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[PATCH] spi: spi-fsl-dspi: Fix imprecise abort on VF500 during probe

by Krzysztof Kozlowski

Registers of DSPI should not be accessed before enabling its clock. On Toradex Colibri VF50 on Iris carrier board this could be seen during bootup as imprecise abort: Unhandled fault: imprecise external abort (0x1c06) at 0x00000000 Internal error: : 1c06 [#1] ARM Modules linked in: CPU: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper Not tainted 4.14.39-dirty #97 Hardware name: Freescale Vybrid VF5xx/VF6xx (Device Tree) Backtrace: [<804166a8>] (regmap_write) from [<80466b5c>] (dspi_probe+0x1f0/0x8dc) [<8046696c>] (dspi_probe) from [<8040107c>] (platform_drv_probe+0x54/0xb8) [<80401028>] (platform_drv_probe) from [<803ff53c>] (driver_probe_device+0x280/0x2f8) [<803ff2bc>] (driver_probe_device) from [<803ff674>] (__driver_attach+0xc0/0xc4) [<803ff5b4>] (__driver_attach) from [<803fd818>] (bus_for_each_dev+0x70/0xa4) [<803fd7a8>] (bus_for_each_dev) from [<803fee74>] (driver_attach+0x24/0x28) [<803fee50>] (driver_attach) from [<803fe980>] (bus_add_driver+0x1a0/0x218) [<803fe7e0>] (bus_add_driver) from [<803fffe8>] (driver_register+0x80/0x100) [<803fff68>] (driver_register) from [<80400fdc>] (__platform_driver_register+0x48/0x50) [<80400f94>] (__platform_driver_register) from [<8091cf7c>] (fsl_dspi_driver_init+0x1c/0x20) [<8091cf60>] (fsl_dspi_driver_init) from [<8010195c>] (do_one_initcall+0x4c/0x174) [<80101910>] (do_one_initcall) from [<80900e8c>] (kernel_init_freeable+0x144/0x1d8) [<80900d48>] (kernel_init_freeable) from [<805ff6a8>] (kernel_init+0x10/0x114) [<805ff698>] (kernel_init) from [<80107be8>] (ret_from_fork+0x14/0x2c) Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> Fixes: 5ee67b587a2b ("spi: dspi: clear SPI_SR before enable interrupt") Signed-off-by: Krzysztof Kozlowski <krzk(a)kernel.org> --- drivers/spi/spi-fsl-dspi.c | 24 ++++++++++++------------ 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/spi/spi-fsl-dspi.c b/drivers/spi/spi-fsl-dspi.c index ff7456be9d6d..89a1e7a4fe5d 100644 --- a/drivers/spi/spi-fsl-dspi.c +++ b/drivers/spi/spi-fsl-dspi.c @@ -1071,30 +1071,30 @@ static int dspi_probe(struct platform_device *pdev) } } + dspi->clk = devm_clk_get(&pdev->dev, "dspi"); + if (IS_ERR(dspi->clk)) { + ret = PTR_ERR(dspi->clk); + dev_err(&pdev->dev, "unable to get clock\n"); + goto out_master_put; + } + ret = clk_prepare_enable(dspi->clk); + if (ret) + goto out_master_put; + dspi_init(dspi); dspi->irq = platform_get_irq(pdev, 0); if (dspi->irq < 0) { dev_err(&pdev->dev, "can't get platform irq\n"); ret = dspi->irq; - goto out_master_put; + goto out_clk_put; } ret = devm_request_irq(&pdev->dev, dspi->irq, dspi_interrupt, 0, pdev->name, dspi); if (ret < 0) { dev_err(&pdev->dev, "Unable to attach DSPI interrupt\n"); - goto out_master_put; - } - - dspi->clk = devm_clk_get(&pdev->dev, "dspi"); - if (IS_ERR(dspi->clk)) { - ret = PTR_ERR(dspi->clk); - dev_err(&pdev->dev, "unable to get clock\n"); - goto out_master_put; + goto out_clk_put; } - ret = clk_prepare_enable(dspi->clk); - if (ret) - goto out_master_put; if (dspi->devtype_data->trans_mode == DSPI_DMA_MODE) { ret = dspi_request_dma(dspi, res->start); -- 2.7.4

7 years, 1 month

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Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH] xen: setup pv irq ops vector earlier

by Juergen Gross

On 02/07/18 13:18, Jan Beulich wrote: >>>> On 02.07.18 at 12:00, <jgross(a)suse.com> wrote: >> --- a/arch/x86/xen/enlighten_pv.c >> +++ b/arch/x86/xen/enlighten_pv.c >> @@ -1213,6 +1213,7 @@ asmlinkage __visible void __init xen_start_kernel(void) >> pv_info = xen_info; >> pv_init_ops.patch = paravirt_patch_default; >> pv_cpu_ops = xen_cpu_ops; >> + xen_init_irq_ops(); > > Isn't this still too late? xen_setup_machphys_mapping(), for example, > has a WARN_ON(), which implies multiple printk()s. Seems as if it would be a good idea to move calling xen_setup_machphys_mapping() into xen_init_mmu_ops(). There is really no need to do it earlier. Juergen

7 years, 1 month

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[PATCH 1/5] ARM: dts: dra7: Disable metastability workaround for USB2

by Roger Quadros

Disable the metastability workaround for USB2. The original patch disabled the workaround on the wrong USB port. Fixes: b8c9c6fa2002 ("ARM: dts: dra7: Disable USB metastability workaround for USB2") Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> [4.16+] Signed-off-by: Roger Quadros <rogerq(a)ti.com> --- arch/arm/boot/dts/dra7.dtsi | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/arch/arm/boot/dts/dra7.dtsi b/arch/arm/boot/dts/dra7.dtsi index f4ddd86..9cace9f 100644 --- a/arch/arm/boot/dts/dra7.dtsi +++ b/arch/arm/boot/dts/dra7.dtsi @@ -1582,7 +1582,6 @@ dr_mode = "otg"; snps,dis_u3_susphy_quirk; snps,dis_u2_susphy_quirk; - snps,dis_metastability_quirk; }; }; @@ -1610,6 +1609,7 @@ dr_mode = "otg"; snps,dis_u3_susphy_quirk; snps,dis_u2_susphy_quirk; + snps,dis_metastability_quirk; }; }; -- cheers, -roger Texas Instruments Finland Oy, Porkkalankatu 22, 00180 Helsinki. Y-tunnus/Business ID: 0615521-4. Kotipaikka/Domicile: Helsinki

7 years, 1 month

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[PATCH] arm64: Use aarch64elf and aarch64elfb emulation mode variants

by Paul Kocialkowski

The aarch64linux and aarch64linuxb emulation modes are not supported by bare-metal toolchains and Linux using them forbids building the kernel with these toolchains. Since there is apparently no reason to target these emulation modes, the more generic elf modes are used instead, allowing to build on bare-metal toolchains as well as the already-supported ones. Fixes: 3d6a7b99e3fa ("arm64: ensure the kernel is compiled for LP64") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Paul Kocialkowski <contact(a)paulk.fr> --- arch/arm64/Makefile | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/arm64/Makefile b/arch/arm64/Makefile index 87f7d2f9f17c..3e959ac43b40 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/Makefile +++ b/arch/arm64/Makefile @@ -67,14 +67,14 @@ KBUILD_CPPFLAGS += -mbig-endian CHECKFLAGS += -D__AARCH64EB__ AS += -EB LD += -EB -LDFLAGS += -maarch64linuxb +LDFLAGS += -maarch64elfb UTS_MACHINE := aarch64_be else KBUILD_CPPFLAGS += -mlittle-endian CHECKFLAGS += -D__AARCH64EL__ AS += -EL LD += -EL -LDFLAGS += -maarch64linux +LDFLAGS += -maarch64elf UTS_MACHINE := aarch64 endif -- 2.17.1

7 years, 1 month

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[PATCH 4.17 v2] x86/mm: Don't free P4D table when it is folded at runtime

by Andrey Ryabinin

commit 0e311d237d7f3022b7dafb639b42541bfb42fe94 upstream. When the P4D page table layer is folded at runtime, the p4d_free() should do nothing, the same as in <asm-generic/pgtable-nop4d.h>. It seems this bug should cause double-free in efi_call_phys_epilog(), but I don't know how to trigger that code path, so I can't confirm that by testing. Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin(a)virtuozzo.com> Reviewed-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov(a)linux.intel.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds(a)linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz(a)infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx(a)linutronix.de> Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org # 4.17 Fixes: 98219dda2ab5 ("x86/mm: Fold p4d page table layer at runtime") Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180625102427.15015-1-aryabinin@virtuozzo.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin(a)virtuozzo.com> --- Changes since v1: - Fix wrong "From:" field arch/x86/include/asm/pgalloc.h | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/pgalloc.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/pgalloc.h index 263c142a6a6c..f65e9e1cea4c 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/pgalloc.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/pgalloc.h @@ -184,6 +184,9 @@ static inline p4d_t *p4d_alloc_one(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long addr) static inline void p4d_free(struct mm_struct *mm, p4d_t *p4d) { + if (!pgtable_l5_enabled) + return; + BUG_ON((unsigned long)p4d & (PAGE_SIZE-1)); free_page((unsigned long)p4d); } -- 2.16.4

