The patch below does not apply to the 4.19-stable tree.
If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm
tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit
id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>.
To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands:
git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-4.19.y
git checkout FETCH_HEAD
git cherry-pick -x e972b08b91ef48488bae9789f03cfedb148667fb
# <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.>
git commit -s
git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2024102019-roundness-penholder-bb3f@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 4.19.y' HEAD^..
Possible dependencies:
thanks,
greg k-h
------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------
From e972b08b91ef48488bae9789f03cfedb148667fb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Omar Sandoval <osandov(a)fb.com>
Date: Tue, 15 Oct 2024 10:59:46 -0700
Subject: [PATCH] blk-rq-qos: fix crash on rq_qos_wait vs. rq_qos_wake_function
race
We're seeing crashes from rq_qos_wake_function that look like this:
BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffafe180a40084
#PF: supervisor write access in kernel mode
#PF: error_code(0x0002) - not-present page
PGD 100000067 P4D 100000067 PUD 10027c067 PMD 10115d067 PTE 0
Oops: Oops: 0002 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI
CPU: 17 UID: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/17 Not tainted 6.12.0-rc3-00013-geca631b8fe80 #11
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.0-0-gd239552ce722-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:_raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x1d/0x40
Code: 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 f3 0f 1e fa 0f 1f 44 00 00 41 54 9c 41 5c fa 65 ff 05 62 97 30 4c 31 c0 ba 01 00 00 00 <f0> 0f b1 17 75 0a 4c 89 e0 41 5c c3 cc cc cc cc 89 c6 e8 2c 0b 00
RSP: 0018:ffffafe180580ca0 EFLAGS: 00010046
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffffafe180a3f7a8 RCX: 0000000000000011
RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000000003 RDI: ffffafe180a40084
RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 00000000001e7240 R09: 0000000000000011
R10: 0000000000000028 R11: 0000000000000888 R12: 0000000000000002
R13: ffffafe180a40084 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000003
FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff9aaf1f280000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: ffffafe180a40084 CR3: 000000010e428002 CR4: 0000000000770ef0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
PKRU: 55555554
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
try_to_wake_up+0x5a/0x6a0
rq_qos_wake_function+0x71/0x80
__wake_up_common+0x75/0xa0
__wake_up+0x36/0x60
scale_up.part.0+0x50/0x110
wb_timer_fn+0x227/0x450
...
So rq_qos_wake_function() calls wake_up_process(data->task), which calls
try_to_wake_up(), which faults in raw_spin_lock_irqsave(&p->pi_lock).
p comes from data->task, and data comes from the waitqueue entry, which
is stored on the waiter's stack in rq_qos_wait(). Analyzing the core
dump with drgn, I found that the waiter had already woken up and moved
on to a completely unrelated code path, clobbering what was previously
data->task. Meanwhile, the waker was passing the clobbered garbage in
data->task to wake_up_process(), leading to the crash.
What's happening is that in between rq_qos_wake_function() deleting the
waitqueue entry and calling wake_up_process(), rq_qos_wait() is finding
that it already got a token and returning. The race looks like this:
rq_qos_wait() rq_qos_wake_function()
==============================================================
prepare_to_wait_exclusive()
data->got_token = true;
list_del_init(&curr->entry);
if (data.got_token)
break;
finish_wait(&rqw->wait, &data.wq);
^- returns immediately because
list_empty_careful(&wq_entry->entry)
is true
... return, go do something else ...
wake_up_process(data->task)
(NO LONGER VALID!)-^
Normally, finish_wait() is supposed to synchronize against the waker.
But, as noted above, it is returning immediately because the waitqueue
entry has already been removed from the waitqueue.
The bug is that rq_qos_wake_function() is accessing the waitqueue entry
AFTER deleting it. Note that autoremove_wake_function() wakes the waiter
and THEN deletes the waitqueue entry, which is the proper order.
Fix it by swapping the order. We also need to use
list_del_init_careful() to match the list_empty_careful() in
finish_wait().
Fixes: 38cfb5a45ee0 ("blk-wbt: improve waking of tasks")
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Omar Sandoval <osandov(a)fb.com>
Acked-by: Tejun Heo <tj(a)kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Johannes Thumshirn <johannes.thumshirn(a)wdc.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/d3bee2463a67b1ee597211823bf7ad3721c26e41.17290145…
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe(a)kernel.dk>
diff --git a/block/blk-rq-qos.c b/block/blk-rq-qos.c
index 2cfb297d9a62..058f92c4f9d5 100644
--- a/block/blk-rq-qos.c
+++ b/block/blk-rq-qos.c
@@ -219,8 +219,8 @@ static int rq_qos_wake_function(struct wait_queue_entry *curr,
data->got_token = true;
smp_wmb();
- list_del_init(&curr->entry);
wake_up_process(data->task);
+ list_del_init_careful(&curr->entry);
return 1;
}
The patch below does not apply to the 4.19-stable tree.
If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm
tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit
id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>.
To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands:
git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-4.19.y
git checkout FETCH_HEAD
git cherry-pick -x 2c02f7375e658ae93d57a31a66f91b62754ef8f1
# <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.>
git commit -s
git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2024102001-badly-overvalue-6662@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 4.19.y' HEAD^..
Possible dependencies:
thanks,
greg k-h
------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------
From 2c02f7375e658ae93d57a31a66f91b62754ef8f1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Steven Rostedt <rostedt(a)goodmis.org>
Date: Fri, 18 Oct 2024 21:43:00 -0400
Subject: [PATCH] fgraph: Use CPU hotplug mechanism to initialize idle shadow
stacks
The function graph infrastructure allocates a shadow stack for every task
when enabled. This includes the idle tasks. The first time the function
graph is invoked, the shadow stacks are created and never freed until the
task exits. This includes the idle tasks.
Only the idle tasks that were for online CPUs had their shadow stacks
created when function graph tracing started. If function graph tracing is
enabled and a CPU comes online, the idle task representing that CPU will
not have its shadow stack created, and all function graph tracing for that
idle task will be silently dropped.
Instead, use the CPU hotplug mechanism to allocate the idle shadow stacks.
This will include idle tasks for CPUs that come online during tracing.
This issue can be reproduced by:
# cd /sys/kernel/tracing
# echo 0 > /sys/devices/system/cpu/cpu1/online
# echo 0 > set_ftrace_pid
# echo function_graph > current_tracer
# echo 1 > options/funcgraph-proc
# echo 1 > /sys/devices/system/cpu/cpu1
# grep '<idle>' per_cpu/cpu1/trace | head
Before, nothing would show up.
After:
1) <idle>-0 | 0.811 us | __enqueue_entity();
1) <idle>-0 | 5.626 us | } /* enqueue_entity */
1) <idle>-0 | | dl_server_update_idle_time() {
1) <idle>-0 | | dl_scaled_delta_exec() {
1) <idle>-0 | 0.450 us | arch_scale_cpu_capacity();
1) <idle>-0 | 1.242 us | }
1) <idle>-0 | 1.908 us | }
1) <idle>-0 | | dl_server_start() {
1) <idle>-0 | | enqueue_dl_entity() {
1) <idle>-0 | | task_contending() {
Note, if tracing stops and restarts, the old way would then initialize
the onlined CPUs.
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat(a)kernel.org>
Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers(a)efficios.com>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland(a)arm.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx(a)linutronix.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20241018214300.6df82178@rorschach
Fixes: 868baf07b1a25 ("ftrace: Fix memory leak with function graph and cpu hotplug")
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt(a)goodmis.org>
diff --git a/kernel/trace/fgraph.c b/kernel/trace/fgraph.c
index d7d4fb403f6f..43f4e3f57438 100644
--- a/kernel/trace/fgraph.c
+++ b/kernel/trace/fgraph.c
@@ -1160,19 +1160,13 @@ void fgraph_update_pid_func(void)
static int start_graph_tracing(void)
{
unsigned long **ret_stack_list;
- int ret, cpu;
+ int ret;
ret_stack_list = kmalloc(SHADOW_STACK_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!ret_stack_list)
return -ENOMEM;
- /* The cpu_boot init_task->ret_stack will never be freed */
- for_each_online_cpu(cpu) {
- if (!idle_task(cpu)->ret_stack)
- ftrace_graph_init_idle_task(idle_task(cpu), cpu);
- }
-
do {
ret = alloc_retstack_tasklist(ret_stack_list);
} while (ret == -EAGAIN);
@@ -1242,14 +1236,34 @@ static void ftrace_graph_disable_direct(bool disable_branch)
fgraph_direct_gops = &fgraph_stub;
}
+/* The cpu_boot init_task->ret_stack will never be freed */
+static int fgraph_cpu_init(unsigned int cpu)
+{
+ if (!idle_task(cpu)->ret_stack)
+ ftrace_graph_init_idle_task(idle_task(cpu), cpu);
+ return 0;
+}
+
int register_ftrace_graph(struct fgraph_ops *gops)
{
+ static bool fgraph_initialized;
int command = 0;
int ret = 0;
int i = -1;
mutex_lock(&ftrace_lock);
+ if (!fgraph_initialized) {
+ ret = cpuhp_setup_state(CPUHP_AP_ONLINE_DYN, "fgraph_idle_init",
+ fgraph_cpu_init, NULL);
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ pr_warn("fgraph: Error to init cpu hotplug support\n");
+ return ret;
+ }
+ fgraph_initialized = true;
+ ret = 0;
+ }
+
if (!fgraph_array[0]) {
/* The array must always have real data on it */
for (i = 0; i < FGRAPH_ARRAY_SIZE; i++)
The patch below does not apply to the 5.4-stable tree.
If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm
tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit
id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>.
To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands:
git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-5.4.y
git checkout FETCH_HEAD
git cherry-pick -x 2c02f7375e658ae93d57a31a66f91b62754ef8f1
# <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.>
git commit -s
git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2024102000-mortician-chant-190e@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 5.4.y' HEAD^..
Possible dependencies:
thanks,
greg k-h
------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------
From 2c02f7375e658ae93d57a31a66f91b62754ef8f1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Steven Rostedt <rostedt(a)goodmis.org>
Date: Fri, 18 Oct 2024 21:43:00 -0400
Subject: [PATCH] fgraph: Use CPU hotplug mechanism to initialize idle shadow
stacks
The function graph infrastructure allocates a shadow stack for every task
when enabled. This includes the idle tasks. The first time the function
graph is invoked, the shadow stacks are created and never freed until the
task exits. This includes the idle tasks.
Only the idle tasks that were for online CPUs had their shadow stacks
created when function graph tracing started. If function graph tracing is
enabled and a CPU comes online, the idle task representing that CPU will
not have its shadow stack created, and all function graph tracing for that
idle task will be silently dropped.
Instead, use the CPU hotplug mechanism to allocate the idle shadow stacks.
This will include idle tasks for CPUs that come online during tracing.
This issue can be reproduced by:
# cd /sys/kernel/tracing
# echo 0 > /sys/devices/system/cpu/cpu1/online
# echo 0 > set_ftrace_pid
# echo function_graph > current_tracer
# echo 1 > options/funcgraph-proc
# echo 1 > /sys/devices/system/cpu/cpu1
# grep '<idle>' per_cpu/cpu1/trace | head
Before, nothing would show up.
After:
1) <idle>-0 | 0.811 us | __enqueue_entity();
1) <idle>-0 | 5.626 us | } /* enqueue_entity */
1) <idle>-0 | | dl_server_update_idle_time() {
1) <idle>-0 | | dl_scaled_delta_exec() {
1) <idle>-0 | 0.450 us | arch_scale_cpu_capacity();
1) <idle>-0 | 1.242 us | }
1) <idle>-0 | 1.908 us | }
1) <idle>-0 | | dl_server_start() {
1) <idle>-0 | | enqueue_dl_entity() {
1) <idle>-0 | | task_contending() {
Note, if tracing stops and restarts, the old way would then initialize
the onlined CPUs.
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat(a)kernel.org>
Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers(a)efficios.com>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland(a)arm.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx(a)linutronix.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20241018214300.6df82178@rorschach
Fixes: 868baf07b1a25 ("ftrace: Fix memory leak with function graph and cpu hotplug")
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt(a)goodmis.org>
diff --git a/kernel/trace/fgraph.c b/kernel/trace/fgraph.c
index d7d4fb403f6f..43f4e3f57438 100644
--- a/kernel/trace/fgraph.c
+++ b/kernel/trace/fgraph.c
@@ -1160,19 +1160,13 @@ void fgraph_update_pid_func(void)
static int start_graph_tracing(void)
{
unsigned long **ret_stack_list;
- int ret, cpu;
+ int ret;
ret_stack_list = kmalloc(SHADOW_STACK_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!ret_stack_list)
return -ENOMEM;
- /* The cpu_boot init_task->ret_stack will never be freed */
- for_each_online_cpu(cpu) {
- if (!idle_task(cpu)->ret_stack)
- ftrace_graph_init_idle_task(idle_task(cpu), cpu);
- }
-
do {
ret = alloc_retstack_tasklist(ret_stack_list);
} while (ret == -EAGAIN);
@@ -1242,14 +1236,34 @@ static void ftrace_graph_disable_direct(bool disable_branch)
fgraph_direct_gops = &fgraph_stub;
}
+/* The cpu_boot init_task->ret_stack will never be freed */
+static int fgraph_cpu_init(unsigned int cpu)
+{
+ if (!idle_task(cpu)->ret_stack)
+ ftrace_graph_init_idle_task(idle_task(cpu), cpu);
+ return 0;
+}
+
int register_ftrace_graph(struct fgraph_ops *gops)
{
+ static bool fgraph_initialized;
int command = 0;
int ret = 0;
int i = -1;
mutex_lock(&ftrace_lock);
+ if (!fgraph_initialized) {
+ ret = cpuhp_setup_state(CPUHP_AP_ONLINE_DYN, "fgraph_idle_init",
+ fgraph_cpu_init, NULL);
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ pr_warn("fgraph: Error to init cpu hotplug support\n");
+ return ret;
+ }
+ fgraph_initialized = true;
+ ret = 0;
+ }
+
if (!fgraph_array[0]) {
/* The array must always have real data on it */
for (i = 0; i < FGRAPH_ARRAY_SIZE; i++)
The patch below does not apply to the 5.10-stable tree.
If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm
tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit
id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>.
To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands:
git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-5.10.y
git checkout FETCH_HEAD
git cherry-pick -x 2c02f7375e658ae93d57a31a66f91b62754ef8f1
# <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.>
git commit -s
git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2024102058-headphone-embody-6747@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 5.10.y' HEAD^..
Possible dependencies:
thanks,
greg k-h
------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------
From 2c02f7375e658ae93d57a31a66f91b62754ef8f1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Steven Rostedt <rostedt(a)goodmis.org>
Date: Fri, 18 Oct 2024 21:43:00 -0400
Subject: [PATCH] fgraph: Use CPU hotplug mechanism to initialize idle shadow
stacks
The function graph infrastructure allocates a shadow stack for every task
when enabled. This includes the idle tasks. The first time the function
graph is invoked, the shadow stacks are created and never freed until the
task exits. This includes the idle tasks.
Only the idle tasks that were for online CPUs had their shadow stacks
created when function graph tracing started. If function graph tracing is
enabled and a CPU comes online, the idle task representing that CPU will
not have its shadow stack created, and all function graph tracing for that
idle task will be silently dropped.
Instead, use the CPU hotplug mechanism to allocate the idle shadow stacks.
This will include idle tasks for CPUs that come online during tracing.
This issue can be reproduced by:
# cd /sys/kernel/tracing
# echo 0 > /sys/devices/system/cpu/cpu1/online
# echo 0 > set_ftrace_pid
# echo function_graph > current_tracer
# echo 1 > options/funcgraph-proc
# echo 1 > /sys/devices/system/cpu/cpu1
# grep '<idle>' per_cpu/cpu1/trace | head
Before, nothing would show up.
After:
1) <idle>-0 | 0.811 us | __enqueue_entity();
1) <idle>-0 | 5.626 us | } /* enqueue_entity */
1) <idle>-0 | | dl_server_update_idle_time() {
1) <idle>-0 | | dl_scaled_delta_exec() {
1) <idle>-0 | 0.450 us | arch_scale_cpu_capacity();
1) <idle>-0 | 1.242 us | }
1) <idle>-0 | 1.908 us | }
1) <idle>-0 | | dl_server_start() {
1) <idle>-0 | | enqueue_dl_entity() {
1) <idle>-0 | | task_contending() {
Note, if tracing stops and restarts, the old way would then initialize
the onlined CPUs.
