This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled
termios, tty/tty_baudrate.c: fix buffer overrun
to my tty git tree which can be found at
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gregkh/tty.git
in the tty-linus branch.
The patch will show up in the next release of the linux-next tree
(usually sometime within the next 24 hours during the week.)
The patch will hopefully also be merged in Linus's tree for the
next -rc kernel release.
If you have any questions about this process, please let me know.
>From 991a25194097006ec1e0d2e0814ff920e59e3465 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa(a)zytor.com>
Date: Mon, 22 Oct 2018 09:19:04 -0700
Subject: termios, tty/tty_baudrate.c: fix buffer overrun
On architectures with CBAUDEX == 0 (Alpha and PowerPC), the code in tty_baudrate.c does
not do any limit checking on the tty_baudrate[] array, and in fact a
buffer overrun is possible on both architectures. Add a limit check to
prevent that situation.
This will be followed by a much bigger cleanup/simplification patch.
Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin (Intel) <hpa(a)zytor.com>
Requested-by: Cc: Johan Hovold <johan(a)kernel.org>
Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby(a)suse.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro(a)zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Richard Henderson <rth(a)twiddle.net>
Cc: Ivan Kokshaysky <ink(a)jurassic.park.msu.ru>
Cc: Matt Turner <mattst88(a)gmail.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx(a)linutronix.de>
Cc: Kate Stewart <kstewart(a)linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Philippe Ombredanne <pombredanne(a)nexb.com>
Cc: Eugene Syromiatnikov <esyr(a)redhat.com>
Cc: Alan Cox <alan(a)lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
Cc: stable <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/tty/tty_baudrate.c | 4 ++--
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/tty/tty_baudrate.c b/drivers/tty/tty_baudrate.c
index 7576ceace571..f438eaa68246 100644
--- a/drivers/tty/tty_baudrate.c
+++ b/drivers/tty/tty_baudrate.c
@@ -77,7 +77,7 @@ speed_t tty_termios_baud_rate(struct ktermios *termios)
else
cbaud += 15;
}
- return baud_table[cbaud];
+ return cbaud >= n_baud_table ? 0 : baud_table[cbaud];
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(tty_termios_baud_rate);
@@ -113,7 +113,7 @@ speed_t tty_termios_input_baud_rate(struct ktermios *termios)
else
cbaud += 15;
}
- return baud_table[cbaud];
+ return cbaud >= n_baud_table ? 0 : baud_table[cbaud];
#else /* IBSHIFT */
return tty_termios_baud_rate(termios);
#endif /* IBSHIFT */
--
2.19.1
Currently the NUMA distance map parsing does not validate the distance
table for the distance-matrix rules 1-2 in [1].
However the arch NUMA code may enforce some of these rules, but not all.
Such is the case for the arm64 port, which does not enforce the rule that
the distance between separates nodes cannot equal LOCAL_DISTANCE.
The patch adds the following rules validation:
- distance of node to self equals LOCAL_DISTANCE
- distance of separate nodes > LOCAL_DISTANCE
This change avoids a yet-unresolved crash reported in [2].
A note on dealing with symmetrical distances between nodes:
Validating symmetrical distances between nodes is difficult. If it were
mandated in the bindings that every distance must be recorded in the
table, then it would be easy. However, it isn't.
In addition to this, it is also possible to record [b, a] distance only
(and not [a, b]). So, when processing the table for [b, a], we cannot
assert that current distance of [a, b] != [b, a] as invalid, as [a, b]
distance may not be present in the table and current distance would be
default at REMOTE_DISTANCE.
As such, we maintain the policy that we overwrite distance [a, b] = [b, a]
for b > a. This policy is different to kernel ACPI SLIT validation, which
allows non-symmetrical distances (ACPI spec SLIT rules allow it). However,
the distance debug message is dropped as it may be misleading (for a distance
which is later overwritten).
Some final notes on semantics:
- It is implied that it is the responsibility of the arch NUMA code to
reset the NUMA distance map for an error in distance map parsing.
- It is the responsibility of the FW NUMA topology parsing (whether OF or
ACPI) to enforce NUMA distance rules, and not arch NUMA code.
[1] Documents/devicetree/bindings/numa.txt
[2] https://www.spinics.net/lists/arm-kernel/msg683304.html
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: John Garry <john.garry(a)huawei.com>
Acked-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon(a)arm.com>
---
Change from v1:
- A note of masking crash reported
- Add Will's tag
- Add cc stable
diff --git a/drivers/of/of_numa.c b/drivers/of/of_numa.c
index 35c64a4295e0..fe6b13608e51 100644
--- a/drivers/of/of_numa.c
+++ b/drivers/of/of_numa.c
@@ -104,9 +104,14 @@ static int __init of_numa_parse_distance_map_v1(struct device_node *map)
distance = of_read_number(matrix, 1);
matrix++;
+ if ((nodea == nodeb && distance != LOCAL_DISTANCE) ||
+ (nodea != nodeb && distance <= LOCAL_DISTANCE)) {
+ pr_err("Invalid distance[node%d -> node%d] = %d\n",
+ nodea, nodeb, distance);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
numa_set_distance(nodea, nodeb, distance);
- pr_debug("distance[node%d -> node%d] = %d\n",
- nodea, nodeb, distance);
/* Set default distance of node B->A same as A->B */
if (nodeb > nodea)
--
1.9.1
The source image might be only vertically scaled, and in this case
->is_unity will be false, but we'd still have to force ->x_scaling[0]
to VC4_SCALING_PPF for YUV conversion to work properly.
Let's replace the ->is_unity test by->x_scaling[0] == VC4_SCALING_NONE
to cope with that.
Fixes: 658d8cbd07da ("drm/vc4: Fix the "no scaling" case on multi-planar YUV formats")
Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Boris Brezillon <boris.brezillon(a)bootlin.com>
---
drivers/gpu/drm/vc4/vc4_plane.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/vc4/vc4_plane.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/vc4/vc4_plane.c
index 60d5ad19cedd..32b7b9f47c5d 100644
--- a/drivers/gpu/drm/vc4/vc4_plane.c
+++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/vc4/vc4_plane.c
@@ -318,7 +318,7 @@ static int vc4_plane_setup_clipping_and_scaling(struct drm_plane_state *state)
* even on a plane that's otherwise 1:1. Looks like only PPF
* works in that case, so let's pick that one.
*/
- if (vc4_state->is_unity)
+ if (vc4_state->x_scaling[0] == VC4_SCALING_NONE)
vc4_state->x_scaling[0] = VC4_SCALING_PPF;
} else {
vc4_state->is_yuv = false;
--
2.17.1
Unfortunately drm_dp_get_mst_branch_device which is called from both
drm_dp_mst_handle_down_rep and drm_dp_mst_handle_up_rep seem to rely
on that mgr->mst_primary is not NULL, which seem to be wrong as it can be
cleared with simultaneous mode set, if probing fails or in other case.
mgr->lock mutex doesn't protect against that as it might just get
assigned to NULL right before, not simultaneously.
There are currently bugs 107738, 108616 bugs which crash in
drm_dp_get_mst_branch_device, caused by this issue.
v2: Refactored the code, as it was nicely noticed.
Fixed Bugzilla bug numbers(second was 108616, but not 108816)
and added links.