7 years, 1 month

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[PATCH 4.17] x86/mm: Don't free P4D table when it is folded at runtime

by Andrey Ryabinin

From: "gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org" <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> commit 0e311d237d7f3022b7dafb639b42541bfb42fe94 upstream. When the P4D page table layer is folded at runtime, the p4d_free() should do nothing, the same as in <asm-generic/pgtable-nop4d.h>. It seems this bug should cause double-free in efi_call_phys_epilog(), but I don't know how to trigger that code path, so I can't confirm that by testing. Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin(a)virtuozzo.com> Reviewed-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov(a)linux.intel.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds(a)linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz(a)infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx(a)linutronix.de> Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org # 4.17 Fixes: 98219dda2ab5 ("x86/mm: Fold p4d page table layer at runtime") Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180625102427.15015-1-aryabinin@virtuozzo.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin(a)virtuozzo.com> --- arch/x86/include/asm/pgalloc.h | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/pgalloc.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/pgalloc.h index 263c142a6a6c..f65e9e1cea4c 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/pgalloc.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/pgalloc.h @@ -184,6 +184,9 @@ static inline p4d_t *p4d_alloc_one(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long addr) static inline void p4d_free(struct mm_struct *mm, p4d_t *p4d) { + if (!pgtable_l5_enabled) + return; + BUG_ON((unsigned long)p4d & (PAGE_SIZE-1)); free_page((unsigned long)p4d); } -- 2.16.4

7 years, 1 month

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nfp: don't tell FW about the reserved buffer space

by Jakub Kicinski

Hi! Can we get the following backported to the 4.9 branch? commit 9383b33771e566fa547daa2d09c6e0f1aaa298c3 Author: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski(a)netronome.com> Date: Thu Mar 2 15:26:20 2017 -0800 nfp: don't tell FW about the reserved buffer space Since commit c0f031bc8866 ("nfp_net: use alloc_frag() and build_skb()") we are allocating buffers which have to hold both the data and skb to be created in place by build_skb(). FW should only be told about the buffer space it can DMA to, that is without the build_skb() headroom and tailroom. Note: firmware applications should validate the buffers against both MTU and free list buffer size so oversized packets would not pass through the NIC anyway. Fixes: c0f031bc8866 ("nfp: use alloc_frag() and build_skb()") Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski(a)netronome.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem(a)davemloft.net> Thank you!

7 years, 1 month

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[PATCH 4/4] mtd: cfi_cmdset_0002: Change erase functions to check chip good only

by Tokunori Ikegami

Currently the functions use to check both chip ready and good. But the chip ready is not enough to check the operation status. So change this to check the chip good instead of this. About the retry functions to make sure the error handling remain it. Signed-off-by: Tokunori Ikegami <ikegami(a)allied-telesis.co.jp> Reviewed-by: Joakim Tjernlund <Joakim.Tjernlund(a)infinera.com> Cc: Chris Packham <chris.packham(a)alliedtelesis.co.nz> Cc: Brian Norris <computersforpeace(a)gmail.com> Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2(a)infradead.org> Cc: Boris Brezillon <boris.brezillon(a)free-electrons.com> Cc: Marek Vasut <marek.vasut(a)gmail.com> Cc: Richard Weinberger <richard(a)nod.at> Cc: Cyrille Pitchen <cyrille.pitchen(a)wedev4u.fr> Cc: linux-mtd(a)lists.infradead.org Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Boris Brezillon <boris.brezillon(a)bootlin.com> --- drivers/mtd/chips/cfi_cmdset_0002.c | 22 ++++++++++++---------- 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/mtd/chips/cfi_cmdset_0002.c b/drivers/mtd/chips/cfi_cmdset_0002.c index 13ce64362db8..2a39dc3a4760 100644 --- a/drivers/mtd/chips/cfi_cmdset_0002.c +++ b/drivers/mtd/chips/cfi_cmdset_0002.c @@ -2296,12 +2296,13 @@ static int __xipram do_erase_chip(struct map_info *map, struct flchip *chip) chip->erase_suspended = 0; } - if (chip_ready(map, adr)) + if (chip_good(map, adr, map_word_ff(map))) break; if (time_after(jiffies, timeo)) { printk(KERN_WARNING "MTD %s(): software timeout\n", __func__ ); + ret = -EIO; break; } @@ -2309,15 +2310,15 @@ static int __xipram do_erase_chip(struct map_info *map, struct flchip *chip) UDELAY(map, chip, adr, 1000000/HZ); } /* Did we succeed? */ - if (!chip_good(map, adr, map_word_ff(map))) { + if (ret) { /* reset on all failures. */ map_write( map, CMD(0xF0), chip->start ); /* FIXME - should have reset delay before continuing */ - if (++retry_cnt <= MAX_RETRIES) + if (++retry_cnt <= MAX_RETRIES) { + ret = 0; goto retry; - - ret = -EIO; + } } chip->state = FL_READY; @@ -2391,7 +2392,7 @@ static int __xipram do_erase_oneblock(struct map_info *map, struct flchip *chip, chip->erase_suspended = 0; } - if (chip_ready(map, adr)) { + if (chip_good(map, adr, map_word_ff(map))) { xip_enable(map, chip, adr); break; } @@ -2400,6 +2401,7 @@ static int __xipram do_erase_oneblock(struct map_info *map, struct flchip *chip, xip_enable(map, chip, adr); printk(KERN_WARNING "MTD %s(): software timeout\n", __func__ ); + ret = -EIO; break; } @@ -2407,15 +2409,15 @@ static int __xipram do_erase_oneblock(struct map_info *map, struct flchip *chip, UDELAY(map, chip, adr, 1000000/HZ); } /* Did we succeed? */ - if (!chip_good(map, adr, map_word_ff(map))) { + if (ret) { /* reset on all failures. */ map_write( map, CMD(0xF0), chip->start ); /* FIXME - should have reset delay before continuing */ - if (++retry_cnt <= MAX_RETRIES) + if (++retry_cnt <= MAX_RETRIES) { + ret = 0; goto retry; - - ret = -EIO; + } } chip->state = FL_READY; -- 2.16.1

7 years, 1 month

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[PATCH 3/4] mtd: cfi_cmdset_0002: Change erase functions to retry for error

by Tokunori Ikegami

For the word write functions it is retried for error. But it is not implemented to retry for the erase functions. To make sure for the erase functions change to retry as same. This is needed to prevent the flash erase error caused only once. It was caused by the error case of chip_good() in the do_erase_oneblock(). Also it was confirmed on the MACRONIX flash device MX29GL512FHT2I-11G. But the error issue behavior is not able to reproduce at this moment. The flash controller is parallel Flash interface integrated on BCM53003. Signed-off-by: Tokunori Ikegami <ikegami(a)allied-telesis.co.jp> Reviewed-by: Joakim Tjernlund <Joakim.Tjernlund(a)infinera.com> Cc: Chris Packham <chris.packham(a)alliedtelesis.co.nz> Cc: Brian Norris <computersforpeace(a)gmail.com> Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2(a)infradead.org> Cc: Boris Brezillon <boris.brezillon(a)free-electrons.com> Cc: Marek Vasut <marek.vasut(a)gmail.com> Cc: Richard Weinberger <richard(a)nod.at> Cc: Cyrille Pitchen <cyrille.pitchen(a)wedev4u.fr> Cc: linux-mtd(a)lists.infradead.org Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Boris Brezillon <boris.brezillon(a)bootlin.com> --- drivers/mtd/chips/cfi_cmdset_0002.c | 10 ++++++++++ 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/mtd/chips/cfi_cmdset_0002.c b/drivers/mtd/chips/cfi_cmdset_0002.c index 29913eeac5fb..13ce64362db8 100644 --- a/drivers/mtd/chips/cfi_cmdset_0002.c +++ b/drivers/mtd/chips/cfi_cmdset_0002.c @@ -2241,6 +2241,7 @@ static int __xipram do_erase_chip(struct map_info *map, struct flchip *chip) unsigned long int adr; DECLARE_WAITQUEUE(wait, current); int ret = 0; + int retry_cnt = 0; adr = cfi->addr_unlock1; @@ -2258,6 +2259,7 @@ static int __xipram do_erase_chip(struct map_info *map, struct flchip *chip) ENABLE_VPP(map); xip_disable(map, chip, adr); + retry: cfi_send_gen_cmd(0xAA, cfi->addr_unlock1, chip->start, map, cfi, cfi->device_type, NULL); cfi_send_gen_cmd(0x55, cfi->addr_unlock2, chip->start, map, cfi, cfi->device_type, NULL); cfi_send_gen_cmd(0x80, cfi->addr_unlock1, chip->start, map, cfi, cfi->device_type, NULL); @@ -2312,6 +2314,9 @@ static int __xipram do_erase_chip(struct map_info *map, struct flchip *chip) map_write( map, CMD(0xF0), chip->start ); /* FIXME - should have reset delay before continuing */ + if (++retry_cnt <= MAX_RETRIES) + goto retry; + ret = -EIO; } @@ -2331,6 +2336,7 @@ static int __xipram do_erase_oneblock(struct map_info *map, struct flchip *chip, unsigned long timeo = jiffies + HZ; DECLARE_WAITQUEUE(wait, current); int ret = 0; + int retry_cnt = 0; adr += chip->start; @@ -2348,6 +2354,7 @@ static int __xipram do_erase_oneblock(struct map_info *map, struct flchip *chip, ENABLE_VPP(map); xip_disable(map, chip, adr); + retry: cfi_send_gen_cmd(0xAA, cfi->addr_unlock1, chip->start, map, cfi, cfi->device_type, NULL); cfi_send_gen_cmd(0x55, cfi->addr_unlock2, chip->start, map, cfi, cfi->device_type, NULL); cfi_send_gen_cmd(0x80, cfi->addr_unlock1, chip->start, map, cfi, cfi->device_type, NULL); @@ -2405,6 +2412,9 @@ static int __xipram do_erase_oneblock(struct map_info *map, struct flchip *chip, map_write( map, CMD(0xF0), chip->start ); /* FIXME - should have reset delay before continuing */ + if (++retry_cnt <= MAX_RETRIES) + goto retry; + ret = -EIO; } -- 2.16.1

