ((char *)&svsk->sk_marker) + svsk->sk_tcplen;
iov.iov_len = want;
iov_iter_kvec(&msg.msg_iter, ITER_DEST, &iov, 1, want);
- len = svc_tcp_sock_recv_cmsg(svsk, &msg);
+ len = svc_tcp_sock_recvmsg(svsk, &msg);
if (len < 0)
return len;
svsk->sk_tcplen += len;
--
2.47.1
The patch below does not apply to the 6.12-stable tree.
If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm
tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit
id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>.
To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands:
git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-6.12.y
git checkout FETCH_HEAD
git cherry-pick -x 9e0c433d0c05fde284025264b89eaa4ad59f0a3e
# <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.>
git commit -s
git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2025072832-cannabis-shout-55f6@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 6.12.y' HEAD^..
Possible dependencies:
thanks,
greg k-h
------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------
From 9e0c433d0c05fde284025264b89eaa4ad59f0a3e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: =?UTF-8?q?Ville=20Syrj=C3=A4l=C3=A4?= <ville.syrjala(a)linux.intel.com>
Date: Thu, 10 Jul 2025 23:17:12 +0300
Subject: [PATCH] drm/i915/dp: Fix 2.7 Gbps DP_LINK_BW value on g4x
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
On g4x we currently use the 96MHz non-SSC refclk, which can't actually
generate an exact 2.7 Gbps link rate. In practice we end up with 2.688
Gbps which seems to be close enough to actually work, but link training
is currently failing due to miscalculating the DP_LINK_BW value (we
calcualte it directly from port_clock which reflects the actual PLL
outpout frequency).
Ideas how to fix this:
- nudge port_clock back up to 270000 during PLL computation/readout
- track port_clock and the nominal link rate separately so they might
differ a bit
- switch to the 100MHz refclk, but that one should be SSC so perhaps
not something we want
While we ponder about a better solution apply some band aid to the
immediate issue of miscalculated DP_LINK_BW value. With this
I can again use 2.7 Gbps link rate on g4x.
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 665a7b04092c ("drm/i915: Feed the DPLL output freq back into crtc_state")
Signed-off-by: Ville Syrjälä <ville.syrjala(a)linux.intel.com>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20250710201718.25310-2-ville.…
Reviewed-by: Imre Deak <imre.deak(a)intel.com>
(cherry picked from commit a8b874694db5cae7baaf522756f87acd956e6e66)
Signed-off-by: Rodrigo Vivi <rodrigo.vivi(a)intel.com>
diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/display/intel_dp.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/display/intel_dp.c
index 640c43bf62d4..724de7ed3c04 100644
--- a/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/display/intel_dp.c
+++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/display/intel_dp.c
@@ -1604,6 +1604,12 @@ int intel_dp_rate_select(struct intel_dp *intel_dp, int rate)
void intel_dp_compute_rate(struct intel_dp *intel_dp, int port_clock,
u8 *link_bw, u8 *rate_select)
{
+ struct intel_display *display = to_intel_display(intel_dp);
+
+ /* FIXME g4x can't generate an exact 2.7GHz with the 96MHz non-SSC refclk */
+ if (display->platform.g4x && port_clock == 268800)
+ port_clock = 270000;
+
/* eDP 1.4 rate select method. */
if (intel_dp->use_rate_select) {
*link_bw = 0;
Hi!
So... I'm afraid subject is pretty accurate. I assume there's actual
human being called "Sasha Levin" somewhere, but I interact with him
via email, and while some interactions may be by human, some are
written by LLM but not clearly marked as such.
And that's not okay -- because LLMs lie, have no ethics, and no
memory, so there's no point arguing with them. Its just wasting
everyone's time. People are not very thrilled by 'Markus Elfring' on
the lists, as he seems to ignore feedback, but at least that's actual
human, not a damn LLM that interacts as human but then ignores
everything.
Do we need bot rules on the list?
Oh, and if you find my email offensive, feel free to ask LLM to change
the tone.
Best regards,
Pavel
--
I don't work for Nazis and criminals, and neither should you.
Boycott Putin, Trump, and Musk!
The patch below does not apply to the 5.4-stable tree.
If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm
tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit
id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>.
To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands:
git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-5.4.y
git checkout FETCH_HEAD
git cherry-pick -x 15f77764e90a713ee3916ca424757688e4f565b9
# <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.>
git commit -s
git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2025072855-spongy-yodel-58e6@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 5.4.y' HEAD^..
Possible dependencies:
thanks,
greg k-h
------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------
From 15f77764e90a713ee3916ca424757688e4f565b9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: "Lin.Cao" <lincao12(a)amd.com>
Date: Thu, 17 Jul 2025 16:44:53 +0800
Subject: [PATCH] drm/sched: Remove optimization that causes hang when killing
dependent jobs
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
When application A submits jobs and application B submits a job with a
dependency on A's fence, the normal flow wakes up the scheduler after
processing each job. However, the optimization in
drm_sched_entity_add_dependency_cb() uses a callback that only clears
dependencies without waking up the scheduler.
When application A is killed before its jobs can run, the callback gets
triggered but only clears the dependency without waking up the scheduler,
causing the scheduler to enter sleep state and application B to hang.
Remove the optimization by deleting drm_sched_entity_clear_dep() and its
usage, ensuring the scheduler is always woken up when dependencies are
cleared.
