This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled
arm-ccn: perf: Prevent module unload while PMU is in use
to the 4.14-stable tree which can be found at:
http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum…
The filename of the patch is:
arm-ccn-perf-prevent-module-unload-while-pmu-is-in-use.patch
and it can be found in the queue-4.14 subdirectory.
If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree,
please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it.
>From foo@baz Mon Dec 18 13:28:59 CET 2017
From: Suzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose(a)arm.com>
Date: Fri, 3 Nov 2017 11:45:18 +0000
Subject: arm-ccn: perf: Prevent module unload while PMU is in use
From: Suzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose(a)arm.com>
[ Upstream commit c7f5828bf77dcbd61d51f4736c1d5aa35663fbb4 ]
When the PMU driver is built as a module, the perf expects the
pmu->module to be valid, so that the driver is prevented from
being unloaded while it is in use. Fix the CCN pmu driver to
fill in this field.
Fixes: a33b0daab73a0 ("bus: ARM CCN PMU driver")
Cc: Pawel Moll <pawel.moll(a)arm.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon(a)arm.com>
Acked-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland(a)arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Suzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose(a)arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon(a)arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin(a)verizon.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/bus/arm-ccn.c | 1 +
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
--- a/drivers/bus/arm-ccn.c
+++ b/drivers/bus/arm-ccn.c
@@ -1280,6 +1280,7 @@ static int arm_ccn_pmu_init(struct arm_c
/* Perf driver registration */
ccn->dt.pmu = (struct pmu) {
+ .module = THIS_MODULE,
.attr_groups = arm_ccn_pmu_attr_groups,
.task_ctx_nr = perf_invalid_context,
.event_init = arm_ccn_pmu_event_init,
Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from suzuki.poulose(a)arm.com are
queue-4.14/arm-ccn-perf-prevent-module-unload-while-pmu-is-in-use.patch
This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled
usb: add helper to extract bits 12:11 of wMaxPacketSize
to the 4.9-stable tree which can be found at:
http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum…
The filename of the patch is:
usb-add-helper-to-extract-bits-12-11-of-wmaxpacketsize.patch
and it can be found in the queue-4.9 subdirectory.
If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree,
please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it.
>From 541b6fe63023f3059cf85d47ff2767a3e42a8e44 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Felipe Balbi <felipe.balbi(a)linux.intel.com>
Date: Mon, 26 Sep 2016 10:51:18 +0300
Subject: usb: add helper to extract bits 12:11 of wMaxPacketSize
From: Felipe Balbi <felipe.balbi(a)linux.intel.com>
commit 541b6fe63023f3059cf85d47ff2767a3e42a8e44 upstream.
According to USB Specification 2.0 table 9-4,
wMaxPacketSize is a bitfield. Endpoint's maxpacket
is laid out in bits 10:0. For high-speed,
high-bandwidth isochronous endpoints, bits 12:11
contain a multiplier to tell us how many
transactions we want to try per uframe.
This means that if we want an isochronous endpoint
to issue 3 transfers of 1024 bytes per uframe,
wMaxPacketSize should contain the value:
1024 | (2 << 11)
or 5120 (0x1400). In order to make Host and
Peripheral controller drivers' life easier, we're
adding a helper which returns bits 12:11. Note that
no care is made WRT to checking endpoint type and
gadget's speed. That's left for drivers to handle.
Signed-off-by: Felipe Balbi <felipe.balbi(a)linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org>
---
include/uapi/linux/usb/ch9.h | 19 +++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 19 insertions(+)
--- a/include/uapi/linux/usb/ch9.h
+++ b/include/uapi/linux/usb/ch9.h
@@ -423,6 +423,11 @@ struct usb_endpoint_descriptor {
#define USB_ENDPOINT_XFER_INT 3
#define USB_ENDPOINT_MAX_ADJUSTABLE 0x80
+#define USB_EP_MAXP_MULT_SHIFT 11
+#define USB_EP_MAXP_MULT_MASK (3 << USB_EP_MAXP_MULT_SHIFT)
+#define USB_EP_MAXP_MULT(m) \
+ (((m) & USB_EP_MAXP_MULT_MASK) >> USB_EP_MAXP_MULT_SHIFT)
+
/* The USB 3.0 spec redefines bits 5:4 of bmAttributes as interrupt ep type. */
#define USB_ENDPOINT_INTRTYPE 0x30
#define USB_ENDPOINT_INTR_PERIODIC (0 << 4)
@@ -630,6 +635,20 @@ static inline int usb_endpoint_maxp(cons
return __le16_to_cpu(epd->wMaxPacketSize);
}
+/**
+ * usb_endpoint_maxp_mult - get endpoint's transactional opportunities
+ * @epd: endpoint to be checked
+ *
+ * Return @epd's wMaxPacketSize[12:11] + 1
+ */
+static inline int
+usb_endpoint_maxp_mult(const struct usb_endpoint_descriptor *epd)
+{
+ int maxp = __le16_to_cpu(epd->wMaxPacketSize);
+
+ return USB_EP_MAXP_MULT(maxp) + 1;
+}
+
static inline int usb_endpoint_interrupt_type(
const struct usb_endpoint_descriptor *epd)
{
Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from felipe.balbi(a)linux.intel.com are
queue-4.9/usb-add-helper-to-extract-bits-12-11-of-wmaxpacketsize.patch
On Wed, Nov 22, 2017 at 8:27 PM, Amir Goldstein <amir73il(a)gmail.com> wrote:
> Conform two stray warning messages to the standard overlayfs: prefix.
>
> Signed-off-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il(a)gmail.com>
> ---
Greg,
Upstream commit ("da2e6b7eeda8 ovl: fix overlay: warning prefix")
was not marked for stable, because it is not a bug fix per-se.
Nevertheless, it may be useful to apply it to stable kernels to keep
overlayfs bug reports/analysis consistent.
The first hunk fixes (#v4.10):
a6c606551141 ovl: redirect on rename-dir
The second hunk fixes (#v4.14):
b5efccbe0a12 ovl: constant d_ino across copy up
For your consideration.
If you wish, I can send a patch for v4.10 with just the first hunk.
Thanks,
Amir.
Hi,
Can following commit be included in stable kernel releases starting from
v4.11?
d9018976cdb6eefc62a7ba79a405f6c9661b08a7 ("mfd: lpc_ich: Do not touch SPI-NOR write protection bit on Haswell/Broadwell")
This makes sure older kernels will not accidentally lose the BIOS
settings.
Thanks!
This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled
mac80211: Fix addition of mesh configuration element
to the 4.9-stable tree which can be found at:
http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum…
The filename of the patch is:
mac80211-fix-addition-of-mesh-configuration-element.patch
and it can be found in the queue-4.9 subdirectory.
If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree,
please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it.
>From 57629915d568c522ac1422df7bba4bee5b5c7a7c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Ilan peer <ilan.peer(a)intel.com>
Date: Mon, 26 Dec 2016 18:17:36 +0200
Subject: mac80211: Fix addition of mesh configuration element
From: Ilan peer <ilan.peer(a)intel.com>
commit 57629915d568c522ac1422df7bba4bee5b5c7a7c upstream.
The code was setting the capabilities byte to zero,
after it was already properly set previously. Fix it.
The bug was found while debugging hwsim mesh tests failures
that happened since the commit mentioned below.
Fixes: 76f43b4c0a93 ("mac80211: Remove invalid flag operations in mesh TSF synchronization")
Signed-off-by: Ilan Peer <ilan.peer(a)intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Masashi Honma <masashi.honma(a)gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg(a)intel.com>
Cc: Richard Schütz <rschuetz(a)uni-koblenz.de>
Cc: Mathias Kretschmer <mathias.kretschmer(a)fit.fraunhofer.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org>
---
net/mac80211/mesh.c | 2 --
1 file changed, 2 deletions(-)
--- a/net/mac80211/mesh.c
+++ b/net/mac80211/mesh.c
@@ -279,8 +279,6 @@ int mesh_add_meshconf_ie(struct ieee8021
/* Mesh PS mode. See IEEE802.11-2012 8.4.2.100.8 */
*pos |= ifmsh->ps_peers_deep_sleep ?