7 years, 1 month

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[PATCH 2/4] mtd: cfi_cmdset_0002: Change definition naming to retry write operation

by Tokunori Ikegami

The definition can be used for other program and erase operations also. So change the naming to MAX_RETRIES from MAX_WORD_RETRIES. Signed-off-by: Tokunori Ikegami <ikegami(a)allied-telesis.co.jp> Reviewed-by: Joakim Tjernlund <Joakim.Tjernlund(a)infinera.com> Cc: Chris Packham <chris.packham(a)alliedtelesis.co.nz> Cc: Brian Norris <computersforpeace(a)gmail.com> Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2(a)infradead.org> Cc: Boris Brezillon <boris.brezillon(a)free-electrons.com> Cc: Marek Vasut <marek.vasut(a)gmail.com> Cc: Richard Weinberger <richard(a)nod.at> Cc: Cyrille Pitchen <cyrille.pitchen(a)wedev4u.fr> Cc: linux-mtd(a)lists.infradead.org Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Boris Brezillon <boris.brezillon(a)bootlin.com> --- drivers/mtd/chips/cfi_cmdset_0002.c | 6 +++--- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/mtd/chips/cfi_cmdset_0002.c b/drivers/mtd/chips/cfi_cmdset_0002.c index 9ab521d25ea2..29913eeac5fb 100644 --- a/drivers/mtd/chips/cfi_cmdset_0002.c +++ b/drivers/mtd/chips/cfi_cmdset_0002.c @@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ #define AMD_BOOTLOC_BUG #define FORCE_WORD_WRITE 0 -#define MAX_WORD_RETRIES 3 +#define MAX_RETRIES 3 #define SST49LF004B 0x0060 #define SST49LF040B 0x0050 @@ -1647,7 +1647,7 @@ static int __xipram do_write_oneword(struct map_info *map, struct flchip *chip, map_write( map, CMD(0xF0), chip->start ); /* FIXME - should have reset delay before continuing */ - if (++retry_cnt <= MAX_WORD_RETRIES) + if (++retry_cnt <= MAX_RETRIES) goto retry; ret = -EIO; @@ -2106,7 +2106,7 @@ static int do_panic_write_oneword(struct map_info *map, struct flchip *chip, map_write(map, CMD(0xF0), chip->start); /* FIXME - should have reset delay before continuing */ - if (++retry_cnt <= MAX_WORD_RETRIES) + if (++retry_cnt <= MAX_RETRIES) goto retry; ret = -EIO; -- 2.16.1

7 years, 1 month

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virt: vbox: Only copy_from_user the request-header once

by Justin Forbes

I didn't see this one sent to stable, though it probably should be. commit bd23a7269834dc7c1f93e83535d16ebc44b75eba Author: Wenwen Wang <wang6495(a)umn.edu> Date: Tue May 8 08:50:28 2018 -0500 virt: vbox: Only copy_from_user the request-header once Thanks, Justin

7 years, 1 month

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FAILED: patch "[PATCH] Bluetooth: Fix connection if directed advertising and privacy" failed to apply to 4.4-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 4.4-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ >From 082f2300cfa1a3d9d5221c38c5eba85d4ab98bd8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Szymon Janc <szymon.janc(a)codecoup.pl> Date: Tue, 3 Apr 2018 13:40:06 +0200 Subject: [PATCH] Bluetooth: Fix connection if directed advertising and privacy is used Local random address needs to be updated before creating connection if RPA from LE Direct Advertising Report was resolved in host. Otherwise remote device might ignore connection request due to address mismatch. This was affecting following qualification test cases: GAP/CONN/SCEP/BV-03-C, GAP/CONN/GCEP/BV-05-C, GAP/CONN/DCEP/BV-05-C Before patch: < HCI Command: LE Set Random Address (0x08|0x0005) plen 6 #11350 [hci0] 84680.231216 Address: 56:BC:E8:24:11:68 (Resolvable) Identity type: Random (0x01) Identity: F2:F1:06:3D:9C:42 (Static) > HCI Event: Command Complete (0x0e) plen 4 #11351 [hci0] 84680.246022 LE Set Random Address (0x08|0x0005) ncmd 1 Status: Success (0x00) < HCI Command: LE Set Scan Parameters (0x08|0x000b) plen 7 #11352 [hci0] 84680.246417 Type: Passive (0x00) Interval: 60.000 msec (0x0060) Window: 30.000 msec (0x0030) Own address type: Random (0x01) Filter policy: Accept all advertisement, inc. directed unresolved RPA (0x02) > HCI Event: Command Complete (0x0e) plen 4 #11353 [hci0] 84680.248854 LE Set Scan Parameters (0x08|0x000b) ncmd 1 Status: Success (0x00) < HCI Command: LE Set Scan Enable (0x08|0x000c) plen 2 #11354 [hci0] 84680.249466 Scanning: Enabled (0x01) Filter duplicates: Enabled (0x01) > HCI Event: Command Complete (0x0e) plen 4 #11355 [hci0] 84680.253222 LE Set Scan Enable (0x08|0x000c) ncmd 1 Status: Success (0x00) > HCI Event: LE Meta Event (0x3e) plen 18 #11356 [hci0] 84680.458387 LE Direct Advertising Report (0x0b) Num reports: 1 Event type: Connectable directed - ADV_DIRECT_IND (0x01) Address type: Random (0x01) Address: 53:38:DA:46:8C:45 (Resolvable) Identity type: Public (0x00) Identity: 11:22:33:44:55:66 (OUI 11-22-33) Direct address type: Random (0x01) Direct address: 7C:D6:76:8C:DF:82 (Resolvable) Identity type: Random (0x01) Identity: F2:F1:06:3D:9C:42 (Static) RSSI: -74 dBm (0xb6) < HCI Command: LE Set Scan Enable (0x08|0x000c) plen 2 #11357 [hci0] 84680.458737 Scanning: Disabled (0x00) Filter duplicates: Disabled (0x00) > HCI Event: Command Complete (0x0e) plen 4 #11358 [hci0] 84680.469982 LE Set Scan Enable (0x08|0x000c) ncmd 1 Status: Success (0x00) < HCI Command: LE Create Connection (0x08|0x000d) plen 25 #11359 [hci0] 84680.470444 Scan interval: 60.000 msec (0x0060) Scan window: 60.000 msec (0x0060) Filter policy: White list is not used (0x00) Peer address type: Random (0x01) Peer address: 53:38:DA:46:8C:45 (Resolvable) Identity type: Public (0x00) Identity: 11:22:33:44:55:66 (OUI 11-22-33) Own address type: Random (0x01) Min connection interval: 30.00 msec (0x0018) Max connection interval: 50.00 msec (0x0028) Connection latency: 0 (0x0000) Supervision timeout: 420 msec (0x002a) Min connection length: 0.000 msec (0x0000) Max connection length: 0.000 msec (0x0000) > HCI Event: Command Status (0x0f) plen 4 #11360 [hci0] 84680.474971 LE Create Connection (0x08|0x000d) ncmd 1 Status: Success (0x00) < HCI Command: LE Create Connection Cancel (0x08|0x000e) plen 0 #11361 [hci0] 84682.545385 > HCI Event: Command Complete (0x0e) plen 4 #11362 [hci0] 84682.551014 LE Create Connection Cancel (0x08|0x000e) ncmd 1 Status: Success (0x00) > HCI Event: LE Meta Event (0x3e) plen 19 #11363 [hci0] 84682.551074 LE Connection Complete (0x01) Status: Unknown Connection Identifier (0x02) Handle: 0 Role: Master (0x00) Peer address type: Public (0x00) Peer address: 00:00:00:00:00:00 (OUI 00-00-00) Connection interval: 0.00 msec (0x0000) Connection latency: 0 (0x0000) Supervision timeout: 0 msec (0x0000) Master clock accuracy: 0x00 After patch: < HCI Command: LE Set Scan Parameters (0x08|0x000b) plen 7 #210 [hci0] 667.152459 Type: Passive (0x00) Interval: 60.000 msec (0x0060) Window: 30.000 msec (0x0030) Own address type: Random (0x01) Filter policy: Accept all advertisement, inc. directed unresolved RPA (0x02) > HCI Event: Command Complete (0x0e) plen 4 #211 [hci0] 667.153613 LE Set Scan Parameters (0x08|0x000b) ncmd 1 Status: Success (0x00) < HCI Command: LE Set Scan Enable (0x08|0x000c) plen 2 #212 [hci0] 667.153704 Scanning: Enabled (0x01) Filter duplicates: Enabled (0x01) > HCI Event: Command Complete (0x0e) plen 4 #213 [hci0] 667.154584 LE Set Scan Enable (0x08|0x000c) ncmd 1 Status: Success (0x00) > HCI Event: LE Meta