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat(a)kernel.org>
Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers(a)efficios.com>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland(a)arm.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx(a)linutronix.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20241018214300.6df82178@rorschach
Fixes: 868baf07b1a25 ("ftrace: Fix memory leak with function graph and cpu hotplug")
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt(a)goodmis.org>
diff --git a/kernel/trace/fgraph.c b/kernel/trace/fgraph.c
index d7d4fb403f6f..43f4e3f57438 100644
--- a/kernel/trace/fgraph.c
+++ b/kernel/trace/fgraph.c
@@ -1160,19 +1160,13 @@ void fgraph_update_pid_func(void)
static int start_graph_tracing(void)
{
unsigned long **ret_stack_list;
- int ret, cpu;
+ int ret;
ret_stack_list = kmalloc(SHADOW_STACK_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!ret_stack_list)
return -ENOMEM;
- /* The cpu_boot init_task->ret_stack will never be freed */
- for_each_online_cpu(cpu) {
- if (!idle_task(cpu)->ret_stack)
- ftrace_graph_init_idle_task(idle_task(cpu), cpu);
- }
-
do {
ret = alloc_retstack_tasklist(ret_stack_list);
} while (ret == -EAGAIN);
@@ -1242,14 +1236,34 @@ static void ftrace_graph_disable_direct(bool disable_branch)
fgraph_direct_gops = &fgraph_stub;
}
+/* The cpu_boot init_task->ret_stack will never be freed */
+static int fgraph_cpu_init(unsigned int cpu)
+{
+ if (!idle_task(cpu)->ret_stack)
+ ftrace_graph_init_idle_task(idle_task(cpu), cpu);
+ return 0;
+}
+
int register_ftrace_graph(struct fgraph_ops *gops)
{
+ static bool fgraph_initialized;
int command = 0;
int ret = 0;
int i = -1;
mutex_lock(&ftrace_lock);
+ if (!fgraph_initialized) {
+ ret = cpuhp_setup_state(CPUHP_AP_ONLINE_DYN, "fgraph_idle_init",
+ fgraph_cpu_init, NULL);
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ pr_warn("fgraph: Error to init cpu hotplug support\n");
+ return ret;
+ }
+ fgraph_initialized = true;
+ ret = 0;
+ }
+
if (!fgraph_array[0]) {
/* The array must always have real data on it */
for (i = 0; i < FGRAPH_ARRAY_SIZE; i++)
The patch below does not apply to the 5.15-stable tree.
If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm
tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit
id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>.
To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands:
git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-5.15.y
git checkout FETCH_HEAD
git cherry-pick -x 2c02f7375e658ae93d57a31a66f91b62754ef8f1
# <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.>
git commit -s
git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2024102057-skipper-growl-db34@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 5.15.y' HEAD^..
Possible dependencies:
thanks,
greg k-h
------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------
From 2c02f7375e658ae93d57a31a66f91b62754ef8f1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Steven Rostedt <rostedt(a)goodmis.org>
Date: Fri, 18 Oct 2024 21:43:00 -0400
Subject: [PATCH] fgraph: Use CPU hotplug mechanism to initialize idle shadow
stacks
The function graph infrastructure allocates a shadow stack for every task
when enabled. This includes the idle tasks. The first time the function
graph is invoked, the shadow stacks are created and never freed until the
task exits. This includes the idle tasks.
Only the idle tasks that were for online CPUs had their shadow stacks
created when function graph tracing started. If function graph tracing is
enabled and a CPU comes online, the idle task representing that CPU will
not have its shadow stack created, and all function graph tracing for that
idle task will be silently dropped.
Instead, use the CPU hotplug mechanism to allocate the idle shadow stacks.
This will include idle tasks for CPUs that come online during tracing.
This issue can be reproduced by:
# cd /sys/kernel/tracing
# echo 0 > /sys/devices/system/cpu/cpu1/online
# echo 0 > set_ftrace_pid
# echo function_graph > current_tracer
# echo 1 > options/funcgraph-proc
# echo 1 > /sys/devices/system/cpu/cpu1
# grep '<idle>' per_cpu/cpu1/trace | head
Before, nothing would show up.
After:
1) <idle>-0 | 0.811 us | __enqueue_entity();
1) <idle>-0 | 5.626 us | } /* enqueue_entity */
1) <idle>-0 | | dl_server_update_idle_time() {
1) <idle>-0 | | dl_scaled_delta_exec() {
1) <idle>-0 | 0.450 us | arch_scale_cpu_capacity();
1) <idle>-0 | 1.242 us | }
1) <idle>-0 | 1.908 us | }
1) <idle>-0 | | dl_server_start() {
1) <idle>-0 | | enqueue_dl_entity() {
1) <idle>-0 | | task_contending() {
Note, if tracing stops and restarts, the old way would then initialize
the onlined CPUs.
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat(a)kernel.org>
Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers(a)efficios.com>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland(a)arm.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx(a)linutronix.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20241018214300.6df82178@rorschach
Fixes: 868baf07b1a25 ("ftrace: Fix memory leak with function graph and cpu hotplug")
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt(a)goodmis.org>
diff --git a/kernel/trace/fgraph.c b/kernel/trace/fgraph.c
index d7d4fb403f6f..43f4e3f57438 100644
--- a/kernel/trace/fgraph.c
+++ b/kernel/trace/fgraph.c
@@ -1160,19 +1160,13 @@ void fgraph_update_pid_func(void)
static int start_graph_tracing(void)
{
unsigned long **ret_stack_list;
- int ret, cpu;
+ int ret;
ret_stack_list = kmalloc(SHADOW_STACK_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!ret_stack_list)
return -ENOMEM;
- /* The cpu_boot init_task->ret_stack will never be freed */
- for_each_online_cpu(cpu) {
- if (!idle_task(cpu)->ret_stack)
- ftrace_graph_init_idle_task(idle_task(cpu), cpu);
- }
-
do {
ret = alloc_retstack_tasklist(ret_stack_list);
} while (ret == -EAGAIN);
@@ -1242,14 +1236,34 @@ static void ftrace_graph_disable_direct(bool disable_branch)
fgraph_direct_gops = &fgraph_stub;
}
+/* The cpu_boot init_task->ret_stack will never be freed */
+static int fgraph_cpu_init(unsigned int cpu)
+{
+ if (!idle_task(cpu)->ret_stack)
+ ftrace_graph_init_idle_task(idle_task(cpu), cpu);
+ return 0;
+}
+
int register_ftrace_graph(struct fgraph_ops *gops)
{
+ static bool fgraph_initialized;
int command = 0;
int ret = 0;
int i = -1;
mutex_lock(&ftrace_lock);
+ if (!fgraph_initialized) {
+ ret = cpuhp_setup_state(CPUHP_AP_ONLINE_DYN, "fgraph_idle_init",
+ fgraph_cpu_init, NULL);
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ pr_warn("fgraph: Error to init cpu hotplug support\n");
+ return ret;
+ }
+ fgraph_initialized = true;
+ ret = 0;
+ }
+
if (!fgraph_array[0]) {
/* The array must always have real data on it */
for (i = 0; i < FGRAPH_ARRAY_SIZE; i++)
The patch below does not apply to the 6.1-stable tree.
If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm
tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit
id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>.
To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands:
git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-6.1.y
git checkout FETCH_HEAD
git cherry-pick -x 2c02f7375e658ae93d57a31a66f91b62754ef8f1
# <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.>
git commit -s
git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2024102055-nugget-delicious-edfe@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 6.1.y' HEAD^..
Possible dependencies:
thanks,
greg k-h
------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------
From 2c02f7375e658ae93d57a31a66f91b62754ef8f1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Steven Rostedt <rostedt(a)goodmis.org>
Date: Fri, 18 Oct 2024 21:43:00 -0400
Subject: [PATCH] fgraph: Use CPU hotplug mechanism to initialize idle shadow
stacks
The function graph infrastructure allocates a shadow stack for every task
when enabled. This includes the idle tasks. The first time the function
graph is invoked, the shadow stacks are created and never freed until the
task exits. This includes the idle tasks.
Only the idle tasks that were for online CPUs had their shadow stacks
created when function graph tracing started. If function graph tracing is
enabled and a CPU comes online, the idle task representing that CPU will
not have its shadow stack created, and all function graph tracing for that
idle task will be silently dropped.
Instead, use the CPU hotplug mechanism to allocate the idle shadow stacks.
This will include idle tasks for CPUs that come online during tracing.
This issue can be reproduced by:
# cd /sys/kernel/tracing
# echo 0 > /sys/devices/system/cpu/cpu1/online
# echo 0 > set_ftrace_pid
# echo function_graph > current_tracer
# echo 1 > options/funcgraph-proc
# echo 1 > /sys/devices/system/cpu/cpu1
# grep '<idle>' per_cpu/cpu1/trace | head
Before, nothing would show up.
After:
1) <idle>-0 | 0.811 us | __enqueue_entity();
1) <idle>-0 | 5.626 us | } /* enqueue_entity */
1) <idle>-0 | | dl_server_update_idle_time() {
1) <idle>-0 | | dl_scaled_delta_exec() {
1) <idle>-0 | 0.450 us | arch_scale_cpu_capacity();
1) <idle>-0 | 1.242 us | }
1) <idle>-0 | 1.908 us | }
1) <idle>-0 | | dl_server_start() {
1) <idle>-0 | | enqueue_dl_entity() {
1) <idle>-0 | | task_contending() {
Note, if tracing stops and restarts, the old way would then initialize
the onlined CPUs.
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat(a)kernel.org>
Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers(a)efficios.com>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland(a)arm.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx(a)linutronix.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20241018214300.6df82178@rorschach
Fixes: 868baf07b1a25 ("ftrace: Fix memory leak with function graph and cpu hotplug")
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt(a)goodmis.org>
diff --git a/kernel/trace/fgraph.c b/kernel/trace/fgraph.c
index d7d4fb403f6f..43f4e3f57438 100644
--- a/kernel/trace/fgraph.c
+++ b/kernel/trace/fgraph.c
@@ -1160,19 +1160,13 @@ void fgraph_update_pid_func(void)
static int start_graph_tracing(void)
{
unsigned long **ret_stack_list;
- int ret, cpu;
+ int ret;
ret_stack_list = kmalloc(SHADOW_STACK_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!ret_stack_list)
return -ENOMEM;
- /* The cpu_boot init_task->ret_stack will never be freed */
- for_each_online_cpu(cpu) {
- if (!idle_task(cpu)->ret_stack)
- ftrace_graph_init_idle_task(idle_task(cpu), cpu);
- }
-
do {
ret = alloc_retstack_tasklist(ret_stack_list);
} while (ret == -EAGAIN);
@@ -1242,14 +1236,34 @@ static void ftrace_graph_disable_direct(bool disable_branch)
fgraph_direct_gops = &fgraph_stub;
}
+/* The cpu_boot init_task->ret_stack will never be freed */
+static int fgraph_cpu_init(unsigned int cpu)
+{
+ if (!idle_task(cpu)->ret_stack)
+ ftrace_graph_init_idle_task(idle_task(cpu), cpu);
+ return 0;
+}
+
int register_ftrace_graph(struct fgraph_ops *gops)
{
+ static bool fgraph_initialized;
int command = 0;
int ret = 0;
int i = -1;
mutex_lock(&ftrace_lock);
+ if (!fgraph_initialized) {
+ ret = cpuhp_setup_state(CPUHP_AP_ONLINE_DYN, "fgraph_idle_init",
+ fgraph_cpu_init, NULL);
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ pr_warn("fgraph: Error to init cpu hotplug support\n");
+ return ret;
+ }
+ fgraph_initialized = true;
+ ret = 0;
+ }
+
if (!fgraph_array[0]) {
/* The array must always have real data on it */
for (i = 0; i < FGRAPH_ARRAY_SIZE; i++)
The patch below does not apply to the 6.6-stable tree.
If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm
tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit
id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>.
To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands:
git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-6.6.y
git checkout FETCH_HEAD
git cherry-pick -x 2c02f7375e658ae93d57a31a66f91b62754ef8f1
# <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.>
git commit -s
git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2024102054-nineteen-exemplary-3f78@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 6.6.y' HEAD^..
Possible dependencies:
thanks,
greg k-h
------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------
From 2c02f7375e658ae93d57a31a66f91b62754ef8f1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Steven Rostedt <rostedt(a)goodmis.org>
Date: Fri, 18 Oct 2024 21:43:00 -0400
Subject: [PATCH] fgraph: Use CPU hotplug mechanism to initialize idle shadow
stacks
The function graph infrastructure allocates a shadow stack for every task
when enabled. This includes the idle tasks. The first time the function
graph is invoked, the shadow stacks are created and never freed until the
task exits. This includes the idle tasks.
Only the idle tasks that were for online CPUs had their shadow stacks
created when function graph tracing started. If function graph tracing is
enabled and a CPU comes online, the idle task representing that CPU will
not have its shadow stack created, and all function graph tracing for that
idle task will be silently dropped.
Instead, use the CPU hotplug mechanism to allocate the idle shadow stacks.
This will include idle tasks for CPUs that come online during tracing.
This issue can be reproduced by:
# cd /sys/kernel/tracing
# echo 0 > /sys/devices/system/cpu/cpu1/online
# echo 0 > set_ftrace_pid
# echo function_graph > current_tracer
# echo 1 > options/funcgraph-proc
# echo 1 > /sys/devices/system/cpu/cpu1
# grep '<idle>' per_cpu/cpu1/trace | head
Before, nothing would show up.
After:
1) <idle>-0 | 0.811 us | __enqueue_entity();
1) <idle>-0 | 5.626 us | } /* enqueue_entity */
1) <idle>-0 | | dl_server_update_idle_time() {
1) <idle>-0 | | dl_scaled_delta_exec() {
1) <idle>-0 | 0.450 us | arch_scale_cpu_capacity();
1) <idle>-0 | 1.242 us | }
1) <idle>-0 | 1.908 us | }
1) <idle>-0 | | dl_server_start() {
1) <idle>-0 | | enqueue_dl_entity() {
1) <idle>-0 | | task_contending() {
Note, if tracing stops and restarts, the old way would then initialize
the onlined CPUs.
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat(a)kernel.org>
Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers(a)efficios.com>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland(a)arm.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx(a)linutronix.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20241018214300.6df82178@rorschach
Fixes: 868baf07b1a25 ("ftrace: Fix memory leak with function graph and cpu hotplug")
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt(a)goodmis.org>
diff --git a/kernel/trace/fgraph.c b/kernel/trace/fgraph.c
index d7d4fb403f6f..43f4e3f57438 100644
--- a/kernel/trace/fgraph.c
+++ b/kernel/trace/fgraph.c
@@ -1160,19 +1160,13 @@ void fgraph_update_pid_func(void)
static int start_graph_tracing(void)
{
unsigned long **ret_stack_list;
- int ret, cpu;
+ int ret;
ret_stack_list = kmalloc(SHADOW_STACK_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!ret_stack_list)
return -ENOMEM;
- /* The cpu_boot init_task->ret_stack will never be freed */
- for_each_online_cpu(cpu) {
- if (!idle_task(cpu)->ret_stack)
- ftrace_graph_init_idle_task(idle_task(cpu), cpu);
- }
-
do {
ret = alloc_retstack_tasklist(ret_stack_list);
} while (ret == -EAGAIN);
@@ -1242,14 +1236,34 @@ static void ftrace_graph_disable_direct(bool disable_branch)
fgraph_direct_gops = &fgraph_stub;
}
+/* The cpu_boot init_task->ret_stack will never be freed */
+static int fgraph_cpu_init(unsigned int cpu)
+{
+ if (!idle_task(cpu)->ret_stack)
+ ftrace_graph_init_idle_task(idle_task(cpu), cpu);
+ return 0;
+}
+
int register_ftrace_graph(struct fgraph_ops *gops)
{
+ static bool fgraph_initialized;
int command = 0;
int ret = 0;
int i = -1;
mutex_lock(&ftrace_lock);
+ if (!fgraph_initialized) {
+ ret = cpuhp_setup_state(CPUHP_AP_ONLINE_DYN, "fgraph_idle_init",
+ fgraph_cpu_init, NULL);
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ pr_warn("fgraph: Error to init cpu hotplug support\n");
+ return ret;
+ }
+ fgraph_initialized = true;
+ ret = 0;
+ }
+
if (!fgraph_array[0]) {
/* The array must always have real data on it */
for (i = 0; i < FGRAPH_ARRAY_SIZE; i++)
This patch series is to fix bugs for below APIs:
devm_phy_put()
devm_of_phy_provider_unregister()
devm_phy_destroy()
phy_get()
of_phy_get()
devm_of_phy_get_by_index()
And simplify API of_phy_simple_xlate().