IEEE80211_MESHCONF_CAPAB_POWER_SAVE_LEVEL : 0x00;
- *pos++ = 0x00;
-
return 0;
}
Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from ilan.peer(a)intel.com are
queue-4.9/mac80211-fix-addition-of-mesh-configuration-element.patch
This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled
mac80211: Fix addition of mesh configuration element
to the 4.4-stable tree which can be found at:
http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum…
The filename of the patch is:
mac80211-fix-addition-of-mesh-configuration-element.patch
and it can be found in the queue-4.4 subdirectory.
If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree,
please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it.
>From 57629915d568c522ac1422df7bba4bee5b5c7a7c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Ilan peer <ilan.peer(a)intel.com>
Date: Mon, 26 Dec 2016 18:17:36 +0200
Subject: mac80211: Fix addition of mesh configuration element
From: Ilan peer <ilan.peer(a)intel.com>
commit 57629915d568c522ac1422df7bba4bee5b5c7a7c upstream.
The code was setting the capabilities byte to zero,
after it was already properly set previously. Fix it.
The bug was found while debugging hwsim mesh tests failures
that happened since the commit mentioned below.
Fixes: 76f43b4c0a93 ("mac80211: Remove invalid flag operations in mesh TSF synchronization")
Signed-off-by: Ilan Peer <ilan.peer(a)intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Masashi Honma <masashi.honma(a)gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg(a)intel.com>
Cc: Richard Schütz <rschuetz(a)uni-koblenz.de>
Cc: Mathias Kretschmer <mathias.kretschmer(a)fit.fraunhofer.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org>
---
net/mac80211/mesh.c | 2 --
1 file changed, 2 deletions(-)
--- a/net/mac80211/mesh.c
+++ b/net/mac80211/mesh.c
@@ -295,8 +295,6 @@ int mesh_add_meshconf_ie(struct ieee8021
/* Mesh PS mode. See IEEE802.11-2012 8.4.2.100.8 */
*pos |= ifmsh->ps_peers_deep_sleep ?
IEEE80211_MESHCONF_CAPAB_POWER_SAVE_LEVEL : 0x00;
- *pos++ = 0x00;
-
return 0;
}
Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from ilan.peer(a)intel.com are
queue-4.4/mac80211-fix-addition-of-mesh-configuration-element.patch
This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled
KEYS: add missing permission check for request_key() destination
to the 4.4-stable tree which can be found at:
http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum…
The filename of the patch is:
keys-add-missing-permission-check-for-request_key-destination.patch
and it can be found in the queue-4.4 subdirectory.
If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree,
please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it.
>From 4dca6ea1d9432052afb06baf2e3ae78188a4410b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers(a)google.com>
Date: Fri, 8 Dec 2017 15:13:27 +0000
Subject: KEYS: add missing permission check for request_key() destination
From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers(a)google.com>
commit 4dca6ea1d9432052afb06baf2e3ae78188a4410b upstream.
When the request_key() syscall is not passed a destination keyring, it
links the requested key (if constructed) into the "default" request-key
keyring. This should require Write permission to the keyring. However,
there is actually no permission check.
This can be abused to add keys to any keyring to which only Search
permission is granted. This is because Search permission allows joining
the keyring. keyctl_set_reqkey_keyring(KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_SESSION_KEYRING)
then will set the default request-key keyring to the session keyring.
Then, request_key() can be used to add keys to the keyring.
Both negatively and positively instantiated keys can be added using this
method. Adding negative keys is trivial. Adding a positive key is a
bit trickier. It requires that either /sbin/request-key positively
instantiates the key, or that another thread adds the key to the process
keyring at just the right time, such that request_key() misses it
initially but then finds it in construct_alloc_key().
Fix this bug by checking for Write permission to the keyring in
construct_get_dest_keyring() when the default keyring is being used.
We don't do the permission check for non-default keyrings because that
was already done by the earlier call to lookup_user_key(). Also,
request_key_and_link() is currently passed a 'struct key *' rather than
a key_ref_t, so the "possessed" bit is unavailable.
We also don't do the permission check for the "requestor keyring", to
continue to support the use case described by commit 8bbf4976b59f
("KEYS: Alter use of key instantiation link-to-keyring argument") where
/sbin/request-key recursively calls request_key() to add keys to the
original requestor's destination keyring. (I don't know of any users
who actually do that, though...)
Fixes: 3e30148c3d52 ("[PATCH] Keys: Make request-key create an authorisation key")
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers(a)google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells(a)redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org>
---
security/keys/request_key.c | 48 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------
1 file changed, 38 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
--- a/security/keys/request_key.c
+++ b/security/keys/request_key.c
@@ -250,11 +250,12 @@ static int construct_key(struct key *key
* The keyring selected is returned with an extra reference upon it which the
* caller must release.
*/
-static void construct_get_dest_keyring(struct key **_dest_keyring)
+static int construct_get_dest_keyring(struct key **_dest_keyring)
{
struct request_key_auth *rka;
const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
struct key *dest_keyring = *_dest_keyring, *authkey;
+ int ret;
kenter("%p", dest_keyring);
@@ -263,6 +264,8 @@ static void construct_get_dest_keyring(s
/* the caller supplied one */
key_get(dest_keyring);
} else {
+ bool do_perm_check = true;
+
/* use a default keyring; falling through the cases until we
* find one that we actually have */
switch (cred->jit_keyring) {
@@ -277,8 +280,10 @@ static void construct_get_dest_keyring(s
dest_keyring =
key_get(rka->dest_keyring);
up_read(&authkey->sem);
- if (dest_keyring)
+ if (dest_keyring) {
+ do_perm_check = false;
break;
+ }
}
case KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_THREAD_KEYRING:
@@ -313,11 +318,29 @@ static void construct_get_dest_keyring(s
default:
BUG();
}
+
+ /*
+ * Require Write permission on the keyring. This is essential
+ * because the default keyring may be the session keyring, and
+ * joining a keyring only requires Search permission.
+ *
+ * However, this check is skipped for the "requestor keyring" so
+ * that /sbin/request-key can itself use request_key() to add
+ * keys to the original requestor's destination keyring.
+ */
+ if (dest_keyring && do_perm_check) {
+ ret = key_permission(make_key_ref(dest_keyring, 1),
+ KEY_NEED_WRITE);
+ if (ret) {
+ key_put(dest_keyring);
+ return ret;
+ }
+ }
}
*_dest_keyring = dest_keyring;
kleave(" [dk %d]", key_serial(dest_keyring));
- return;
+ return 0;
}
/*
@@ -442,12 +465,16 @@ static struct key *construct_key_and_lin
if (ctx->index_key.type == &key_type_keyring)
return ERR_PTR(-EPERM);
-
- user = key_user_lookup(current_fsuid());
- if (!user)
- return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
- construct_get_dest_keyring(&dest_keyring);
+ ret = construct_get_dest_keyring(&dest_keyring);
+ if (ret)
+ goto error;
+
+ user = key_user_lookup(current_fsuid());
+ if (!user) {
+ ret = -ENOMEM;
+ goto error_put_dest_keyring;
+ }
ret = construct_alloc_key(ctx, dest_keyring, flags, user, &key);
key_user_put(user);
@@ -462,7 +489,7 @@ static struct key *construct_key_and_lin
} else if (ret == -EINPROGRESS) {
ret = 0;
} else {
- goto couldnt_alloc_key;
+ goto error_put_dest_keyring;
}
key_put(dest_keyring);
@@ -472,8 +499,9 @@ static struct key *construct_key_and_lin
construction_failed:
key_negate_and_link(key, key_negative_timeout, NULL, NULL);
key_put(key);
-couldnt_alloc_key:
+error_put_dest_keyring:
key_put(dest_keyring);
+error:
kleave(" = %d", ret);
return ERR_PTR(ret);
}
Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from ebiggers(a)google.com are
queue-4.4/crypto-salsa20-fix-blkcipher_walk-api-usage.patch
queue-4.4/keys-add-missing-permission-check-for-request_key-destination.patch
queue-4.4/crypto-hmac-require-that-the-underlying-hash-algorithm-is-unkeyed.patch
This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled
mac80211: Fix addition of mesh configuration element
to the 3.18-stable tree which can be found at:
http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum…
The filename of the patch is:
mac80211-fix-addition-of-mesh-configuration-element.patch
and it can be found in the queue-3.18 subdirectory.