Fixes: 777dbd458c89 ("drm/amdgpu: drop a dummy wakeup scheduler")
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org # v4.6+
Signed-off-by: Lin.Cao <lincao12(a)amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Christian König <christian.koenig(a)amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Philipp Stanner <phasta(a)kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250717084453.921097-1-lincao12@amd.com
diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/scheduler/sched_entity.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/scheduler/sched_entity.c
index e671aa241720..ac678de7fe5e 100644
--- a/drivers/gpu/drm/scheduler/sched_entity.c
+++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/scheduler/sched_entity.c
@@ -355,17 +355,6 @@ void drm_sched_entity_destroy(struct drm_sched_entity *entity)
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(drm_sched_entity_destroy);
-/* drm_sched_entity_clear_dep - callback to clear the entities dependency */
-static void drm_sched_entity_clear_dep(struct dma_fence *f,
- struct dma_fence_cb *cb)
-{
- struct drm_sched_entity *entity =
- container_of(cb, struct drm_sched_entity, cb);
-
- entity->dependency = NULL;
- dma_fence_put(f);
-}
-
/*
* drm_sched_entity_wakeup - callback to clear the entity's dependency and
* wake up the scheduler
@@ -376,7 +365,8 @@ static void drm_sched_entity_wakeup(struct dma_fence *f,
struct drm_sched_entity *entity =
container_of(cb, struct drm_sched_entity, cb);
- drm_sched_entity_clear_dep(f, cb);
+ entity->dependency = NULL;
+ dma_fence_put(f);
drm_sched_wakeup(entity->rq->sched);
}
@@ -429,13 +419,6 @@ static bool drm_sched_entity_add_dependency_cb(struct drm_sched_entity *entity)
fence = dma_fence_get(&s_fence->scheduled);
dma_fence_put(entity->dependency);
entity->dependency = fence;
- if (!dma_fence_add_callback(fence, &entity->cb,
- drm_sched_entity_clear_dep))
- return true;
-
- /* Ignore it when it is already scheduled */
- dma_fence_put(fence);
- return false;
}
if (!dma_fence_add_callback(entity->dependency, &entity->cb,
The patch below does not apply to the 5.15-stable tree.
If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm
tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit
id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>.
To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands:
git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-5.15.y
git checkout FETCH_HEAD
git cherry-pick -x d42e6c20de6192f8e4ab4cf10be8c694ef27e8cb
# <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.>
git commit -s
git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2025072811-pension-lyrics-6070@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 5.15.y' HEAD^..
Possible dependencies:
thanks,
greg k-h
------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------
From d42e6c20de6192f8e4ab4cf10be8c694ef27e8cb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Ada Couprie Diaz <ada.coupriediaz(a)arm.com>
Date: Fri, 18 Jul 2025 15:28:14 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] arm64/entry: Mask DAIF in cpu_switch_to(),
call_on_irq_stack()
`cpu_switch_to()` and `call_on_irq_stack()` manipulate SP to change
to different stacks along with the Shadow Call Stack if it is enabled.
Those two stack changes cannot be done atomically and both functions
can be interrupted by SErrors or Debug Exceptions which, though unlikely,
is very much broken : if interrupted, we can end up with mismatched stacks
and Shadow Call Stack leading to clobbered stacks.
In `cpu_switch_to()`, it can happen when SP_EL0 points to the new task,
but x18 stills points to the old task's SCS. When the interrupt handler
tries to save the task's SCS pointer, it will save the old task
SCS pointer (x18) into the new task struct (pointed to by SP_EL0),
clobbering it.
In `call_on_irq_stack()`, it can happen when switching from the task stack
to the IRQ stack and when switching back. In both cases, we can be
interrupted when the SCS pointer points to the IRQ SCS, but SP points to
the task stack. The nested interrupt handler pushes its return addresses
on the IRQ SCS. It then detects that SP points to the task stack,
calls `call_on_irq_stack()` and clobbers the task SCS pointer with
the IRQ SCS pointer, which it will also use !
This leads to tasks returning to addresses on the wrong SCS,
or even on the IRQ SCS, triggering kernel panics via CONFIG_VMAP_STACK
or FPAC if enabled.
This is possible on a default config, but unlikely.
However, when enabling CONFIG_ARM64_PSEUDO_NMI, DAIF is unmasked and
instead the GIC is responsible for filtering what interrupts the CPU
should receive based on priority.
Given the goal of emulating NMIs, pseudo-NMIs can be received by the CPU
even in `cpu_switch_to()` and `call_on_irq_stack()`, possibly *very*
frequently depending on the system configuration and workload, leading
to unpredictable kernel panics.
Completely mask DAIF in `cpu_switch_to()` and restore it when returning.
Do the same in `call_on_irq_stack()`, but restore and mask around
the branch.
Mask DAIF even if CONFIG_SHADOW_CALL_STACK is not enabled for consistency
of behaviour between all configurations.
Introduce and use an assembly macro for saving and masking DAIF,
as the existing one saves but only masks IF.
Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Ada Couprie Diaz <ada.coupriediaz(a)arm.com>
Reported-by: Cristian Prundeanu <cpru(a)amazon.com>
Fixes: 59b37fe52f49 ("arm64: Stash shadow stack pointer in the task struct on interrupt")
Tested-by: Cristian Prundeanu <cpru(a)amazon.com>
Acked-by: Will Deacon <will(a)kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250718142814.133329-1-ada.coupriediaz@arm.com
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will(a)kernel.org>
diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/assembler.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/assembler.h
index ad63457a05c5..c56c21bb1eec 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/assembler.h
+++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/assembler.h
@@ -41,6 +41,11 @@
/*
* Save/restore interrupts.
*/
+ .macro save_and_disable_daif, flags
+ mrs \flags, daif
+ msr daifset, #0xf
+ .endm
+
.macro save_and_disable_irq, flags
mrs \flags, daif
msr daifset, #3
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S b/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S
index 5ae2a34b50bd..30dcb719685b 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S
+++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S
@@ -825,6 +825,7 @@ SYM_CODE_END(__bp_harden_el1_vectors)
*
*/
SYM_FUNC_START(cpu_switch_to)
+ save_and_disable_daif x11
mov x10, #THREAD_CPU_CONTEXT
add x8, x0, x10
mov x9, sp
@@ -848,6 +849,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(cpu_switch_to)
ptrauth_keys_install_kernel x1, x8, x9, x10
scs_save x0
scs_load_current
+ restore_irq x11
ret
SYM_FUNC_END(cpu_switch_to)
NOKPROBE(cpu_switch_to)
@@ -874,6 +876,7 @@ NOKPROBE(ret_from_fork)
* Calls func(regs) using this CPU's irq stack and shadow irq stack.