Event (0x3e) plen 18 #214 [hci0] 667.182619 LE Direct Advertising Report (0x0b) Num reports: 1 Event type: Connectable directed - ADV_DIRECT_IND (0x01) Address type: Random (0x01) Address: 50:52:D9:A6:48:A0 (Resolvable) Identity type: Public (0x00) Identity: 11:22:33:44:55:66 (OUI 11-22-33) Direct address type: Random (0x01) Direct address: 7C:C1:57:A5:B7:A8 (Resolvable) Identity type: Random (0x01) Identity: F4:28:73:5D:38:B0 (Static) RSSI: -70 dBm (0xba) < HCI Command: LE Set Scan Enable (0x08|0x000c) plen 2 #215 [hci0] 667.182704 Scanning: Disabled (0x00) Filter duplicates: Disabled (0x00) > HCI Event: Command Complete (0x0e) plen 4 #216 [hci0] 667.183599 LE Set Scan Enable (0x08|0x000c) ncmd 1 Status: Success (0x00) < HCI Command: LE Set Random Address (0x08|0x0005) plen 6 #217 [hci0] 667.183645 Address: 7C:C1:57:A5:B7:A8 (Resolvable) Identity type: Random (0x01) Identity: F4:28:73:5D:38:B0 (Static) > HCI Event: Command Complete (0x0e) plen 4 #218 [hci0] 667.184590 LE Set Random Address (0x08|0x0005) ncmd 1 Status: Success (0x00) < HCI Command: LE Create Connection (0x08|0x000d) plen 25 #219 [hci0] 667.184613 Scan interval: 60.000 msec (0x0060) Scan window: 60.000 msec (0x0060) Filter policy: White list is not used (0x00) Peer address type: Random (0x01) Peer address: 50:52:D9:A6:48:A0 (Resolvable) Identity type: Public (0x00) Identity: 11:22:33:44:55:66 (OUI 11-22-33) Own address type: Random (0x01) Min connection interval: 30.00 msec (0x0018) Max connection interval: 50.00 msec (0x0028) Connection latency: 0 (0x0000) Supervision timeout: 420 msec (0x002a) Min connection length: 0.000 msec (0x0000) Max connection length: 0.000 msec (0x0000) > HCI Event: Command Status (0x0f) plen 4 #220 [hci0] 667.186558 LE Create Connection (0x08|0x000d) ncmd 1 Status: Success (0x00) > HCI Event: LE Meta Event (0x3e) plen 19 #221 [hci0] 667.485824 LE Connection Complete (0x01) Status: Success (0x00) Handle: 0 Role: Master (0x00) Peer address type: Random (0x01) Peer address: 50:52:D9:A6:48:A0 (Resolvable) Identity type: Public (0x00) Identity: 11:22:33:44:55:66 (OUI 11-22-33) Connection interval: 50.00 msec (0x0028) Connection latency: 0 (0x0000) Supervision timeout: 420 msec (0x002a) Master clock accuracy: 0x07 @ MGMT Event: Device Connected (0x000b) plen 13 {0x0002} [hci0] 667.485996 LE Address: 11:22:33:44:55:66 (OUI 11-22-33) Flags: 0x00000000 Data length: 0 Signed-off-by: Szymon Janc <szymon.janc(a)codecoup.pl> Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel(a)holtmann.org> Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org diff --git a/include/net/bluetooth/hci_core.h b/include/net/bluetooth/hci_core.h index 95ccc1eef558..b619a190ff12 100644 --- a/include/net/bluetooth/hci_core.h +++ b/include/net/bluetooth/hci_core.h @@ -895,7 +895,7 @@ struct hci_conn *hci_connect_le_scan(struct hci_dev *hdev, bdaddr_t *dst, u16 conn_timeout); struct hci_conn *hci_connect_le(struct hci_dev *hdev, bdaddr_t *dst, u8 dst_type, u8 sec_level, u16 conn_timeout, - u8 role); + u8 role, bdaddr_t *direct_rpa); struct hci_conn *hci_connect_acl(struct hci_dev *hdev, bdaddr_t *dst, u8 sec_level, u8 auth_type); struct hci_conn *hci_connect_sco(struct hci_dev *hdev, int type, bdaddr_t *dst, diff --git a/net/bluetooth/hci_conn.c b/net/bluetooth/hci_conn.c index a9682534c377..45ff5dc124cc 100644 --- a/net/bluetooth/hci_conn.c +++ b/net/bluetooth/hci_conn.c @@ -749,18 +749,31 @@ static bool conn_use_rpa(struct hci_conn *conn) } static void hci_req_add_le_create_conn(struct hci_request *req, - struct hci_conn *conn) + struct hci_conn *conn, + bdaddr_t *direct_rpa) { struct hci_cp_le_create_conn cp; struct hci_dev *hdev = conn->hdev; u8 own_addr_type; - /* Update random address, but set require_privacy to false so - * that we never connect with an non-resolvable address. + /* If direct address was provided we use it instead of current + * address. */ - if (hci_update_random_address(req, false, conn_use_rpa(conn), - &own_addr_type)) - return; + if (direct_rpa) { + if (bacmp(&req->hdev->random_addr, direct_rpa)) + hci_req_add(req, HCI_OP_LE_SET_RANDOM_ADDR, 6, + direct_rpa); + + /* direct address is always RPA */ + own_addr_type = ADDR_LE_DEV_RANDOM; + } else { + /* Update random address, but set require_privacy to false so + * that we never connect with an non-resolvable address. + */ + if (hci_update_random_address(req, false, conn_use_rpa(conn), + &own_addr_type)) + return; + } memset(&cp, 0, sizeof(cp)); @@ -825,7 +838,7 @@ static void hci_req_directed_advertising(struct hci_request *req, struct hci_conn *hci_connect_le(struct hci_dev *hdev, bdaddr_t *dst, u8 dst_type, u8 sec_level, u16 conn_timeout, - u8 role) + u8 role, bdaddr_t *direct_rpa) { struct hci_conn_params *params; struct hci_conn *conn; @@ -940,7 +953,7 @@ struct hci_conn *hci_connect_le(struct hci_dev *hdev, bdaddr_t *dst, hci_dev_set_flag(hdev, HCI_LE_SCAN_INTERRUPTED); } - hci_req_add_le_create_conn(&req, conn); + hci_req_add_le_create_conn(&req, conn, direct_rpa); create_conn: err = hci_req_run(&req, create_le_conn_complete); diff --git a/net/bluetooth/hci_event.c b/net/bluetooth/hci_event.c index cd3bbb766c24..139707cd9d35 100644 --- a/net/bluetooth/hci_event.c +++ b/net/bluetooth/hci_event.c @@ -4648,7 +4648,8 @@ static void hci_le_conn_update_complete_evt(struct hci_dev *hdev, /* This function requires the caller holds hdev->lock */ static struct hci_conn *check_pending_le_conn(struct hci_dev *hdev, bdaddr_t *addr, - u8 addr_type, u8 adv_type) + u8 addr_type, u8 adv_type, + bdaddr_t *direct_rpa) { struct hci_conn *conn; struct hci_conn_params *params; @@ -4699,7 +4700,8 @@ static struct hci_conn *check_pending_le_conn(struct hci_dev *hdev, } conn = hci_connect_le(hdev, addr, addr_type, BT_SECURITY_LOW, - HCI_LE_AUTOCONN_TIMEOUT, HCI_ROLE_MASTER); + HCI_LE_AUTOCONN_TIMEOUT, HCI_ROLE_MASTER, + direct_rpa); if (!IS_ERR(conn)) { /* If HCI_AUTO_CONN_EXPLICIT is set, conn is already owned * by higher layer that tried to connect, if no then @@ -4808,8 +4810,13 @@ static void process_adv_report(struct hci_dev *hdev, u8 type, bdaddr_t *bdaddr, bdaddr_type = irk->addr_type; } - /* Check if we have been requested to connect to this device */ - conn = check_pending_le_conn(hdev, bdaddr, bdaddr_type, type); + /* Check if we have been requested to connect to this device. + * + * direct_addr is set only for directed advertising reports (it is NULL + * for advertising reports) and is already verified to be RPA above. + */ + conn = check_pending_le_conn(hdev, bdaddr, bdaddr_type, type, + direct_addr); if (conn && type == LE_ADV_IND) { /* Store report for later inclusion by * mgmt_device_connected diff --git a/net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c b/net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c index fc6615d59165..9b7907ebfa01 100644 --- a/net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c +++ b/net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c @@ -7156,7 +7156,7 @@ int l2cap_chan_connect(struct l2cap_chan *chan, __le16 psm, u16 cid, hcon = hci_connect_le(hdev, dst, dst_type, chan->sec_level, HCI_LE_CONN_TIMEOUT, - HCI_ROLE_SLAVE); + HCI_ROLE_SLAVE, NULL); else hcon = hci_connect_le_scan(hdev, dst, dst_type, chan->sec_level,