If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree,
please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it.
>From 57629915d568c522ac1422df7bba4bee5b5c7a7c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Ilan peer <ilan.peer(a)intel.com>
Date: Mon, 26 Dec 2016 18:17:36 +0200
Subject: mac80211: Fix addition of mesh configuration element
From: Ilan peer <ilan.peer(a)intel.com>
commit 57629915d568c522ac1422df7bba4bee5b5c7a7c upstream.
The code was setting the capabilities byte to zero,
after it was already properly set previously. Fix it.
The bug was found while debugging hwsim mesh tests failures
that happened since the commit mentioned below.
Fixes: 76f43b4c0a93 ("mac80211: Remove invalid flag operations in mesh TSF synchronization")
Signed-off-by: Ilan Peer <ilan.peer(a)intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Masashi Honma <masashi.honma(a)gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg(a)intel.com>
Cc: Richard Schütz <rschuetz(a)uni-koblenz.de>
Cc: Mathias Kretschmer <mathias.kretschmer(a)fit.fraunhofer.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org>
---
net/mac80211/mesh.c | 2 --
1 file changed, 2 deletions(-)
--- a/net/mac80211/mesh.c
+++ b/net/mac80211/mesh.c
@@ -289,8 +289,6 @@ int mesh_add_meshconf_ie(struct ieee8021
/* Mesh PS mode. See IEEE802.11-2012 8.4.2.100.8 */
*pos |= ifmsh->ps_peers_deep_sleep ?
IEEE80211_MESHCONF_CAPAB_POWER_SAVE_LEVEL : 0x00;
- *pos++ = 0x00;
-
return 0;
}
Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from ilan.peer(a)intel.com are
queue-3.18/mac80211-fix-addition-of-mesh-configuration-element.patch
This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled
KEYS: Don't permit request_key() to construct a new keyring
to the 3.18-stable tree which can be found at:
http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum…
The filename of the patch is:
keys-don-t-permit-request_key-to-construct-a-new-keyring.patch
and it can be found in the queue-3.18 subdirectory.
If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree,
please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it.
>From 911b79cde95c7da0ec02f48105358a36636b7a71 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: David Howells <dhowells(a)redhat.com>
Date: Mon, 19 Oct 2015 11:20:28 +0100
Subject: KEYS: Don't permit request_key() to construct a new keyring
From: David Howells <dhowells(a)redhat.com>
commit 911b79cde95c7da0ec02f48105358a36636b7a71 upstream.
If request_key() is used to find a keyring, only do the search part - don't
do the construction part if the keyring was not found by the search. We
don't really want keyrings in the negative instantiated state since the
rejected/negative instantiation error value in the payload is unioned with
keyring metadata.
Now the kernel gives an error:
request_key("keyring", "#selinux,bdekeyring", "keyring", KEY_SPEC_USER_SESSION_KEYRING) = -1 EPERM (Operation not permitted)
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells(a)redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers(a)google.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org>
---
security/keys/request_key.c | 3 +++
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
--- a/security/keys/request_key.c
+++ b/security/keys/request_key.c
@@ -467,6 +467,9 @@ static struct key *construct_key_and_lin
if (ret)
goto error;
+ if (ctx->index_key.type == &key_type_keyring)
+ return ERR_PTR(-EPERM);
+
user = key_user_lookup(current_fsuid());
if (!user) {
ret = -ENOMEM;
Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from dhowells(a)redhat.com are
queue-3.18/keys-don-t-permit-request_key-to-construct-a-new-keyring.patch
queue-3.18/don-t-leak-a-key-reference-if-request_key-tries-to-use-a-revoked-keyring.patch
This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled
Don't leak a key reference if request_key() tries to use a revoked keyring
to the 3.18-stable tree which can be found at:
http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum…
The filename of the patch is:
don-t-leak-a-key-reference-if-request_key-tries-to-use-a-revoked-keyring.patch
and it can be found in the queue-3.18 subdirectory.
If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree,
please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it.
>From d0709f1e66e8066c4ac6a54620ec116aa41937c0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: David Jeffery <djeffery(a)redhat.com>
Date: Thu, 12 Feb 2015 16:45:31 +0000
Subject: Don't leak a key reference if request_key() tries to use a revoked keyring
From: David Jeffery <djeffery(a)redhat.com>
commit d0709f1e66e8066c4ac6a54620ec116aa41937c0 upstream.
If a request_key() call to allocate and fill out a key attempts to insert the
key structure into a revoked keyring, the key will leak, using memory and part
of the user's key quota until the system reboots. This is from a failure of
construct_alloc_key() to decrement the key's reference count after the attempt
to insert into the requested keyring is rejected.
key_put() needs to be called in the link_prealloc_failed callpath to ensure
the unused key is released.
Signed-off-by: David Jeffery <djeffery(a)redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells(a)redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris(a)oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers(a)google.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org>
---
security/keys/request_key.c | 1 +
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
--- a/security/keys/request_key.c
+++ b/security/keys/request_key.c
@@ -437,6 +437,7 @@ link_check_failed:
link_prealloc_failed:
mutex_unlock(&user->cons_lock);
+ key_put(key);
kleave(" = %d [prelink]", ret);
return ret;
Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from djeffery(a)redhat.com are
queue-3.18/don-t-leak-a-key-reference-if-request_key-tries-to-use-a-revoked-keyring.patch
From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers(a)google.com>
commit 4dca6ea1d9432052afb06baf2e3ae78188a4410b upstream.
[Please apply to 4.4-stable.]
When the request_key() syscall is not passed a destination keyring, it
links the requested key (if constructed) into the "default" request-key
keyring. This should require Write permission to the keyring. However,
there is actually no permission check.
This can be abused to add keys to any keyring to which only Search
permission is granted. This is because Search permission allows joining
the keyring. keyctl_set_reqkey_keyring(KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_SESSION_KEYRING)
then will set the default request-key keyring to the session keyring.
Then, request_key() can be used to add keys to the keyring.
Both negatively and positively instantiated keys can be added using this
method. Adding negative keys is trivial. Adding a positive key is a
bit trickier. It requires that either /sbin/request-key positively
instantiates the key, or that another thread adds the key to the process
keyring at just the right time, such that request_key() misses it
initially but then finds it in construct_alloc_key().
Fix this bug by checking for Write permission to the keyring in
construct_get_dest_keyring() when the default keyring is being used.
We don't do the permission check for non-default keyrings because that
was already done by the earlier call to lookup_user_key(). Also,
request_key_and_link() is currently passed a 'struct key *' rather than
a key_ref_t, so the "possessed" bit is unavailable.