Bugzilla: https://bugs.freedesktop.org/show_bug.cgi?id=108616
Bugzilla: https://bugs.freedesktop.org/show_bug.cgi?id=107738
Signed-off-by: Stanislav Lisovskiy <stanislav.lisovskiy(a)intel.com>
---
drivers/gpu/drm/drm_dp_mst_topology.c | 3 +++
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/drm_dp_mst_topology.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/drm_dp_mst_topology.c
index 5ff1d79b86c4..0e0df398222d 100644
--- a/drivers/gpu/drm/drm_dp_mst_topology.c
+++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/drm_dp_mst_topology.c
@@ -1275,6 +1275,9 @@ static struct drm_dp_mst_branch *drm_dp_get_mst_branch_device(struct drm_dp_mst_
mutex_lock(&mgr->lock);
mstb = mgr->mst_primary;
+ if (!mstb)
+ goto out;
+
for (i = 0; i < lct - 1; i++) {
int shift = (i % 2) ? 0 : 4;
int port_num = (rad[i / 2] >> shift) & 0xf;
--
2.17.1
From: Janosch Frank <frankja(a)de.ibm.com>
Userspace could have munmapped the area before doing unmapping from
the gmap. This would leave us with a valid vmaddr, but an invalid vma
from which we would try to zap memory. Let's check before using the
vma.
Function was moved with 1e133ab296f3 in v4.6.
Is 1843abd upstream.
Fixes: 388186b ("kvm: Handle diagnose 0x10 (release pages)")
Signed-off-by: Janosch Frank <frankja(a)de.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david(a)redhat.com>
Reported-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter(a)oracle.com>
CC: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> # 4.4
---
arch/s390/mm/pgtable.c | 2 ++
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
diff --git a/arch/s390/mm/pgtable.c b/arch/s390/mm/pgtable.c
index 05ae254..1866b6a 100644
--- a/arch/s390/mm/pgtable.c
+++ b/arch/s390/mm/pgtable.c
@@ -637,6 +637,8 @@ void gmap_discard(struct gmap *gmap, unsigned long from, unsigned long to)
vmaddr |= gaddr & ~PMD_MASK;
/* Find vma in the parent mm */
vma = find_vma(gmap->mm, vmaddr);
+ if (!vma)
+ continue;
size = min(to - gaddr, PMD_SIZE - (gaddr & ~PMD_MASK));
zap_page_range(vma, vmaddr, size, NULL);
}
--
2.7.4
From: Guenter Roeck <linux(a)roeck-us.net>
commit 1823342a1f2b47a4e6f5667f67cd28ab6bc4d6cd upstream.
gcc 8.1.0 complains:
fs/configfs/symlink.c:67:3: warning:
'strncpy' output truncated before terminating nul copying as many
bytes from a string as its length
fs/configfs/symlink.c: In function 'configfs_get_link':
fs/configfs/symlink.c:63:13: note: length computed here
Using strncpy() is indeed less than perfect since the length of data to
be copied has already been determined with strlen(). Replace strncpy()
with memcpy() to address the warning and optimize the code a little.
Signed-off-by: Guenter Roeck <linux(a)roeck-us.net>
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch(a)lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Nobuhiro Iwamatsu <nobuhiro.iwamatsu(a)cybertrust.co.jp>
---
fs/configfs/symlink.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/fs/configfs/symlink.c b/fs/configfs/symlink.c
index 0525ebc3aea2..66e8c5d58b21 100644
--- a/fs/configfs/symlink.c
+++ b/fs/configfs/symlink.c
@@ -64,7 +64,7 @@ static void fill_item_path(struct config_item * item, char * buffer, int length)
/* back up enough to print this bus id with '/' */
length -= cur;
- strncpy(buffer + length,config_item_name(p),cur);
+ memcpy(buffer + length, config_item_name(p), cur);
*(buffer + --length) = '/';
}
}
--
2.18.0
From: Brian Foster <bfoster(a)redhat.com>
The truncate transaction does not ever modify the inode btree, but
includes an associated log reservation. Update
xfs_calc_itruncate_reservation() to remove the reservation
associated with inobt updates.
[Amir: This commit was merged for kernel v4.16 and a twin commit was
merged for xfsprogs v4.16. As a result, a small xfs filesystem
formatted with features -m rmapbt=1,reflink=1 using mkfs.xfs
version >= v4.16 cannot be mounted with kernel < v4.16.
For example, xfstests generic/17{1,2,3} format a small fs and
when trying to mount it, they fail with an assert on this very
demonic line:
XFS (vdc): Log size 3075 blocks too small, minimum size is 3717 blocks
XFS (vdc): AAIEEE! Log failed size checks. Abort!
XFS: Assertion failed: 0, file: src/linux/fs/xfs/xfs_log.c, line: 666
The simple solution for stable kernels is to apply this patch,
because mkfs.xfs v4.16 is already in the wild, so we have to
assume that xfs filesystems with a "too small" log exist.
Regardless, xfsprogs maintainers should also consider reverting
the twin patch to stop creating those filesystems for the sake
of users with unpatched kernels.]
Signed-off-by: Brian Foster <bfoster(a)redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner(a)redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong(a)oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong(a)oracle.com>
Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> # v4.9+
Signed-off-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il(a)gmail.com>
---
Darrick/Dave,
It took me a while to figure out what was going on with my test systems
when small test partitions (10G) stopped working with older kernels.
Please bless this change for stable and consider the remedie for mkfs.xfs
I verified that patch cleanly applies to stable kernels 4.14.y and 4.9.y
and that I can mount a filsystem created with new mkfs.xfs.
I am now running quick tests on stable 4.14.y with configs 4k, 1k,
reflink,reflink+overlay to verify no regressions from this patch.
Thanks,
Amir.
fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_trans_resv.c | 9 +--------
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 8 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_trans_resv.c b/fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_trans_resv.c
index 6bd916bd35e2..48eff18c5496 100644
--- a/fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_trans_resv.c
+++ b/fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_trans_resv.c
@@ -232,8 +232,6 @@ xfs_calc_write_reservation(
* the super block to reflect the freed blocks: sector size
* worst case split in allocation btrees per extent assuming 4 extents:
* 4 exts * 2 trees * (2 * max depth - 1) * block size
- * the inode btree: max depth * blocksize
- * the allocation btrees: 2 trees * (max depth - 1) * block size
*/
STATIC uint
xfs_calc_itruncate_reservation(
@@ -245,12 +243,7 @@ xfs_calc_itruncate_reservation(
XFS_FSB_TO_B(mp, 1))),
(xfs_calc_buf_res(9, mp->m_sb.sb_sectsize) +
xfs_calc_buf_res(xfs_allocfree_log_count(mp, 4),
- XFS_FSB_TO_B(mp, 1)) +
- xfs_calc_buf_res(5, 0) +
- xfs_calc_buf_res(xfs_allocfree_log_count(mp, 1),
- XFS_FSB_TO_B(mp, 1)) +
- xfs_calc_buf_res(2 + mp->m_ialloc_blks +
- mp->m_in_maxlevels, 0)));
+ XFS_FSB_TO_B(mp, 1))));
}
/*
--
2.17.1
ndctl zero-labels completes with a large number of zeroed nmems when
it fails to do zeroing on a protected NVDIMM.
# ndctl zero-labels nmem1
zeroed 65504 nmems
When an ACPI call completes with error, xlat_status() called from
acpi_nfit_ctl() sets error to *cmd_rc. __nd_ioctl(), however, does
not check this error and returns with success.
Fix __nd_ioctl() to check this error in cmd_rc.