Signed-off-by: Zijun Hu <quic_zijuhu(a)quicinc.com>
---
Zijun Hu (6):
phy: core: Fix API devm_phy_put() can not release the phy
phy: core: Fix API devm_of_phy_provider_unregister() can not unregister the phy provider
phy: core: Fix API devm_phy_destroy() can not destroy the phy
phy: core: Add missing of_node_put() for an error handling path of _of_phy_get()
phy: core: Add missing of_node_put() in of_phy_provider_lookup()
phy: core: Simplify API of_phy_simple_xlate() implementation
drivers/phy/phy-core.c | 39 ++++++++++++++++++---------------------
1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-)
---
base-commit: d8f9d6d826fc15780451802796bb88ec52978f17
change-id: 20241020-phy_core_fix-e3ad65db98f7
Best regards,
--
Zijun Hu <quic_zijuhu(a)quicinc.com>
Some page flags (page->flags) were converted to page types
(page->page_types). A recent example is PG_hugetlb.
From the exclusive writer's perspective, e.g., a thread doing
__folio_set_hugetlb(), there is a difference between the page flag and
type APIs: the former allows the same non-atomic operation to be
repeated whereas the latter does not. For example, calling
__folio_set_hugetlb() twice triggers VM_BUG_ON_FOLIO(), since the
second call expects the type (PG_hugetlb) not to be set previously.
Using add_hugetlb_folio() as an example, it calls
__folio_set_hugetlb() in the following error-handling path. And when
that happens, it triggers the aforementioned VM_BUG_ON_FOLIO().
if (folio_test_hugetlb(folio)) {
rc = hugetlb_vmemmap_restore_folio(h, folio);
if (rc) {
spin_lock_irq(&hugetlb_lock);
add_hugetlb_folio(h, folio, false);
...
It is possible to make hugeTLB comply with the new requirements from
the page type API. However, a straightforward fix would be to just
allow the same page type to be set or cleared again inside the API,
to avoid any changes to its callers.
Fixes: d99e3140a4d3 ("mm: turn folio_test_hugetlb into a PageType")
Signed-off-by: Yu Zhao <yuzhao(a)google.com>
Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>
---
include/linux/page-flags.h | 8 ++++++++
1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)
diff --git a/include/linux/page-flags.h b/include/linux/page-flags.h
index ccf3c78faefc..e80665bc51fa 100644
--- a/include/linux/page-flags.h
+++ b/include/linux/page-flags.h
@@ -977,12 +977,16 @@ static __always_inline bool folio_test_##fname(const struct folio *folio) \
} \
static __always_inline void __folio_set_##fname(struct folio *folio) \
{ \
+ if (folio_test_##fname(folio)) \
+ return; \
VM_BUG_ON_FOLIO(data_race(folio->page.page_type) != UINT_MAX, \
folio); \
folio->page.page_type = (unsigned int)PGTY_##lname << 24; \
} \
static __always_inline void __folio_clear_##fname(struct folio *folio) \
{ \
+ if (folio->page.page_type == UINT_MAX) \
+ return; \
VM_BUG_ON_FOLIO(!folio_test_##fname(folio), folio); \
folio->page.page_type = UINT_MAX; \
}
@@ -995,11 +999,15 @@ static __always_inline int Page##uname(const struct page *page) \
} \
static __always_inline void __SetPage##uname(struct page *page) \
{ \
+ if (Page##uname(page)) \
+ return; \
VM_BUG_ON_PAGE(data_race(page->page_type) != UINT_MAX, page); \
page->page_type = (unsigned int)PGTY_##lname << 24; \
} \
static __always_inline void __ClearPage##uname(struct page *page) \
{ \
+ if (page->page_type == UINT_MAX) \
+ return; \
VM_BUG_ON_PAGE(!Page##uname(page), page); \
page->page_type = UINT_MAX; \
}
--
2.47.0.rc1.288.g06298d1525-goog
tpm2_sessions_init() does not ignore the result of
tpm2_create_null_primary(). Address this by returning -ENODEV to the
caller. Given that upper layers cannot help healing the situation
further, deal with the TPM error here by
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org # v6.10+
Fixes: d2add27cf2b8 ("tpm: Add NULL primary creation")
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko(a)kernel.org>
---
v6:
- Address:
https://lore.kernel.org/linux-integrity/69c893e7-6b87-4daa-80db-44d1120e80f…
as TPM RC is taken care of at the call site. Add also the missing
documentation for the return values.
v5:
- Do not print klog messages on error, as tpm2_save_context() already
takes care of this.
v4:
- Fixed up stable version.
v3:
- Handle TPM and POSIX error separately and return -ENODEV always back
to the caller.
v2:
- Refined the commit message.
---
drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c | 7 ++++++-
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c
index 511c67061728..253639767c1e 100644
--- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c
@@ -1347,6 +1347,11 @@ static int tpm2_create_null_primary(struct tpm_chip *chip)
*
* Derive and context save the null primary and allocate memory in the
* struct tpm_chip for the authorizations.
+ *
+ * Return:
+ * * 0 - OK
+ * * -errno - A system error
+ * * TPM_RC - A TPM error
*/
int tpm2_sessions_init(struct tpm_chip *chip)
{
@@ -1354,7 +1359,7 @@ int tpm2_sessions_init(struct tpm_chip *chip)
rc = tpm2_create_null_primary(chip);
if (rc)
- dev_err(&chip->dev, "TPM: security failed (NULL seed derivation): %d\n", rc);
+ return rc;
chip->auth = kmalloc(sizeof(*chip->auth), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!chip->auth)
--
2.47.0
Returning an abort to the guest for an unsupported MMIO access is a
documented feature of the KVM UAPI. Nevertheless, it's clear that this
plumbing has seen limited testing, since userspace can trivially cause a
WARN in the MMIO return:
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 30558 at arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_emulate.h:536 kvm_handle_mmio_return+0x46c/0x5c4 arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_emulate.h:536
Call trace:
kvm_handle_mmio_return+0x46c/0x5c4 arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_emulate.h:536
kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x98/0x15b4 arch/arm64/kvm/arm.c:1133
kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x75c/0xa78 virt/kvm/kvm_main.c:4487
__do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline]
__se_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:893 [inline]
__arm64_sys_ioctl+0x14c/0x1c8 fs/ioctl.c:893
__invoke_syscall arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:35 [inline]
invoke_syscall+0x98/0x2b8 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:49
el0_svc_common+0x1e0/0x23c arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:132
do_el0_svc+0x48/0x58 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:151
el0_svc+0x38/0x68 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:712
el0t_64_sync_handler+0x90/0xfc arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:730
el0t_64_sync+0x190/0x194 arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S:598
The splat is complaining that KVM is advancing PC while an exception is
pending, i.e. that KVM is retiring the MMIO instruction despite a
pending external abort. Womp womp.
Fix the glaring UAPI bug by skipping over all the MMIO emulation in
case there is a pending synchronous exception. Note that while userspace
is capable of pending an asynchronous exception (SError, IRQ, or FIQ),
it is still safe to retire the MMIO instruction in this case as (1) they
are by definition asynchronous, and (2) KVM relies on hardware support
for pending/delivering these exceptions instead of the software state
machine for advancing PC.
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
Fixes: da345174ceca ("KVM: arm/arm64: Allow user injection of external data aborts")
Reported-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider(a)google.com>
Signed-off-by: Oliver Upton <oliver.upton(a)linux.dev>
---
arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_emulate.h | 25 +++++++++++++++++++++++++
arch/arm64/kvm/mmio.c | 7 +++++--
2 files changed, 30 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_emulate.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_emulate.h
index a601a9305b10..1b229099f684 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_emulate.h
+++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_emulate.h
@@ -544,6 +544,31 @@ static __always_inline void kvm_incr_pc(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
vcpu_set_flag((v), e); \
} while (0)
+static inline bool kvm_pending_sync_exception(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ if (!vcpu_get_flag(vcpu, PENDING_EXCEPTION))
+ return false;
+
+ if (vcpu_el1_is_32bit(vcpu)) {
+ switch (vcpu_get_flag(vcpu, EXCEPT_MASK)) {
+ case unpack_vcpu_flag(EXCEPT_AA32_UND):
+ case unpack_vcpu_flag(EXCEPT_AA32_IABT):
+ case unpack_vcpu_flag(EXCEPT_AA32_DABT):
+ return true;
+ default:
+ return false;
+ }
+ } else {
+ switch (vcpu_get_flag(vcpu, EXCEPT_MASK)) {
+ case unpack_vcpu_flag(EXCEPT_AA64_EL1_SYNC):
+ case unpack_vcpu_flag(EXCEPT_AA64_EL2_SYNC):
+ return true;
+ default:
+ return false;
+ }
+ }
+}
+
#define __build_check_all_or_none(r, bits) \
BUILD_BUG_ON(((r) & (bits)) && ((r) & (bits)) != (bits))
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/mmio.c b/arch/arm64/kvm/mmio.c
index cd6b7b83e2c3..0155ba665717 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kvm/mmio.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/mmio.c
@@ -84,8 +84,11 @@ int kvm_handle_mmio_return(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
unsigned int len;
int mask;
- /* Detect an already handled MMIO return */
- if (unlikely(!vcpu->mmio_needed))
+ /*
+ * Detect if the MMIO return was already handled or if userspace aborted
+ * the MMIO access.
+ */
+ if (unlikely(!vcpu->mmio_needed || kvm_pending_sync_exception(vcpu)))
return 1;
vcpu->mmio_needed = 0;
--
2.47.0.rc1.288.g06298d1525-goog
During the aborting of a command, the software receives a command
completion event for the command ring stopped, with the TRB pointing
to the next TRB after the aborted command.
If the command we abort is located just before the Link TRB in the
command ring, then during the 'command ring stopped' completion event,
the xHC gives the Link TRB in the event's cmd DMA, which causes a
mismatch in handling command completion event.
To handle this situation, an additional check has been added to ignore
the mismatch error and continue the operation.
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Faisal Hassan <quic_faisalh(a)quicinc.com>
---
drivers/usb/host/xhci-ring.c | 38 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
1 file changed, 35 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/usb/host/xhci-ring.c b/drivers/usb/host/xhci-ring.c
index b2950c35c740..43926c378df9 100644
--- a/drivers/usb/host/xhci-ring.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/host/xhci-ring.c
@@ -126,6 +126,32 @@ static void inc_td_cnt(struct urb *urb)
urb_priv->num_tds_done++;
}
+/*
+ * Return true if the DMA is pointing to a Link TRB in the ring;
+ * otherwise, return false.
+ */
+static bool is_dma_link_trb(struct xhci_ring *ring, dma_addr_t dma)
+{
+ struct xhci_segment *seg;
+ union xhci_trb *trb;
+ dma_addr_t trb_dma;
+ int i;
+
+ seg = ring->first_seg;
+ do {
+ for (i = 0; i < TRBS_PER_SEGMENT; i++) {
+ trb = &seg->trbs[i];
+ trb_dma = seg->dma + (i * sizeof(union xhci_trb));
+
+ if (trb_is_link(trb) && trb_dma == dma)
+ return true;
+ }
+ seg = seg->next;
+ } while (seg != ring->first_seg);
+
+ return false;
+}
+
static void trb_to_noop(union xhci_trb *trb, u32 noop_type)
{
if (trb_is_link(trb)) {
@@ -1718,13 +1744,21 @@ static void handle_cmd_completion(struct xhci_hcd *xhci,
trace_xhci_handle_command(xhci->cmd_ring, &cmd_trb->generic);
+ cmd_comp_code = GET_COMP_CODE(le32_to_cpu(event->status));
cmd_dequeue_dma = xhci_trb_virt_to_dma(xhci->cmd_ring->deq_seg,
cmd_trb);
/*
* Check whether the completion event is for our internal kept
* command.
+ * For the 'command ring stopped' completion event, there is a
+ * risk of a mismatch in dequeue pointers if we abort the command
+ * just before the link TRB in the command ring. In this scenario,
+ * the cmd_dma in the event would point to a link TRB, while the
+ * software dequeue pointer circles back to the start.
*/
- if (!cmd_dequeue_dma || cmd_dma != (u64)cmd_dequeue_dma) {
+ if ((!cmd_dequeue_dma || cmd_dma != (u64)cmd_dequeue_dma) &&
+ !(cmd_comp_code == COMP_COMMAND_RING_STOPPED &&
+ is_dma_link_trb(xhci->cmd_ring, cmd_dma))) {
xhci_warn(xhci,
"ERROR mismatched command completion event\n");
return;
@@ -1734,8 +1768,6 @@ static void handle_cmd_completion(struct xhci_hcd *xhci,
cancel_delayed_work(&xhci->cmd_timer);
- cmd_comp_code = GET_COMP_CODE(le32_to_cpu(event->status));
-
/* If CMD ring stopped we own the trbs between enqueue and dequeue */
if (cmd_comp_code == COMP_COMMAND_RING_STOPPED) {
complete_all(&xhci->cmd_ring_stop_completion);
--
2.17.1
Since Linux 6.11 we support AT_EMPTY_PATH and NULL path for fstatat and
statx in "some circumstances" mostly for performance and allowing
seccomp audition. But to make the API easier to be documented and used,
we should just treat AT_EMPTY_PATH and NULL as is AT_EMPTY_PATH and
empty string even if there are no performance or seccomp benefits.
Cc: Miao Wang <shankerwangmiao(a)gmail.com>
Cc: linux-fsdevel(a)vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-kernel(a)vger.kernel.org
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
Xi Ruoyao (2):
vfs: support fstatat(..., NULL, AT_EMPTY_PATH | AT_NO_AUTOMOUNT, ...)
vfs: Make sure {statx,fstatat}(..., AT_EMPTY_PATH | ..., NULL, ...)
behave as (..., AT_EMPTY_PATH | ..., "", ...)
fs/stat.c | 11 +++++++++--
1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
--
2.46.2
When an i915 PMU counter is enabled and the driver is then unbound, the
PMU will be unregistered via perf_pmu_unregister(), however the event
will still be alive. i915 currently tries to deal with this situation
by:
a) Marking the pmu as "closed" and shortcut the calls from perf
b) Taking a reference from i915, that is put back when the event
is destroyed.
c) Setting event_init to NULL to avoid any further event
(a) is ugly, but may be left as is since it protects not trying to
access the HW that is now gone. Unless a pmu driver can call
perf_pmu_unregister() and not receive any more calls, it's a necessary
ugliness.
(b) doesn't really work: when the event is destroyed and the i915 ref is
put it may free the i915 object, that contains the pmu, not only the
event. After event->destroy() callback, perf still expects the pmu
object to be alive.
Instead of pigging back on the event->destroy() to take and put the
device reference, implement the new get()/put() on the pmu object for
that purpose.
(c) is only done to have a flag to avoid some function entrypoints when
pmu is unregistered.
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org # 5.11+
Signed-off-by: Lucas De Marchi <lucas.demarchi(a)intel.com>
---
drivers/gpu/drm/i915/i915_pmu.c | 36 ++++++++++++++++++++-------------
1 file changed, 22 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/i915_pmu.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/i915_pmu.c
index 4d05d98f51b8e..dc9f753369170 100644
--- a/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/i915_pmu.c
+++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/i915_pmu.c
@@ -515,15 +515,6 @@ static enum hrtimer_restart i915_sample(struct hrtimer *hrtimer)
return HRTIMER_RESTART;
}
-static void i915_pmu_event_destroy(struct perf_event *event)
-{
- struct i915_pmu *pmu = event_to_pmu(event);
- struct drm_i915_private *i915 = pmu_to_i915(pmu);
-
- drm_WARN_ON(&i915->drm, event->parent);
-
- drm_dev_put(&i915->drm);
-}
static int
engine_event_status(struct intel_engine_cs *engine,
@@ -629,11 +620,6 @@ static int i915_pmu_event_init(struct perf_event *event)
if (ret)
return ret;
- if (!event->parent) {
- drm_dev_get(&i915->drm);
- event->destroy = i915_pmu_event_destroy;
- }
-
return 0;
}
@@ -872,6 +858,24 @@ static int i915_pmu_event_event_idx(struct perf_event *event)
return 0;
}
+static struct pmu *i915_pmu_get(struct pmu *base)
+{
+ struct i915_pmu *pmu = container_of(base, struct i915_pmu, base);
+ struct drm_i915_private *i915 = pmu_to_i915(pmu);
+
+ drm_dev_get(&i915->drm);
+
+ return base;
+}
+
+static void i915_pmu_put(struct pmu *base)
+{
+ struct i915_pmu *pmu = container_of(base, struct i915_pmu, base);
+ struct drm_i915_private *i915 = pmu_to_i915(pmu);
+
+ drm_dev_put(&i915->drm);
+}
+
struct i915_str_attribute {
struct device_attribute attr;
const char *str;
@@ -1154,6 +1158,8 @@ static void free_pmu(struct drm_device *dev, void *res)
struct i915_pmu *pmu = res;
struct drm_i915_private *i915 = pmu_to_i915(pmu);
+ perf_pmu_free(&pmu->base);
+
free_event_attributes(pmu);
kfree(pmu->base.attr_groups);
if (IS_DGFX(i915))
@@ -1299,6 +1305,8 @@ void i915_pmu_register(struct drm_i915_private *i915)
pmu->base.stop = i915_pmu_event_stop;
pmu->base.read = i915_pmu_event_read;
pmu->base.event_idx = i915_pmu_event_event_idx;
+ pmu->base.get = i915_pmu_get;
+ pmu->base.put = i915_pmu_put;
ret = perf_pmu_register(&pmu->base, pmu->name, -1);
if (ret)
--
2.47.0
[ Upstream commit 0885ef4705607936fc36a38fd74356e1c465b023 ]
I found a regression on mm-unstable during my swap stress test, using
tmpfs to compile linux. The test OOM very soon after the make spawns many
cc processes.