We also don't do the permission check for the "requestor keyring", to
continue to support the use case described by commit 8bbf4976b59f
("KEYS: Alter use of key instantiation link-to-keyring argument") where
/sbin/request-key recursively calls request_key() to add keys to the
original requestor's destination keyring. (I don't know of any users
who actually do that, though...)
Fixes: 3e30148c3d52 ("[PATCH] Keys: Make request-key create an authorisation key")
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers(a)google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells(a)redhat.com>
---
security/keys/request_key.c | 48 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------
1 file changed, 38 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
diff --git a/security/keys/request_key.c b/security/keys/request_key.c
index 2ce733342b5a..3ae3acf473c8 100644
--- a/security/keys/request_key.c
+++ b/security/keys/request_key.c
@@ -250,11 +250,12 @@ static int construct_key(struct key *key, const void *callout_info,
* The keyring selected is returned with an extra reference upon it which the
* caller must release.
*/
-static void construct_get_dest_keyring(struct key **_dest_keyring)
+static int construct_get_dest_keyring(struct key **_dest_keyring)
{
struct request_key_auth *rka;
const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
struct key *dest_keyring = *_dest_keyring, *authkey;
+ int ret;
kenter("%p", dest_keyring);
@@ -263,6 +264,8 @@ static void construct_get_dest_keyring(struct key **_dest_keyring)
/* the caller supplied one */
key_get(dest_keyring);
} else {
+ bool do_perm_check = true;
+
/* use a default keyring; falling through the cases until we
* find one that we actually have */
switch (cred->jit_keyring) {
@@ -277,8 +280,10 @@ static void construct_get_dest_keyring(struct key **_dest_keyring)
dest_keyring =
key_get(rka->dest_keyring);
up_read(&authkey->sem);
- if (dest_keyring)
+ if (dest_keyring) {
+ do_perm_check = false;
break;
+ }
}
case KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_THREAD_KEYRING:
@@ -313,11 +318,29 @@ static void construct_get_dest_keyring(struct key **_dest_keyring)
default:
BUG();
}
+
+ /*
+ * Require Write permission on the keyring. This is essential
+ * because the default keyring may be the session keyring, and
+ * joining a keyring only requires Search permission.
+ *
+ * However, this check is skipped for the "requestor keyring" so
+ * that /sbin/request-key can itself use request_key() to add
+ * keys to the original requestor's destination keyring.
+ */
+ if (dest_keyring && do_perm_check) {
+ ret = key_permission(make_key_ref(dest_keyring, 1),
+ KEY_NEED_WRITE);
+ if (ret) {
+ key_put(dest_keyring);
+ return ret;
+ }
+ }
}
*_dest_keyring = dest_keyring;
kleave(" [dk %d]", key_serial(dest_keyring));
- return;
+ return 0;
}
/*
@@ -442,12 +465,16 @@ static struct key *construct_key_and_link(struct keyring_search_context *ctx,
if (ctx->index_key.type == &key_type_keyring)
return ERR_PTR(-EPERM);
-
- user = key_user_lookup(current_fsuid());
- if (!user)
- return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
- construct_get_dest_keyring(&dest_keyring);
+ ret = construct_get_dest_keyring(&dest_keyring);
+ if (ret)
+ goto error;
+
+ user = key_user_lookup(current_fsuid());
+ if (!user) {
+ ret = -ENOMEM;
+ goto error_put_dest_keyring;
+ }
ret = construct_alloc_key(ctx, dest_keyring, flags, user, &key);
key_user_put(user);
@@ -462,7 +489,7 @@ static struct key *construct_key_and_link(struct keyring_search_context *ctx,
} else if (ret == -EINPROGRESS) {
ret = 0;
} else {
- goto couldnt_alloc_key;
+ goto error_put_dest_keyring;
}
key_put(dest_keyring);
@@ -472,8 +499,9 @@ static struct key *construct_key_and_link(struct keyring_search_context *ctx,
construction_failed:
key_negate_and_link(key, key_negative_timeout, NULL, NULL);
key_put(key);
-couldnt_alloc_key:
+error_put_dest_keyring:
key_put(dest_keyring);
+error:
kleave(" = %d", ret);
return ERR_PTR(ret);
}
--
2.15.1.504.g5279b80103-goog
From: David Howells <dhowells(a)redhat.com>
commit 911b79cde95c7da0ec02f48105358a36636b7a71 upstream.
[Please apply to 3.18-stable and 4.1-stable.]
If request_key() is used to find a keyring, only do the search part - don't
do the construction part if the keyring was not found by the search. We
don't really want keyrings in the negative instantiated state since the
rejected/negative instantiation error value in the payload is unioned with
keyring metadata.
Now the kernel gives an error:
request_key("keyring", "#selinux,bdekeyring", "keyring", KEY_SPEC_USER_SESSION_KEYRING) = -1 EPERM (Operation not permitted)
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells(a)redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers(a)google.com>
---
security/keys/request_key.c | 3 +++
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
diff --git a/security/keys/request_key.c b/security/keys/request_key.c
index 486ef6fa393b..0d6253124278 100644
--- a/security/keys/request_key.c
+++ b/security/keys/request_key.c
@@ -440,6 +440,9 @@ static struct key *construct_key_and_link(struct keyring_search_context *ctx,
kenter("");
+ if (ctx->index_key.type == &key_type_keyring)
+ return ERR_PTR(-EPERM);
+
user = key_user_lookup(current_fsuid());
if (!user)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
--
2.15.1.504.g5279b80103-goog
From: David Jeffery <djeffery(a)redhat.com>
commit d0709f1e66e8066c4ac6a54620ec116aa41937c0 upstream.
[Please apply to 3.18-stable.]
If a request_key() call to allocate and fill out a key attempts to insert the
key structure into a revoked keyring, the key will leak, using memory and part
of the user's key quota until the system reboots. This is from a failure of
construct_alloc_key() to decrement the key's reference count after the attempt
to insert into the requested keyring is rejected.
key_put() needs to be called in the link_prealloc_failed callpath to ensure
the unused key is released.
Signed-off-by: David Jeffery <djeffery(a)redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells(a)redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris(a)oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers(a)google.com>
---
security/keys/request_key.c | 1 +
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
diff --git a/security/keys/request_key.c b/security/keys/request_key.c
index 8117a774ee5d..edc367ef0bd6 100644
--- a/security/keys/request_key.c
+++ b/security/keys/request_key.c
@@ -437,6 +437,7 @@ link_check_failed:
link_prealloc_failed:
mutex_unlock(&user->cons_lock);
+ key_put(key);
kleave(" = %d [prelink]", ret);
return ret;
--
2.15.1.504.g5279b80103-goog
This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled
xhci: Don't add a virt_dev to the devs array before it's fully allocated
to the 4.9-stable tree which can be found at:
http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum…
The filename of the patch is:
xhci-don-t-add-a-virt_dev-to-the-devs-array-before-it-s-fully-allocated.patch
and it can be found in the queue-4.9 subdirectory.
If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree,
please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it.
>From 5d9b70f7d52eb14bb37861c663bae44de9521c35 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Mathias Nyman <mathias.nyman(a)linux.intel.com>
Date: Fri, 8 Dec 2017 18:10:05 +0200
Subject: xhci: Don't add a virt_dev to the devs array before it's fully allocated
From: Mathias Nyman <mathias.nyman(a)linux.intel.com>
commit 5d9b70f7d52eb14bb37861c663bae44de9521c35 upstream.
Avoid null pointer dereference if some function is walking through the
devs array accessing members of a new virt_dev that is mid allocation.
Add the virt_dev to xhci->devs[i] _after_ the virt_device and all its
members are properly allocated.
issue found by KASAN: null-ptr-deref in xhci_find_slot_id_by_port
"Quick analysis suggests that xhci_alloc_virt_device() is not mutex
protected. If so, there is a time frame where xhci->devs[slot_id] is set
but not fully initialized. Specifically, xhci->devs[i]->udev can be NULL."