*/
SYM_FUNC_START(call_on_irq_stack)
+ save_and_disable_daif x9
#ifdef CONFIG_SHADOW_CALL_STACK
get_current_task x16
scs_save x16
@@ -888,8 +891,10 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(call_on_irq_stack)
/* Move to the new stack and call the function there */
add sp, x16, #IRQ_STACK_SIZE
+ restore_irq x9
blr x1
+ save_and_disable_daif x9
/*
* Restore the SP from the FP, and restore the FP and LR from the frame
* record.
@@ -897,6 +902,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(call_on_irq_stack)
mov sp, x29
ldp x29, x30, [sp], #16
scs_load_current
+ restore_irq x9
ret
SYM_FUNC_END(call_on_irq_stack)
NOKPROBE(call_on_irq_stack)
The patch below does not apply to the 6.1-stable tree.
If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm
tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit
id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>.
To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands:
git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-6.1.y
git checkout FETCH_HEAD
git cherry-pick -x d42e6c20de6192f8e4ab4cf10be8c694ef27e8cb
# <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.>
git commit -s
git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2025072817-deeply-galleria-d758@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 6.1.y' HEAD^..
Possible dependencies:
thanks,
greg k-h
------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------
From d42e6c20de6192f8e4ab4cf10be8c694ef27e8cb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Ada Couprie Diaz <ada.coupriediaz(a)arm.com>
Date: Fri, 18 Jul 2025 15:28:14 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] arm64/entry: Mask DAIF in cpu_switch_to(),
call_on_irq_stack()
`cpu_switch_to()` and `call_on_irq_stack()` manipulate SP to change
to different stacks along with the Shadow Call Stack if it is enabled.
Those two stack changes cannot be done atomically and both functions
can be interrupted by SErrors or Debug Exceptions which, though unlikely,
is very much broken : if interrupted, we can end up with mismatched stacks
and Shadow Call Stack leading to clobbered stacks.
In `cpu_switch_to()`, it can happen when SP_EL0 points to the new task,
but x18 stills points to the old task's SCS. When the interrupt handler
tries to save the task's SCS pointer, it will save the old task
SCS pointer (x18) into the new task struct (pointed to by SP_EL0),
clobbering it.
In `call_on_irq_stack()`, it can happen when switching from the task stack
to the IRQ stack and when switching back. In both cases, we can be
interrupted when the SCS pointer points to the IRQ SCS, but SP points to
the task stack. The nested interrupt handler pushes its return addresses
on the IRQ SCS. It then detects that SP points to the task stack,
calls `call_on_irq_stack()` and clobbers the task SCS pointer with
the IRQ SCS pointer, which it will also use !
This leads to tasks returning to addresses on the wrong SCS,
or even on the IRQ SCS, triggering kernel panics via CONFIG_VMAP_STACK
or FPAC if enabled.
This is possible on a default config, but unlikely.
However, when enabling CONFIG_ARM64_PSEUDO_NMI, DAIF is unmasked and
instead the GIC is responsible for filtering what interrupts the CPU
should receive based on priority.
Given the goal of emulating NMIs, pseudo-NMIs can be received by the CPU
even in `cpu_switch_to()` and `call_on_irq_stack()`, possibly *very*
frequently depending on the system configuration and workload, leading
to unpredictable kernel panics.
Completely mask DAIF in `cpu_switch_to()` and restore it when returning.
Do the same in `call_on_irq_stack()`, but restore and mask around
the branch.
Mask DAIF even if CONFIG_SHADOW_CALL_STACK is not enabled for consistency
of behaviour between all configurations.
Introduce and use an assembly macro for saving and masking DAIF,
as the existing one saves but only masks IF.
Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Ada Couprie Diaz <ada.coupriediaz(a)arm.com>
Reported-by: Cristian Prundeanu <cpru(a)amazon.com>
Fixes: 59b37fe52f49 ("arm64: Stash shadow stack pointer in the task struct on interrupt")
Tested-by: Cristian Prundeanu <cpru(a)amazon.com>
Acked-by: Will Deacon <will(a)kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250718142814.133329-1-ada.coupriediaz@arm.com
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will(a)kernel.org>
diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/assembler.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/assembler.h
index ad63457a05c5..c56c21bb1eec 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/assembler.h
+++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/assembler.h
@@ -41,6 +41,11 @@
/*
* Save/restore interrupts.
*/
+ .macro save_and_disable_daif, flags
+ mrs \flags, daif
+ msr daifset, #0xf
+ .endm
+
.macro save_and_disable_irq, flags
mrs \flags, daif
msr daifset, #3
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S b/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S
index 5ae2a34b50bd..30dcb719685b 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S
+++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S
@@ -825,6 +825,7 @@ SYM_CODE_END(__bp_harden_el1_vectors)
*
*/
SYM_FUNC_START(cpu_switch_to)
+ save_and_disable_daif x11
mov x10, #THREAD_CPU_CONTEXT
add x8, x0, x10
mov x9, sp
@@ -848,6 +849,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(cpu_switch_to)
ptrauth_keys_install_kernel x1, x8, x9, x10
scs_save x0
scs_load_current
+ restore_irq x11
ret
SYM_FUNC_END(cpu_switch_to)
NOKPROBE(cpu_switch_to)
@@ -874,6 +876,7 @@ NOKPROBE(ret_from_fork)
* Calls func(regs) using this CPU's irq stack and shadow irq stack.