7 years, 1 month

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[PATCH stable 4.9 and 4.4] cdc_ncm: avoid padding beyond end of skb

by Bjørn Mork

[ Upstream commit 49c2c3f246e2fc3009039e31a826333dcd0283cd ] Commit 4a0e3e989d66 ("cdc_ncm: Add support for moving NDP to end of NCM frame") added logic to reserve space for the NDP at the end of the NTB/skb. This reservation did not take the final alignment of the NDP into account, causing us to reserve too little space. Additionally the padding prior to NDP addition did not ensure there was enough space for the NDP. The NTB/skb with the NDP appended would then exceed the configured max size. This caused the final padding of the NTB to use a negative count, padding to almost INT_MAX, and resulting in: [60103.825970] BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at ffff9641f2004000 [60103.825998] IP: __memset+0x24/0x30 [60103.826001] PGD a6a06067 P4D a6a06067 PUD 4f65a063 PMD 72003063 PTE 0 [60103.826013] Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP NOPTI [60103.826018] Modules linked in: (removed( [60103.826158] CPU: 0 PID: 5990 Comm: Chrome_DevTools Tainted: G O 4.14.0-3-amd64 #1 Debian 4.14.17-1 [60103.826162] Hardware name: LENOVO 20081 BIOS 41CN28WW(V2.04) 05/03/2012 [60103.826166] task: ffff964193484fc0 task.stack: ffffb2890137c000 [60103.826171] RIP: 0010:__memset+0x24/0x30 [60103.826174] RSP: 0000:ffff964316c03b68 EFLAGS: 00010216 [60103.826178] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 00000000fffffffd RCX: 000000001ffa5000 [60103.826181] RDX: 0000000000000005 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffff9641f2003ffc [60103.826184] RBP: ffff964192f6c800 R08: 00000000304d434e R09: ffff9641f1d2c004 [60103.826187] R10: 0000000000000002 R11: 00000000000005ae R12: ffff9642e6957a80 [60103.826190] R13: ffff964282ff2ee8 R14: 000000000000000d R15: ffff9642e4843900 [60103.826194] FS: 00007f395aaf6700(0000) GS:ffff964316c00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [60103.826197] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [60103.826200] CR2: ffff9641f2004000 CR3: 0000000013b0c000 CR4: 00000000000006f0 [60103.826204] Call Trace: [60103.826212] <IRQ> [60103.826225] cdc_ncm_fill_tx_frame+0x5e3/0x740 [cdc_ncm] [60103.826236] cdc_ncm_tx_fixup+0x57/0x70 [cdc_ncm] [60103.826246] usbnet_start_xmit+0x5d/0x710 [usbnet] [60103.826254] ? netif_skb_features+0x119/0x250 [60103.826259] dev_hard_start_xmit+0xa1/0x200 [60103.826267] sch_direct_xmit+0xf2/0x1b0 [60103.826273] __dev_queue_xmit+0x5e3/0x7c0 [60103.826280] ? ip_finish_output2+0x263/0x3c0 [60103.826284] ip_finish_output2+0x263/0x3c0 [60103.826289] ? ip_output+0x6c/0xe0 [60103.826293] ip_output+0x6c/0xe0 [60103.826298] ? ip_forward_options+0x1a0/0x1a0 [60103.826303] tcp_transmit_skb+0x516/0x9b0 [60103.826309] tcp_write_xmit+0x1aa/0xee0 [60103.826313] ? sch_direct_xmit+0x71/0x1b0 [60103.826318] tcp_tasklet_func+0x177/0x180 [60103.826325] tasklet_action+0x5f/0x110 [60103.826332] __do_softirq+0xde/0x2b3 [60103.826337] irq_exit+0xae/0xb0 [60103.826342] do_IRQ+0x81/0xd0 [60103.826347] common_interrupt+0x98/0x98 [60103.826351] </IRQ> [60103.826355] RIP: 0033:0x7f397bdf2282 [60103.826358] RSP: 002b:00007f395aaf57d8 EFLAGS: 00000206 ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffff6e [60103.826362] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 00002f07bc6d0900 RCX: 00007f39752d7fe7 [60103.826365] RDX: 0000000000000022 RSI: 0000000000000147 RDI: 00002f07baea02c0 [60103.826368] RBP: 0000000000000001 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 [60103.826371] R10: 00000000ffffffff R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 00002f07baea02c0 [60103.826373] R13: 00002f07bba227a0 R14: 00002f07bc6d090c R15: 0000000000000000 [60103.826377] Code: 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 0f 1f 44 00 00 49 89 f9 48 89 d1 83 e2 07 48 c1 e9 03 40 0f b6 f6 48 b8 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 48 0f af c6 <f3> 48 ab 89 d1 f3 aa 4c 89 c8 c3 90 49 89 f9 40 88 f0 48 89 d1 [60103.826442] RIP: __memset+0x24/0x30 RSP: ffff964316c03b68 [60103.826444] CR2: ffff9641f2004000 Commit e1069bbfcf3b ("net: cdc_ncm: Reduce memory use when kernel memory low") made this bug much more likely to trigger by reducing the NTB size under memory pressure. Link: https://bugs.debian.org/893393 Reported-by: Горбешко Богдан <bodqhrohro(a)gmail.com> Reported-and-tested-by: Dennis Wassenberg <dennis.wassenberg(a)secunet.com> Cc: Enrico Mioso <mrkiko.rs(a)gmail.com> Fixes: 4a0e3e989d66 ("cdc_ncm: Add support for moving NDP to end of NCM frame") [ bmork: tx_curr_size => tx_max and context fixup for v4.12 and older ] Signed-off-by: Bjørn Mork <bjorn(a)mork.no> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem(a)davemloft.net> --- This has already been applied to stable 4.14 and newer, but needed two minor changes for anything older than v4.13. The bug is only present in v4.3 and and newer, so there is no need to consider this backport for anything older than stable 4.4. Please apply to 4.4 and 4.9 stable. Thanks, Bjørn drivers/net/usb/cdc_ncm.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/usb/cdc_ncm.c b/drivers/net/usb/cdc_ncm.c index feb61eaffe32..3086cae62fdc 100644 --- a/drivers/net/usb/cdc_ncm.c +++ b/drivers/net/usb/cdc_ncm.c @@ -1124,7 +1124,7 @@ cdc_ncm_fill_tx_frame(struct usbnet *dev, struct sk_buff *skb, __le32 sign) * accordingly. Otherwise, we should check here. */ if (ctx->drvflags & CDC_NCM_FLAG_NDP_TO_END) - delayed_ndp_size = ctx->max_ndp_size; + delayed_ndp_size = ALIGN(ctx->max_ndp_size, ctx->tx_ndp_modulus); else delayed_ndp_size = 0; @@ -1257,7 +1257,7 @@ cdc_ncm_fill_tx_frame(struct usbnet *dev, struct sk_buff *skb, __le32 sign) /* If requested, put NDP at end of frame. */ if (ctx->drvflags & CDC_NCM_FLAG_NDP_TO_END) { nth16 = (struct usb_cdc_ncm_nth16 *)skb_out->data; - cdc_ncm_align_tail(skb_out, ctx->tx_ndp_modulus, 0, ctx->tx_max); + cdc_ncm_align_tail(skb_out, ctx->tx_ndp_modulus, 0, ctx->tx_max - ctx->max_ndp_size); nth16->wNdpIndex = cpu_to_le16(skb_out->len); memcpy(skb_put(skb_out, ctx->max_ndp_size), ctx->delayed_ndp16, ctx->max_ndp_size); -- 2.11.0

7 years, 1 month

2
1
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stable request for v4.14.x: xhci: Fix use-after-free in xhci_free_virt_device

by Sudip Mukherjee

Hi Greg, This fix missed the v4.14.x stable tree. The original patch with the bug was added in v4.14.44. The backported patch is attached with this mail, please apply to v4.14.x. -- Regards Sudip

7 years, 1 month

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FAILED: patch "[PATCH] selinux: move user accesses in selinuxfs out of locked" failed to apply to 3.18-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 3.18-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ >From 0da74120c5341389b97c4ee27487a97224999ee1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jann Horn <jannh(a)google.com> Date: Thu, 28 Jun 2018 20:39:54 -0400 Subject: [PATCH] selinux: move user accesses in selinuxfs out of locked regions If a user is accessing a file in selinuxfs with a pointer to a userspace buffer that is backed by e.g. a userfaultfd, the userspace access can stall indefinitely, which can block fsi->mutex if it is held. For sel_read_policy(), remove the locking, since this method doesn't seem to access anything that requires locking. For sel_read_bool(), move the user access below the locked region. For sel_write_bool() and sel_commit_bools_write(), move the user access up above the locked region. Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh(a)google.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds(a)tycho.nsa.gov> [PM: removed an unused variable in sel_read_policy()] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul(a)paul-moore.com> diff --git a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c index c0cadbc5f85c..19e35dd695d7 100644 --- a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c +++ b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c @@ -441,22 +441,16 @@ static int sel_release_policy(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp) static ssize_t sel_read_policy(struct file *filp, char __user *buf, size_t count, loff_t *ppos) { - struct selinux_fs_info *fsi = file_inode(filp)->i_sb->s_fs_info; struct policy_load_memory *plm = filp->private_data; int ret; - mutex_lock(&fsi->mutex); - ret = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, current_sid(), SECINITSID_SECURITY, SECCLASS_SECURITY, SECURITY__READ_POLICY, NULL); if (ret) - goto out; + return ret; - ret = simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, plm->data, plm->len); -out: - mutex_unlock(&fsi->mutex); - return ret; + return simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, plm->data, plm->len); } static vm_fault_t sel_mmap_policy_fault(struct vm_fault *vmf) @@ -1188,25 +1182,29 @@ static ssize_t sel_read_bool(struct file *filep, char __user *buf, ret = -EINVAL; if (index >= fsi->bool_num || strcmp(name, fsi->bool_pending_names[index])) - goto out; + goto out_unlock; ret = -ENOMEM; page = (char *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL); if (!page) - goto out; + goto out_unlock; cur_enforcing = security_get_bool_value(fsi->state, index); if (cur_enforcing < 0) { ret = cur_enforcing; - goto out; + goto out_unlock; } length = scnprintf(page, PAGE_SIZE, "%d %d", cur_enforcing, fsi->bool_pending_values[index]); - ret = simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, page, length); -out: mutex_unlock(&fsi->mutex); + ret = simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, page, length); +out_free: free_page((unsigned long)page); return ret; + +out_unlock: + mutex_unlock(&fsi->mutex); + goto out_free; } static ssize_t sel_write_bool(struct file *filep, const char __user *buf, @@ -1219,6 +1217,17 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_bool(struct file *filep, const char __user *buf, unsigned index = file_inode(filep)->i_ino & SEL_INO_MASK; const char *name = filep->f_path.dentry->d_name.name; + if (count >= PAGE_SIZE) + return -ENOMEM; + + /* No partial writes. */ + if (*ppos != 0) + return -EINVAL; + + page = memdup_user_nul(buf, count); + if (IS_ERR(page)) + return PTR_ERR(page); + mutex_lock(&fsi->mutex); length = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, @@ -1233,22 +1242,6 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_bool(struct file *filep, const char __user *buf, fsi->bool_pending_names[index])) goto out; - length = -ENOMEM; - if (count >= PAGE_SIZE) - goto out; - - /* No partial writes. */ - length = -EINVAL; - if (*ppos != 0) - goto out; - - page = memdup_user_nul(buf, count); - if (IS_ERR(page)) { - length = PTR_ERR(page); - page = NULL; - goto out; - } - length = -EINVAL; if (sscanf(page, "%d", &new_value) != 1) goto out; @@ -1280,6 +1273,17 @@ static ssize_t sel_commit_bools_write(struct file *filep, ssize_t length; int new_value; + if (count >= PAGE_SIZE) + return -ENOMEM; + + /* No partial writes. */ + if (*ppos != 0) + return -EINVAL; + + page = memdup_user_nul(buf, count); + if (IS_ERR(page)) + return PTR_ERR(page); + mutex_lock(&fsi->mutex); length = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, @@ -1289,22 +1293,6 @@ static ssize_t sel_commit_bools_write(struct file *filep, if (length) goto out; - length = -ENOMEM; - if (count >= PAGE_SIZE) - goto out; - - /* No partial writes. */ - length = -EINVAL; - if (*ppos != 0) - goto out; - - page = memdup_user_nul(buf, count); - if (IS_ERR(page)) { - length = PTR_ERR(page); - page = NULL; - goto out; - } - length = -EINVAL; if (sscanf(page, "%d", &new_value) != 1) goto out;