Signed-off-by: Mathias Nyman <mathias.nyman(a)linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/usb/host/xhci-mem.c | 15 +++++++++++----
1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
--- a/drivers/usb/host/xhci-mem.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/host/xhci-mem.c
@@ -1032,10 +1032,9 @@ int xhci_alloc_virt_device(struct xhci_h
return 0;
}
- xhci->devs[slot_id] = kzalloc(sizeof(*xhci->devs[slot_id]), flags);
- if (!xhci->devs[slot_id])
+ dev = kzalloc(sizeof(*dev), flags);
+ if (!dev)
return 0;
- dev = xhci->devs[slot_id];
/* Allocate the (output) device context that will be used in the HC. */
dev->out_ctx = xhci_alloc_container_ctx(xhci, XHCI_CTX_TYPE_DEVICE, flags);
@@ -1083,9 +1082,17 @@ int xhci_alloc_virt_device(struct xhci_h
&xhci->dcbaa->dev_context_ptrs[slot_id],
le64_to_cpu(xhci->dcbaa->dev_context_ptrs[slot_id]));
+ xhci->devs[slot_id] = dev;
+
return 1;
fail:
- xhci_free_virt_device(xhci, slot_id);
+
+ if (dev->in_ctx)
+ xhci_free_container_ctx(xhci, dev->in_ctx);
+ if (dev->out_ctx)
+ xhci_free_container_ctx(xhci, dev->out_ctx);
+ kfree(dev);
+
return 0;
}
Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from mathias.nyman(a)linux.intel.com are
queue-4.9/usb-xhci-fix-tds-for-mtk-xhci1.1.patch
queue-4.9/xhci-don-t-add-a-virt_dev-to-the-devs-array-before-it-s-fully-allocated.patch
This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled
usbip: fix stub_send_ret_submit() vulnerability to null transfer_buffer
to the 4.9-stable tree which can be found at:
http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum…
The filename of the patch is:
usbip-fix-stub_send_ret_submit-vulnerability-to-null-transfer_buffer.patch
and it can be found in the queue-4.9 subdirectory.
If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree,
please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it.
>From be6123df1ea8f01ee2f896a16c2b7be3e4557a5a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Shuah Khan <shuahkh(a)osg.samsung.com>
Date: Thu, 7 Dec 2017 14:16:50 -0700
Subject: usbip: fix stub_send_ret_submit() vulnerability to null transfer_buffer
From: Shuah Khan <shuahkh(a)osg.samsung.com>
commit be6123df1ea8f01ee2f896a16c2b7be3e4557a5a upstream.
stub_send_ret_submit() handles urb with a potential null transfer_buffer,
when it replays a packet with potential malicious data that could contain
a null buffer. Add a check for the condition when actual_length > 0 and
transfer_buffer is null.
Reported-by: Secunia Research <vuln(a)secunia.com>
Signed-off-by: Shuah Khan <shuahkh(a)osg.samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/usb/usbip/stub_tx.c | 7 +++++++
1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
--- a/drivers/usb/usbip/stub_tx.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/usbip/stub_tx.c
@@ -181,6 +181,13 @@ static int stub_send_ret_submit(struct s
memset(&pdu_header, 0, sizeof(pdu_header));
memset(&msg, 0, sizeof(msg));
+ if (urb->actual_length > 0 && !urb->transfer_buffer) {
+ dev_err(&sdev->udev->dev,
+ "urb: actual_length %d transfer_buffer null\n",
+ urb->actual_length);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
if (usb_pipetype(urb->pipe) == PIPE_ISOCHRONOUS)
iovnum = 2 + urb->number_of_packets;
else
Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from shuahkh(a)osg.samsung.com are
queue-4.9/usbip-fix-stub_rx-harden-cmd_submit-path-to-handle-malicious-input.patch
queue-4.9/usbip-fix-stub_send_ret_submit-vulnerability-to-null-transfer_buffer.patch
queue-4.9/usbip-fix-stub_rx-get_pipe-to-validate-endpoint-number.patch
This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled
usb: xhci: fix TDS for MTK xHCI1.1
to the 4.9-stable tree which can be found at:
http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum…
The filename of the patch is:
usb-xhci-fix-tds-for-mtk-xhci1.1.patch
and it can be found in the queue-4.9 subdirectory.
If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree,
please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it.
>From 72b663a99c074a8d073e7ecdae446cfb024ef551 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Chunfeng Yun <chunfeng.yun(a)mediatek.com>
Date: Fri, 8 Dec 2017 18:10:06 +0200
Subject: usb: xhci: fix TDS for MTK xHCI1.1
From: Chunfeng Yun <chunfeng.yun(a)mediatek.com>
commit 72b663a99c074a8d073e7ecdae446cfb024ef551 upstream.
For MTK's xHCI 1.0 or latter, TD size is the number of max
packet sized packets remaining in the TD, not including
this TRB (following spec).
For MTK's xHCI 0.96 and older, TD size is the number of max
packet sized packets remaining in the TD, including this TRB
(not following spec).
Signed-off-by: Chunfeng Yun <chunfeng.yun(a)mediatek.com>
Signed-off-by: Mathias Nyman <mathias.nyman(a)linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/usb/host/xhci-ring.c | 6 +++---
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
--- a/drivers/usb/host/xhci-ring.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/host/xhci-ring.c
@@ -3132,7 +3132,7 @@ static u32 xhci_td_remainder(struct xhci
{
u32 maxp, total_packet_count;
- /* MTK xHCI is mostly 0.97 but contains some features from 1.0 */
+ /* MTK xHCI 0.96 contains some features from 1.0 */
if (xhci->hci_version < 0x100 && !(xhci->quirks & XHCI_MTK_HOST))
return ((td_total_len - transferred) >> 10);
@@ -3141,8 +3141,8 @@ static u32 xhci_td_remainder(struct xhci
trb_buff_len == td_total_len)
return 0;
- /* for MTK xHCI, TD size doesn't include this TRB */
- if (xhci->quirks & XHCI_MTK_HOST)
+ /* for MTK xHCI 0.96, TD size include this TRB, but not in 1.x */
+ if ((xhci->quirks & XHCI_MTK_HOST) && (xhci->hci_version < 0x100))
trb_buff_len = 0;
maxp = GET_MAX_PACKET(usb_endpoint_maxp(&urb->ep->desc));
Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from chunfeng.yun(a)mediatek.com are
queue-4.9/usb-xhci-fix-tds-for-mtk-xhci1.1.patch
This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled
usbip: fix stub_rx: get_pipe() to validate endpoint number
to the 4.9-stable tree which can be found at:
http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum…
The filename of the patch is:
usbip-fix-stub_rx-get_pipe-to-validate-endpoint-number.patch
and it can be found in the queue-4.9 subdirectory.
If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree,
please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it.
>From 635f545a7e8be7596b9b2b6a43cab6bbd5a88e43 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Shuah Khan <shuahkh(a)osg.samsung.com>
Date: Thu, 7 Dec 2017 14:16:47 -0700
Subject: usbip: fix stub_rx: get_pipe() to validate endpoint number
From: Shuah Khan <shuahkh(a)osg.samsung.com>
commit 635f545a7e8be7596b9b2b6a43cab6bbd5a88e43 upstream.
get_pipe() routine doesn't validate the input endpoint number
and uses to reference ep_in and ep_out arrays. Invalid endpoint
number can trigger BUG(). Range check the epnum and returning
error instead of calling BUG().
Change caller stub_recv_cmd_submit() to handle the get_pipe()
error return.