It bisects down to this change: 33dfe9204f29b415bbc0abb1a50642d1ba94f5e9
(mm/gup: clear the LRU flag of a page before adding to LRU batch)
Yu Zhao propose the fix: "I think this is one of the potential side
effects -- Huge mentioned earlier about isolate_lru_folios():"
I test that with it the swap stress test no longer OOM.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/CAOUHufYi9h0kz5uW3LHHS3ZrVwEq-kKp8S6N-MZUmErNAXoX…
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240905-lru-flag-v2-1-8a2d9046c594@kernel.org
Fixes: 33dfe9204f29 ("mm/gup: clear the LRU flag of a page before adding to LRU batch")
Signed-off-by: Chris Li <chrisl(a)kernel.org>
Suggested-by: Yu Zhao <yuzhao(a)google.com>
Suggested-by: Hugh Dickins <hughd(a)google.com>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/CAF8kJuNP5iTj2p07QgHSGOJsiUfYpJ2f4R1Q5-3BN9JiD9…
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm(a)linux-foundation.org>
---
mm/vmscan.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/mm/vmscan.c b/mm/vmscan.c
index bd489c1af2289..a8d61a8b68944 100644
--- a/mm/vmscan.c
+++ b/mm/vmscan.c
@@ -4300,7 +4300,7 @@ static bool sort_folio(struct lruvec *lruvec, struct folio *folio, struct scan_c
}
/* ineligible */
- if (zone > sc->reclaim_idx) {
+ if (!folio_test_lru(folio) || zone > sc->reclaim_idx) {
gen = folio_inc_gen(lruvec, folio, false);
list_move_tail(&folio->lru, &lrugen->folios[gen][type][zone]);
return true;
---
base-commit: 8e24a758d14c0b1cd42ab0aea980a1030eea811f
change-id: 20241015-stable-oom-fix-a6ab273b1817
Best regards,
--
Chris Li <chrisl(a)kernel.org>
The patch titled
Subject: Revert "selftests/mm: replace atomic_bool with pthread_barrier_t"
has been added to the -mm mm-hotfixes-unstable branch. Its filename is
revert-selftests-mm-replace-atomic_bool-with-pthread_barrier_t.patch
This patch will shortly appear at
https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/25-new.git/tree/patche…
This patch will later appear in the mm-hotfixes-unstable branch at
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm
Before you just go and hit "reply", please:
a) Consider who else should be cc'ed
b) Prefer to cc a suitable mailing list as well
c) Ideally: find the original patch on the mailing list and do a
reply-to-all to that, adding suitable additional cc's
*** Remember to use Documentation/process/submit-checklist.rst when testing your code ***
The -mm tree is included into linux-next via the mm-everything
branch at git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm
and is updated there every 2-3 working days
------------------------------------------------------
From: Edward Liaw <edliaw(a)google.com>
Subject: Revert "selftests/mm: replace atomic_bool with pthread_barrier_t"
Date: Fri, 18 Oct 2024 17:17:23 +0000
This reverts commit e61ef21e27e8deed8c474e9f47f4aa7bc37e138c.
uffd_poll_thread may be called by other tests that do not initialize the
pthread_barrier, so this approach is not correct. This will revert to
using atomic_bool instead.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20241018171734.2315053-3-edliaw@google.com
Fixes: e61ef21e27e8 ("selftests/mm: replace atomic_bool with pthread_barrier_t")
Signed-off-by: Edward Liaw <edliaw(a)google.com>
Cc: Ryan Roberts <ryan.roberts(a)arm.com>
Cc: Peter Xu <peterx(a)redhat.com>
Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah(a)kernel.org>
Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm(a)linux-foundation.org>
---
tools/testing/selftests/mm/uffd-common.c | 5 ++---
tools/testing/selftests/mm/uffd-common.h | 3 ++-
tools/testing/selftests/mm/uffd-unit-tests.c | 14 ++++++--------
3 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/mm/uffd-common.c~revert-selftests-mm-replace-atomic_bool-with-pthread_barrier_t
+++ a/tools/testing/selftests/mm/uffd-common.c
@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ bool test_uffdio_wp = true;
unsigned long long *count_verify;
uffd_test_ops_t *uffd_test_ops;
uffd_test_case_ops_t *uffd_test_case_ops;
-pthread_barrier_t ready_for_fork;
+atomic_bool ready_for_fork;
static int uffd_mem_fd_create(off_t mem_size, bool hugetlb)
{
@@ -519,8 +519,7 @@ void *uffd_poll_thread(void *arg)
pollfd[1].fd = pipefd[cpu*2];
pollfd[1].events = POLLIN;
- /* Ready for parent thread to fork */
- pthread_barrier_wait(&ready_for_fork);
+ ready_for_fork = true;
for (;;) {
ret = poll(pollfd, 2, -1);
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/mm/uffd-common.h~revert-selftests-mm-replace-atomic_bool-with-pthread_barrier_t
+++ a/tools/testing/selftests/mm/uffd-common.h
@@ -33,6 +33,7 @@
#include <inttypes.h>
#include <stdint.h>
#include <sys/random.h>
+#include <stdatomic.h>
#include "../kselftest.h"
#include "vm_util.h"
@@ -104,7 +105,7 @@ extern bool map_shared;
extern bool test_uffdio_wp;
extern unsigned long long *count_verify;
extern volatile bool test_uffdio_copy_eexist;
-extern pthread_barrier_t ready_for_fork;
+extern atomic_bool ready_for_fork;
extern uffd_test_ops_t anon_uffd_test_ops;
extern uffd_test_ops_t shmem_uffd_test_ops;
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/mm/uffd-unit-tests.c~revert-selftests-mm-replace-atomic_bool-with-pthread_barrier_t
+++ a/tools/testing/selftests/mm/uffd-unit-tests.c
@@ -774,7 +774,7 @@ static void uffd_sigbus_test_common(bool
char c;
struct uffd_args args = { 0 };
- pthread_barrier_init(&ready_for_fork, NULL, 2);
+ ready_for_fork = false;
fcntl(uffd, F_SETFL, uffd_flags | O_NONBLOCK);
@@ -791,9 +791,8 @@ static void uffd_sigbus_test_common(bool
if (pthread_create(&uffd_mon, NULL, uffd_poll_thread, &args))
err("uffd_poll_thread create");
- /* Wait for child thread to start before forking */
- pthread_barrier_wait(&ready_for_fork);
- pthread_barrier_destroy(&ready_for_fork);
+ while (!ready_for_fork)
+ ; /* Wait for the poll_thread to start executing before forking */
pid = fork();
if (pid < 0)
@@ -834,7 +833,7 @@ static void uffd_events_test_common(bool
char c;
struct uffd_args args = { 0 };
- pthread_barrier_init(&ready_for_fork, NULL, 2);
+ ready_for_fork = false;
fcntl(uffd, F_SETFL, uffd_flags | O_NONBLOCK);
if (uffd_register(uffd, area_dst, nr_pages * page_size,
@@ -845,9 +844,8 @@ static void uffd_events_test_common(bool
if (pthread_create(&uffd_mon, NULL, uffd_poll_thread, &args))
err("uffd_poll_thread create");
- /* Wait for child thread to start before forking */
- pthread_barrier_wait(&ready_for_fork);
- pthread_barrier_destroy(&ready_for_fork);
+ while (!ready_for_fork)
+ ; /* Wait for the poll_thread to start executing before forking */
pid = fork();
if (pid < 0)
_
Patches currently in -mm which might be from edliaw(a)google.com are
revert-selftests-mm-fix-deadlock-for-fork-after-pthread_create-on-arm.patch
revert-selftests-mm-replace-atomic_bool-with-pthread_barrier_t.patch
selftests-mm-fix-deadlock-for-fork-after-pthread_create-with-atomic_bool.patch
The patch titled
Subject: Revert "selftests/mm: fix deadlock for fork after pthread_create on ARM"
has been added to the -mm mm-hotfixes-unstable branch. Its filename is
revert-selftests-mm-fix-deadlock-for-fork-after-pthread_create-on-arm.patch
This patch will shortly appear at
https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/25-new.git/tree/patche…
This patch will later appear in the mm-hotfixes-unstable branch at
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm
Before you just go and hit "reply", please:
a) Consider who else should be cc'ed
b) Prefer to cc a suitable mailing list as well
c) Ideally: find the original patch on the mailing list and do a
reply-to-all to that, adding suitable additional cc's
*** Remember to use Documentation/process/submit-checklist.rst when testing your code ***
The -mm tree is included into linux-next via the mm-everything
branch at git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm
and is updated there every 2-3 working days
------------------------------------------------------
From: Edward Liaw <edliaw(a)google.com>
Subject: Revert "selftests/mm: fix deadlock for fork after pthread_create on ARM"
Date: Fri, 18 Oct 2024 17:17:22 +0000
Patch series "selftests/mm: revert pthread_barrier change"
On Android arm, pthread_create followed by a fork caused a deadlock in
the case where the fork required work to be completed by the created
thread.
The previous patches incorrectly assumed that the parent would
always initialize the pthread_barrier for the child thread. This
reverts the change and replaces the fix for wp-fork-with-event with the
original use of atomic_bool.
This patch (of 3):
This reverts commit e142cc87ac4ec618f2ccf5f68aedcd6e28a59d9d.
fork_event_consumer may be called by other tests that do not initialize
the pthread_barrier, so this approach is not correct. The subsequent
patch will revert to using atomic_bool instead.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20241018171734.2315053-1-edliaw@google.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20241018171734.2315053-2-edliaw@google.com
Fixes: e142cc87ac4e ("fix deadlock for fork after pthread_create on ARM")
Signed-off-by: Edward Liaw <edliaw(a)google.com>
Cc: Ryan Roberts <ryan.roberts(a)arm.com>
Cc: Peter Xu <peterx(a)redhat.com>
Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah(a)kernel.org>
Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm(a)linux-foundation.org>
---
tools/testing/selftests/mm/uffd-unit-tests.c | 7 -------
1 file changed, 7 deletions(-)
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/mm/uffd-unit-tests.c~revert-selftests-mm-fix-deadlock-for-fork-after-pthread_create-on-arm
+++ a/tools/testing/selftests/mm/uffd-unit-tests.c
@@ -241,9 +241,6 @@ static void *fork_event_consumer(void *d
fork_event_args *args = data;
struct uffd_msg msg = { 0 };
- /* Ready for parent thread to fork */
- pthread_barrier_wait(&ready_for_fork);
-
/* Read until a full msg received */
while (uffd_read_msg(args->parent_uffd, &msg));
@@ -311,12 +308,8 @@ static int pagemap_test_fork(int uffd, b
/* Prepare a thread to resolve EVENT_FORK */
if (with_event) {
- pthread_barrier_init(&ready_for_fork, NULL, 2);
if (pthread_create(&thread, NULL, fork_event_consumer, &args))
err("pthread_create()");
- /* Wait for child thread to start before forking */
- pthread_barrier_wait(&ready_for_fork);
- pthread_barrier_destroy(&ready_for_fork);
}
child = fork();
_
Patches currently in -mm which might be from edliaw(a)google.com are
revert-selftests-mm-fix-deadlock-for-fork-after-pthread_create-on-arm.patch
revert-selftests-mm-replace-atomic_bool-with-pthread_barrier_t.patch
selftests-mm-fix-deadlock-for-fork-after-pthread_create-with-atomic_bool.patch
There is a race between laundromat handling of revoked delegations
and a client sending free_stateid operation. Laundromat thread
finds that delegation has expired and needs to be revoked so it
marks the delegation stid revoked and it puts it on a reaper list
but then it unlock the state lock and the actual delegation revocation
happens without the lock. Once the stid is marked revoked a racing
free_stateid processing thread does the following (1) it calls
list_del_init() which removes it from the reaper list and (2) frees
the delegation stid structure. The laundromat thread ends up not
calling the revoke_delegation() function for this particular delegation
but that means it will no release the lock lease that exists on
the file.
Now, a new open for this file comes in and ends up finding that
lease list isn't empty and calls nfsd_breaker_owns_lease() which ends
up trying to derefence a freed delegation stateid. Leading to the
followint use-after-free KASAN warning:
kernel: ==================================================================
kernel: BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in nfsd_breaker_owns_lease+0x140/0x160 [nfsd]
kernel: Read of size 8 at addr ffff0000e73cd0c8 by task nfsd/6205
kernel:
kernel: CPU: 2 UID: 0 PID: 6205 Comm: nfsd Kdump: loaded Not tainted 6.11.0-rc7+ #9
kernel: Hardware name: Apple Inc. Apple Virtualization Generic Platform, BIOS 2069.0.0.0.0 08/03/2024
kernel: Call trace:
kernel: dump_backtrace+0x98/0x120
kernel: show_stack+0x1c/0x30
kernel: dump_stack_lvl+0x80/0xe8
kernel: print_address_description.constprop.0+0x84/0x390
kernel: print_report+0xa4/0x268
kernel: kasan_report+0xb4/0xf8
kernel: __asan_report_load8_noabort+0x1c/0x28
kernel: nfsd_breaker_owns_lease+0x140/0x160 [nfsd]
kernel: nfsd_file_do_acquire+0xb3c/0x11d0 [nfsd]
kernel: nfsd_file_acquire_opened+0x84/0x110 [nfsd]
kernel: nfs4_get_vfs_file+0x634/0x958 [nfsd]
kernel: nfsd4_process_open2+0xa40/0x1a40 [nfsd]
kernel: nfsd4_open+0xa08/0xe80 [nfsd]
kernel: nfsd4_proc_compound+0xb8c/0x2130 [nfsd]
kernel: nfsd_dispatch+0x22c/0x718 [nfsd]
kernel: svc_process_common+0x8e8/0x1960 [sunrpc]
kernel: svc_process+0x3d4/0x7e0 [sunrpc]
kernel: svc_handle_xprt+0x828/0xe10 [sunrpc]
kernel: svc_recv+0x2cc/0x6a8 [sunrpc]
kernel: nfsd+0x270/0x400 [nfsd]
kernel: kthread+0x288/0x310
kernel: ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20
This patch proposes a fixed that's based on adding 2 new additional
stid's sc_status values that help coordinate between the laundromat
and other operations (nfsd4_free_stateid() and nfsd4_delegreturn()).
First to make sure, that once the stid is marked revoked, it is not
removed by the nfsd4_free_stateid(), the laundromat take a reference
on the stateid. Then, coordinating whether the stid has been put
on the cl_revoked list or we are processing FREE_STATEID and need to
make sure to remove it from the list, each check that state and act
accordingly. If laundromat has added to the cl_revoke list before
the arrival of FREE_STATEID, then nfsd4_free_stateid() knows to remove
it from the list. If nfsd4_free_stateid() finds that operations arrived
before laundromat has placed it on cl_revoke list, it marks the state
freed and then laundromat will no longer add it to the list.
Also, for nfsd4_delegreturn() when looking for the specified stid,
we need to access stid that are marked removed or freeable, it means
the laundromat has started processing it but hasn't finished and this
delegreturn needs to return nfserr_deleg_revoked and not
nfserr_bad_stateid. The latter will not trigger a FREE_STATEID and the
lack of it will leave this stid on the cl_revoked list indefinitely.
Fixes: 2d4a532d385f ("nfsd: ensure that clp->cl_revoked list is
protected by clp->cl_lock")
CC: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Olga Kornievskaia <okorniev(a)redhat.com>
--- v3. (1) adds refcount to nfsd4_revoke_states() (2) adds comments
to revoke_delegation(), adds the WARN_ON_ONCE to make sure stid
state is what is expected and changes unlock placement.