Fixes: 006358b35c73a ("libnvdimm: add support for clear poison list and badblocks for device dax")
Reported-by: Robert Elliott <elliott(a)hpe.com>
Signed-off-by: Toshi Kani <toshi.kani(a)hpe.com>
Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams(a)intel.com>
Cc: Vishal Verma <vishal.l.verma(a)intel.com>
Cc: Dave Jiang <dave.jiang(a)intel.com>
Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>
---
drivers/nvdimm/bus.c | 4 ++++
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
diff --git a/drivers/nvdimm/bus.c b/drivers/nvdimm/bus.c
index f1fb39921236..af12817d8a02 100644
--- a/drivers/nvdimm/bus.c
+++ b/drivers/nvdimm/bus.c
@@ -1050,6 +1050,10 @@ static int __nd_ioctl(struct nvdimm_bus *nvdimm_bus, struct nvdimm *nvdimm,
rc = nd_desc->ndctl(nd_desc, nvdimm, cmd, buf, buf_len, &cmd_rc);
if (rc < 0)
goto out_unlock;
+ if (cmd_rc < 0) {
+ rc = cmd_rc;
+ goto out_unlock;
+ }
if (!nvdimm && cmd == ND_CMD_CLEAR_ERROR && cmd_rc >= 0) {
struct nd_cmd_clear_error *clear_err = buf;
The patch titled
Subject: lib/ubsan.c: don't mark __ubsan_handle_builtin_unreachable as noreturn
has been added to the -mm tree. Its filename is
ubsan-dont-mark-__ubsan_handle_builtin_unreachable-as-noreturn.patch
This patch should soon appear at
http://ozlabs.org/~akpm/mmots/broken-out/ubsan-dont-mark-__ubsan_handle_bui…
and later at
http://ozlabs.org/~akpm/mmotm/broken-out/ubsan-dont-mark-__ubsan_handle_bui…
Before you just go and hit "reply", please:
a) Consider who else should be cc'ed
b) Prefer to cc a suitable mailing list as well
c) Ideally: find the original patch on the mailing list and do a
reply-to-all to that, adding suitable additional cc's
*** Remember to use Documentation/process/submit-checklist.rst when testing your code ***
The -mm tree is included into linux-next and is updated
there every 3-4 working days
------------------------------------------------------
From: Arnd Bergmann <arnd(a)arndb.de>
Subject: lib/ubsan.c: don't mark __ubsan_handle_builtin_unreachable as noreturn
gcc-8 complains about the prototype for this function:
lib/ubsan.c:432:1: error: ignoring attribute 'noreturn' in declaration of a built-in function '__ubsan_handle_builtin_unreachable' because it conflicts with attribute 'const' [-Werror=attributes]
This is actually a GCC's bug. In GCC internals
__ubsan_handle_builtin_unreachable() declared with both 'noreturn' and
'const' attributes instead of only 'noreturn':
https://gcc.gnu.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=84210
Workaround this by removing the noreturn attribute.
[aryabinin: add information about GCC bug in changelog]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181107144516.4587-1-aryabinin@virtuozzo.com
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd(a)arndb.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin(a)virtuozzo.com>
Acked-by: Olof Johansson <olof(a)lixom.net>
Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm(a)linux-foundation.org>
---
lib/ubsan.c | 3 +--
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-)
--- a/lib/ubsan.c~ubsan-dont-mark-__ubsan_handle_builtin_unreachable-as-noreturn
+++ a/lib/ubsan.c
@@ -427,8 +427,7 @@ void __ubsan_handle_shift_out_of_bounds(
EXPORT_SYMBOL(__ubsan_handle_shift_out_of_bounds);
-void __noreturn
-__ubsan_handle_builtin_unreachable(struct unreachable_data *data)
+void __ubsan_handle_builtin_unreachable(struct unreachable_data *data)
{
unsigned long flags;
_
Patches currently in -mm which might be from arnd(a)arndb.de are
ubsan-dont-mark-__ubsan_handle_builtin_unreachable-as-noreturn.patch
vfs-replace-current_kernel_time64-with-ktime-equivalent.patch
From: Sai Praneeth <sai.praneeth.prakhya(a)intel.com>
[ Upstream commit 706d51681d636a0c4a5ef53395ec3b803e45ed4d ]
Future Intel processors will support "Enhanced IBRS" which is an "always
on" mode i.e. IBRS bit in SPEC_CTRL MSR is enabled once and never
disabled.
>From the specification [1]:
"With enhanced IBRS, the predicted targets of indirect branches
executed cannot be controlled by software that was executed in a less
privileged predictor mode or on another logical processor. As a
result, software operating on a processor with enhanced IBRS need not
use WRMSR to set IA32_SPEC_CTRL.IBRS after every transition to a more
privileged predictor mode. Software can isolate predictor modes
effectively simply by setting the bit once. Software need not disable
enhanced IBRS prior to entering a sleep state such as MWAIT or HLT."
If Enhanced IBRS is supported by the processor then use it as the
preferred spectre v2 mitigation mechanism instead of Retpoline. Intel's
Retpoline white paper [2] states:
"Retpoline is known to be an effective branch target injection (Spectre
variant 2) mitigation on Intel processors belonging to family 6
(enumerated by the CPUID instruction) that do not have support for
enhanced IBRS. On processors that support enhanced IBRS, it should be
used for mitigation instead of retpoline."
The reason why Enhanced IBRS is the recommended mitigation on processors
which support it is that these processors also support CET which
provides a defense against ROP attacks. Retpoline is very similar to ROP
techniques and might trigger false positives in the CET defense.
If Enhanced IBRS is selected as the mitigation technique for spectre v2,
the IBRS bit in SPEC_CTRL MSR is set once at boot time and never
cleared. Kernel also has to make sure that IBRS bit remains set after
VMEXIT because the guest might have cleared the bit. This is already
covered by the existing x86_spec_ctrl_set_guest() and
x86_spec_ctrl_restore_host() speculation control functions.
Enhanced IBRS still requires IBPB for full mitigation.
[1] Speculative-Execution-Side-Channel-Mitigations.pdf
[2] Retpoline-A-Branch-Target-Injection-Mitigation.pdf
Both documents are available at:
https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=199511
Originally-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Sai Praneeth Prakhya <sai.praneeth.prakhya(a)intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx(a)linutronix.de>
Cc: Tim C Chen <tim.c.chen(a)intel.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen(a)intel.com>
Cc: Ravi Shankar <ravi.v.shankar(a)intel.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak(a)linux.intel.com>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>
---
arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 1 +
arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h | 1 +
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 20 ++++++++++++++++++--
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 3 +++
4 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
Changes from upstream:
----------------------
1. Use bit 30 of word 7 in cpufeatures for X86_FEATURE_IBRS_ENHANCED as bit 29
is now used by L1TF.
2. Fix some trivial line fuzzing.
Based on kernel version:
------------------------
Linux 4.9.135
Changes from V1->V2:
--------------------
1. Fix the format of commit log, as suggested by Greg KH, to follow standard
procedure.
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
index f6d1bc93589c..c56c24347f15 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
@@ -213,6 +213,7 @@
#define X86_FEATURE_STIBP ( 7*32+27) /* Single Thread Indirect Branch Predictors */
#define X86_FEATURE_ZEN ( 7*32+28) /* "" CPU is AMD family 0x17 (Zen) */
#define X86_FEATURE_L1TF_PTEINV ( 7*32+29) /* "" L1TF workaround PTE inversion */
+#define X86_FEATURE_IBRS_ENHANCED ( 7*32+30) /* Enhanced IBRS */
/* Virtualization flags: Linux defined, word 8 */
#define X86_FEATURE_TPR_SHADOW ( 8*32+ 0) /* Intel TPR Shadow */
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
index 8b38df98548e..1b4132161c1f 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
@@ -215,6 +215,7 @@ enum spectre_v2_mitigation {
SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_GENERIC,
SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_AMD,
SPECTRE_V2_IBRS,
+ SPECTRE_V2_IBRS_ENHANCED,
};
/* The Speculative Store Bypass disable variants */
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
index 8103adacbc83..6221166e3fca 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -139,6 +139,7 @@ static const char *spectre_v2_strings[] = {
[SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_MINIMAL_AMD] = "Vulnerable: Minimal AMD ASM retpoline",
[SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_GENERIC] = "Mitigation: Full generic retpoline",
[SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_AMD] = "Mitigation: Full AMD retpoline",
+ [SPECTRE_V2_IBRS_ENHANCED] = "Mitigation: Enhanced IBRS",
};
#undef pr_fmt
@@ -340,6 +341,13 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void)
case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_FORCE:
case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO:
+ if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBRS_ENHANCED)) {
+ mode = SPECTRE_V2_IBRS_ENHANCED;
+ /* Force it so VMEXIT will restore correctly */
+ x86_spec_ctrl_base |= SPEC_CTRL_IBRS;
+ wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, x86_spec_ctrl_base);
+ goto specv2_set_mode;
+ }
if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RETPOLINE))
goto retpoline_auto;
break;
@@ -377,6 +385,7 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void)
setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE);
}
+specv2_set_mode:
spectre_v2_enabled = mode;
pr_info("%s\n", spectre_v2_strings[mode]);
@@ -399,9 +408,16 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void)
/*
* Retpoline means the kernel is safe because it has no indirect
- * branches. But firmware isn't, so use IBRS to protect that.