*/
SYM_FUNC_START(call_on_irq_stack)
+ save_and_disable_daif x9
#ifdef CONFIG_SHADOW_CALL_STACK
get_current_task x16
scs_save x16
@@ -888,8 +891,10 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(call_on_irq_stack)
/* Move to the new stack and call the function there */
add sp, x16, #IRQ_STACK_SIZE
+ restore_irq x9
blr x1
+ save_and_disable_daif x9
/*
* Restore the SP from the FP, and restore the FP and LR from the frame
* record.
@@ -897,6 +902,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(call_on_irq_stack)
mov sp, x29
ldp x29, x30, [sp], #16
scs_load_current
+ restore_irq x9
ret
SYM_FUNC_END(call_on_irq_stack)
NOKPROBE(call_on_irq_stack)
Revert kvec msg iterator before trying to process a TLS alert
when possible.
In nvmet_tcp_try_recv_data(), it's assumed that no msg control
message buffer is set prior to sock_recvmsg(). If no control
message structure is setup, kTLS layer will read and process
TLS data record types. As soon as it encounters a TLS control
message, it would return an error. At that point, we setup a kvec
backed control buffer and read in the control message such as
a TLS alert. Msg can advance the kvec pointer as a part of the
copy process thus we need to revert the iterator before calling
into the tls_alert_recv.
Fixes: a1c5dd8355b1 ("nvmet-tcp: control messages for recvmsg()")
Cc: <Stable(a)vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Olga Kornievskaia <okorniev(a)redhat.com>
---
drivers/nvme/target/tcp.c | 48 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------
1 file changed, 38 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/nvme/target/tcp.c b/drivers/nvme/target/tcp.c
index 688033b88d38..cf3336ddc9a3 100644
--- a/drivers/nvme/target/tcp.c
+++ b/drivers/nvme/target/tcp.c
@@ -1161,6 +1161,7 @@ static int nvmet_tcp_try_recv_pdu(struct nvmet_tcp_queue *queue)
if (unlikely(len < 0))
return len;
if (queue->tls_pskid) {
+ iov_iter_revert(&msg.msg_iter, len);
ret = nvmet_tcp_tls_record_ok(queue, &msg, cbuf);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
@@ -1218,18 +1219,47 @@ static int nvmet_tcp_try_recv_data(struct nvmet_tcp_queue *queue)
{
struct nvmet_tcp_cmd *cmd = queue->cmd;
int len, ret;
+ union {
+ struct cmsghdr cmsg;
+ u8 buf[CMSG_SPACE(sizeof(u8))];
+ } u;
+ u8 alert[2];
+ struct kvec alert_kvec = {
+ .iov_base = alert,
+ .iov_len = sizeof(alert),
+ };
+ struct msghdr msg = {
+ .msg_control = &u,
+ .msg_controllen = sizeof(u),
+ };
while (msg_data_left(&cmd->recv_msg)) {
+ /* assumed that cmg->recv_msg's control buffer is not setup
+ */
+ WARN_ON_ONCE(cmd->recv_msg.msg_controllen > 0);
+
len = sock_recvmsg(cmd->queue->sock, &cmd->recv_msg,
cmd->recv_msg.msg_flags);
+ if (cmd->recv_msg.msg_flags & MSG_CTRUNC) {
+ cmd->recv_msg.msg_flags &= ~(MSG_CTRUNC | MSG_EOF);
+ if (len == 0 || len == -EIO) {
+ iov_iter_kvec(&msg.msg_iter, ITER_DEST, &alert_kvec,
+ 1, alert_kvec.iov_len);
+ len = sock_recvmsg(cmd->queue->sock, &msg,
+ MSG_DONTWAIT);
+ if (len > 0 &&
+ tls_get_record_type(cmd->queue->sock->sk,
+ &u.cmsg) == TLS_RECORD_TYPE_ALERT) {
+ iov_iter_revert(&msg.msg_iter, len);
+ ret = nvmet_tcp_tls_record_ok(cmd->queue,
+ &msg, u.buf);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return ret;
+ }
+ }
+ }
if (len <= 0)
return len;
- if (queue->tls_pskid) {
- ret = nvmet_tcp_tls_record_ok(cmd->queue,
- &cmd->recv_msg, cmd->recv_cbuf);
- if (ret < 0)
- return ret;
- }
cmd->pdu_recv += len;
cmd->rbytes_done += len;
@@ -1267,6 +1297,7 @@ static int nvmet_tcp_try_recv_ddgst(struct nvmet_tcp_queue *queue)
if (unlikely(len < 0))
return len;
if (queue->tls_pskid) {
+ iov_iter_revert(&msg.msg_iter, len);
ret = nvmet_tcp_tls_record_ok(queue, &msg, cbuf);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
@@ -1453,10 +1484,6 @@ static int nvmet_tcp_alloc_cmd(struct nvmet_tcp_queue *queue,
if (!c->r2t_pdu)
goto out_free_data;
- if (queue->state == NVMET_TCP_Q_TLS_HANDSHAKE) {
- c->recv_msg.msg_control = c->recv_cbuf;
- c->recv_msg.msg_controllen = sizeof(c->recv_cbuf);
- }
c->recv_msg.msg_flags = MSG_DONTWAIT | MSG_NOSIGNAL;
list_add_tail(&c->entry, &queue->free_list);
@@ -1736,6 +1763,7 @@ static int nvmet_tcp_try_peek_pdu(struct nvmet_tcp_queue *queue)
return len;
}
+ iov_iter_revert(&msg.msg_iter, len);
ret = nvmet_tcp_tls_record_ok(queue, &msg, cbuf);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
--
2.47.1
A security exploit was discovered in NFS over TLS in tls_alert_recv
due to its assumption that there is valid data in the msghdr's
iterator's kvec.
Instead, this patch proposes the rework how control messages are
setup and used by sock_recvmsg().
If no control message structure is setup, kTLS layer will read and
process TLS data record types. As soon as it encounters a TLS control
message, it would return an error. At that point, NFS can setup a kvec
backed control buffer and read in the control message such as a TLS
alert. Msg iterator can advance the kvec pointer as a part of the copy
process thus we need to revert the iterator before calling into the
tls_alert_recv.