---
fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c | 46 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------
fs/nfsd/state.h | 2 ++
2 files changed, 40 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c b/fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c
index 7905ab9d8bc6..28e9b52b01fd 100644
--- a/fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c
+++ b/fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c
@@ -1351,21 +1351,47 @@ static void destroy_delegation(struct nfs4_delegation *dp)
destroy_unhashed_deleg(dp);
}
+/**
+ * revoke_delegation - perform nfs4 delegation structure cleanup
+ * @dp: pointer to the delegation
+ *
+ * This function assumes that it's called either from the administrative
+ * interface (nfsd4_revoke_states()) that's revoking a specific delegation
+ * stateid or it's called from a laundromat thread (nfsd4_landromat()) that
+ * determined that this specific state has expired and needs to be revoked
+ * (both mark state with the appropriate stid sc_status mode). It is also
+ * assumed that a reference was take on the @dp state.
+ *
+ * If this function finds that the @dp state is SC_STATUS_FREED it means
+ * that a FREE_STATEID operation for this stateid has been processed and
+ * we can proceed to removing it from recalled list. However, if @dp state
+ * isn't marked SC_STATUS_FREED, it means we need place it on the cl_revoked
+ * list and wait for the FREE_STATEID to arrive from the client. At the same
+ * time, we need to mark it as SC_STATUS_FREEABLE to indicate to the
+ * nfsd4_free_stateid() function that this stateid has already been added
+ * to the cl_revoked list and that nfsd4_free_stateid() is now responsible
+ * for removing it from the list. Inspection of where the delegation state
+ * in the revocation process is protected by the clp->cl_lock.
+ */
static void revoke_delegation(struct nfs4_delegation *dp)
{
struct nfs4_client *clp = dp->dl_stid.sc_client;
WARN_ON(!list_empty(&dp->dl_recall_lru));
+ WARN_ON_ONCE(!(dp->dl_stid.sc_status &
+ (SC_STATUS_REVOKED | SC_STATUS_ADMIN_REVOKED)));
trace_nfsd_stid_revoke(&dp->dl_stid);
- if (dp->dl_stid.sc_status &
- (SC_STATUS_REVOKED | SC_STATUS_ADMIN_REVOKED)) {
- spin_lock(&clp->cl_lock);
- refcount_inc(&dp->dl_stid.sc_count);
- list_add(&dp->dl_recall_lru, &clp->cl_revoked);
- spin_unlock(&clp->cl_lock);
+ spin_lock(&clp->cl_lock);
+ if (dp->dl_stid.sc_status & SC_STATUS_FREED) {
+ list_del_init(&dp->dl_recall_lru);
+ goto out;
}
+ list_add(&dp->dl_recall_lru, &clp->cl_revoked);
+ dp->dl_stid.sc_status |= SC_STATUS_FREEABLE;
+out:
+ spin_unlock(&clp->cl_lock);
destroy_unhashed_deleg(dp);
}
@@ -1772,6 +1798,7 @@ void nfsd4_revoke_states(struct net *net, struct super_block *sb)
mutex_unlock(&stp->st_mutex);
break;
case SC_TYPE_DELEG:
+ refcount_inc(&stid->sc_count);
dp = delegstateid(stid);
spin_lock(&state_lock);
if (!unhash_delegation_locked(
@@ -6606,6 +6633,7 @@ nfs4_laundromat(struct nfsd_net *nn)
dp = list_entry (pos, struct nfs4_delegation, dl_recall_lru);
if (!state_expired(<, dp->dl_time))
break;
+ refcount_inc(&dp->dl_stid.sc_count);
unhash_delegation_locked(dp, SC_STATUS_REVOKED);
list_add(&dp->dl_recall_lru, &reaplist);
}
@@ -7218,7 +7246,9 @@ nfsd4_free_stateid(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct nfsd4_compound_state *cstate,
s->sc_status |= SC_STATUS_CLOSED;
spin_unlock(&s->sc_lock);
dp = delegstateid(s);
- list_del_init(&dp->dl_recall_lru);
+ if (s->sc_status & SC_STATUS_FREEABLE)
+ list_del_init(&dp->dl_recall_lru);
+ s->sc_status |= SC_STATUS_FREED;
spin_unlock(&cl->cl_lock);
nfs4_put_stid(s);
ret = nfs_ok;
@@ -7548,7 +7578,7 @@ nfsd4_delegreturn(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct nfsd4_compound_state *cstate,
if ((status = fh_verify(rqstp, &cstate->current_fh, S_IFREG, 0)))
return status;
- status = nfsd4_lookup_stateid(cstate, stateid, SC_TYPE_DELEG, 0, &s, nn);
+ status = nfsd4_lookup_stateid(cstate, stateid, SC_TYPE_DELEG, SC_STATUS_REVOKED|SC_STATUS_FREEABLE, &s, nn);
if (status)
goto out;
dp = delegstateid(s);
diff --git a/fs/nfsd/state.h b/fs/nfsd/state.h
index 6351e6eca7cc..cc00d6b64b88 100644
--- a/fs/nfsd/state.h
+++ b/fs/nfsd/state.h
@@ -114,6 +114,8 @@ struct nfs4_stid {
/* For a deleg stateid kept around only to process free_stateid's: */
#define SC_STATUS_REVOKED BIT(1)
#define SC_STATUS_ADMIN_REVOKED BIT(2)
+#define SC_STATUS_FREEABLE BIT(3)
+#define SC_STATUS_FREED BIT(4)
unsigned short sc_status;
struct list_head sc_cp_list;
--
2.43.5
There is a race between laundromat handling of revoked delegations
and a client sending free_stateid operation. Laundromat thread
finds that delegation has expired and needs to be revoked so it
marks the delegation stid revoked and it puts it on a reaper list
but then it unlock the state lock and the actual delegation revocation
happens without the lock. Once the stid is marked revoked a racing
free_stateid processing thread does the following (1) it calls
list_del_init() which removes it from the reaper list and (2) frees
the delegation stid structure. The laundromat thread ends up not
calling the revoke_delegation() function for this particular delegation
but that means it will no release the lock lease that exists on
the file.
Now, a new open for this file comes in and ends up finding that
lease list isn't empty and calls nfsd_breaker_owns_lease() which ends
up trying to derefence a freed delegation stateid. Leading to the
followint use-after-free KASAN warning:
kernel: ==================================================================
kernel: BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in nfsd_breaker_owns_lease+0x140/0x160 [nfsd]
kernel: Read of size 8 at addr ffff0000e73cd0c8 by task nfsd/6205
kernel:
kernel: CPU: 2 UID: 0 PID: 6205 Comm: nfsd Kdump: loaded Not tainted 6.11.0-rc7+ #9
kernel: Hardware name: Apple Inc. Apple Virtualization Generic Platform, BIOS 2069.0.0.0.0 08/03/2024
kernel: Call trace:
kernel: dump_backtrace+0x98/0x120
kernel: show_stack+0x1c/0x30
kernel: dump_stack_lvl+0x80/0xe8
kernel: print_address_description.constprop.0+0x84/0x390
kernel: print_report+0xa4/0x268
kernel: kasan_report+0xb4/0xf8
kernel: __asan_report_load8_noabort+0x1c/0x28
kernel: nfsd_breaker_owns_lease+0x140/0x160 [nfsd]
kernel: leases_conflict+0x68/0x370
kernel: __break_lease+0x204/0xc38
kernel: nfsd_open_break_lease+0x8c/0xf0 [nfsd]
kernel: nfsd_file_do_acquire+0xb3c/0x11d0 [nfsd]
kernel: nfsd_file_acquire_opened+0x84/0x110 [nfsd]
kernel: nfs4_get_vfs_file+0x634/0x958 [nfsd]
kernel: nfsd4_process_open2+0xa40/0x1a40 [nfsd]
kernel: nfsd4_open+0xa08/0xe80 [nfsd]
kernel: nfsd4_proc_compound+0xb8c/0x2130 [nfsd]
kernel: nfsd_dispatch+0x22c/0x718 [nfsd]
kernel: svc_process_common+0x8e8/0x1960 [sunrpc]
kernel: svc_process+0x3d4/0x7e0 [sunrpc]
kernel: svc_handle_xprt+0x828/0xe10 [sunrpc]
kernel: svc_recv+0x2cc/0x6a8 [sunrpc]
kernel: nfsd+0x270/0x400 [nfsd]
kernel: kthread+0x288/0x310
kernel: ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20
This patch proposes a fix that's based on adding 2 new additional
stid's sc_status values that help coordinate between the laundromat
and other operations (nfsd4_free_stateid() and nfsd4_delegreturn()).
First to make sure, that once the stid is marked revoked, it is not
removed by the nfsd4_free_stateid(), the laundromat take a reference
on the stateid. Then, coordinating whether the stid has been put
on the cl_revoked list or we are processing FREE_STATEID and need to
make sure to remove it from the list, each check that state and act
accordingly. If laundromat has added to the cl_revoke list before
the arrival of FREE_STATEID, then nfsd4_free_stateid() knows to remove
it from the list. If nfsd4_free_stateid() finds that operations arrived
before laundromat has placed it on cl_revoke list, it marks the state
freed and then laundromat will no longer add it to the list.
Also, for nfsd4_delegreturn() when looking for the specified stid,
we need to access stid that are marked removed or freeable, it means
the laundromat has started processing it but hasn't finished and this
delegreturn needs to return nfserr_deleg_revoked and not
nfserr_bad_stateid. The latter will not trigger a FREE_STATEID and the
lack of it will leave this stid on the cl_revoked list indefinitely.
Fixes: 2d4a532d385f ("nfsd: ensure that clp->cl_revoked list is
protected by clp->cl_lock")
CC: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Olga Kornievskaia <okorniev(a)redhat.com>
---
fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c | 15 ++++++++++++---
fs/nfsd/state.h | 2 ++
2 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c b/fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c
index ac1859c7cc9d..cb989802e896 100644
--- a/fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c
+++ b/fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c
@@ -1370,10 +1370,16 @@ static void revoke_delegation(struct nfs4_delegation *dp)
if (dp->dl_stid.sc_status &
(SC_STATUS_REVOKED | SC_STATUS_ADMIN_REVOKED)) {
spin_lock(&clp->cl_lock);
- refcount_inc(&dp->dl_stid.sc_count);
+ if (dp->dl_stid.sc_status & SC_STATUS_FREED) {
+ list_del_init(&dp->dl_recall_lru);
+ spin_unlock(&clp->cl_lock);
+ goto out;
+ }
list_add(&dp->dl_recall_lru, &clp->cl_revoked);
+ dp->dl_stid.sc_status |= SC_STATUS_FREEABLE;
spin_unlock(&clp->cl_lock);
}
+out:
destroy_unhashed_deleg(dp);
}
@@ -6545,6 +6551,7 @@ nfs4_laundromat(struct nfsd_net *nn)
dp = list_entry (pos, struct nfs4_delegation, dl_recall_lru);
if (!state_expired(<, dp->dl_time))
break;
+ refcount_inc(&dp->dl_stid.sc_count);
unhash_delegation_locked(dp, SC_STATUS_REVOKED);
list_add(&dp->dl_recall_lru, &reaplist);
}
@@ -7156,7 +7163,9 @@ nfsd4_free_stateid(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct nfsd4_compound_state *cstate,
if (s->sc_status & SC_STATUS_REVOKED) {
spin_unlock(&s->sc_lock);
dp = delegstateid(s);
- list_del_init(&dp->dl_recall_lru);
+ if (s->sc_status & SC_STATUS_FREEABLE)
+ list_del_init(&dp->dl_recall_lru);
+ s->sc_status |= SC_STATUS_FREED;
spin_unlock(&cl->cl_lock);
nfs4_put_stid(s);
ret = nfs_ok;
@@ -7486,7 +7495,7 @@ nfsd4_delegreturn(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct nfsd4_compound_state *cstate,
if ((status = fh_verify(rqstp, &cstate->current_fh, S_IFREG, 0)))
return status;
- status = nfsd4_lookup_stateid(cstate, stateid, SC_TYPE_DELEG, 0, &s, nn);
+ status = nfsd4_lookup_stateid(cstate, stateid, SC_TYPE_DELEG, SC_STATUS_REVOKED|SC_STATUS_FREEABLE, &s, nn);
if (status)
goto out;
dp = delegstateid(s);
diff --git a/fs/nfsd/state.h b/fs/nfsd/state.h
index 79c743c01a47..35b3564c065f 100644
--- a/fs/nfsd/state.h
+++ b/fs/nfsd/state.h
@@ -114,6 +114,8 @@ struct nfs4_stid {
/* For a deleg stateid kept around only to process free_stateid's: */
#define SC_STATUS_REVOKED BIT(1)
#define SC_STATUS_ADMIN_REVOKED BIT(2)
+#define SC_STATUS_FREEABLE BIT(3)
+#define SC_STATUS_FREED BIT(4)
unsigned short sc_status;
struct list_head sc_cp_list;
--
2.43.5
From: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov(a)linux.intel.com>
Commit ea7e2d5e49c0 ("mm: call the security_mmap_file() LSM hook in
remap_file_pages()") fixed a security issue, it added an LSM check when
trying to remap file pages, so that LSMs have the opportunity to evaluate
such action like for other memory operations such as mmap() and mprotect().
However, that commit called security_mmap_file() inside the mmap_lock lock,
while the other calls do it before taking the lock, after commit
8b3ec6814c83 ("take security_mmap_file() outside of ->mmap_sem").
This caused lock inversion issue with IMA which was taking the mmap_lock
and i_mutex lock in the opposite way when the remap_file_pages() system
call was called.
Solve the issue by splitting the critical region in remap_file_pages() in
two regions: the first takes a read lock of mmap_lock and retrieves the VMA
and the file associated, and calculate the 'prot' and 'flags' variable; the
second takes a write lock on mmap_lock, checks that the VMA flags and the
VMA file descriptor are the same as the ones obtained in the first critical
region (otherwise the system call fails), and calls do_mmap().
In between, after releasing the read lock and taking the write lock, call
security_mmap_file(), and solve the lock inversion issue.
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
Fixes: ea7e2d5e49c0 ("mm: call the security_mmap_file() LSM hook in remap_file_pages()")
Reported-by: syzbot+91ae49e1c1a2634d20c0(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-security-module/66f7b10e.050a0220.46d20.0036.…
Reviewed-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu(a)huawei.com> (Calculate prot and flags earlier)
Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov(a)linux.intel.com>
---
mm/mmap.c | 62 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------------
1 file changed, 45 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)
diff --git a/mm/mmap.c b/mm/mmap.c
index 9c0fb43064b5..762944427e03 100644
--- a/mm/mmap.c
+++ b/mm/mmap.c
@@ -1640,6 +1640,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(remap_file_pages, unsigned long, start, unsigned long, size,
unsigned long populate = 0;
unsigned long ret = -EINVAL;
struct file *file;
+ vm_flags_t vm_flags;
pr_warn_once("%s (%d) uses deprecated remap_file_pages() syscall. See Documentation/mm/remap_file_pages.rst.\n",
current->comm, current->pid);
@@ -1656,12 +1657,53 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(remap_file_pages, unsigned long, start, unsigned long, size,
if (pgoff + (size >> PAGE_SHIFT) < pgoff)
return ret;
- if (mmap_write_lock_killable(mm))
+ if (mmap_read_lock_killable(mm))
+ return -EINTR;
+
+ vma = vma_lookup(mm, start);
+
+ if (!vma || !(vma->vm_flags & VM_SHARED)) {
+ mmap_read_unlock(mm);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ prot |= vma->vm_flags & VM_READ ? PROT_READ : 0;
+ prot |= vma->vm_flags & VM_WRITE ? PROT_WRITE : 0;
+ prot |= vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC ? PROT_EXEC : 0;
+
+ flags &= MAP_NONBLOCK;
+ flags |= MAP_SHARED | MAP_FIXED | MAP_POPULATE;
+ if (vma->vm_flags & VM_LOCKED)
+ flags |= MAP_LOCKED;
+
+ /* Save vm_flags used to calculate prot and flags, and recheck later. */
+ vm_flags = vma->vm_flags;
+ file = get_file(vma->vm_file);
+
+ mmap_read_unlock(mm);
+
+ ret = security_mmap_file(file, prot, flags);
+ if (ret) {
+ fput(file);
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+
+ if (mmap_write_lock_killable(mm)) {
+ fput(file);
return -EINTR;
+ }
vma = vma_lookup(mm, start);
- if (!vma || !(vma->vm_flags & VM_SHARED))
+ if (!vma)
+ goto out;
+
+ if (vma->vm_flags != vm_flags)
+ goto out;
+
+ if (vma->vm_file != file)
goto out;
if (start + size > vma->vm_end) {
@@ -1689,25 +1731,11 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(remap_file_pages, unsigned long, start, unsigned long, size,
goto out;
}
- prot |= vma->vm_flags & VM_READ ? PROT_READ : 0;
- prot |= vma->vm_flags & VM_WRITE ? PROT_WRITE : 0;
- prot |= vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC ? PROT_EXEC : 0;
-
- flags &= MAP_NONBLOCK;
- flags |= MAP_SHARED | MAP_FIXED | MAP_POPULATE;
- if (vma->vm_flags & VM_LOCKED)
- flags |= MAP_LOCKED;
-
- file = get_file(vma->vm_file);
- ret = security_mmap_file(vma->vm_file, prot, flags);
- if (ret)
- goto out_fput;
ret = do_mmap(vma->vm_file, start, size,
prot, flags, 0, pgoff, &populate, NULL);
-out_fput:
- fput(file);
out:
mmap_write_unlock(mm);
+ fput(file);
if (populate)
mm_populate(ret, populate);
if (!IS_ERR_VALUE(ret))
--
2.34.1
If some remap_pfn_range() calls succeeded before one failed, we still have
buffer pages mapped into the userspace page tables when we drop the buffer
reference with comedi_buf_map_put(bm). The userspace mappings are only
cleaned up later in the mmap error path.