+ * branches. Enhanced IBRS protects firmware too, so, enable restricted
+ * speculation around firmware calls only when Enhanced IBRS isn't
+ * supported.
+ *
+ * Use "mode" to check Enhanced IBRS instead of boot_cpu_has(), because
+ * the user might select retpoline on the kernel command line and if
+ * the CPU supports Enhanced IBRS, kernel might un-intentionally not
+ * enable IBRS around firmware calls.
*/
- if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBRS)) {
+ if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBRS) && mode != SPECTRE_V2_IBRS_ENHANCED) {
setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_USE_IBRS_FW);
pr_info("Enabling Restricted Speculation for firmware calls\n");
}
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
index dc0850bb74be..3c01610c5ba9 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
@@ -959,6 +959,9 @@ static void __init cpu_set_bug_bits(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V1);
setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2);
+ if (ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_IBRS_ALL)
+ setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_IBRS_ENHANCED);
+
if (x86_match_cpu(cpu_no_meltdown))
return;
--
2.7.4
From: Sai Praneeth <sai.praneeth.prakhya(a)intel.com>
[ Upstream commit 706d51681d636a0c4a5ef53395ec3b803e45ed4d ]
Changes from upstream:
----------------------
1. Use bit 30 of word 7 in cpufeatures for X86_FEATURE_IBRS_ENHANCED as bit 29
is now used by L1TF.
2. Fix some trivial line fuzzing.
Based on kernel version:
------------------------
Linux 4.9.135
Commit message from upstream:
-----------------------------
Future Intel processors will support "Enhanced IBRS" which is an "always
on" mode i.e. IBRS bit in SPEC_CTRL MSR is enabled once and never
disabled.
>From the specification [1]:
"With enhanced IBRS, the predicted targets of indirect branches
executed cannot be controlled by software that was executed in a less
privileged predictor mode or on another logical processor. As a
result, software operating on a processor with enhanced IBRS need not
use WRMSR to set IA32_SPEC_CTRL.IBRS after every transition to a more
privileged predictor mode. Software can isolate predictor modes
effectively simply by setting the bit once. Software need not disable
enhanced IBRS prior to entering a sleep state such as MWAIT or HLT."
If Enhanced IBRS is supported by the processor then use it as the
preferred spectre v2 mitigation mechanism instead of Retpoline. Intel's
Retpoline white paper [2] states:
"Retpoline is known to be an effective branch target injection (Spectre
variant 2) mitigation on Intel processors belonging to family 6
(enumerated by the CPUID instruction) that do not have support for
enhanced IBRS. On processors that support enhanced IBRS, it should be
used for mitigation instead of retpoline."
The reason why Enhanced IBRS is the recommended mitigation on processors
which support it is that these processors also support CET which
provides a defense against ROP attacks. Retpoline is very similar to ROP
techniques and might trigger false positives in the CET defense.
If Enhanced IBRS is selected as the mitigation technique for spectre v2,
the IBRS bit in SPEC_CTRL MSR is set once at boot time and never
cleared. Kernel also has to make sure that IBRS bit remains set after
VMEXIT because the guest might have cleared the bit. This is already
covered by the existing x86_spec_ctrl_set_guest() and
x86_spec_ctrl_restore_host() speculation control functions.
Enhanced IBRS still requires IBPB for full mitigation.
[1] Speculative-Execution-Side-Channel-Mitigations.pdf
[2] Retpoline-A-Branch-Target-Injection-Mitigation.pdf
Both documents are available at:
https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=199511
Originally-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Sai Praneeth Prakhya <sai.praneeth.prakhya(a)intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx(a)linutronix.de>
Cc: Tim C Chen <tim.c.chen(a)intel.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen(a)intel.com>
Cc: Ravi Shankar <ravi.v.shankar(a)intel.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak(a)linux.intel.com>
Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>
---
arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 1 +
arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h | 1 +
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 20 ++++++++++++++++++--
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 3 +++
4 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
index f6d1bc93589c..c56c24347f15 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
@@ -213,6 +213,7 @@
#define X86_FEATURE_STIBP ( 7*32+27) /* Single Thread Indirect Branch Predictors */
#define X86_FEATURE_ZEN ( 7*32+28) /* "" CPU is AMD family 0x17 (Zen) */
#define X86_FEATURE_L1TF_PTEINV ( 7*32+29) /* "" L1TF workaround PTE inversion */
+#define X86_FEATURE_IBRS_ENHANCED ( 7*32+30) /* Enhanced IBRS */
/* Virtualization flags: Linux defined, word 8 */
#define X86_FEATURE_TPR_SHADOW ( 8*32+ 0) /* Intel TPR Shadow */
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
index 8b38df98548e..1b4132161c1f 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
@@ -215,6 +215,7 @@ enum spectre_v2_mitigation {
SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_GENERIC,
SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_AMD,
SPECTRE_V2_IBRS,
+ SPECTRE_V2_IBRS_ENHANCED,
};
/* The Speculative Store Bypass disable variants */
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
index 8103adacbc83..6221166e3fca 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -139,6 +139,7 @@ static const char *spectre_v2_strings[] = {
[SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_MINIMAL_AMD] = "Vulnerable: Minimal AMD ASM retpoline",
[SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_GENERIC] = "Mitigation: Full generic retpoline",
[SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_AMD] = "Mitigation: Full AMD retpoline",
+ [SPECTRE_V2_IBRS_ENHANCED] = "Mitigation: Enhanced IBRS",
};
#undef pr_fmt
@@ -340,6 +341,13 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void)
case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_FORCE:
case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO:
+ if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBRS_ENHANCED)) {
+ mode = SPECTRE_V2_IBRS_ENHANCED;
+ /* Force it so VMEXIT will restore correctly */
+ x86_spec_ctrl_base |= SPEC_CTRL_IBRS;
+ wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, x86_spec_ctrl_base);
+ goto specv2_set_mode;
+ }
if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RETPOLINE))
goto retpoline_auto;
break;
@@ -377,6 +385,7 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void)
setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE);
}
+specv2_set_mode:
spectre_v2_enabled = mode;
pr_info("%s\n", spectre_v2_strings[mode]);
@@ -399,9 +408,16 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void)
/*
* Retpoline means the kernel is safe because it has no indirect
- * branches. But firmware isn't, so use IBRS to protect that.
+ * branches. Enhanced IBRS protects firmware too, so, enable restricted
+ * speculation around firmware calls only when Enhanced IBRS isn't
+ * supported.
+ *
+ * Use "mode" to check Enhanced IBRS instead of boot_cpu_has(), because
+ * the user might select retpoline on the kernel command line and if
+ * the CPU supports Enhanced IBRS, kernel might un-intentionally not
+ * enable IBRS around firmware calls.