Fixes: dea034b963c8 ("SUNRPC: Capture CMSG metadata on client-side receive")
Suggested-by: Trond Myklebust <trondmy(a)hammerspace.com>
Cc: <Stable(a)vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Olga Kornievskaia <okorniev(a)redhat.com>
---
net/sunrpc/xprtsock.c | 40 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------
1 file changed, 30 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/sunrpc/xprtsock.c b/net/sunrpc/xprtsock.c
index 04ff66758fc3..c5f7bbf5775f 100644
--- a/net/sunrpc/xprtsock.c
+++ b/net/sunrpc/xprtsock.c
@@ -358,7 +358,7 @@ xs_alloc_sparse_pages(struct xdr_buf *buf, size_t want, gfp_t gfp)
static int
xs_sock_process_cmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
- struct cmsghdr *cmsg, int ret)
+ unsigned int *msg_flags, struct cmsghdr *cmsg, int ret)
{
u8 content_type = tls_get_record_type(sock->sk, cmsg);
u8 level, description;
@@ -371,7 +371,7 @@ xs_sock_process_cmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
* record, even though there might be more frames
* waiting to be decrypted.
*/
- msg->msg_flags &= ~MSG_EOR;
+ *msg_flags &= ~MSG_EOR;
break;
case TLS_RECORD_TYPE_ALERT:
tls_alert_recv(sock->sk, msg, &level, &description);
@@ -386,19 +386,33 @@ xs_sock_process_cmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
}
static int
-xs_sock_recv_cmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, int flags)
+xs_sock_recv_cmsg(struct socket *sock, unsigned int *msg_flags, int flags)
{
union {
struct cmsghdr cmsg;
u8 buf[CMSG_SPACE(sizeof(u8))];
} u;
+ u8 alert[2];
+ struct kvec alert_kvec = {
+ .iov_base = alert,
+ .iov_len = sizeof(alert),
+ };
+ struct msghdr msg = {
+ .msg_flags = *msg_flags,
+ .msg_control = &u,
+ .msg_controllen = sizeof(u),
+ };
int ret;
- msg->msg_control = &u;
- msg->msg_controllen = sizeof(u);
- ret = sock_recvmsg(sock, msg, flags);
- if (msg->msg_controllen != sizeof(u))
- ret = xs_sock_process_cmsg(sock, msg, &u.cmsg, ret);
+ iov_iter_kvec(&msg.msg_iter, ITER_DEST, &alert_kvec, 1,
+ alert_kvec.iov_len);
+ ret = sock_recvmsg(sock, &msg, flags);
+ if (ret > 0 &&
+ tls_get_record_type(sock->sk, &u.cmsg) == TLS_RECORD_TYPE_ALERT) {
+ iov_iter_revert(&msg.msg_iter, ret);
+ ret = xs_sock_process_cmsg(sock, &msg, msg_flags, &u.cmsg,
+ -EAGAIN);
+ }
return ret;
}
@@ -408,7 +422,13 @@ xs_sock_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, int flags, size_t seek)
ssize_t ret;
if (seek != 0)
iov_iter_advance(&msg->msg_iter, seek);
- ret = xs_sock_recv_cmsg(sock, msg, flags);
+ ret = sock_recvmsg(sock, msg, flags);
+ /* Handle TLS inband control message lazily */
+ if (msg->msg_flags & MSG_CTRUNC) {
+ msg->msg_flags &= ~(MSG_CTRUNC | MSG_EOR);
+ if (ret == 0 || ret == -EIO)
+ ret = xs_sock_recv_cmsg(sock, &msg->msg_flags, flags);
+ }
return ret > 0 ? ret + seek : ret;
}
@@ -434,7 +454,7 @@ xs_read_discard(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, int flags,
size_t count)
{
iov_iter_discard(&msg->msg_iter, ITER_DEST, count);
- return xs_sock_recv_cmsg(sock, msg, flags);
+ return xs_sock_recvmsg(sock, msg, flags, 0);
}
#if ARCH_IMPLEMENTS_FLUSH_DCACHE_PAGE
--
2.47.1
Scott Mayhew discovered a security exploit in NFS over TLS in
tls_alert_recv() due to its assumption it can read data from
the msg iterator's kvec..
kTLS implementation splits TLS non-data record payload between
the control message buffer (which includes the type such as TLS
aler or TLS cipher change) and the rest of the payload (say TLS
alert's level/description) which goes into the msg payload buffer.
This patch proposes to rework how control messages are setup and
used by sock_recvmsg().
If no control message structure is setup, kTLS layer will read and
process TLS data record types. As soon as it encounters a TLS control
message, it would return an error. At that point, NFS can setup a
kvec backed msg buffer and read in the control message such as a
TLS alert. Msg iterator can advance the kvec pointer as a part of
the copy process thus we need to revert the iterator before calling
into the tls_alert_recv.