Fix it by explicitly flushing all mappings in our VMA on the error path.
See commit 79a61cc3fc04 ("mm: avoid leaving partial pfn mappings around in
error case").
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
Fixes: ed9eccbe8970 ("Staging: add comedi core")
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh(a)google.com>
---
Note: compile-tested only; I don't actually have comedi hardware, and I
don't know anything about comedi.
---
Changes in v3:
- gate zapping ptes on CONFIG_MMU (Intel kernel test robot)
- Link to v2: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241015-comedi-tlb-v2-1-cafb0e27dd9a@google.com
Changes in v2:
- only do the zapping in the pfnmap path (Ian Abbott)
- use zap_vma_ptes() instead of zap_page_range_single() (Ian Abbott)
- Link to v1: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241014-comedi-tlb-v1-1-4b699144b438@google.com
---
drivers/comedi/comedi_fops.c | 12 ++++++++++++
1 file changed, 12 insertions(+)
diff --git a/drivers/comedi/comedi_fops.c b/drivers/comedi/comedi_fops.c
index 1b481731df96..b9df9b19d4bd 100644
--- a/drivers/comedi/comedi_fops.c
+++ b/drivers/comedi/comedi_fops.c
@@ -2407,6 +2407,18 @@ static int comedi_mmap(struct file *file, struct vm_area_struct *vma)
start += PAGE_SIZE;
}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_MMU
+ /*
+ * Leaving behind a partial mapping of a buffer we're about to
+ * drop is unsafe, see remap_pfn_range_notrack().
+ * We need to zap the range here ourselves instead of relying
+ * on the automatic zapping in remap_pfn_range() because we call
+ * remap_pfn_range() in a loop.
+ */
+ if (retval)
+ zap_vma_ptes(vma, vma->vm_start, size);
+#endif
}
if (retval == 0) {
---
base-commit: 6485cf5ea253d40d507cd71253c9568c5470cd27
change-id: 20241014-comedi-tlb-400246505961
--
Jann Horn <jannh(a)google.com>
In psnet_open_pf_bar() and snet_open_vf_bar() a string later passed to
pcim_iomap_regions() is placed on the stack. Neither
pcim_iomap_regions() nor the functions it calls copy that string.
Should the string later ever be used, this, consequently, causes
undefined behavior since the stack frame will by then have disappeared.
Fix the bug by allocating the strings on the heap through
devm_kasprintf().
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org # v6.3
Fixes: 51a8f9d7f587 ("virtio: vdpa: new SolidNET DPU driver.")
Reported-by: Christophe JAILLET <christophe.jaillet(a)wanadoo.fr>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/74e9109a-ac59-49e2-9b1d-d825c9c9f891@wanadoo.fr/
Suggested-by: Andy Shevchenko <andy(a)kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Philipp Stanner <pstanner(a)redhat.com>
---
drivers/vdpa/solidrun/snet_main.c | 14 ++++++++++----
1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/vdpa/solidrun/snet_main.c b/drivers/vdpa/solidrun/snet_main.c
index 99428a04068d..c8b74980dbd1 100644
--- a/drivers/vdpa/solidrun/snet_main.c
+++ b/drivers/vdpa/solidrun/snet_main.c
@@ -555,7 +555,7 @@ static const struct vdpa_config_ops snet_config_ops = {
static int psnet_open_pf_bar(struct pci_dev *pdev, struct psnet *psnet)
{
- char name[50];
+ char *name;
int ret, i, mask = 0;
/* We don't know which BAR will be used to communicate..
* We will map every bar with len > 0.
@@ -573,7 +573,10 @@ static int psnet_open_pf_bar(struct pci_dev *pdev, struct psnet *psnet)
return -ENODEV;
}
- snprintf(name, sizeof(name), "psnet[%s]-bars", pci_name(pdev));
+ name = devm_kasprintf(&pdev->dev, GFP_KERNEL, "psnet[%s]-bars", pci_name(pdev));
+ if (!name)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
ret = pcim_iomap_regions(pdev, mask, name);
if (ret) {
SNET_ERR(pdev, "Failed to request and map PCI BARs\n");
@@ -590,10 +593,13 @@ static int psnet_open_pf_bar(struct pci_dev *pdev, struct psnet *psnet)
static int snet_open_vf_bar(struct pci_dev *pdev, struct snet *snet)
{
- char name[50];
+ char *name;
int ret;
- snprintf(name, sizeof(name), "snet[%s]-bar", pci_name(pdev));
+ name = devm_kasprintf(&pdev->dev, GFP_KERNEL, "snet[%s]-bars", pci_name(pdev));
+ if (!name)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
/* Request and map BAR */
ret = pcim_iomap_regions(pdev, BIT(snet->psnet->cfg.vf_bar), name);
if (ret) {
--
2.46.1
The patch below does not apply to the 4.19-stable tree.
If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm
tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit
id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>.
To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands:
git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-4.19.y
git checkout FETCH_HEAD
git cherry-pick -x e8061f06185be0a06a73760d6526b8b0feadfe52
# <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.>
git commit -s
git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2024101827-implosion-twilight-c8e1@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 4.19.y' HEAD^..
Possible dependencies:
thanks,
greg k-h
------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------
From e8061f06185be0a06a73760d6526b8b0feadfe52 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Nico Boehr <nrb(a)linux.ibm.com>
Date: Tue, 17 Sep 2024 17:18:33 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] KVM: s390: gaccess: Check if guest address is in memslot
Previously, access_guest_page() did not check whether the given guest
address is inside of a memslot. This is not a problem, since
kvm_write_guest_page/kvm_read_guest_page return -EFAULT in this case.
However, -EFAULT is also returned when copy_to/from_user fails.
When emulating a guest instruction, the address being outside a memslot
usually means that an addressing exception should be injected into the
guest.
Failure in copy_to/from_user however indicates that something is wrong
in userspace and hence should be handled there.
To be able to distinguish these two cases, return PGM_ADDRESSING in
access_guest_page() when the guest address is outside guest memory. In
access_guest_real(), populate vcpu->arch.pgm.code such that
kvm_s390_inject_prog_cond() can be used in the caller for injecting into
the guest (if applicable).
Since this adds a new return value to access_guest_page(), we need to make
sure that other callers are not confused by the new positive return value.
There are the following users of access_guest_page():
- access_guest_with_key() does the checking itself (in
guest_range_to_gpas()), so this case should never happen. Even if, the
handling is set up properly.
- access_guest_real() just passes the return code to its callers, which
are:
- read_guest_real() - see below
- write_guest_real() - see below
There are the following users of read_guest_real():
- ar_translation() in gaccess.c which already returns PGM_*
- setup_apcb10(), setup_apcb00(), setup_apcb11() in vsie.c which always
return -EFAULT on read_guest_read() nonzero return - no change
- shadow_crycb(), handle_stfle() always present this as validity, this
could be handled better but doesn't change current behaviour - no change
There are the following users of write_guest_real():
- kvm_s390_store_status_unloaded() always returns -EFAULT on
write_guest_real() failure.
Fixes: 2293897805c2 ("KVM: s390: add architecture compliant guest access functions")
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Nico Boehr <nrb(a)linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Heiko Carstens <hca(a)linux.ibm.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240917151904.74314-2-nrb@linux.ibm.com
Acked-by: Janosch Frank <frankja(a)linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <hca(a)linux.ibm.com>
diff --git a/arch/s390/kvm/gaccess.c b/arch/s390/kvm/gaccess.c
index e65f597e3044..a688351f4ab5 100644
--- a/arch/s390/kvm/gaccess.c
+++ b/arch/s390/kvm/gaccess.c
@@ -828,6 +828,8 @@ static int access_guest_page(struct kvm *kvm, enum gacc_mode mode, gpa_t gpa,
const gfn_t gfn = gpa_to_gfn(gpa);
int rc;
+ if (!gfn_to_memslot(kvm, gfn))
+ return PGM_ADDRESSING;
if (mode == GACC_STORE)
rc = kvm_write_guest_page(kvm, gfn, data, offset, len);
else
@@ -985,6 +987,8 @@ int access_guest_real(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long gra,
gra += fragment_len;
data += fragment_len;
}
+ if (rc > 0)
+ vcpu->arch.pgm.code = rc;
return rc;
}
diff --git a/arch/s390/kvm/gaccess.h b/arch/s390/kvm/gaccess.h
index b320d12aa049..3fde45a151f2 100644
--- a/arch/s390/kvm/gaccess.h
+++ b/arch/s390/kvm/gaccess.h
@@ -405,11 +405,12 @@ int read_guest_abs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long gpa, void *data,
* @len: number of bytes to copy
*
* Copy @len bytes from @data (kernel space) to @gra (guest real address).
- * It is up to the caller to ensure that the entire guest memory range is
- * valid memory before calling this function.
* Guest low address and key protection are not checked.
*
- * Returns zero on success or -EFAULT on error.
+ * Returns zero on success, -EFAULT when copying from @data failed, or
+ * PGM_ADRESSING in case @gra is outside a memslot. In this case, pgm check info
+ * is also stored to allow injecting into the guest (if applicable) using
+ * kvm_s390_inject_prog_cond().
*
* If an error occurs data may have been copied partially to guest memory.
*/
@@ -428,11 +429,12 @@ int write_guest_real(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long gra, void *data,
* @len: number of bytes to copy
*
* Copy @len bytes from @gra (guest real address) to @data (kernel space).
- * It is up to the caller to ensure that the entire guest memory range is
- * valid memory before calling this function.
* Guest key protection is not checked.
*
- * Returns zero on success or -EFAULT on error.
+ * Returns zero on success, -EFAULT when copying to @data failed, or
+ * PGM_ADRESSING in case @gra is outside a memslot. In this case, pgm check info
+ * is also stored to allow injecting into the guest (if applicable) using
+ * kvm_s390_inject_prog_cond().
*
* If an error occurs data may have been copied partially to kernel space.
*/
The patch below does not apply to the 5.4-stable tree.
If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm
tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit
id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>.
To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands:
git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-5.4.y
git checkout FETCH_HEAD
git cherry-pick -x e8061f06185be0a06a73760d6526b8b0feadfe52
# <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.>
git commit -s
git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2024101826-gracious-singer-816f@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 5.4.y' HEAD^..
Possible dependencies:
thanks,
greg k-h
------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------
From e8061f06185be0a06a73760d6526b8b0feadfe52 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Nico Boehr <nrb(a)linux.ibm.com>
Date: Tue, 17 Sep 2024 17:18:33 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] KVM: s390: gaccess: Check if guest address is in memslot
Previously, access_guest_page() did not check whether the given guest
address is inside of a memslot. This is not a problem, since
kvm_write_guest_page/kvm_read_guest_page return -EFAULT in this case.
However, -EFAULT is also returned when copy_to/from_user fails.
When emulating a guest instruction, the address being outside a memslot
usually means that an addressing exception should be injected into the
guest.
Failure in copy_to/from_user however indicates that something is wrong
in userspace and hence should be handled there.
To be able to distinguish these two cases, return PGM_ADDRESSING in
access_guest_page() when the guest address is outside guest memory. In
access_guest_real(), populate vcpu->arch.pgm.code such that
kvm_s390_inject_prog_cond() can be used in the caller for injecting into
the guest (if applicable).
Since this adds a new return value to access_guest_page(), we need to make
sure that other callers are not confused by the new positive return value.
There are the following users of access_guest_page():
- access_guest_with_key() does the checking itself (in
guest_range_to_gpas()), so this case should never happen. Even if, the
handling is set up properly.
- access_guest_real() just passes the return code to its callers, which
are:
- read_guest_real() - see below
- write_guest_real() - see below
There are the following users of read_guest_real():
- ar_translation() in gaccess.c which already returns PGM_*
- setup_apcb10(), setup_apcb00(), setup_apcb11() in vsie.c which always
return -EFAULT on read_guest_read() nonzero return - no change
- shadow_crycb(), handle_stfle() always present this as validity, this
could be handled better but doesn't change current behaviour - no change
There are the following users of write_guest_real():
- kvm_s390_store_status_unloaded() always returns -EFAULT on
write_guest_real() failure.
Fixes: 2293897805c2 ("KVM: s390: add architecture compliant guest access functions")
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Nico Boehr <nrb(a)linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Heiko Carstens <hca(a)linux.ibm.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240917151904.74314-2-nrb@linux.ibm.com
Acked-by: Janosch Frank <frankja(a)linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <hca(a)linux.ibm.com>
diff --git a/arch/s390/kvm/gaccess.c b/arch/s390/kvm/gaccess.c
index e65f597e3044..a688351f4ab5 100644
--- a/arch/s390/kvm/gaccess.c
+++ b/arch/s390/kvm/gaccess.c
@@ -828,6 +828,8 @@ static int access_guest_page(struct kvm *kvm, enum gacc_mode mode, gpa_t gpa,
const gfn_t gfn = gpa_to_gfn(gpa);
int rc;
+ if (!gfn_to_memslot(kvm, gfn))
+ return PGM_ADDRESSING;
if (mode == GACC_STORE)
rc = kvm_write_guest_page(kvm, gfn, data, offset, len);
else
@@ -985,6 +987,8 @@ int access_guest_real(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long gra,
gra += fragment_len;
data += fragment_len;
}
+ if (rc > 0)
+ vcpu->arch.pgm.code = rc;
return rc;
}
diff --git a/arch/s390/kvm/gaccess.h b/arch/s390/kvm/gaccess.h
index b320d12aa049..3fde45a151f2 100644
--- a/arch/s390/kvm/gaccess.h
+++ b/arch/s390/kvm/gaccess.h
@@ -405,11 +405,12 @@ int read_guest_abs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long gpa, void *data,
* @len: number of bytes to copy
*
* Copy @len bytes from @data (kernel space) to @gra (guest real address).
- * It is up to the caller to ensure that the entire guest memory range is
- * valid memory before calling this function.
* Guest low address and key protection are not checked.
*
- * Returns zero on success or -EFAULT on error.
+ * Returns zero on success, -EFAULT when copying from @data failed, or
+ * PGM_ADRESSING in case @gra is outside a memslot. In this case, pgm check info
+ * is also stored to allow injecting into the guest (if applicable) using
+ * kvm_s390_inject_prog_cond().
*
* If an error occurs data may have been copied partially to guest memory.
*/
@@ -428,11 +429,12 @@ int write_guest_real(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long gra, void *data,
* @len: number of bytes to copy
*
* Copy @len bytes from @gra (guest real address) to @data (kernel space).
- * It is up to the caller to ensure that the entire guest memory range is
- * valid memory before calling this function.
* Guest key protection is not checked.
*
- * Returns zero on success or -EFAULT on error.
+ * Returns zero on success, -EFAULT when copying to @data failed, or
+ * PGM_ADRESSING in case @gra is outside a memslot. In this case, pgm check info
+ * is also stored to allow injecting into the guest (if applicable) using
+ * kvm_s390_inject_prog_cond().
*
* If an error occurs data may have been copied partially to kernel space.
*/
The patch below does not apply to the 5.10-stable tree.
If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm
tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit
id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>.
To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands:
git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-5.10.y
git checkout FETCH_HEAD
git cherry-pick -x e8061f06185be0a06a73760d6526b8b0feadfe52
# <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.>
git commit -s
git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2024101824-departure-oversight-aa1e@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 5.10.y' HEAD^..