*/
- if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBRS)) {
+ if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBRS) && mode != SPECTRE_V2_IBRS_ENHANCED) {
setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_USE_IBRS_FW);
pr_info("Enabling Restricted Speculation for firmware calls\n");
}
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
index dc0850bb74be..3c01610c5ba9 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
@@ -959,6 +959,9 @@ static void __init cpu_set_bug_bits(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V1);
setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2);
+ if (ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_IBRS_ALL)
+ setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_IBRS_ENHANCED);
+
if (x86_match_cpu(cpu_no_meltdown))
return;
--
2.7.4
Fix an issue with the 32-bit range error path in `rtc_hctosys' where no
error code is set and consequently the successful preceding call result
from `rtc_read_time' is propagated to `rtc_hctosys_ret'. This in turn
makes any subsequent call to `hctosys_show' incorrectly report in sysfs
that the system time has been set from this RTC while it has not.
Set the error to ERANGE then if we can't express the result due to an
overflow.
Signed-off-by: Maciej W. Rozycki <macro(a)linux-mips.org>
Fixes: b3a5ac42ab18 ("rtc: hctosys: Ensure system time doesn't overflow time_t")
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org # 4.17+
---
drivers/rtc/hctosys.c | 4 +++-
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
linux-rtc-hctosys-range.diff
Index: linux-20181008-swarm64-eb/drivers/rtc/hctosys.c
===================================================================
--- linux-20181008-swarm64-eb.orig/drivers/rtc/hctosys.c
+++ linux-20181008-swarm64-eb/drivers/rtc/hctosys.c
@@ -50,8 +50,10 @@ static int __init rtc_hctosys(void)
tv64.tv_sec = rtc_tm_to_time64(&tm);
#if BITS_PER_LONG == 32
- if (tv64.tv_sec > INT_MAX)
+ if (tv64.tv_sec > INT_MAX) {
+ err = -ERANGE;
goto err_read;
+ }
#endif
err = do_settimeofday64(&tv64);
Exercising the gpu reloc path strenuously revealed an issue where the
updated relocations (from MI_STORE_DWORD_IMM) were not being observed
upon execution. After some experiments with adding pipecontrols (a lot
of pipecontrols (32) as gen4/5 do not have a bit to wait on earlier pipe
controls or even the current on), it was discovered that we merely
needed to delay the EMIT_INVALIDATE by several flushes. It is important
to note that it is the EMIT_INVALIDATE as opposed to the EMIT_FLUSH that
needs the delay as opposed to what one might first expect -- that the
delay is required for the TLB invalidation to take effect (one presumes
to purge any CS buffers) as opposed to a delay after flushing to ensure
the writes have landed before triggering invalidation.
Testcase: igt/gem_tiled_fence_blits
Signed-off-by: Chris Wilson <chris(a)chris-wilson.co.uk>
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
---
drivers/gpu/drm/i915/intel_ringbuffer.c | 38 +++++++++++++++++++++++--
1 file changed, 36 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/intel_ringbuffer.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/intel_ringbuffer.c
index b8a7a014d46d..87eebc13c0d8 100644
--- a/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/intel_ringbuffer.c
+++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/intel_ringbuffer.c
@@ -91,6 +91,7 @@ static int
gen4_render_ring_flush(struct i915_request *rq, u32 mode)
{
u32 cmd, *cs;
+ int i;
/*
* read/write caches:
@@ -127,12 +128,45 @@ gen4_render_ring_flush(struct i915_request *rq, u32 mode)
cmd |= MI_INVALIDATE_ISP;
}
- cs = intel_ring_begin(rq, 2);
+ i = 2;
+ if (mode & EMIT_INVALIDATE)
+ i += 20;
+
+ cs = intel_ring_begin(rq, i);
if (IS_ERR(cs))
return PTR_ERR(cs);
*cs++ = cmd;
- *cs++ = MI_NOOP;
+
+ /*
+ * A random delay to let the CS invalidate take effect? Without this
+ * delay, the GPU relocation path fails as the CS does not see
+ * the updated contents. Just as important, if we apply the flushes
+ * to the EMIT_FLUSH branch (i.e. immediately after the relocation
+ * write and before the invalidate on the next batch), the relocations
+ * still fail. This implies that is a delay following invalidation
+ * that is required to reset the caches as opposed to a delay to
+ * ensure the memory is written.
+ */
+ if (mode & EMIT_INVALIDATE) {
+ *cs++ = GFX_OP_PIPE_CONTROL(4) | PIPE_CONTROL_QW_WRITE;
+ *cs++ = i915_ggtt_offset(rq->engine->scratch) |
+ PIPE_CONTROL_GLOBAL_GTT;
+ *cs++ = 0;
+ *cs++ = 0;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < 12; i++)
+ *cs++ = MI_FLUSH;
+
+ *cs++ = GFX_OP_PIPE_CONTROL(4) | PIPE_CONTROL_QW_WRITE;
+ *cs++ = i915_ggtt_offset(rq->engine->scratch) |
+ PIPE_CONTROL_GLOBAL_GTT;
+ *cs++ = 0;
+ *cs++ = 0;
+ }
+
+ *cs++ = cmd;
+
intel_ring_advance(rq, cs);
return 0;
--
2.19.1
This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled
USB: quirks: Add no-lpm quirk for Raydium touchscreens
to my usb git tree which can be found at
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gregkh/usb.git
in the usb-linus branch.
The patch will show up in the next release of the linux-next tree
(usually sometime within the next 24 hours during the week.)
The patch will hopefully also be merged in Linus's tree for the
next -rc kernel release.
If you have any questions about this process, please let me know.
>From deefd24228a172d1b27d4a9adbfd2cdacd60ae64 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Kai-Heng Feng <kai.heng.feng(a)canonical.com>
Date: Fri, 26 Oct 2018 13:33:15 +0800
Subject: USB: quirks: Add no-lpm quirk for Raydium touchscreens
Raydium USB touchscreen fails to set config if LPM is enabled:
[ 2.030658] usb 1-8: New USB device found, idVendor=2386, idProduct=3119
[ 2.030659] usb 1-8: New USB device strings: Mfr=1, Product=2, SerialNumber=0
[ 2.030660] usb 1-8: Product: Raydium Touch System
[ 2.030661] usb 1-8: Manufacturer: Raydium Corporation
[ 7.132209] usb 1-8: can't set config #1, error -110
Same behavior can be observed on 2386:3114.
Raydium claims the touchscreen supports LPM under Windows, so I used
Microsoft USB Test Tools (MUTT) [1] to check its LPM status. MUTT shows
that the LPM doesn't work under Windows, either. So let's just disable LPM
for Raydium touchscreens.
[1] https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-hardware/drivers/usbcon/usb-test-t…
Signed-off-by: Kai-Heng Feng <kai.heng.feng(a)canonical.com>
Cc: stable <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/usb/core/quirks.c | 5 +++++
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
diff --git a/drivers/usb/core/quirks.c b/drivers/usb/core/quirks.c
index 64df444af229..f9ff03e6af93 100644
--- a/drivers/usb/core/quirks.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/core/quirks.c
@@ -420,6 +420,11 @@ static const struct usb_device_id usb_quirk_list[] = {
{ USB_DEVICE(0x2040, 0x7200), .driver_info =
USB_QUIRK_CONFIG_INTF_STRINGS },
+ /* Raydium Touchscreen */
+ { USB_DEVICE(0x2386, 0x3114), .driver_info = USB_QUIRK_NO_LPM },
+
+ { USB_DEVICE(0x2386, 0x3119), .driver_info = USB_QUIRK_NO_LPM },
+
/* DJI CineSSD */
{ USB_DEVICE(0x2ca3, 0x0031), .driver_info = USB_QUIRK_NO_LPM },
--
2.19.1
This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled
USB: misc: appledisplay: add 20" Apple Cinema Display
to my usb git tree which can be found at
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gregkh/usb.git
in the usb-linus branch.