Reported-by: Scott Mayhew <smayhew(a)redhat.com>
Fixes: 5e052dda121e ("SUNRPC: Recognize control messages in server-side TCP socket code")
Suggested-by: Trond Myklebust <trondmy(a)hammerspace.com>
Cc: <Stable(a)vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Olga Kornievskaia <okorniev(a)redhat.com>
---
net/sunrpc/svcsock.c | 43 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------
1 file changed, 35 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/sunrpc/svcsock.c b/net/sunrpc/svcsock.c
index 46c156b121db..e2c5e0e626f9 100644
--- a/net/sunrpc/svcsock.c
+++ b/net/sunrpc/svcsock.c
@@ -257,20 +257,47 @@ svc_tcp_sock_process_cmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
}
static int
-svc_tcp_sock_recv_cmsg(struct svc_sock *svsk, struct msghdr *msg)
+svc_tcp_sock_recv_cmsg(struct socket *sock, unsigned int *msg_flags)
{
union {
struct cmsghdr cmsg;
u8 buf[CMSG_SPACE(sizeof(u8))];
} u;
- struct socket *sock = svsk->sk_sock;
+ u8 alert[2];
+ struct kvec alert_kvec = {
+ .iov_base = alert,
+ .iov_len = sizeof(alert),
+ };
+ struct msghdr msg = {
+ .msg_flags = *msg_flags,
+ .msg_control = &u,
+ .msg_controllen = sizeof(u),
+ };
+ int ret;
+
+ iov_iter_kvec(&msg.msg_iter, ITER_DEST, &alert_kvec, 1,
+ alert_kvec.iov_len);
+ ret = sock_recvmsg(sock, &msg, MSG_DONTWAIT);
+ if (ret > 0 &&
+ tls_get_record_type(sock->sk, &u.cmsg) == TLS_RECORD_TYPE_ALERT) {
+ iov_iter_revert(&msg.msg_iter, ret);
+ ret = svc_tcp_sock_process_cmsg(sock, &msg, &u.cmsg, -EAGAIN);
+ }
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int
+svc_tcp_sock_recvmsg(struct svc_sock *svsk, struct msghdr *msg)
+{
int ret;
+ struct socket *sock = svsk->sk_sock;
- msg->msg_control = &u;
- msg->msg_controllen = sizeof(u);
ret = sock_recvmsg(sock, msg, MSG_DONTWAIT);
- if (unlikely(msg->msg_controllen != sizeof(u)))
- ret = svc_tcp_sock_process_cmsg(sock, msg, &u.cmsg, ret);
+ if (msg->msg_flags & MSG_CTRUNC) {
+ msg->msg_flags &= ~(MSG_CTRUNC | MSG_EOR);
+ if (ret == 0 || ret == -EIO)
+ ret = svc_tcp_sock_recv_cmsg(sock, &msg->msg_flags);
+ }
return ret;
}
@@ -321,7 +348,7 @@ static ssize_t svc_tcp_read_msg(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, size_t buflen,
iov_iter_advance(&msg.msg_iter, seek);
buflen -= seek;
}
- len = svc_tcp_sock_recv_cmsg(svsk, &msg);
+ len = svc_tcp_sock_recvmsg(svsk, &msg);
if (len > 0)
svc_flush_bvec(bvec, len, seek);
@@ -1018,7 +1045,7 @@ static ssize_t svc_tcp_read_marker(struct svc_sock *svsk,
iov.iov_base = ((char *)&svsk->sk_marker) + svsk->sk_tcplen;
iov.iov_len = want;
iov_iter_kvec(&msg.msg_iter, ITER_DEST, &iov, 1, want);
- len = svc_tcp_sock_recv_cmsg(svsk, &msg);
+ len = svc_tcp_sock_recvmsg(svsk, &msg);
if (len < 0)
return len;
svsk->sk_tcplen += len;
--
2.47.1
The patch below does not apply to the 5.10-stable tree.
If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm
tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit
id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>.
To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands:
git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-5.10.y
git checkout FETCH_HEAD
git cherry-pick -x 15f77764e90a713ee3916ca424757688e4f565b9
# <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.>
git commit -s
git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2025072854-humbling-collector-aca6@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 5.10.y' HEAD^..
Possible dependencies:
thanks,
greg k-h
------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------
From 15f77764e90a713ee3916ca424757688e4f565b9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: "Lin.Cao" <lincao12(a)amd.com>
Date: Thu, 17 Jul 2025 16:44:53 +0800
Subject: [PATCH] drm/sched: Remove optimization that causes hang when killing
dependent jobs
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
When application A submits jobs and application B submits a job with a
dependency on A's fence, the normal flow wakes up the scheduler after
processing each job. However, the optimization in
drm_sched_entity_add_dependency_cb() uses a callback that only clears
dependencies without waking up the scheduler.
When application A is killed before its jobs can run, the callback gets
triggered but only clears the dependency without waking up the scheduler,
causing the scheduler to enter sleep state and application B to hang.
Remove the optimization by deleting drm_sched_entity_clear_dep() and its
usage, ensuring the scheduler is always woken up when dependencies are
cleared.
Fixes: 777dbd458c89 ("drm/amdgpu: drop a dummy wakeup scheduler")
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org # v4.6+
Signed-off-by: Lin.Cao <lincao12(a)amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Christian König <christian.koenig(a)amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Philipp Stanner <phasta(a)kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250717084453.921097-1-lincao12@amd.com
diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/scheduler/sched_entity.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/scheduler/sched_entity.c
index e671aa241720..ac678de7fe5e 100644
--- a/drivers/gpu/drm/scheduler/sched_entity.c
+++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/scheduler/sched_entity.c
@@ -355,17 +355,6 @@ void drm_sched_entity_destroy(struct drm_sched_entity *entity)
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(drm_sched_entity_destroy);
-/* drm_sched_entity_clear_dep - callback to clear the entities dependency */
-static void drm_sched_entity_clear_dep(struct dma_fence *f,
- struct dma_fence_cb *cb)
-{
- struct drm_sched_entity *entity =
- container_of(cb, struct drm_sched_entity, cb);
-
- entity->dependency = NULL;
- dma_fence_put(f);
-}
-
/*
* drm_sched_entity_wakeup - callback to clear the entity's dependency and
* wake up the scheduler
@@ -376,7 +365,8 @@ static void drm_sched_entity_wakeup(struct dma_fence *f,
struct drm_sched_entity *entity =
container_of(cb, struct drm_sched_entity, cb);
- drm_sched_entity_clear_dep(f, cb);
+ entity->dependency = NULL;
+ dma_fence_put(f);
drm_sched_wakeup(entity->rq->sched);
}
@@ -429,13 +419,6 @@ static bool drm_sched_entity_add_dependency_cb(struct drm_sched_entity *entity)
fence = dma_fence_get(&s_fence->scheduled);
dma_fence_put(entity->dependency);
entity->dependency = fence;
- if (!dma_fence_add_callback(fence, &entity->cb,
- drm_sched_entity_clear_dep))
- return true;
-
- /* Ignore it when it is already scheduled */
- dma_fence_put(fence);
- return false;
}
if (!dma_fence_add_callback(entity->dependency, &entity->cb,
A security exploit was discovered in NFS over TLS in tls_alert_recv
due to its assumption that there is valid data in the msghdr's
iterator's kvec.