7 years, 1 month

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FAILED: patch "[PATCH] selinux: move user accesses in selinuxfs out of locked" failed to apply to 4.4-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 4.4-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ >From 0da74120c5341389b97c4ee27487a97224999ee1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jann Horn <jannh(a)google.com> Date: Thu, 28 Jun 2018 20:39:54 -0400 Subject: [PATCH] selinux: move user accesses in selinuxfs out of locked regions If a user is accessing a file in selinuxfs with a pointer to a userspace buffer that is backed by e.g. a userfaultfd, the userspace access can stall indefinitely, which can block fsi->mutex if it is held. For sel_read_policy(), remove the locking, since this method doesn't seem to access anything that requires locking. For sel_read_bool(), move the user access below the locked region. For sel_write_bool() and sel_commit_bools_write(), move the user access up above the locked region. Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh(a)google.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds(a)tycho.nsa.gov> [PM: removed an unused variable in sel_read_policy()] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul(a)paul-moore.com> diff --git a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c index c0cadbc5f85c..19e35dd695d7 100644 --- a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c +++ b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c @@ -441,22 +441,16 @@ static int sel_release_policy(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp) static ssize_t sel_read_policy(struct file *filp, char __user *buf, size_t count, loff_t *ppos) { - struct selinux_fs_info *fsi = file_inode(filp)->i_sb->s_fs_info; struct policy_load_memory *plm = filp->private_data; int ret; - mutex_lock(&fsi->mutex); - ret = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, current_sid(), SECINITSID_SECURITY, SECCLASS_SECURITY, SECURITY__READ_POLICY, NULL); if (ret) - goto out; + return ret; - ret = simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, plm->data, plm->len); -out: - mutex_unlock(&fsi->mutex); - return ret; + return simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, plm->data, plm->len); } static vm_fault_t sel_mmap_policy_fault(struct vm_fault *vmf) @@ -1188,25 +1182,29 @@ static ssize_t sel_read_bool(struct file *filep, char __user *buf, ret = -EINVAL; if (index >= fsi->bool_num || strcmp(name, fsi->bool_pending_names[index])) - goto out; + goto out_unlock; ret = -ENOMEM; page = (char *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL); if (!page) - goto out; + goto out_unlock; cur_enforcing = security_get_bool_value(fsi->state, index); if (cur_enforcing < 0) { ret = cur_enforcing; - goto out; + goto out_unlock; } length = scnprintf(page, PAGE_SIZE, "%d %d", cur_enforcing, fsi->bool_pending_values[index]); - ret = simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, page, length); -out: mutex_unlock(&fsi->mutex); + ret = simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, page, length); +out_free: free_page((unsigned long)page); return ret; + +out_unlock: + mutex_unlock(&fsi->mutex); + goto out_free; } static ssize_t sel_write_bool(struct file *filep, const char __user *buf, @@ -1219,6 +1217,17 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_bool(struct file *filep, const char __user *buf, unsigned index = file_inode(filep)->i_ino & SEL_INO_MASK; const char *name = filep->f_path.dentry->d_name.name; + if (count >= PAGE_SIZE) + return -ENOMEM; + + /* No partial writes. */ + if (*ppos != 0) + return -EINVAL; + + page = memdup_user_nul(buf, count); + if (IS_ERR(page)) + return PTR_ERR(page); + mutex_lock(&fsi->mutex); length = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, @@ -1233,22 +1242,6 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_bool(struct file *filep, const char __user *buf, fsi->bool_pending_names[index])) goto out; - length = -ENOMEM; - if (count >= PAGE_SIZE) - goto out; - - /* No partial writes. */ - length = -EINVAL; - if (*ppos != 0) - goto out; - - page = memdup_user_nul(buf, count); - if (IS_ERR(page)) { - length = PTR_ERR(page); - page = NULL; - goto out; - } - length = -EINVAL; if (sscanf(page, "%d", &new_value) != 1) goto out; @@ -1280,6 +1273,17 @@ static ssize_t sel_commit_bools_write(struct file *filep, ssize_t length; int new_value; + if (count >= PAGE_SIZE) + return -ENOMEM; + + /* No partial writes. */ + if (*ppos != 0) + return -EINVAL; + + page = memdup_user_nul(buf, count); + if (IS_ERR(page)) + return PTR_ERR(page); + mutex_lock(&fsi->mutex); length = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, @@ -1289,22 +1293,6 @@ static ssize_t sel_commit_bools_write(struct file *filep, if (length) goto out; - length = -ENOMEM; - if (count >= PAGE_SIZE) - goto out; - - /* No partial writes. */ - length = -EINVAL; - if (*ppos != 0) - goto out; - - page = memdup_user_nul(buf, count); - if (IS_ERR(page)) { - length = PTR_ERR(page); - page = NULL; - goto out; - } - length = -EINVAL; if (sscanf(page, "%d", &new_value) != 1) goto out;

7 years, 1 month

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FAILED: patch "[PATCH] selinux: move user accesses in selinuxfs out of locked" failed to apply to 4.9-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 4.9-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ >From 0da74120c5341389b97c4ee27487a97224999ee1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jann Horn <jannh(a)google.com> Date: Thu, 28 Jun 2018 20:39:54 -0400 Subject: [PATCH] selinux: move user accesses in selinuxfs out of locked regions If a user is accessing a file in selinuxfs with a pointer to a userspace buffer that is backed by e.g. a userfaultfd, the userspace access can stall indefinitely, which can block fsi->mutex if it is held. For sel_read_policy(), remove the locking, since this method doesn't seem to access anything that requires locking. For sel_read_bool(), move the user access below the locked region. For sel_write_bool() and sel_commit_bools_write(), move the user access up above the locked region. Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh(a)google.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds(a)tycho.nsa.gov> [PM: removed an unused variable in sel_read_policy()] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul(a)paul-moore.com> diff --git a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c index c0cadbc5f85c..19e35dd695d7 100644 --- a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c +++ b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c @@ -441,22 +441,16 @@ static int sel_release_policy(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp) static ssize_t sel_read_policy(struct file *filp, char __user *buf, size_t count, loff_t *ppos) { - struct selinux_fs_info *fsi = file_inode(filp)->i_sb->s_fs_info; struct policy_load_memory *plm = filp->private_data; int ret; - mutex_lock(&fsi->mutex); - ret = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, current_sid(), SECINITSID_SECURITY, SECCLASS_SECURITY, SECURITY__READ_POLICY, NULL); if (ret) - goto out; + return ret; - ret = simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, plm->data, plm->len); -out: - mutex_unlock(&fsi->mutex); - return ret; + return simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, plm->data, plm->len); } static vm_fault_t sel_mmap_policy_fault(struct vm_fault *vmf) @@ -1188,25 +1182,29 @@ static ssize_t sel_read_bool(struct file *filep, char __user *buf, ret = -EINVAL; if (index >= fsi->bool_num || strcmp(name, fsi->bool_pending_names[index])) - goto out; + goto out_unlock; ret = -ENOMEM; page = (char *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL); if (!page) - goto out; + goto out_unlock; cur_enforcing = security_get_bool_value(fsi->state, index); if (cur_enforcing < 0) { ret = cur_enforcing; - goto out; + goto out_unlock; } length = scnprintf(page, PAGE_SIZE, "%d %d", cur_enforcing, fsi->bool_pending_values[index]); - ret = simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, page, length); -out: mutex_unlock(&fsi->mutex); + ret = simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, page, length); +out_free: free_page((unsigned long)page); return ret; + +out_unlock: + mutex_unlock(&fsi->mutex); + goto out_free; } static ssize_t sel_write_bool(struct file *filep, const char __user *buf, @@ -1219,6 +1217,17 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_bool(struct file *filep, const char __user *buf, unsigned index = file_inode(filep)->i_ino & SEL_INO_MASK; const char *name = filep->f_path.dentry->d_name.name; + if (count >= PAGE_SIZE) + return -ENOMEM; + + /* No partial writes. */ + if (*ppos != 0) + return -EINVAL; + + page = memdup_user_nul(buf, count); + if (IS_ERR(page)) + return PTR_ERR(page); + mutex_lock(&fsi->mutex); length = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, @@ -1233,22 +1242,6 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_bool(struct file *filep, const char __user *buf, fsi->bool_pending_names[index])) goto out; - length = -ENOMEM; - if (count >= PAGE_SIZE) - goto out; - - /* No partial writes. */ - length = -EINVAL; - if (*ppos != 0) - goto out; - - page = memdup_user_nul(buf, count); - if (IS_ERR(page)) { - length = PTR_ERR(page); - page = NULL; - goto out; - } - length = -EINVAL; if (sscanf(page, "%d", &new_value) != 1) goto out; @@ -1280,6 +1273,17 @@ static ssize_t sel_commit_bools_write(struct file *filep, ssize_t length; int new_value; + if (count >= PAGE_SIZE) + return -ENOMEM; + + /* No partial writes. */ + if (*ppos != 0) + return -EINVAL; + + page = memdup_user_nul(buf, count); + if (IS_ERR(page)) + return PTR_ERR(page); + mutex_lock(&fsi->mutex); length = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, @@ -1289,22 +1293,6 @@ static ssize_t sel_commit_bools_write(struct file *filep, if (length) goto out; - length = -ENOMEM; - if (count >= PAGE_SIZE) - goto out; - - /* No partial writes. */ - length = -EINVAL; - if (*ppos != 0) - goto out; - - page = memdup_user_nul(buf, count); - if (IS_ERR(page)) { - length = PTR_ERR(page); - page = NULL; - goto out; - } - length = -EINVAL; if (sscanf(page, "%d", &new_value) != 1) goto out;