The patch will show up in the next release of the linux-next tree
(usually sometime within the next 24 hours during the week.)
The patch will hopefully also be merged in Linus's tree for the
next -rc kernel release.
If you have any questions about this process, please let me know.
>From f6501f49199097b99e4e263644d88c90d1ec1060 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Mattias Jacobsson <2pi(a)mok.nu>
Date: Sun, 21 Oct 2018 11:25:37 +0200
Subject: USB: misc: appledisplay: add 20" Apple Cinema Display
Add another Apple Cinema Display to the list of supported displays
Signed-off-by: Mattias Jacobsson <2pi(a)mok.nu>
Cc: stable <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/usb/misc/appledisplay.c | 1 +
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
diff --git a/drivers/usb/misc/appledisplay.c b/drivers/usb/misc/appledisplay.c
index bd539f3058bc..85b48c6ddc7e 100644
--- a/drivers/usb/misc/appledisplay.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/misc/appledisplay.c
@@ -50,6 +50,7 @@ static const struct usb_device_id appledisplay_table[] = {
{ APPLEDISPLAY_DEVICE(0x9219) },
{ APPLEDISPLAY_DEVICE(0x921c) },
{ APPLEDISPLAY_DEVICE(0x921d) },
+ { APPLEDISPLAY_DEVICE(0x9222) },
{ APPLEDISPLAY_DEVICE(0x9236) },
/* Terminating entry */
--
2.19.1
This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled
usb: quirks: Add delay-init quirk for Corsair K70 LUX RGB
to my usb git tree which can be found at
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gregkh/usb.git
in the usb-linus branch.
The patch will show up in the next release of the linux-next tree
(usually sometime within the next 24 hours during the week.)
The patch will hopefully also be merged in Linus's tree for the
next -rc kernel release.
If you have any questions about this process, please let me know.
>From a77112577667cbda7c6292c52d909636aef31fd9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Emmanuel Pescosta <emmanuelpescosta099(a)gmail.com>
Date: Fri, 26 Oct 2018 14:48:09 +0200
Subject: usb: quirks: Add delay-init quirk for Corsair K70 LUX RGB
Following on from this patch: https://lkml.org/lkml/2017/11/3/516,
Corsair K70 LUX RGB keyboards also require the DELAY_INIT quirk to
start correctly at boot.
Dmesg output:
usb 1-6: string descriptor 0 read error: -110
usb 1-6: New USB device found, idVendor=1b1c, idProduct=1b33
usb 1-6: New USB device strings: Mfr=1, Product=2, SerialNumber=3
usb 1-6: can't set config #1, error -110
Signed-off-by: Emmanuel Pescosta <emmanuelpescosta099(a)gmail.com>
Cc: stable <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/usb/core/quirks.c | 3 +++
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
diff --git a/drivers/usb/core/quirks.c b/drivers/usb/core/quirks.c
index 4d7d948eae63..64df444af229 100644
--- a/drivers/usb/core/quirks.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/core/quirks.c
@@ -397,6 +397,9 @@ static const struct usb_device_id usb_quirk_list[] = {
{ USB_DEVICE(0x1b1c, 0x1b20), .driver_info = USB_QUIRK_DELAY_INIT |
USB_QUIRK_DELAY_CTRL_MSG },
+ /* Corsair K70 LUX RGB */
+ { USB_DEVICE(0x1b1c, 0x1b33), .driver_info = USB_QUIRK_DELAY_INIT },
+
/* Corsair K70 LUX */
{ USB_DEVICE(0x1b1c, 0x1b36), .driver_info = USB_QUIRK_DELAY_INIT },
--
2.19.1
This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled
USB: Wait for extra delay time after USB_PORT_FEAT_RESET for quirky
to my usb git tree which can be found at
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gregkh/usb.git
in the usb-linus branch.
The patch will show up in the next release of the linux-next tree
(usually sometime within the next 24 hours during the week.)
The patch will hopefully also be merged in Linus's tree for the
next -rc kernel release.
If you have any questions about this process, please let me know.
>From 781f0766cc41a9dd2e5d118ef4b1d5d89430257b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Kai-Heng Feng <kai.heng.feng(a)canonical.com>
Date: Fri, 19 Oct 2018 16:14:50 +0800
Subject: USB: Wait for extra delay time after USB_PORT_FEAT_RESET for quirky
hub
Devices connected under Terminus Technology Inc. Hub (1a40:0101) may
fail to work after the system resumes from suspend:
[ 206.063325] usb 3-2.4: reset full-speed USB device number 4 using xhci_hcd
[ 206.143691] usb 3-2.4: device descriptor read/64, error -32
[ 206.351671] usb 3-2.4: device descriptor read/64, error -32
Info for this hub:
T: Bus=03 Lev=01 Prnt=01 Port=01 Cnt=01 Dev#= 2 Spd=480 MxCh= 4
D: Ver= 2.00 Cls=09(hub ) Sub=00 Prot=01 MxPS=64 #Cfgs= 1
P: Vendor=1a40 ProdID=0101 Rev=01.11
S: Product=USB 2.0 Hub
C: #Ifs= 1 Cfg#= 1 Atr=e0 MxPwr=100mA
I: If#= 0 Alt= 0 #EPs= 1 Cls=09(hub ) Sub=00 Prot=00 Driver=hub
Some expirements indicate that the USB devices connected to the hub are
innocent, it's the hub itself is to blame. The hub needs extra delay
time after it resets its port.
Hence wait for extra delay, if the device is connected to this quirky
hub.