Instead, this patch proposes the rework how control messages are
setup and used by sock_recvmsg().
If no control message structure is setup, kTLS layer will read and
process TLS data record types. As soon as it encounters a TLS control
message, it would return an error. At that point, NFS can setup a kvec
backed control buffer and read in the control message such as a TLS
alert. Msg iterator can advance the kvec pointer as a part of the copy
process thus we need to revert the iterator before calling into the
tls_alert_recv.
Fixes: dea034b963c8 ("SUNRPC: Capture CMSG metadata on client-side receive")
Suggested-by: Trond Myklebust <trondmy(a)hammerspace.com>
Cc: <Stable(a)vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Olga Kornievskaia <okorniev(a)redhat.com>
---
net/sunrpc/xprtsock.c | 40 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------
1 file changed, 30 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/sunrpc/xprtsock.c b/net/sunrpc/xprtsock.c
index 04ff66758fc3..c5f7bbf5775f 100644
--- a/net/sunrpc/xprtsock.c
+++ b/net/sunrpc/xprtsock.c
@@ -358,7 +358,7 @@ xs_alloc_sparse_pages(struct xdr_buf *buf, size_t want, gfp_t gfp)
static int
xs_sock_process_cmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
- struct cmsghdr *cmsg, int ret)
+ unsigned int *msg_flags, struct cmsghdr *cmsg, int ret)
{
u8 content_type = tls_get_record_type(sock->sk, cmsg);
u8 level, description;
@@ -371,7 +371,7 @@ xs_sock_process_cmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
* record, even though there might be more frames
* waiting to be decrypted.
*/
- msg->msg_flags &= ~MSG_EOR;
+ *msg_flags &= ~MSG_EOR;
break;
case TLS_RECORD_TYPE_ALERT:
tls_alert_recv(sock->sk, msg, &level, &description);
@@ -386,19 +386,33 @@ xs_sock_process_cmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
}
static int
-xs_sock_recv_cmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, int flags)
+xs_sock_recv_cmsg(struct socket *sock, unsigned int *msg_flags, int flags)
{
union {
struct cmsghdr cmsg;
u8 buf[CMSG_SPACE(sizeof(u8))];
} u;
+ u8 alert[2];
+ struct kvec alert_kvec = {
+ .iov_base = alert,
+ .iov_len = sizeof(alert),
+ };
+ struct msghdr msg = {
+ .msg_flags = *msg_flags,
+ .msg_control = &u,
+ .msg_controllen = sizeof(u),
+ };
int ret;
- msg->msg_control = &u;
- msg->msg_controllen = sizeof(u);
- ret = sock_recvmsg(sock, msg, flags);
- if (msg->msg_controllen != sizeof(u))
- ret = xs_sock_process_cmsg(sock, msg, &u.cmsg, ret);
+ iov_iter_kvec(&msg.msg_iter, ITER_DEST, &alert_kvec, 1,
+ alert_kvec.iov_len);
+ ret = sock_recvmsg(sock, &msg, flags);
+ if (ret > 0 &&
+ tls_get_record_type(sock->sk, &u.cmsg) == TLS_RECORD_TYPE_ALERT) {
+ iov_iter_revert(&msg.msg_iter, ret);
+ ret = xs_sock_process_cmsg(sock, &msg, msg_flags, &u.cmsg,
+ -EAGAIN);
+ }
return ret;
}
@@ -408,7 +422,13 @@ xs_sock_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, int flags, size_t seek)
ssize_t ret;
if (seek != 0)
iov_iter_advance(&msg->msg_iter, seek);
- ret = xs_sock_recv_cmsg(sock, msg, flags);
+ ret = sock_recvmsg(sock, msg, flags);
+ /* Handle TLS inband control message lazily */
+ if (msg->msg_flags & MSG_CTRUNC) {
+ msg->msg_flags &= ~(MSG_CTRUNC | MSG_EOR);
+ if (ret == 0 || ret == -EIO)
+ ret = xs_sock_recv_cmsg(sock, &msg->msg_flags, flags);
+ }
return ret > 0 ? ret + seek : ret;
}
@@ -434,7 +454,7 @@ xs_read_discard(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, int flags,
size_t count)
{
iov_iter_discard(&msg->msg_iter, ITER_DEST, count);
- return xs_sock_recv_cmsg(sock, msg, flags);
+ return xs_sock_recvmsg(sock, msg, flags, 0);
}
#if ARCH_IMPLEMENTS_FLUSH_DCACHE_PAGE
--
2.47.1
The patch below does not apply to the 5.15-stable tree.
If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm
tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit
id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>.
To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands:
git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-5.15.y
git checkout FETCH_HEAD
git cherry-pick -x 15f77764e90a713ee3916ca424757688e4f565b9
# <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.>
git commit -s
git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2025072854-backlog-freeness-4f50@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 5.15.y' HEAD^..
Possible dependencies:
thanks,
greg k-h
------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------
From 15f77764e90a713ee3916ca424757688e4f565b9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: "Lin.Cao" <lincao12(a)amd.com>
Date: Thu, 17 Jul 2025 16:44:53 +0800
Subject: [PATCH] drm/sched: Remove optimization that causes hang when killing
dependent jobs
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
When application A submits jobs and application B submits a job with a
dependency on A's fence, the normal flow wakes up the scheduler after
processing each job. However, the optimization in
drm_sched_entity_add_dependency_cb() uses a callback that only clears
dependencies without waking up the scheduler.