7 years, 1 month

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FAILED: patch "[PATCH] selinux: move user accesses in selinuxfs out of locked" failed to apply to 4.14-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 4.14-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ >From 0da74120c5341389b97c4ee27487a97224999ee1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jann Horn <jannh(a)google.com> Date: Thu, 28 Jun 2018 20:39:54 -0400 Subject: [PATCH] selinux: move user accesses in selinuxfs out of locked regions If a user is accessing a file in selinuxfs with a pointer to a userspace buffer that is backed by e.g. a userfaultfd, the userspace access can stall indefinitely, which can block fsi->mutex if it is held. For sel_read_policy(), remove the locking, since this method doesn't seem to access anything that requires locking. For sel_read_bool(), move the user access below the locked region. For sel_write_bool() and sel_commit_bools_write(), move the user access up above the locked region. Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh(a)google.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds(a)tycho.nsa.gov> [PM: removed an unused variable in sel_read_policy()] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul(a)paul-moore.com> diff --git a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c index c0cadbc5f85c..19e35dd695d7 100644 --- a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c +++ b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c @@ -441,22 +441,16 @@ static int sel_release_policy(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp) static ssize_t sel_read_policy(struct file *filp, char __user *buf, size_t count, loff_t *ppos) { - struct selinux_fs_info *fsi = file_inode(filp)->i_sb->s_fs_info; struct policy_load_memory *plm = filp->private_data; int ret; - mutex_lock(&fsi->mutex); - ret = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, current_sid(), SECINITSID_SECURITY, SECCLASS_SECURITY, SECURITY__READ_POLICY, NULL); if (ret) - goto out; + return ret; - ret = simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, plm->data, plm->len); -out: - mutex_unlock(&fsi->mutex); - return ret; + return simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, plm->data, plm->len); } static vm_fault_t sel_mmap_policy_fault(struct vm_fault *vmf) @@ -1188,25 +1182,29 @@ static ssize_t sel_read_bool(struct file *filep, char __user *buf, ret = -EINVAL; if (index >= fsi->bool_num || strcmp(name, fsi->bool_pending_names[index])) - goto out; + goto out_unlock; ret = -ENOMEM; page = (char *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL); if (!page) - goto out; + goto out_unlock; cur_enforcing = security_get_bool_value(fsi->state, index); if (cur_enforcing < 0) { ret = cur_enforcing; - goto out; + goto out_unlock; } length = scnprintf(page, PAGE_SIZE, "%d %d", cur_enforcing, fsi->bool_pending_values[index]); - ret = simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, page, length); -out: mutex_unlock(&fsi->mutex); + ret = simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, page, length); +out_free: free_page((unsigned long)page); return ret; + +out_unlock: + mutex_unlock(&fsi->mutex); + goto out_free; } static ssize_t sel_write_bool(struct file *filep, const char __user *buf, @@ -1219,6 +1217,17 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_bool(struct file *filep, const char __user *buf, unsigned index = file_inode(filep)->i_ino & SEL_INO_MASK; const char *name = filep->f_path.dentry->d_name.name; + if (count >= PAGE_SIZE) + return -ENOMEM; + + /* No partial writes. */ + if (*ppos != 0) + return -EINVAL; + + page = memdup_user_nul(buf, count); + if (IS_ERR(page)) + return PTR_ERR(page); + mutex_lock(&fsi->mutex); length = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, @@ -1233,22 +1242,6 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_bool(struct file *filep, const char __user *buf, fsi->bool_pending_names[index])) goto out; - length = -ENOMEM; - if (count >= PAGE_SIZE) - goto out; - - /* No partial writes. */ - length = -EINVAL; - if (*ppos != 0) - goto out; - - page = memdup_user_nul(buf, count); - if (IS_ERR(page)) { - length = PTR_ERR(page); - page = NULL; - goto out; - } - length = -EINVAL; if (sscanf(page, "%d", &new_value) != 1) goto out; @@ -1280,6 +1273,17 @@ static ssize_t sel_commit_bools_write(struct file *filep, ssize_t length; int new_value; + if (count >= PAGE_SIZE) + return -ENOMEM; + + /* No partial writes. */ + if (*ppos != 0) + return -EINVAL; + + page = memdup_user_nul(buf, count); + if (IS_ERR(page)) + return PTR_ERR(page); + mutex_lock(&fsi->mutex); length = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, @@ -1289,22 +1293,6 @@ static ssize_t sel_commit_bools_write(struct file *filep, if (length) goto out; - length = -ENOMEM; - if (count >= PAGE_SIZE) - goto out; - - /* No partial writes. */ - length = -EINVAL; - if (*ppos != 0) - goto out; - - page = memdup_user_nul(buf, count); - if (IS_ERR(page)) { - length = PTR_ERR(page); - page = NULL; - goto out; - } - length = -EINVAL; if (sscanf(page, "%d", &new_value) != 1) goto out;

7 years, 1 month

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FAILED: patch "[PATCH] dax: check for QUEUE_FLAG_DAX in bdev_dax_supported()" failed to apply to 4.9-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 4.9-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ >From 15256f6cc4b44f2e70503758150267fd2a53c0d6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ross Zwisler <ross.zwisler(a)linux.intel.com> Date: Tue, 26 Jun 2018 16:30:40 -0600 Subject: [PATCH] dax: check for QUEUE_FLAG_DAX in bdev_dax_supported() Add an explicit check for QUEUE_FLAG_DAX to __bdev_dax_supported(). This is needed for DM configurations where the first element in the dm-linear or dm-stripe target supports DAX, but other elements do not. Without this check __bdev_dax_supported() will pass for such devices, letting a filesystem on that device mount with the DAX option. Signed-off-by: Ross Zwisler <ross.zwisler(a)linux.intel.com> Suggested-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer(a)redhat.com> Fixes: commit 545ed20e6df6 ("dm: add infrastructure for DAX support") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Acked-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams(a)intel.com> Reviewed-by: Toshi Kani <toshi.kani(a)hpe.com> Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer(a)redhat.com> diff --git a/drivers/dax/super.c b/drivers/dax/super.c index 903d9c473749..45276abf03aa 100644 --- a/drivers/dax/super.c +++ b/drivers/dax/super.c @@ -86,6 +86,7 @@ bool __bdev_dax_supported(struct block_device *bdev, int blocksize) { struct dax_device *dax_dev; bool dax_enabled = false; + struct request_queue *q; pgoff_t pgoff; int err, id; void *kaddr; @@ -99,6 +100,13 @@ bool __bdev_dax_supported(struct block_device *bdev, int blocksize) return false; } + q = bdev_get_queue(bdev); + if (!q || !blk_queue_dax(q)) { + pr_debug("%s: error: request queue doesn't support dax\n", + bdevname(bdev, buf)); + return false; + } + err = bdev_dax_pgoff(bdev, 0, PAGE_SIZE, &pgoff); if (err) { pr_debug("%s: error: unaligned partition for dax\n",

7 years, 1 month

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FAILED: patch "[PATCH] dax: check for QUEUE_FLAG_DAX in bdev_dax_supported()" failed to apply to 4.14-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 4.14-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ >From 15256f6cc4b44f2e70503758150267fd2a53c0d6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ross Zwisler <ross.zwisler(a)linux.intel.com> Date: Tue, 26 Jun 2018 16:30:40 -0600 Subject: [PATCH] dax: check for QUEUE_FLAG_DAX in bdev_dax_supported() Add an explicit check for QUEUE_FLAG_DAX to __bdev_dax_supported(). This is needed for DM configurations where the first element in the dm-linear or dm-stripe target supports DAX, but other elements do not. Without this check __bdev_dax_supported() will pass for such devices, letting a filesystem on that device mount with the DAX option. Signed-off-by: Ross Zwisler <ross.zwisler(a)linux.intel.com> Suggested-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer(a)redhat.com> Fixes: commit 545ed20e6df6 ("dm: add infrastructure for DAX support") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Acked-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams(a)intel.com> Reviewed-by: Toshi Kani <toshi.kani(a)hpe.com> Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer(a)redhat.com> diff --git a/drivers/dax/super.c b/drivers/dax/super.c index 903d9c473749..45276abf03aa 100644 --- a/drivers/dax/super.c +++ b/drivers/dax/super.c @@ -86,6 +86,7 @@ bool __bdev_dax_supported(struct block_device *bdev, int blocksize) { struct dax_device *dax_dev; bool dax_enabled = false; + struct request_queue *q; pgoff_t pgoff; int err, id; void *kaddr; @@ -99,6 +100,13 @@ bool __bdev_dax_supported(struct block_device *bdev, int blocksize) return false; } + q = bdev_get_queue(bdev); + if (!q || !blk_queue_dax(q)) { + pr_debug("%s: error: request queue doesn't support dax\n", + bdevname(bdev, buf)); + return false; + } + err = bdev_dax_pgoff(bdev, 0, PAGE_SIZE, &pgoff); if (err) { pr_debug("%s: error: unaligned partition for dax\n",