Possible dependencies:
thanks,
greg k-h
------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------
From e8061f06185be0a06a73760d6526b8b0feadfe52 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Nico Boehr <nrb(a)linux.ibm.com>
Date: Tue, 17 Sep 2024 17:18:33 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] KVM: s390: gaccess: Check if guest address is in memslot
Previously, access_guest_page() did not check whether the given guest
address is inside of a memslot. This is not a problem, since
kvm_write_guest_page/kvm_read_guest_page return -EFAULT in this case.
However, -EFAULT is also returned when copy_to/from_user fails.
When emulating a guest instruction, the address being outside a memslot
usually means that an addressing exception should be injected into the
guest.
Failure in copy_to/from_user however indicates that something is wrong
in userspace and hence should be handled there.
To be able to distinguish these two cases, return PGM_ADDRESSING in
access_guest_page() when the guest address is outside guest memory. In
access_guest_real(), populate vcpu->arch.pgm.code such that
kvm_s390_inject_prog_cond() can be used in the caller for injecting into
the guest (if applicable).
Since this adds a new return value to access_guest_page(), we need to make
sure that other callers are not confused by the new positive return value.
There are the following users of access_guest_page():
- access_guest_with_key() does the checking itself (in
guest_range_to_gpas()), so this case should never happen. Even if, the
handling is set up properly.
- access_guest_real() just passes the return code to its callers, which
are:
- read_guest_real() - see below
- write_guest_real() - see below
There are the following users of read_guest_real():
- ar_translation() in gaccess.c which already returns PGM_*
- setup_apcb10(), setup_apcb00(), setup_apcb11() in vsie.c which always
return -EFAULT on read_guest_read() nonzero return - no change
- shadow_crycb(), handle_stfle() always present this as validity, this
could be handled better but doesn't change current behaviour - no change
There are the following users of write_guest_real():
- kvm_s390_store_status_unloaded() always returns -EFAULT on
write_guest_real() failure.
Fixes: 2293897805c2 ("KVM: s390: add architecture compliant guest access functions")
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Nico Boehr <nrb(a)linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Heiko Carstens <hca(a)linux.ibm.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240917151904.74314-2-nrb@linux.ibm.com
Acked-by: Janosch Frank <frankja(a)linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <hca(a)linux.ibm.com>
diff --git a/arch/s390/kvm/gaccess.c b/arch/s390/kvm/gaccess.c
index e65f597e3044..a688351f4ab5 100644
--- a/arch/s390/kvm/gaccess.c
+++ b/arch/s390/kvm/gaccess.c
@@ -828,6 +828,8 @@ static int access_guest_page(struct kvm *kvm, enum gacc_mode mode, gpa_t gpa,
const gfn_t gfn = gpa_to_gfn(gpa);
int rc;
+ if (!gfn_to_memslot(kvm, gfn))
+ return PGM_ADDRESSING;
if (mode == GACC_STORE)
rc = kvm_write_guest_page(kvm, gfn, data, offset, len);
else
@@ -985,6 +987,8 @@ int access_guest_real(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long gra,
gra += fragment_len;
data += fragment_len;
}
+ if (rc > 0)
+ vcpu->arch.pgm.code = rc;
return rc;
}
diff --git a/arch/s390/kvm/gaccess.h b/arch/s390/kvm/gaccess.h
index b320d12aa049..3fde45a151f2 100644
--- a/arch/s390/kvm/gaccess.h
+++ b/arch/s390/kvm/gaccess.h
@@ -405,11 +405,12 @@ int read_guest_abs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long gpa, void *data,
* @len: number of bytes to copy
*
* Copy @len bytes from @data (kernel space) to @gra (guest real address).
- * It is up to the caller to ensure that the entire guest memory range is
- * valid memory before calling this function.
* Guest low address and key protection are not checked.
*
- * Returns zero on success or -EFAULT on error.
+ * Returns zero on success, -EFAULT when copying from @data failed, or
+ * PGM_ADRESSING in case @gra is outside a memslot. In this case, pgm check info
+ * is also stored to allow injecting into the guest (if applicable) using
+ * kvm_s390_inject_prog_cond().
*
* If an error occurs data may have been copied partially to guest memory.
*/
@@ -428,11 +429,12 @@ int write_guest_real(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long gra, void *data,
* @len: number of bytes to copy
*
* Copy @len bytes from @gra (guest real address) to @data (kernel space).
- * It is up to the caller to ensure that the entire guest memory range is
- * valid memory before calling this function.
* Guest key protection is not checked.
*
- * Returns zero on success or -EFAULT on error.
+ * Returns zero on success, -EFAULT when copying to @data failed, or
+ * PGM_ADRESSING in case @gra is outside a memslot. In this case, pgm check info
+ * is also stored to allow injecting into the guest (if applicable) using
+ * kvm_s390_inject_prog_cond().
*
* If an error occurs data may have been copied partially to kernel space.
*/
The patch below does not apply to the 5.15-stable tree.
If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm
tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit
id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>.
To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands:
git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-5.15.y
git checkout FETCH_HEAD
git cherry-pick -x e8061f06185be0a06a73760d6526b8b0feadfe52
# <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.>
git commit -s
git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2024101823-tractor-twitter-a318@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 5.15.y' HEAD^..
Possible dependencies:
thanks,
greg k-h
------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------
From e8061f06185be0a06a73760d6526b8b0feadfe52 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Nico Boehr <nrb(a)linux.ibm.com>
Date: Tue, 17 Sep 2024 17:18:33 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] KVM: s390: gaccess: Check if guest address is in memslot
Previously, access_guest_page() did not check whether the given guest
address is inside of a memslot. This is not a problem, since
kvm_write_guest_page/kvm_read_guest_page return -EFAULT in this case.
However, -EFAULT is also returned when copy_to/from_user fails.
When emulating a guest instruction, the address being outside a memslot
usually means that an addressing exception should be injected into the
guest.
Failure in copy_to/from_user however indicates that something is wrong
in userspace and hence should be handled there.
To be able to distinguish these two cases, return PGM_ADDRESSING in
access_guest_page() when the guest address is outside guest memory. In
access_guest_real(), populate vcpu->arch.pgm.code such that
kvm_s390_inject_prog_cond() can be used in the caller for injecting into
the guest (if applicable).
Since this adds a new return value to access_guest_page(), we need to make
sure that other callers are not confused by the new positive return value.
There are the following users of access_guest_page():
- access_guest_with_key() does the checking itself (in
guest_range_to_gpas()), so this case should never happen. Even if, the
handling is set up properly.
- access_guest_real() just passes the return code to its callers, which
are:
- read_guest_real() - see below
- write_guest_real() - see below
There are the following users of read_guest_real():
- ar_translation() in gaccess.c which already returns PGM_*
- setup_apcb10(), setup_apcb00(), setup_apcb11() in vsie.c which always
return -EFAULT on read_guest_read() nonzero return - no change
- shadow_crycb(), handle_stfle() always present this as validity, this
could be handled better but doesn't change current behaviour - no change
There are the following users of write_guest_real():
- kvm_s390_store_status_unloaded() always returns -EFAULT on
write_guest_real() failure.
Fixes: 2293897805c2 ("KVM: s390: add architecture compliant guest access functions")
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Nico Boehr <nrb(a)linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Heiko Carstens <hca(a)linux.ibm.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240917151904.74314-2-nrb@linux.ibm.com
Acked-by: Janosch Frank <frankja(a)linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <hca(a)linux.ibm.com>
diff --git a/arch/s390/kvm/gaccess.c b/arch/s390/kvm/gaccess.c
index e65f597e3044..a688351f4ab5 100644
--- a/arch/s390/kvm/gaccess.c
+++ b/arch/s390/kvm/gaccess.c
@@ -828,6 +828,8 @@ static int access_guest_page(struct kvm *kvm, enum gacc_mode mode, gpa_t gpa,
const gfn_t gfn = gpa_to_gfn(gpa);
int rc;
+ if (!gfn_to_memslot(kvm, gfn))
+ return PGM_ADDRESSING;
if (mode == GACC_STORE)
rc = kvm_write_guest_page(kvm, gfn, data, offset, len);
else
@@ -985,6 +987,8 @@ int access_guest_real(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long gra,
gra += fragment_len;
data += fragment_len;
}
+ if (rc > 0)
+ vcpu->arch.pgm.code = rc;
return rc;
}
diff --git a/arch/s390/kvm/gaccess.h b/arch/s390/kvm/gaccess.h
index b320d12aa049..3fde45a151f2 100644
--- a/arch/s390/kvm/gaccess.h
+++ b/arch/s390/kvm/gaccess.h
@@ -405,11 +405,12 @@ int read_guest_abs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long gpa, void *data,
* @len: number of bytes to copy
*
* Copy @len bytes from @data (kernel space) to @gra (guest real address).
- * It is up to the caller to ensure that the entire guest memory range is
- * valid memory before calling this function.
* Guest low address and key protection are not checked.
*
- * Returns zero on success or -EFAULT on error.
+ * Returns zero on success, -EFAULT when copying from @data failed, or
+ * PGM_ADRESSING in case @gra is outside a memslot. In this case, pgm check info
+ * is also stored to allow injecting into the guest (if applicable) using
+ * kvm_s390_inject_prog_cond().
*
* If an error occurs data may have been copied partially to guest memory.
*/
@@ -428,11 +429,12 @@ int write_guest_real(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long gra, void *data,
* @len: number of bytes to copy
*
* Copy @len bytes from @gra (guest real address) to @data (kernel space).
- * It is up to the caller to ensure that the entire guest memory range is
- * valid memory before calling this function.
* Guest key protection is not checked.
*
- * Returns zero on success or -EFAULT on error.
+ * Returns zero on success, -EFAULT when copying to @data failed, or
+ * PGM_ADRESSING in case @gra is outside a memslot. In this case, pgm check info
+ * is also stored to allow injecting into the guest (if applicable) using
+ * kvm_s390_inject_prog_cond().
*
* If an error occurs data may have been copied partially to kernel space.
*/
Currently, the rproc "atomic_t power" variable is incremented during:
a. WPSS rproc auto boot.
b. AHB power on for ath11k.
During AHB power off (rmmod ath11k_ahb.ko), rproc_shutdown fails
to unload the WPSS firmware because the rproc->power value is '2',
causing the atomic_dec_and_test(&rproc->power) condition to fail.
Consequently, during AHB power on (insmod ath11k_ahb.ko),
QMI_WLANFW_HOST_CAP_REQ_V01 fails due to the host and firmware QMI
states being out of sync.
Fixes: 300ed425dfa9 ("remoteproc: qcom_q6v5_pas: Add SC7280 ADSP, CDSP & WPSS")
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Balaji Pothunoori <quic_bpothuno(a)quicinc.com>
---
v2: updated commit text.
added Fixes/cc:stable tags.
drivers/remoteproc/qcom_q6v5_pas.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/drivers/remoteproc/qcom_q6v5_pas.c b/drivers/remoteproc/qcom_q6v5_pas.c
index ef82835e98a4..05963d7924df 100644
--- a/drivers/remoteproc/qcom_q6v5_pas.c
+++ b/drivers/remoteproc/qcom_q6v5_pas.c
@@ -1344,7 +1344,7 @@ static const struct adsp_data sc7280_wpss_resource = {
.crash_reason_smem = 626,
.firmware_name = "wpss.mdt",
.pas_id = 6,
- .auto_boot = true,
+ .auto_boot = false,
.proxy_pd_names = (char*[]){
"cx",
"mx",
--
2.34.1
commit f011c9cf04c06f16b24f583d313d3c012e589e50 upstream.
The submit queue polling threads are userland threads that just never
exit to the userland. When creating the thread with IORING_SETUP_SQ_AFF,
the affinity of the poller thread is set to the cpu specified in
sq_thread_cpu. However, this CPU can be outside of the cpuset defined
by the cgroup cpuset controller. This violates the rules defined by the
cpuset controller and is a potential issue for realtime applications.
In b7ed6d8ffd6 we fixed the default affinity of the poller thread, in
case no explicit pinning is required by inheriting the one of the
creating task. In case of explicit pinning, the check is more
complicated, as also a cpu outside of the parent cpumask is allowed.
We implemented this by using cpuset_cpus_allowed (that has support for
cgroup cpusets) and testing if the requested cpu is in the set.
Fixes: 37d1e2e3642e ("io_uring: move SQPOLL thread io-wq forked worker")
Signed-off-by: Felix Moessbauer <felix.moessbauer(a)siemens.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240909150036.55921-1-felix.moessbauer@siemens.c…
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe(a)kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org>
---
io_uring/io_uring.c | 5 ++++-
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/io_uring/io_uring.c b/io_uring/io_uring.c
index 8ed2c65529714..6b6fd244233f8 100644
--- a/io_uring/io_uring.c
+++ b/io_uring/io_uring.c
@@ -56,6 +56,7 @@
#include <linux/mm.h>
#include <linux/mman.h>
#include <linux/percpu.h>
+#include <linux/cpuset.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <linux/blkdev.h>
#include <linux/bvec.h>
@@ -8746,10 +8747,12 @@ static int io_sq_offload_create(struct io_ring_ctx *ctx,
return 0;
if (p->flags & IORING_SETUP_SQ_AFF) {
+ struct cpumask allowed_mask;
int cpu = p->sq_thread_cpu;
ret = -EINVAL;
- if (cpu >= nr_cpu_ids || !cpu_online(cpu))
+ cpuset_cpus_allowed(current, &allowed_mask);
+ if (!cpumask_test_cpu(cpu, &allowed_mask))
goto err_sqpoll;
sqd->sq_cpu = cpu;
} else {
--
2.39.5
Svacer reports a NULL-pointer dereference in rtl8xxxu_probe().
After having been compared to a NULL value, pointer hw is passed as
1st parameter in call to ieee80211_free_hw(), where it is dereferenced.
The problem is present in 5.10 stable release and can be fixed by the
following upstream patch that can be cleanly applied to 5.10 branch.
The patch below does not apply to the 6.1-stable tree.
If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm
tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit
id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>.
To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands:
git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-6.1.y
git checkout FETCH_HEAD
git cherry-pick -x bea07fd63192b61209d48cbb81ef474cc3ee4c62
# <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.>
git commit -s
git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2024101840-army-handstand-92f8@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 6.1.y' HEAD^..
Possible dependencies:
thanks,
greg k-h
------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------
From bea07fd63192b61209d48cbb81ef474cc3ee4c62 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Lorenzo Stoakes <lorenzo.stoakes(a)oracle.com>
Date: Mon, 7 Oct 2024 16:28:32 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] maple_tree: correct tree corruption on spanning store
Patch series "maple_tree: correct tree corruption on spanning store", v3.
There has been a nasty yet subtle maple tree corruption bug that appears
to have been in existence since the inception of the algorithm.
This bug seems far more likely to happen since commit f8d112a4e657
("mm/mmap: avoid zeroing vma tree in mmap_region()"), which is the point
at which reports started to be submitted concerning this bug.
We were made definitely aware of the bug thanks to the kind efforts of
Bert Karwatzki who helped enormously in my being able to track this down
and identify the cause of it.
The bug arises when an attempt is made to perform a spanning store across
two leaf nodes, where the right leaf node is the rightmost child of the
shared parent, AND the store completely consumes the right-mode node.
This results in mas_wr_spanning_store() mitakenly duplicating the new and
existing entries at the maximum pivot within the range, and thus maple
tree corruption.
The fix patch corrects this by detecting this scenario and disallowing the
mistaken duplicate copy.
The fix patch commit message goes into great detail as to how this occurs.
This series also includes a test which reliably reproduces the issue, and
asserts that the fix works correctly.
Bert has kindly tested the fix and confirmed it resolved his issues. Also
Mikhail Gavrilov kindly reported what appears to be precisely the same
bug, which this fix should also resolve.
This patch (of 2):
There has been a subtle bug present in the maple tree implementation from
its inception.
This arises from how stores are performed - when a store occurs, it will
overwrite overlapping ranges and adjust the tree as necessary to
accommodate this.
A range may always ultimately span two leaf nodes. In this instance we
walk the two leaf nodes, determine which elements are not overwritten to
the left and to the right of the start and end of the ranges respectively
and then rebalance the tree to contain these entries and the newly
inserted one.
This kind of store is dubbed a 'spanning store' and is implemented by
mas_wr_spanning_store().
In order to reach this stage, mas_store_gfp() invokes
mas_wr_preallocate(), mas_wr_store_type() and mas_wr_walk() in turn to
walk the tree and update the object (mas) to traverse to the location
where the write should be performed, determining its store type.