When application A is killed before its jobs can run, the callback gets
triggered but only clears the dependency without waking up the scheduler,
causing the scheduler to enter sleep state and application B to hang.
Remove the optimization by deleting drm_sched_entity_clear_dep() and its
usage, ensuring the scheduler is always woken up when dependencies are
cleared.
Fixes: 777dbd458c89 ("drm/amdgpu: drop a dummy wakeup scheduler")
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org # v4.6+
Signed-off-by: Lin.Cao <lincao12(a)amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Christian König <christian.koenig(a)amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Philipp Stanner <phasta(a)kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250717084453.921097-1-lincao12@amd.com
diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/scheduler/sched_entity.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/scheduler/sched_entity.c
index e671aa241720..ac678de7fe5e 100644
--- a/drivers/gpu/drm/scheduler/sched_entity.c
+++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/scheduler/sched_entity.c
@@ -355,17 +355,6 @@ void drm_sched_entity_destroy(struct drm_sched_entity *entity)
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(drm_sched_entity_destroy);
-/* drm_sched_entity_clear_dep - callback to clear the entities dependency */
-static void drm_sched_entity_clear_dep(struct dma_fence *f,
- struct dma_fence_cb *cb)
-{
- struct drm_sched_entity *entity =
- container_of(cb, struct drm_sched_entity, cb);
-
- entity->dependency = NULL;
- dma_fence_put(f);
-}
-
/*
* drm_sched_entity_wakeup - callback to clear the entity's dependency and
* wake up the scheduler
@@ -376,7 +365,8 @@ static void drm_sched_entity_wakeup(struct dma_fence *f,
struct drm_sched_entity *entity =
container_of(cb, struct drm_sched_entity, cb);
- drm_sched_entity_clear_dep(f, cb);
+ entity->dependency = NULL;
+ dma_fence_put(f);
drm_sched_wakeup(entity->rq->sched);
}
@@ -429,13 +419,6 @@ static bool drm_sched_entity_add_dependency_cb(struct drm_sched_entity *entity)
fence = dma_fence_get(&s_fence->scheduled);
dma_fence_put(entity->dependency);
entity->dependency = fence;
- if (!dma_fence_add_callback(fence, &entity->cb,
- drm_sched_entity_clear_dep))
- return true;
-
- /* Ignore it when it is already scheduled */
- dma_fence_put(fence);
- return false;
}
if (!dma_fence_add_callback(entity->dependency, &entity->cb,
The patch below does not apply to the 6.1-stable tree.
If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm
tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit
id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>.
To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands:
git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-6.1.y
git checkout FETCH_HEAD
git cherry-pick -x 15f77764e90a713ee3916ca424757688e4f565b9
# <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.>
git commit -s
git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2025072853-startup-unwomanly-7e1c@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 6.1.y' HEAD^..
Possible dependencies:
thanks,
greg k-h
------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------
From 15f77764e90a713ee3916ca424757688e4f565b9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: "Lin.Cao" <lincao12(a)amd.com>
Date: Thu, 17 Jul 2025 16:44:53 +0800
Subject: [PATCH] drm/sched: Remove optimization that causes hang when killing
dependent jobs
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
When application A submits jobs and application B submits a job with a
dependency on A's fence, the normal flow wakes up the scheduler after
processing each job. However, the optimization in
drm_sched_entity_add_dependency_cb() uses a callback that only clears
dependencies without waking up the scheduler.
When application A is killed before its jobs can run, the callback gets
triggered but only clears the dependency without waking up the scheduler,
causing the scheduler to enter sleep state and application B to hang.
Remove the optimization by deleting drm_sched_entity_clear_dep() and its
usage, ensuring the scheduler is always woken up when dependencies are
cleared.
Fixes: 777dbd458c89 ("drm/amdgpu: drop a dummy wakeup scheduler")
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org # v4.6+
Signed-off-by: Lin.Cao <lincao12(a)amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Christian König <christian.koenig(a)amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Philipp Stanner <phasta(a)kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250717084453.921097-1-lincao12@amd.com
diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/scheduler/sched_entity.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/scheduler/sched_entity.c
index e671aa241720..ac678de7fe5e 100644
--- a/drivers/gpu/drm/scheduler/sched_entity.c
+++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/scheduler/sched_entity.c
@@ -355,17 +355,6 @@ void drm_sched_entity_destroy(struct drm_sched_entity *entity)
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(drm_sched_entity_destroy);
-/* drm_sched_entity_clear_dep - callback to clear the entities dependency */
-static void drm_sched_entity_clear_dep(struct dma_fence *f,
- struct dma_fence_cb *cb)
-{
- struct drm_sched_entity *entity =
- container_of(cb, struct drm_sched_entity, cb);
-
- entity->dependency = NULL;
- dma_fence_put(f);
-}
-
/*
* drm_sched_entity_wakeup - callback to clear the entity's dependency and
* wake up the scheduler
@@ -376,7 +365,8 @@ static void drm_sched_entity_wakeup(struct dma_fence *f,
struct drm_sched_entity *entity =
container_of(cb, struct drm_sched_entity, cb);
- drm_sched_entity_clear_dep(f, cb);
+ entity->dependency = NULL;
+ dma_fence_put(f);
drm_sched_wakeup(entity->rq->sched);
}
@@ -429,13 +419,6 @@ static bool drm_sched_entity_add_dependency_cb(struct drm_sched_entity *entity)
fence = dma_fence_get(&s_fence->scheduled);
dma_fence_put(entity->dependency);
entity->dependency = fence;
- if (!dma_fence_add_callback(fence, &entity->cb,
- drm_sched_entity_clear_dep))
- return true;
-
- /* Ignore it when it is already scheduled */
- dma_fence_put(fence);
- return false;
}
if (!dma_fence_add_callback(entity->dependency, &entity->cb,