7 years, 1 month

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FAILED: patch "[PATCH] dax: check for QUEUE_FLAG_DAX in bdev_dax_supported()" failed to apply to 4.17-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 4.17-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ >From 15256f6cc4b44f2e70503758150267fd2a53c0d6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ross Zwisler <ross.zwisler(a)linux.intel.com> Date: Tue, 26 Jun 2018 16:30:40 -0600 Subject: [PATCH] dax: check for QUEUE_FLAG_DAX in bdev_dax_supported() Add an explicit check for QUEUE_FLAG_DAX to __bdev_dax_supported(). This is needed for DM configurations where the first element in the dm-linear or dm-stripe target supports DAX, but other elements do not. Without this check __bdev_dax_supported() will pass for such devices, letting a filesystem on that device mount with the DAX option. Signed-off-by: Ross Zwisler <ross.zwisler(a)linux.intel.com> Suggested-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer(a)redhat.com> Fixes: commit 545ed20e6df6 ("dm: add infrastructure for DAX support") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Acked-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams(a)intel.com> Reviewed-by: Toshi Kani <toshi.kani(a)hpe.com> Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer(a)redhat.com> diff --git a/drivers/dax/super.c b/drivers/dax/super.c index 903d9c473749..45276abf03aa 100644 --- a/drivers/dax/super.c +++ b/drivers/dax/super.c @@ -86,6 +86,7 @@ bool __bdev_dax_supported(struct block_device *bdev, int blocksize) { struct dax_device *dax_dev; bool dax_enabled = false; + struct request_queue *q; pgoff_t pgoff; int err, id; void *kaddr; @@ -99,6 +100,13 @@ bool __bdev_dax_supported(struct block_device *bdev, int blocksize) return false; } + q = bdev_get_queue(bdev); + if (!q || !blk_queue_dax(q)) { + pr_debug("%s: error: request queue doesn't support dax\n", + bdevname(bdev, buf)); + return false; + } + err = bdev_dax_pgoff(bdev, 0, PAGE_SIZE, &pgoff); if (err) { pr_debug("%s: error: unaligned partition for dax\n",

7 years, 1 month

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FAILED: patch "[PATCH] dm: use bio_split() when splitting out the already processed" failed to apply to 4.4-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 4.4-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ >From f21c601a2bb319ec19eb4562eadc7797d90fd90e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Mike Snitzer <snitzer(a)redhat.com> Date: Fri, 15 Jun 2018 09:35:33 -0400 Subject: [PATCH] dm: use bio_split() when splitting out the already processed bio Use of bio_clone_bioset() is inefficient if there is no need to clone the original bio's bio_vec array. Best to use the bio_clone_fast() variant. Also, just using bio_advance() is only part of what is needed to properly setup the clone -- it doesn't account for the various bio_integrity() related work that also needs to be performed (see bio_split). Address both of these issues by switching from bio_clone_bioset() to bio_split(). Fixes: 18a25da8 ("dm: ensure bio submission follows a depth-first tree walk") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org # 4.15+, requires removal of '&' before md->queue->bio_split Reported-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch(a)lst.de> Reviewed-by: NeilBrown <neilb(a)suse.com> Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer(a)redhat.com> diff --git a/drivers/md/dm.c b/drivers/md/dm.c index e65429a29c06..a3b103e8e3ce 100644 --- a/drivers/md/dm.c +++ b/drivers/md/dm.c @@ -1606,10 +1606,9 @@ static blk_qc_t __split_and_process_bio(struct mapped_device *md, * the usage of io->orig_bio in dm_remap_zone_report() * won't be affected by this reassignment. */ - struct bio *b = bio_clone_bioset(bio, GFP_NOIO, - &md->queue->bio_split); + struct bio *b = bio_split(bio, bio_sectors(bio) - ci.sector_count, + GFP_NOIO, &md->queue->bio_split); ci.io->orig_bio = b; - bio_advance(bio, (bio_sectors(bio) - ci.sector_count) << 9); bio_chain(b, bio); ret = generic_make_request(bio); break;

7 years, 1 month

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FAILED: patch "[PATCH] dm: use bio_split() when splitting out the already processed" failed to apply to 4.9-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 4.9-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ >From f21c601a2bb319ec19eb4562eadc7797d90fd90e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Mike Snitzer <snitzer(a)redhat.com> Date: Fri, 15 Jun 2018 09:35:33 -0400 Subject: [PATCH] dm: use bio_split() when splitting out the already processed bio Use of bio_clone_bioset() is inefficient if there is no need to clone the original bio's bio_vec array. Best to use the bio_clone_fast() variant. Also, just using bio_advance() is only part of what is needed to properly setup the clone -- it doesn't account for the various bio_integrity() related work that also needs to be performed (see bio_split). Address both of these issues by switching from bio_clone_bioset() to bio_split(). Fixes: 18a25da8 ("dm: ensure bio submission follows a depth-first tree walk") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org # 4.15+, requires removal of '&' before md->queue->bio_split Reported-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch(a)lst.de> Reviewed-by: NeilBrown <neilb(a)suse.com> Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer(a)redhat.com> diff --git a/drivers/md/dm.c b/drivers/md/dm.c index e65429a29c06..a3b103e8e3ce 100644 --- a/drivers/md/dm.c +++ b/drivers/md/dm.c @@ -1606,10 +1606,9 @@ static blk_qc_t __split_and_process_bio(struct mapped_device *md, * the usage of io->orig_bio in dm_remap_zone_report() * won't be affected by this reassignment. */ - struct bio *b = bio_clone_bioset(bio, GFP_NOIO, - &md->queue->bio_split); + struct bio *b = bio_split(bio, bio_sectors(bio) - ci.sector_count, + GFP_NOIO, &md->queue->bio_split); ci.io->orig_bio = b; - bio_advance(bio, (bio_sectors(bio) - ci.sector_count) << 9); bio_chain(b, bio); ret = generic_make_request(bio); break;

7 years, 1 month

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FAILED: patch "[PATCH] dm: use bio_split() when splitting out the already processed" failed to apply to 4.14-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 4.14-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ >From f21c601a2bb319ec19eb4562eadc7797d90fd90e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Mike Snitzer <snitzer(a)redhat.com> Date: Fri, 15 Jun 2018 09:35:33 -0400 Subject: [PATCH] dm: use bio_split() when splitting out the already processed bio Use of bio_clone_bioset() is inefficient if there is no need to clone the original bio's bio_vec array. Best to use the bio_clone_fast() variant. Also, just using bio_advance() is only part of what is needed to properly setup the clone -- it doesn't account for the various bio_integrity() related work that also needs to be performed (see bio_split). Address both of these issues by switching from bio_clone_bioset() to bio_split(). Fixes: 18a25da8 ("dm: ensure bio submission follows a depth-first tree walk") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org # 4.15+, requires removal of '&' before md->queue->bio_split Reported-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch(a)lst.de> Reviewed-by: NeilBrown <neilb(a)suse.com> Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer(a)redhat.com> diff --git a/drivers/md/dm.c b/drivers/md/dm.c index e65429a29c06..a3b103e8e3ce 100644 --- a/drivers/md/dm.c +++ b/drivers/md/dm.c @@ -1606,10 +1606,9 @@ static blk_qc_t __split_and_process_bio(struct mapped_device *md, * the usage of io->orig_bio in dm_remap_zone_report() * won't be affected by this reassignment. */ - struct bio *b = bio_clone_bioset(bio, GFP_NOIO, - &md->queue->bio_split); + struct bio *b = bio_split(bio, bio_sectors(bio) - ci.sector_count, + GFP_NOIO, &md->queue->bio_split); ci.io->orig_bio = b; - bio_advance(bio, (bio_sectors(bio) - ci.sector_count) << 9); bio_chain(b, bio); ret = generic_make_request(bio); break;

7 years, 1 month

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FAILED: patch "[PATCH] dm: prevent DAX mounts if not supported" failed to apply to 4.14-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 4.14-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ >From dbc626597c39b24cefce09fbd8e9dea85869a801 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ross Zwisler <ross.zwisler(a)linux.intel.com> Date: Tue, 26 Jun 2018 16:30:41 -0600 Subject: [PATCH] dm: prevent DAX mounts if not supported Currently device_supports_dax() just checks to see if the QUEUE_FLAG_DAX flag is set on the device's request queue to decide whether or not the device supports filesystem DAX. Really we should be using bdev_dax_supported() like filesystems do at mount time. This performs other tests like checking to make sure the dax_direct_access() path works. We also explicitly clear QUEUE_FLAG_DAX on the DM device's request queue if any of the underlying devices do not support DAX. This makes the handling of QUEUE_FLAG_DAX consistent with the setting/clearing of most other flags in dm_table_set_restrictions(). Now that bdev_dax_supported() explicitly checks for QUEUE_FLAG_DAX, this will ensure that filesystems built upon DM devices will only be able to mount with DAX if all underlying devices also support DAX. Signed-off-by: Ross Zwisler <ross.zwisler(a)linux.intel.com> Fixes: commit 545ed20e6df6 ("dm: add infrastructure for DAX support") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Acked-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams(a)intel.com> Reviewed-by: Toshi Kani <toshi.kani(a)hpe.com> Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer(a)redhat.com> diff --git a/drivers/md/dm-table.c b/drivers/md/dm-table.c index 938766794c2e..3d0e2c198f06 100644 --- a/drivers/md/dm-table.c +++ b/drivers/md/dm-table.c @@ -885,9 +885,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(dm_table_set_type); static int device_supports_dax(struct dm_target *ti, struct dm_dev *dev, sector_t start, sector_t len, void *data) { - struct request_queue *q = bdev_get_queue(dev->bdev); - - return q && blk_queue_dax(q); + return bdev_dax_supported(dev->bdev, PAGE_SIZE); } static bool dm_table_supports_dax(struct dm_table *t) @@ -1907,6 +1905,9 @@ void dm_table_set_restrictions(struct dm_table *t, struct request_queue *q, if (dm_table_supports_dax(t)) blk_queue_flag_set(QUEUE_FLAG_DAX, q); + else + blk_queue_flag_clear(QUEUE_FLAG_DAX, q); + if (dm_table_supports_dax_write_cache(t)) dax_write_cache(t->md->dax_dev, true); diff --git a/drivers/md/dm.c b/drivers/md/dm.c index a3b103e8e3ce..b0dd7027848b 100644 --- a/drivers/md/dm.c +++ b/drivers/md/dm.c @@ -1056,8 +1056,7 @@ static long dm_dax_direct_access(struct dax_device *dax_dev, pgoff_t pgoff, if (len < 1) goto out; nr_pages = min(len, nr_pages); - if (ti->type->direct_access) - ret = ti->type->direct_access(ti, pgoff, nr_pages, kaddr, pfn); + ret = ti->type->direct_access(ti, pgoff, nr_pages, kaddr, pfn); out: dm_put_live_table(md, srcu_idx);

7 years, 1 month

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