Reported-by: Secunia Research <vuln(a)secunia.com>
Signed-off-by: Shuah Khan <shuahkh(a)osg.samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/usb/usbip/stub_rx.c | 18 +++++++++++-------
1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
--- a/drivers/usb/usbip/stub_rx.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/usbip/stub_rx.c
@@ -342,15 +342,15 @@ static int get_pipe(struct stub_device *
struct usb_host_endpoint *ep;
struct usb_endpoint_descriptor *epd = NULL;
+ if (epnum < 0 || epnum > 15)
+ goto err_ret;
+
if (dir == USBIP_DIR_IN)
ep = udev->ep_in[epnum & 0x7f];
else
ep = udev->ep_out[epnum & 0x7f];
- if (!ep) {
- dev_err(&sdev->udev->dev, "no such endpoint?, %d\n",
- epnum);
- BUG();
- }
+ if (!ep)
+ goto err_ret;
epd = &ep->desc;
if (usb_endpoint_xfer_control(epd)) {
@@ -381,9 +381,10 @@ static int get_pipe(struct stub_device *
return usb_rcvisocpipe(udev, epnum);
}
+err_ret:
/* NOT REACHED */
- dev_err(&sdev->udev->dev, "get pipe, epnum %d\n", epnum);
- return 0;
+ dev_err(&sdev->udev->dev, "get pipe() invalid epnum %d\n", epnum);
+ return -1;
}
static void masking_bogus_flags(struct urb *urb)
@@ -449,6 +450,9 @@ static void stub_recv_cmd_submit(struct
struct usb_device *udev = sdev->udev;
int pipe = get_pipe(sdev, pdu->base.ep, pdu->base.direction);
+ if (pipe == -1)
+ return;
+
priv = stub_priv_alloc(sdev, pdu);
if (!priv)
return;
Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from shuahkh(a)osg.samsung.com are
queue-4.9/usbip-fix-stub_rx-harden-cmd_submit-path-to-handle-malicious-input.patch
queue-4.9/usbip-fix-stub_send_ret_submit-vulnerability-to-null-transfer_buffer.patch
queue-4.9/usbip-fix-stub_rx-get_pipe-to-validate-endpoint-number.patch
This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled
USB: core: prevent malicious bNumInterfaces overflow
to the 4.9-stable tree which can be found at:
http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum…
The filename of the patch is:
usb-core-prevent-malicious-bnuminterfaces-overflow.patch
and it can be found in the queue-4.9 subdirectory.
If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree,
please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it.
>From 48a4ff1c7bb5a32d2e396b03132d20d552c0eca7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Alan Stern <stern(a)rowland.harvard.edu>
Date: Tue, 12 Dec 2017 14:25:13 -0500
Subject: USB: core: prevent malicious bNumInterfaces overflow
From: Alan Stern <stern(a)rowland.harvard.edu>
commit 48a4ff1c7bb5a32d2e396b03132d20d552c0eca7 upstream.
A malicious USB device with crafted descriptors can cause the kernel
to access unallocated memory by setting the bNumInterfaces value too
high in a configuration descriptor. Although the value is adjusted
during parsing, this adjustment is skipped in one of the error return
paths.
This patch prevents the problem by setting bNumInterfaces to 0
initially. The existing code already sets it to the proper value
after parsing is complete.
Signed-off-by: Alan Stern <stern(a)rowland.harvard.edu>
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl(a)google.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/usb/core/config.c | 4 +++-
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/drivers/usb/core/config.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/core/config.c
@@ -550,6 +550,9 @@ static int usb_parse_configuration(struc
unsigned iad_num = 0;
memcpy(&config->desc, buffer, USB_DT_CONFIG_SIZE);
+ nintf = nintf_orig = config->desc.bNumInterfaces;
+ config->desc.bNumInterfaces = 0; // Adjusted later
+
if (config->desc.bDescriptorType != USB_DT_CONFIG ||
config->desc.bLength < USB_DT_CONFIG_SIZE ||
config->desc.bLength > size) {
@@ -563,7 +566,6 @@ static int usb_parse_configuration(struc
buffer += config->desc.bLength;
size -= config->desc.bLength;
- nintf = nintf_orig = config->desc.bNumInterfaces;
if (nintf > USB_MAXINTERFACES) {
dev_warn(ddev, "config %d has too many interfaces: %d, "
"using maximum allowed: %d\n",
Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from stern(a)rowland.harvard.edu are
queue-4.9/usb-core-prevent-malicious-bnuminterfaces-overflow.patch
queue-4.9/usb-uas-and-storage-add-us_fl_broken_fua-for-another-jmicron-jms567-id.patch
This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled
USB: uas and storage: Add US_FL_BROKEN_FUA for another JMicron JMS567 ID
to the 4.9-stable tree which can be found at:
http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum…
The filename of the patch is:
usb-uas-and-storage-add-us_fl_broken_fua-for-another-jmicron-jms567-id.patch
and it can be found in the queue-4.9 subdirectory.
If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree,
please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it.
>From 62354454625741f0569c2cbe45b2d192f8fd258e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: David Kozub <zub(a)linux.fjfi.cvut.cz>
Date: Tue, 5 Dec 2017 22:40:04 +0100
Subject: USB: uas and storage: Add US_FL_BROKEN_FUA for another JMicron JMS567 ID
From: David Kozub <zub(a)linux.fjfi.cvut.cz>
commit 62354454625741f0569c2cbe45b2d192f8fd258e upstream.
There is another JMS567-based USB3 UAS enclosure (152d:0578) that fails
with the following error:
[sda] tag#0 FAILED Result: hostbyte=DID_OK driverbyte=DRIVER_SENSE
[sda] tag#0 Sense Key : Illegal Request [current]
[sda] tag#0 Add. Sense: Invalid field in cdb
The issue occurs both with UAS (occasionally) and mass storage
(immediately after mounting a FS on a disk in the enclosure).
Enabling US_FL_BROKEN_FUA quirk solves this issue.
This patch adds an UNUSUAL_DEV with US_FL_BROKEN_FUA for the enclosure
for both UAS and mass storage.
Signed-off-by: David Kozub <zub(a)linux.fjfi.cvut.cz>
Acked-by: Alan Stern <stern(a)rowland.harvard.edu>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/usb/storage/unusual_devs.h | 7 +++++++
drivers/usb/storage/unusual_uas.h | 7 +++++++
2 files changed, 14 insertions(+)
--- a/drivers/usb/storage/unusual_devs.h
+++ b/drivers/usb/storage/unusual_devs.h
@@ -2113,6 +2113,13 @@ UNUSUAL_DEV( 0x152d, 0x0567, 0x0114, 0x
USB_SC_DEVICE, USB_PR_DEVICE, NULL,
US_FL_BROKEN_FUA ),
+/* Reported by David Kozub <zub(a)linux.fjfi.cvut.cz> */
+UNUSUAL_DEV(0x152d, 0x0578, 0x0000, 0x9999,
+ "JMicron",
+ "JMS567",
+ USB_SC_DEVICE, USB_PR_DEVICE, NULL,
+ US_FL_BROKEN_FUA),
+
/*
* Reported by Alexandre Oliva <oliva(a)lsd.ic.unicamp.br>
* JMicron responds to USN and several other SCSI ioctls with a
--- a/drivers/usb/storage/unusual_uas.h
+++ b/drivers/usb/storage/unusual_uas.h
@@ -142,6 +142,13 @@ UNUSUAL_DEV(0x152d, 0x0567, 0x0000, 0x99
USB_SC_DEVICE, USB_PR_DEVICE, NULL,
US_FL_BROKEN_FUA | US_FL_NO_REPORT_OPCODES),
+/* Reported-by: David Kozub <zub(a)linux.fjfi.cvut.cz> */
+UNUSUAL_DEV(0x152d, 0x0578, 0x0000, 0x9999,
+ "JMicron",
+ "JMS567",
+ USB_SC_DEVICE, USB_PR_DEVICE, NULL,
+ US_FL_BROKEN_FUA),
+
/* Reported-by: Hans de Goede <hdegoede(a)redhat.com> */
UNUSUAL_DEV(0x2109, 0x0711, 0x0000, 0x9999,
"VIA",
Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from zub(a)linux.fjfi.cvut.cz are
queue-4.9/usb-uas-and-storage-add-us_fl_broken_fua-for-another-jmicron-jms567-id.patch
This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled
sched/rt: Do not pull from current CPU if only one CPU to pull
to the 4.9-stable tree which can be found at:
http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum…
The filename of the patch is:
sched-rt-do-not-pull-from-current-cpu-if-only-one-cpu-to-pull.patch
and it can be found in the queue-4.9 subdirectory.