Signed-off-by: Kai-Heng Feng <kai.heng.feng(a)canonical.com>
Cc: stable <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>
Acked-by: Alan Stern <stern(a)rowland.harvard.edu>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org>
---
Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 2 ++
drivers/usb/core/hub.c | 14 +++++++++++---
drivers/usb/core/quirks.c | 6 ++++++
include/linux/usb/quirks.h | 3 +++
4 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
index 81d1d5a74728..19f4423e70d9 100644
--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
@@ -4713,6 +4713,8 @@
prevent spurious wakeup);
n = USB_QUIRK_DELAY_CTRL_MSG (Device needs a
pause after every control message);
+ o = USB_QUIRK_HUB_SLOW_RESET (Hub needs extra
+ delay after resetting its port);
Example: quirks=0781:5580:bk,0a5c:5834:gij
usbhid.mousepoll=
diff --git a/drivers/usb/core/hub.c b/drivers/usb/core/hub.c
index c6077d582d29..d9bd7576786a 100644
--- a/drivers/usb/core/hub.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/core/hub.c
@@ -2794,6 +2794,7 @@ static int hub_port_reset(struct usb_hub *hub, int port1,
int i, status;
u16 portchange, portstatus;
struct usb_port *port_dev = hub->ports[port1 - 1];
+ int reset_recovery_time;
if (!hub_is_superspeed(hub->hdev)) {
if (warm) {
@@ -2885,11 +2886,18 @@ static int hub_port_reset(struct usb_hub *hub, int port1,
done:
if (status == 0) {
- /* TRSTRCY = 10 ms; plus some extra */
if (port_dev->quirks & USB_PORT_QUIRK_FAST_ENUM)
usleep_range(10000, 12000);
- else
- msleep(10 + 40);
+ else {
+ /* TRSTRCY = 10 ms; plus some extra */
+ reset_recovery_time = 10 + 40;
+
+ /* Hub needs extra delay after resetting its port. */
+ if (hub->hdev->quirks & USB_QUIRK_HUB_SLOW_RESET)
+ reset_recovery_time += 100;
+
+ msleep(reset_recovery_time);
+ }
if (udev) {
struct usb_hcd *hcd = bus_to_hcd(udev->bus);
diff --git a/drivers/usb/core/quirks.c b/drivers/usb/core/quirks.c
index 178d6c6063c0..4d7d948eae63 100644
--- a/drivers/usb/core/quirks.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/core/quirks.c
@@ -128,6 +128,9 @@ static int quirks_param_set(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp)
case 'n':
flags |= USB_QUIRK_DELAY_CTRL_MSG;
break;
+ case 'o':
+ flags |= USB_QUIRK_HUB_SLOW_RESET;
+ break;
/* Ignore unrecognized flag characters */
}
}
@@ -380,6 +383,9 @@ static const struct usb_device_id usb_quirk_list[] = {
{ USB_DEVICE(0x1a0a, 0x0200), .driver_info =
USB_QUIRK_LINEAR_UFRAME_INTR_BINTERVAL },
+ /* Terminus Technology Inc. Hub */
+ { USB_DEVICE(0x1a40, 0x0101), .driver_info = USB_QUIRK_HUB_SLOW_RESET },
+
/* Corsair K70 RGB */
{ USB_DEVICE(0x1b1c, 0x1b13), .driver_info = USB_QUIRK_DELAY_INIT },
diff --git a/include/linux/usb/quirks.h b/include/linux/usb/quirks.h
index b7a99ce56bc9..a1be64c9940f 100644
--- a/include/linux/usb/quirks.h
+++ b/include/linux/usb/quirks.h
@@ -66,4 +66,7 @@
/* Device needs a pause after every control message. */
#define USB_QUIRK_DELAY_CTRL_MSG BIT(13)
+/* Hub needs extra delay after resetting its port. */
+#define USB_QUIRK_HUB_SLOW_RESET BIT(14)
+
#endif /* __LINUX_USB_QUIRKS_H */
--
2.19.1
This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled
staging: rtl8723bs: Fix incorrect sense of ether_addr_equal
to my staging git tree which can be found at
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gregkh/staging.git
in the staging-linus branch.
The patch will show up in the next release of the linux-next tree
(usually sometime within the next 24 hours during the week.)
The patch will hopefully also be merged in Linus's tree for the
next -rc kernel release.
If you have any questions about this process, please let me know.
>From c948c6915b620f075496846df8d4487ee0c56121 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Larry Finger <Larry.Finger(a)lwfinger.net>
Date: Tue, 6 Nov 2018 21:33:14 -0600
Subject: staging: rtl8723bs: Fix incorrect sense of ether_addr_equal
In commit b37f9e1c3801 ("staging: rtl8723bs: Fix lines too long in
update_recvframe_attrib()."), the refactoring involved replacing
two memcmp() calls with ether_addr_equal() calls. What the author
missed is that memcmp() returns false when the two strings are equal,
whereas ether_addr_equal() returns true when the two addresses are
equal. One side effect of this error is that the strength of an
unassociated AP was much stronger than the same AP after association.
This bug is reported at bko#201611.
Fixes: b37f9e1c3801 ("staging: rtl8723bs: Fix lines too long in update_recvframe_attrib().")
Cc: Stable <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>
Cc: youling257 <youling257(a)gmail.com>
Cc: u.srikant.patnaik(a)gmail.com
Reported-and-tested-by: youling257 <youling257(a)gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Larry Finger <Larry.Finger(a)lwfinger.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/hal/rtl8723bs_recv.c | 4 ++--
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/hal/rtl8723bs_recv.c b/drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/hal/rtl8723bs_recv.c
index 85077947b9b8..85aba8a503cd 100644
--- a/drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/hal/rtl8723bs_recv.c
+++ b/drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/hal/rtl8723bs_recv.c
@@ -109,12 +109,12 @@ static void update_recvframe_phyinfo(union recv_frame *precvframe,
rx_bssid = get_hdr_bssid(wlanhdr);
pkt_info.bssid_match = ((!IsFrameTypeCtrl(wlanhdr)) &&
!pattrib->icv_err && !pattrib->crc_err &&
- !ether_addr_equal(rx_bssid, my_bssid));
+ ether_addr_equal(rx_bssid, my_bssid));
rx_ra = get_ra(wlanhdr);
my_hwaddr = myid(&padapter->eeprompriv);
pkt_info.to_self = pkt_info.bssid_match &&
- !ether_addr_equal(rx_ra, my_hwaddr);
+ ether_addr_equal(rx_ra, my_hwaddr);
pkt_info.is_beacon = pkt_info.bssid_match &&
--
2.19.1
This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled
staging: mt7621-dma: fix potentially dereferencing uninitialized
to my staging git tree which can be found at
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gregkh/staging.git
in the staging-linus branch.
The patch will show up in the next release of the linux-next tree
(usually sometime within the next 24 hours during the week.)
The patch will hopefully also be merged in Linus's tree for the
next -rc kernel release.
If you have any questions about this process, please let me know.
>From 354e379684fcc70ab8d5450b4d57bd92b5294dfd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Sergio Paracuellos <sergio.paracuellos(a)gmail.com>
Date: Sat, 20 Oct 2018 13:31:06 +0200
Subject: staging: mt7621-dma: fix potentially dereferencing uninitialized
'tx_desc'
Function 'mtk_hsdma_start_transfer' uses 'tx_desc' pointer which can be
dereferenced before it is initializated. Initializate pointer before
avoiding the problem.
Fixes: 0853c7a53eb3 ("staging: mt7621-dma: ralink: add rt2880 dma engine")
Reported-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter(a)oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Sergio Paracuellos <sergio.paracuellos(a)gmail.com>
Cc: stable <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/staging/mt7621-dma/mtk-hsdma.c | 3 ++-
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/drivers/staging/mt7621-dma/mtk-hsdma.c b/drivers/staging/mt7621-dma/mtk-hsdma.c
index df6ebf41bdea..5831f816c17b 100644
--- a/drivers/staging/mt7621-dma/mtk-hsdma.c
+++ b/drivers/staging/mt7621-dma/mtk-hsdma.c
@@ -335,6 +335,8 @@ static int mtk_hsdma_start_transfer(struct mtk_hsdam_engine *hsdma,
/* tx desc */
src = sg->src_addr;
for (i = 0; i < chan->desc->num_sgs; i++) {
+ tx_desc = &chan->tx_ring[chan->tx_idx];
+
if (len > HSDMA_MAX_PLEN)
tlen = HSDMA_MAX_PLEN;
else
@@ -344,7 +346,6 @@ static int mtk_hsdma_start_transfer(struct mtk_hsdam_engine *hsdma,
tx_desc->addr1 = src;
tx_desc->flags |= HSDMA_DESC_PLEN1(tlen);
} else {
- tx_desc = &chan->tx_ring[chan->tx_idx];
tx_desc->addr0 = src;
tx_desc->flags = HSDMA_DESC_PLEN0(tlen);
--
2.19.1
From: Sai Praneeth <sai.praneeth.prakhya(a)intel.com>
[ Upstream commit 706d51681d636a0c4a5ef53395ec3b803e45ed4d ]
Changes from upstream:
----------------------
1. Use bit 30 of word 7 in cpufeatures for X86_FEATURE_IBRS_ENHANCED as bit 29
is now used by L1TF.
2. Fix some trivial line fuzzing.
Note: Based on kernel version "Linux 4.18.17" and to be applied on both "Linux
4.18.17" and "Linux 4.14.79".
Commit message from upstream:
-----------------------------
Future Intel processors will support "Enhanced IBRS" which is an "always
on" mode i.e. IBRS bit in SPEC_CTRL MSR is enabled once and never
disabled.