If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree,
please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it.
>From f73c52a5bcd1710994e53fbccc378c42b97a06b6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Steven Rostedt <rostedt(a)goodmis.org>
Date: Sat, 2 Dec 2017 13:04:54 -0500
Subject: sched/rt: Do not pull from current CPU if only one CPU to pull
From: Steven Rostedt <rostedt(a)goodmis.org>
commit f73c52a5bcd1710994e53fbccc378c42b97a06b6 upstream.
Daniel Wagner reported a crash on the BeagleBone Black SoC.
This is a single CPU architecture, and does not have a functional
arch_send_call_function_single_ipi() implementation which can crash
the kernel if that is called.
As it only has one CPU, it shouldn't be called, but if the kernel is
compiled for SMP, the push/pull RT scheduling logic now calls it for
irq_work if the one CPU is overloaded, it can use that function to call
itself and crash the kernel.
Ideally, we should disable the SCHED_FEAT(RT_PUSH_IPI) if the system
only has a single CPU. But SCHED_FEAT is a constant if sched debugging
is turned off. Another fix can also be used, and this should also help
with normal SMP machines. That is, do not initiate the pull code if
there's only one RT overloaded CPU, and that CPU happens to be the
current CPU that is scheduling in a lower priority task.
Even on a system with many CPUs, if there's many RT tasks waiting to
run on a single CPU, and that CPU schedules in another RT task of lower
priority, it will initiate the PULL logic in case there's a higher
priority RT task on another CPU that is waiting to run. But if there is
no other CPU with waiting RT tasks, it will initiate the RT pull logic
on itself (as it still has RT tasks waiting to run). This is a wasted
effort.
Not only does this help with SMP code where the current CPU is the only
one with RT overloaded tasks, it should also solve the issue that
Daniel encountered, because it will prevent the PULL logic from
executing, as there's only one CPU on the system, and the check added
here will cause it to exit the RT pull code.
Reported-by: Daniel Wagner <wagi(a)monom.org>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt(a)goodmis.org>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz(a)infradead.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds(a)linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy(a)linutronix.de>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx(a)linutronix.de>
Cc: linux-rt-users <linux-rt-users(a)vger.kernel.org>
Fixes: 4bdced5c9 ("sched/rt: Simplify the IPI based RT balancing logic")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171202130454.4cbbfe8d@vmware.local.home
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo(a)kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org>
---
kernel/sched/rt.c | 8 +++++++-
1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/kernel/sched/rt.c
+++ b/kernel/sched/rt.c
@@ -2022,8 +2022,9 @@ static void pull_rt_task(struct rq *this
bool resched = false;
struct task_struct *p;
struct rq *src_rq;
+ int rt_overload_count = rt_overloaded(this_rq);
- if (likely(!rt_overloaded(this_rq)))
+ if (likely(!rt_overload_count))
return;
/*
@@ -2032,6 +2033,11 @@ static void pull_rt_task(struct rq *this
*/
smp_rmb();
+ /* If we are the only overloaded CPU do nothing */
+ if (rt_overload_count == 1 &&
+ cpumask_test_cpu(this_rq->cpu, this_rq->rd->rto_mask))
+ return;
+
#ifdef HAVE_RT_PUSH_IPI
if (sched_feat(RT_PUSH_IPI)) {
tell_cpu_to_push(this_rq);
Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from rostedt(a)goodmis.org are
queue-4.9/sched-rt-do-not-pull-from-current-cpu-if-only-one-cpu-to-pull.patch
queue-4.9/tracing-allocate-mask_str-buffer-dynamically.patch
This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled
tracing: Allocate mask_str buffer dynamically
to the 4.9-stable tree which can be found at:
http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum…
The filename of the patch is:
tracing-allocate-mask_str-buffer-dynamically.patch
and it can be found in the queue-4.9 subdirectory.
If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree,
please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it.
>From 90e406f96f630c07d631a021fd4af10aac913e77 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Changbin Du <changbin.du(a)intel.com>
Date: Thu, 30 Nov 2017 11:39:43 +0800
Subject: tracing: Allocate mask_str buffer dynamically
From: Changbin Du <changbin.du(a)intel.com>
commit 90e406f96f630c07d631a021fd4af10aac913e77 upstream.
The default NR_CPUS can be very large, but actual possible nr_cpu_ids
usually is very small. For my x86 distribution, the NR_CPUS is 8192 and
nr_cpu_ids is 4. About 2 pages are wasted.
Most machines don't have so many CPUs, so define a array with NR_CPUS
just wastes memory. So let's allocate the buffer dynamically when need.
With this change, the mutext tracing_cpumask_update_lock also can be
removed now, which was used to protect mask_str.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1512013183-19107-1-git-send-email-changbin.du@inte…
Fixes: 36dfe9252bd4c ("ftrace: make use of tracing_cpumask")
Signed-off-by: Changbin Du <changbin.du(a)intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt(a)goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org>
---
kernel/trace/trace.c | 29 +++++++++--------------------
1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-)
--- a/kernel/trace/trace.c
+++ b/kernel/trace/trace.c
@@ -3727,37 +3727,30 @@ static const struct file_operations show
.llseek = seq_lseek,
};
-/*
- * The tracer itself will not take this lock, but still we want
- * to provide a consistent cpumask to user-space:
- */
-static DEFINE_MUTEX(tracing_cpumask_update_lock);
-
-/*
- * Temporary storage for the character representation of the
- * CPU bitmask (and one more byte for the newline):
- */
-static char mask_str[NR_CPUS + 1];
-
static ssize_t
tracing_cpumask_read(struct file *filp, char __user *ubuf,
size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
{
struct trace_array *tr = file_inode(filp)->i_private;
+ char *mask_str;
int len;
- mutex_lock(&tracing_cpumask_update_lock);
+ len = snprintf(NULL, 0, "%*pb\n",
+ cpumask_pr_args(tr->tracing_cpumask)) + 1;
+ mask_str = kmalloc(len, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!mask_str)
+ return -ENOMEM;
- len = snprintf(mask_str, count, "%*pb\n",
+ len = snprintf(mask_str, len, "%*pb\n",
cpumask_pr_args(tr->tracing_cpumask));
if (len >= count) {
count = -EINVAL;
goto out_err;
}
- count = simple_read_from_buffer(ubuf, count, ppos, mask_str, NR_CPUS+1);
+ count = simple_read_from_buffer(ubuf, count, ppos, mask_str, len);
out_err:
- mutex_unlock(&tracing_cpumask_update_lock);
+ kfree(mask_str);
return count;
}
@@ -3777,8 +3770,6 @@ tracing_cpumask_write(struct file *filp,
if (err)
goto err_unlock;
- mutex_lock(&tracing_cpumask_update_lock);
-
local_irq_disable();
arch_spin_lock(&tr->max_lock);
for_each_tracing_cpu(cpu) {
@@ -3801,8 +3792,6 @@ tracing_cpumask_write(struct file *filp,
local_irq_enable();
cpumask_copy(tr->tracing_cpumask, tracing_cpumask_new);
-
- mutex_unlock(&tracing_cpumask_update_lock);
free_cpumask_var(tracing_cpumask_new);
return count;
Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from changbin.du(a)intel.com are
queue-4.9/tracing-allocate-mask_str-buffer-dynamically.patch
This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled
nfs: don't wait on commit in nfs_commit_inode() if there were no commit requests
to the 4.9-stable tree which can be found at:
http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum…
The filename of the patch is:
nfs-don-t-wait-on-commit-in-nfs_commit_inode-if-there-were-no-commit-requests.patch
and it can be found in the queue-4.9 subdirectory.
If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree,
please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it.
>From dc4fd9ab01ab379ae5af522b3efd4187a7c30a31 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Scott Mayhew <smayhew(a)redhat.com>
Date: Fri, 8 Dec 2017 16:00:12 -0500
Subject: nfs: don't wait on commit in nfs_commit_inode() if there were no commit requests
From: Scott Mayhew <smayhew(a)redhat.com>
commit dc4fd9ab01ab379ae5af522b3efd4187a7c30a31 upstream.
If there were no commit requests, then nfs_commit_inode() should not
wait on the commit or mark the inode dirty, otherwise the following
BUG_ON can be triggered:
[ 1917.130762] kernel BUG at fs/inode.c:578!
[ 1917.130766] Oops: Exception in kernel mode, sig: 5 [#1]
[ 1917.130768] SMP NR_CPUS=2048 NUMA pSeries
[ 1917.130772] Modules linked in: iscsi_tcp libiscsi_tcp libiscsi scsi_transport_iscsi blocklayoutdriver rpcsec_gss_krb5 auth_rpcgss nfsv4 dns_resolver nfs lockd grace fscache sunrpc sg nx_crypto pseries_rng ip_tables xfs libcrc32c sd_mod crc_t10dif crct10dif_generic crct10dif_common ibmvscsi scsi_transport_srp ibmveth scsi_tgt dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log dm_mod
[ 1917.130805] CPU: 2 PID: 14923 Comm: umount.nfs4 Tainted: G ------------ T 3.10.0-768.el7.ppc64 #1
[ 1917.130810] task: c0000005ecd88040 ti: c00000004cea0000 task.ti: c00000004cea0000
[ 1917.130813] NIP: c000000000354178 LR: c000000000354160 CTR: c00000000012db80
[ 1917.130816] REGS: c00000004cea3720 TRAP: 0700 Tainted: G ------------ T (3.10.0-768.el7.ppc64)
[ 1917.130820] MSR: 8000000100029032 <SF,EE,ME,IR,DR,RI> CR: 22002822 XER: 20000000
[ 1917.130828] CFAR: c00000000011f594 SOFTE: 1
GPR00: c000000000354160 c00000004cea39a0 c0000000014c4700 c0000000018cc750
GPR04: 000000000000c750 80c0000000000000 0600000000000000 04eeb76bea749a03
GPR08: 0000000000000034 c0000000018cc758 0000000000000001 d000000005e619e8
GPR12: c00000000012db80 c000000007b31200 0000000000000000 0000000000000000
GPR16: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000
GPR20: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000
GPR24: 0000000000000000 c000000000dfc3ec 0000000000000000 c0000005eefc02c0
GPR28: d0000000079dbd50 c0000005b94a02c0 c0000005b94a0250 c0000005b94a01c8
[ 1917.130867] NIP [c000000000354178] .evict+0x1c8/0x350
[ 1917.130871] LR [c000000000354160] .evict+0x1b0/0x350
[ 1917.130873] Call Trace:
[ 1917.130876] [c00000004cea39a0] [c000000000354160] .evict+0x1b0/0x350 (unreliable)
[ 1917.130880] [c00000004cea3a30] [c0000000003558cc] .evict_inodes+0x13c/0x270
[ 1917.130884] [c00000004cea3af0] [c000000000327d20] .kill_anon_super+0x70/0x1e0
[ 1917.130896] [c00000004cea3b80] [d000000005e43e30] .nfs_kill_super+0x20/0x60 [nfs]
[ 1917.130900] [c00000004cea3c00] [c000000000328a20] .deactivate_locked_super+0xa0/0x1b0
[ 1917.130903] [c00000004cea3c80] [c00000000035ba54] .cleanup_mnt+0xd4/0x180
[ 1917.130907] [c00000004cea3d10] [c000000000119034] .task_work_run+0x114/0x150
[ 1917.130912] [c00000004cea3db0] [c00000000001ba6c] .do_notify_resume+0xcc/0x100
[ 1917.130916] [c00000004cea3e30] [c00000000000a7b0] .ret_from_except_lite+0x5c/0x60
[ 1917.130919] Instruction dump:
[ 1917.130921] 7fc3f378 486734b5 60000000 387f00a0 38800003 4bdcb365 60000000 e95f00a0
[ 1917.130927] 694a0060 7d4a0074 794ad182 694a0001 <0b0a0000> 892d02a4 2f890000 40de0134
Signed-off-by: Scott Mayhew <smayhew(a)redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Anna Schumaker <Anna.Schumaker(a)Netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org>
---
fs/nfs/write.c | 2 ++
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
--- a/fs/nfs/write.c
+++ b/fs/nfs/write.c
@@ -1859,6 +1859,8 @@ int nfs_commit_inode(struct inode *inode
if (res)
error = nfs_generic_commit_list(inode, &head, how, &cinfo);
nfs_commit_end(cinfo.mds);
+ if (res == 0)
+ return res;
if (error < 0)
goto out_error;
if (!may_wait)
Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from smayhew(a)redhat.com are
queue-4.9/nfs-don-t-wait-on-commit-in-nfs_commit_inode-if-there-were-no-commit-requests.patch
This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled
ext4: fix fdatasync(2) after fallocate(2) operation
to the 4.9-stable tree which can be found at:
http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum…
The filename of the patch is:
ext4-fix-fdatasync-2-after-fallocate-2-operation.patch
and it can be found in the queue-4.9 subdirectory.
If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree,
please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it.
>From c894aa97577e47d3066b27b32499ecf899bfa8b0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Eryu Guan <eguan(a)redhat.com>
Date: Sun, 3 Dec 2017 22:52:51 -0500
Subject: ext4: fix fdatasync(2) after fallocate(2) operation
From: Eryu Guan <eguan(a)redhat.com>
commit c894aa97577e47d3066b27b32499ecf899bfa8b0 upstream.
Currently, fallocate(2) with KEEP_SIZE followed by a fdatasync(2)
then crash, we'll see wrong allocated block number (stat -c %b), the
blocks allocated beyond EOF are all lost. fstests generic/468
exposes this bug.
Commit 67a7d5f561f4 ("ext4: fix fdatasync(2) after extent
manipulation operations") fixed all the other extent manipulation
operation paths such as hole punch, zero range, collapse range etc.,
but forgot the fallocate case.
So similarly, fix it by recording the correct journal tid in ext4
inode in fallocate(2) path, so that ext4_sync_file() will wait for
the right tid to be committed on fdatasync(2).
This addresses the test failure in xfstests test generic/468.
Signed-off-by: Eryu Guan <eguan(a)redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso(a)mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org>
---
fs/ext4/extents.c | 1 +
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
--- a/fs/ext4/extents.c
+++ b/fs/ext4/extents.c
@@ -4731,6 +4731,7 @@ retry:
EXT4_INODE_EOFBLOCKS);
}
ext4_mark_inode_dirty(handle, inode);
+ ext4_update_inode_fsync_trans(handle, inode, 1);
ret2 = ext4_journal_stop(handle);
if (ret2)
break;
Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from eguan(a)redhat.com are
queue-4.9/ext4-fix-fdatasync-2-after-fallocate-2-operation.patch