>From the specification [1]:
"With enhanced IBRS, the predicted targets of indirect branches
executed cannot be controlled by software that was executed in a less
privileged predictor mode or on another logical processor. As a
result, software operating on a processor with enhanced IBRS need not
use WRMSR to set IA32_SPEC_CTRL.IBRS after every transition to a more
privileged predictor mode. Software can isolate predictor modes
effectively simply by setting the bit once. Software need not disable
enhanced IBRS prior to entering a sleep state such as MWAIT or HLT."
If Enhanced IBRS is supported by the processor then use it as the
preferred spectre v2 mitigation mechanism instead of Retpoline. Intel's
Retpoline white paper [2] states:
"Retpoline is known to be an effective branch target injection (Spectre
variant 2) mitigation on Intel processors belonging to family 6
(enumerated by the CPUID instruction) that do not have support for
enhanced IBRS. On processors that support enhanced IBRS, it should be
used for mitigation instead of retpoline."
The reason why Enhanced IBRS is the recommended mitigation on processors
which support it is that these processors also support CET which
provides a defense against ROP attacks. Retpoline is very similar to ROP
techniques and might trigger false positives in the CET defense.
If Enhanced IBRS is selected as the mitigation technique for spectre v2,
the IBRS bit in SPEC_CTRL MSR is set once at boot time and never
cleared. Kernel also has to make sure that IBRS bit remains set after
VMEXIT because the guest might have cleared the bit. This is already
covered by the existing x86_spec_ctrl_set_guest() and
x86_spec_ctrl_restore_host() speculation control functions.
Enhanced IBRS still requires IBPB for full mitigation.
[1] Speculative-Execution-Side-Channel-Mitigations.pdf
[2] Retpoline-A-Branch-Target-Injection-Mitigation.pdf
Both documents are available at:
https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=199511
Originally-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Sai Praneeth Prakhya <sai.praneeth.prakhya(a)intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx(a)linutronix.de>
Cc: Tim C Chen <tim.c.chen(a)intel.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen(a)intel.com>
Cc: Ravi Shankar <ravi.v.shankar(a)intel.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak(a)linux.intel.com>
Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>
---
arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 1 +
arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h | 1 +
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 20 ++++++++++++++++++--
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 3 +++
4 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
index 64aaa3f5f36c..c8ac84e90d0f 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
@@ -220,6 +220,7 @@
#define X86_FEATURE_STIBP ( 7*32+27) /* Single Thread Indirect Branch Predictors */
#define X86_FEATURE_ZEN ( 7*32+28) /* "" CPU is AMD family 0x17 (Zen) */
#define X86_FEATURE_L1TF_PTEINV ( 7*32+29) /* "" L1TF workaround PTE inversion */
+#define X86_FEATURE_IBRS_ENHANCED ( 7*32+30) /* Enhanced IBRS */
/* Virtualization flags: Linux defined, word 8 */
#define X86_FEATURE_TPR_SHADOW ( 8*32+ 0) /* Intel TPR Shadow */
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
index f6f6c63da62f..e7c8086e570e 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
@@ -215,6 +215,7 @@ enum spectre_v2_mitigation {
SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_GENERIC,
SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_AMD,
SPECTRE_V2_IBRS,
+ SPECTRE_V2_IBRS_ENHANCED,
};
/* The Speculative Store Bypass disable variants */
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
index 4891a621a752..817e57e96d67 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -141,6 +141,7 @@ static const char *spectre_v2_strings[] = {
[SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_MINIMAL_AMD] = "Vulnerable: Minimal AMD ASM retpoline",
[SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_GENERIC] = "Mitigation: Full generic retpoline",
[SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_AMD] = "Mitigation: Full AMD retpoline",
+ [SPECTRE_V2_IBRS_ENHANCED] = "Mitigation: Enhanced IBRS",
};
#undef pr_fmt
@@ -343,6 +344,13 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void)
case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_FORCE:
case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO:
+ if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBRS_ENHANCED)) {
+ mode = SPECTRE_V2_IBRS_ENHANCED;
+ /* Force it so VMEXIT will restore correctly */
+ x86_spec_ctrl_base |= SPEC_CTRL_IBRS;
+ wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, x86_spec_ctrl_base);
+ goto specv2_set_mode;
+ }
if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RETPOLINE))
goto retpoline_auto;
break;
@@ -380,6 +388,7 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void)
setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE);
}
+specv2_set_mode:
spectre_v2_enabled = mode;
pr_info("%s\n", spectre_v2_strings[mode]);
@@ -402,9 +411,16 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void)
/*
* Retpoline means the kernel is safe because it has no indirect
- * branches. But firmware isn't, so use IBRS to protect that.
+ * branches. Enhanced IBRS protects firmware too, so, enable restricted
+ * speculation around firmware calls only when Enhanced IBRS isn't
+ * supported.
+ *
+ * Use "mode" to check Enhanced IBRS instead of boot_cpu_has(), because
+ * the user might select retpoline on the kernel command line and if
+ * the CPU supports Enhanced IBRS, kernel might un-intentionally not
+ * enable IBRS around firmware calls.
*/
- if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBRS)) {
+ if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBRS) && mode != SPECTRE_V2_IBRS_ENHANCED) {
setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_USE_IBRS_FW);
pr_info("Enabling Restricted Speculation for firmware calls\n");
}
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
index 1ee8ea36af30..79561bfcfa87 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
@@ -1015,6 +1015,9 @@ static void __init cpu_set_bug_bits(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
!cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_AMD_SSB_NO))
setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS);
+ if (ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_IBRS_ALL)
+ setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_IBRS_ENHANCED);
+
if (x86_match_cpu(cpu_no_meltdown))
return;
--
2.7.4
In commit b37f9e1c3801 ("staging: rtl8723bs: Fix lines too long in
update_recvframe_attrib()."), the refactoring involved replacing
two memcmp() calls with ether_addr_equal() calls. What the author
missed is that memcmp() returns false when the two strings are equal,
whereas ether_addr_equal() returns true when the two addresses are
equal. One side effect of this error is that the strength of an
unassociated AP was much stronger than the same AP after association.
This bug is reported at bko#201611.
Fixes: b37f9e1c3801 ("staging: rtl8723bs: Fix lines too long in update_recvframe_attrib().")
Cc: Stable <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>
Cc: youling257 <youling257(a)gmail.com>
Cc: u.srikant.patnaik(a)gmail.com
Reported-and-tested-by: youling257 <youling257(a)gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Larry Finger <Larry.Finger(a)lwfinger.net>
---
drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/hal/rtl8723bs_recv.c | 4 ++--
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/hal/rtl8723bs_recv.c b/drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/hal/rtl8723bs_recv.c
index 85077947b9b8..85aba8a503cd 100644
--- a/drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/hal/rtl8723bs_recv.c
+++ b/drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/hal/rtl8723bs_recv.c
@@ -109,12 +109,12 @@ static void update_recvframe_phyinfo(union recv_frame *precvframe,
rx_bssid = get_hdr_bssid(wlanhdr);
pkt_info.bssid_match = ((!IsFrameTypeCtrl(wlanhdr)) &&
!pattrib->icv_err && !pattrib->crc_err &&
- !ether_addr_equal(rx_bssid, my_bssid));
+ ether_addr_equal(rx_bssid, my_bssid));
rx_ra = get_ra(wlanhdr);
my_hwaddr = myid(&padapter->eeprompriv);
pkt_info.to_self = pkt_info.bssid_match &&
- !ether_addr_equal(rx_ra, my_hwaddr);
+ ether_addr_equal(rx_ra, my_hwaddr);
pkt_info.is_beacon = pkt_info.bssid_match &&
--
2.19.1