When a spanning store is required, this function returns false stopping at
the parent node which contains the target range, and mas_wr_store_type()
marks the mas->store_type as wr_spanning_store to denote this fact.
When we go to perform the store in mas_wr_spanning_store(), we first
determine the elements AFTER the END of the range we wish to store (that
is, to the right of the entry to be inserted) - we do this by walking to
the NEXT pivot in the tree (i.e. r_mas.last + 1), starting at the node we
have just determined contains the range over which we intend to write.
We then turn our attention to the entries to the left of the entry we are
inserting, whose state is represented by l_mas, and copy these into a 'big
node', which is a special node which contains enough slots to contain two
leaf node's worth of data.
We then copy the entry we wish to store immediately after this - the copy
and the insertion of the new entry is performed by mas_store_b_node().
After this we copy the elements to the right of the end of the range which
we are inserting, if we have not exceeded the length of the node (i.e.
r_mas.offset <= r_mas.end).
Herein lies the bug - under very specific circumstances, this logic can
break and corrupt the maple tree.
Consider the following tree:
Height
0 Root Node
/ \
pivot = 0xffff / \ pivot = ULONG_MAX
/ \
1 A [-----] ...
/ \
pivot = 0x4fff / \ pivot = 0xffff
/ \
2 (LEAVES) B [-----] [-----] C
^--- Last pivot 0xffff.
Now imagine we wish to store an entry in the range [0x4000, 0xffff] (note
that all ranges expressed in maple tree code are inclusive):
1. mas_store_gfp() descends the tree, finds node A at <=0xffff, then
determines that this is a spanning store across nodes B and C. The mas
state is set such that the current node from which we traverse further
is node A.
2. In mas_wr_spanning_store() we try to find elements to the right of pivot
0xffff by searching for an index of 0x10000:
- mas_wr_walk_index() invokes mas_wr_walk_descend() and
mas_wr_node_walk() in turn.
- mas_wr_node_walk() loops over entries in node A until EITHER it
finds an entry whose pivot equals or exceeds 0x10000 OR it
reaches the final entry.
- Since no entry has a pivot equal to or exceeding 0x10000, pivot
0xffff is selected, leading to node C.
- mas_wr_walk_traverse() resets the mas state to traverse node C. We
loop around and invoke mas_wr_walk_descend() and mas_wr_node_walk()
in turn once again.
- Again, we reach the last entry in node C, which has a pivot of
0xffff.
3. We then copy the elements to the left of 0x4000 in node B to the big
node via mas_store_b_node(), and insert the new [0x4000, 0xffff] entry
too.
4. We determine whether we have any entries to copy from the right of the
end of the range via - and with r_mas set up at the entry at pivot
0xffff, r_mas.offset <= r_mas.end, and then we DUPLICATE the entry at
pivot 0xffff.
5. BUG! The maple tree is corrupted with a duplicate entry.
This requires a very specific set of circumstances - we must be spanning
the last element in a leaf node, which is the last element in the parent
node.
spanning store across two leaf nodes with a range that ends at that shared
pivot.
A potential solution to this problem would simply be to reset the walk
each time we traverse r_mas, however given the rarity of this situation it
seems that would be rather inefficient.
Instead, this patch detects if the right hand node is populated, i.e. has
anything we need to copy.
We do so by only copying elements from the right of the entry being
inserted when the maximum value present exceeds the last, rather than
basing this on offset position.
The patch also updates some comments and eliminates the unused bool return
value in mas_wr_walk_index().
The work performed in commit f8d112a4e657 ("mm/mmap: avoid zeroing vma
tree in mmap_region()") seems to have made the probability of this event
much more likely, which is the point at which reports started to be
submitted concerning this bug.
The motivation for this change arose from Bert Karwatzki's report of
encountering mm instability after the release of kernel v6.12-rc1 which,
after the use of CONFIG_DEBUG_VM_MAPLE_TREE and similar configuration
options, was identified as maple tree corruption.
After Bert very generously provided his time and ability to reproduce this
event consistently, I was able to finally identify that the issue
discussed in this commit message was occurring for him.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/cover.1728314402.git.lorenzo.stoakes@oracle.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/48b349a2a0f7c76e18772712d0997a5e12ab0a3b.17283144…
Fixes: 54a611b60590 ("Maple Tree: add new data structure")
Signed-off-by: Lorenzo Stoakes <lorenzo.stoakes(a)oracle.com>
Reported-by: Bert Karwatzki <spasswolf(a)web.de>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20241001023402.3374-1-spasswolf@web.de/
Tested-by: Bert Karwatzki <spasswolf(a)web.de>
Reported-by: Mikhail Gavrilov <mikhail.v.gavrilov(a)gmail.com>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/CABXGCsOPwuoNOqSMmAvWO2Fz4TEmPnjFj-b7iF+XFRu1h7…
Acked-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka(a)suse.cz>
Reviewed-by: Liam R. Howlett <Liam.Howlett(a)Oracle.com>
Tested-by: Mikhail Gavrilov <mikhail.v.gavrilov(a)gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Wei Yang <richard.weiyang(a)gmail.com>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy(a)infradead.org>
Cc: Sidhartha Kumar <sidhartha.kumar(a)oracle.com>
Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm(a)linux-foundation.org>
diff --git a/lib/maple_tree.c b/lib/maple_tree.c
index ce7c7a7a8258..3619301dda2e 100644
--- a/lib/maple_tree.c
+++ b/lib/maple_tree.c
@@ -2196,6 +2196,8 @@ static inline void mas_node_or_none(struct ma_state *mas,
/*
* mas_wr_node_walk() - Find the correct offset for the index in the @mas.
+ * If @mas->index cannot be found within the containing
+ * node, we traverse to the last entry in the node.
* @wr_mas: The maple write state
*
* Uses mas_slot_locked() and does not need to worry about dead nodes.
@@ -3532,7 +3534,7 @@ static bool mas_wr_walk(struct ma_wr_state *wr_mas)
return true;
}
-static bool mas_wr_walk_index(struct ma_wr_state *wr_mas)
+static void mas_wr_walk_index(struct ma_wr_state *wr_mas)
{
struct ma_state *mas = wr_mas->mas;
@@ -3541,11 +3543,9 @@ static bool mas_wr_walk_index(struct ma_wr_state *wr_mas)
wr_mas->content = mas_slot_locked(mas, wr_mas->slots,
mas->offset);
if (ma_is_leaf(wr_mas->type))
- return true;
+ return;
mas_wr_walk_traverse(wr_mas);
-
}
- return true;
}
/*
* mas_extend_spanning_null() - Extend a store of a %NULL to include surrounding %NULLs.
@@ -3765,8 +3765,8 @@ static noinline void mas_wr_spanning_store(struct ma_wr_state *wr_mas)
memset(&b_node, 0, sizeof(struct maple_big_node));
/* Copy l_mas and store the value in b_node. */
mas_store_b_node(&l_wr_mas, &b_node, l_mas.end);
- /* Copy r_mas into b_node. */
- if (r_mas.offset <= r_mas.end)
+ /* Copy r_mas into b_node if there is anything to copy. */
+ if (r_mas.max > r_mas.last)
mas_mab_cp(&r_mas, r_mas.offset, r_mas.end,
&b_node, b_node.b_end + 1);
else
Avoid xHC host from processing a cancelled URB by always turning
cancelled URB TDs into no-op TRBs before queuing a 'Set TR Deq' command.
If the command fails then xHC will start processing the cancelled TD
instead of skipping it once endpoint is restarted, causing issues like
Babble error.
This is not a complete solution as a failed 'Set TR Deq' command does not
guarantee xHC TRB caches are cleared.
Fixes: 4db356924a50 ("xhci: turn cancelled td cleanup to its own function")
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Mathias Nyman <mathias.nyman(a)linux.intel.com>
---
drivers/usb/host/xhci-ring.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/drivers/usb/host/xhci-ring.c b/drivers/usb/host/xhci-ring.c
index 4d664ba53fe9..7dedf31bbddd 100644
--- a/drivers/usb/host/xhci-ring.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/host/xhci-ring.c
@@ -1023,7 +1023,7 @@ static int xhci_invalidate_cancelled_tds(struct xhci_virt_ep *ep)
td_to_noop(xhci, ring, cached_td, false);
cached_td->cancel_status = TD_CLEARED;
}
-
+ td_to_noop(xhci, ring, td, false);
td->cancel_status = TD_CLEARING_CACHE;
cached_td = td;
break;
--
2.25.1
The PLL checks are comparing 64 bit integers with 32 bit
ones, as reported by Coverity. Depending on the values of
the variables, this may underflow.
Fix it ensuring that both sides of the expression are u64.
Fixes: 852b50aeed15 ("media: On Semi AR0521 sensor driver")
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab+huawei(a)kernel.org>
Acked-by: Sakari Ailus <sakari.ailus(a)linux.intel.com>
---
drivers/media/i2c/ar0521.c | 4 ++--
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/media/i2c/ar0521.c b/drivers/media/i2c/ar0521.c
index fc27238dd4d3..24873149096c 100644
--- a/drivers/media/i2c/ar0521.c
+++ b/drivers/media/i2c/ar0521.c
@@ -255,10 +255,10 @@ static u32 calc_pll(struct ar0521_dev *sensor, u32 freq, u16 *pre_ptr, u16 *mult
continue; /* Minimum value */
if (new_mult > 254)
break; /* Maximum, larger pre won't work either */
- if (sensor->extclk_freq * (u64)new_mult < AR0521_PLL_MIN *
+ if (sensor->extclk_freq * (u64)new_mult < (u64)AR0521_PLL_MIN *
new_pre)
continue;
- if (sensor->extclk_freq * (u64)new_mult > AR0521_PLL_MAX *
+ if (sensor->extclk_freq * (u64)new_mult > (u64)AR0521_PLL_MAX *
new_pre)
break; /* Larger pre won't work either */
new_pll = div64_round_up(sensor->extclk_freq * (u64)new_mult,
--
2.47.0
Svacer reports possible dereference of a NULL-pointer in
amd_iommu_probe_finalize(). The problem is present in 5.10 stable release
and can be fixed by the following upstream patch. In order to apply this
patch, the incoming changes had to be manually accepted. This action was
necessary due to some differences in the code of amd_iommu_probe_finalize()
of the upstream version and 5.10 version of the kernel.
A commit adding back the stopping of tx on port shutdown failed to add
back the locking which had also been removed by commit e83766334f96
("tty: serial: qcom_geni_serial: No need to stop tx/rx on UART
shutdown").
Holding the port lock is needed to serialise against the console code,
which may update the interrupt enable register and access the port
state.
Fixes: d8aca2f96813 ("tty: serial: qcom-geni-serial: stop operations in progress at shutdown")
Fixes: 947cc4ecc06c ("serial: qcom-geni: fix soft lockup on sw flow control and suspend")
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org # 6.3
Cc: Bartosz Golaszewski <bartosz.golaszewski(a)linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <johan+linaro(a)kernel.org>
---
drivers/tty/serial/qcom_geni_serial.c | 2 ++
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
diff --git a/drivers/tty/serial/qcom_geni_serial.c b/drivers/tty/serial/qcom_geni_serial.c
index 9ea6bd09e665..b6a8729cee6d 100644
--- a/drivers/tty/serial/qcom_geni_serial.c
+++ b/drivers/tty/serial/qcom_geni_serial.c
@@ -1096,10 +1096,12 @@ static void qcom_geni_serial_shutdown(struct uart_port *uport)
{
disable_irq(uport->irq);
+ uart_port_lock_irq(uport);
qcom_geni_serial_stop_tx(uport);
qcom_geni_serial_stop_rx(uport);
qcom_geni_serial_cancel_tx_cmd(uport);
+ uart_port_unlock_irq(uport);
}
static void qcom_geni_serial_flush_buffer(struct uart_port *uport)
--
2.45.2
The patch below does not apply to the 6.6-stable tree.
If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm
tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit
id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>.
To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands:
git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-6.6.y
git checkout FETCH_HEAD
git cherry-pick -x bea07fd63192b61209d48cbb81ef474cc3ee4c62
# <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.>
git commit -s
git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2024101818-ducky-dallying-2814@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 6.6.y' HEAD^..
Possible dependencies:
thanks,
greg k-h
------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------
From bea07fd63192b61209d48cbb81ef474cc3ee4c62 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Lorenzo Stoakes <lorenzo.stoakes(a)oracle.com>
Date: Mon, 7 Oct 2024 16:28:32 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] maple_tree: correct tree corruption on spanning store
Patch series "maple_tree: correct tree corruption on spanning store", v3.
There has been a nasty yet subtle maple tree corruption bug that appears
to have been in existence since the inception of the algorithm.
This bug seems far more likely to happen since commit f8d112a4e657
("mm/mmap: avoid zeroing vma tree in mmap_region()"), which is the point
at which reports started to be submitted concerning this bug.
We were made definitely aware of the bug thanks to the kind efforts of
Bert Karwatzki who helped enormously in my being able to track this down
and identify the cause of it.
The bug arises when an attempt is made to perform a spanning store across
two leaf nodes, where the right leaf node is the rightmost child of the
shared parent, AND the store completely consumes the right-mode node.
This results in mas_wr_spanning_store() mitakenly duplicating the new and
existing entries at the maximum pivot within the range, and thus maple
tree corruption.
The fix patch corrects this by detecting this scenario and disallowing the
mistaken duplicate copy.
The fix patch commit message goes into great detail as to how this occurs.
This series also includes a test which reliably reproduces the issue, and
asserts that the fix works correctly.
Bert has kindly tested the fix and confirmed it resolved his issues. Also
Mikhail Gavrilov kindly reported what appears to be precisely the same
bug, which this fix should also resolve.
This patch (of 2):
There has been a subtle bug present in the maple tree implementation from
its inception.
This arises from how stores are performed - when a store occurs, it will
overwrite overlapping ranges and adjust the tree as necessary to
accommodate this.
A range may always ultimately span two leaf nodes. In this instance we
walk the two leaf nodes, determine which elements are not overwritten to
the left and to the right of the start and end of the ranges respectively
and then rebalance the tree to contain these entries and the newly
inserted one.
This kind of store is dubbed a 'spanning store' and is implemented by
mas_wr_spanning_store().
In order to reach this stage, mas_store_gfp() invokes
mas_wr_preallocate(), mas_wr_store_type() and mas_wr_walk() in turn to
walk the tree and update the object (mas) to traverse to the location
where the write should be performed, determining its store type.
When a spanning store is required, this function returns false stopping at
the parent node which contains the target range, and mas_wr_store_type()
marks the mas->store_type as wr_spanning_store to denote this fact.
When we go to perform the store in mas_wr_spanning_store(), we first
determine the elements AFTER the END of the range we wish to store (that
is, to the right of the entry to be inserted) - we do this by walking to
the NEXT pivot in the tree (i.e. r_mas.last + 1), starting at the node we
have just determined contains the range over which we intend to write.
We then turn our attention to the entries to the left of the entry we are
inserting, whose state is represented by l_mas, and copy these into a 'big
node', which is a special node which contains enough slots to contain two
leaf node's worth of data.
We then copy the entry we wish to store immediately after this - the copy
and the insertion of the new entry is performed by mas_store_b_node().
After this we copy the elements to the right of the end of the range which
we are inserting, if we have not exceeded the length of the node (i.e.
r_mas.offset <= r_mas.end).
Herein lies the bug - under very specific circumstances, this logic can
break and corrupt the maple tree.
Consider the following tree:
Height
0 Root Node
/ \
pivot = 0xffff / \ pivot = ULONG_MAX
/ \
1 A [-----] ...
/ \
pivot = 0x4fff / \ pivot = 0xffff
/ \
2 (LEAVES) B [-----] [-----] C
^--- Last pivot 0xffff.
Now imagine we wish to store an entry in the range [0x4000, 0xffff] (note
that all ranges expressed in maple tree code are inclusive):
1. mas_store_gfp() descends the tree, finds node A at <=0xffff, then
determines that this is a spanning store across nodes B and C. The mas
state is set such that the current node from which we traverse further
is node A.
2. In mas_wr_spanning_store() we try to find elements to the right of pivot
0xffff by searching for an index of 0x10000:
- mas_wr_walk_index() invokes mas_wr_walk_descend() and
mas_wr_node_walk() in turn.
- mas_wr_node_walk() loops over entries in node A until EITHER it
finds an entry whose pivot equals or exceeds 0x10000 OR it
reaches the final entry.
- Since no entry has a pivot equal to or exceeding 0x10000, pivot
0xffff is selected, leading to node C.
- mas_wr_walk_traverse() resets the mas state to traverse node C. We
loop around and invoke mas_wr_walk_descend() and mas_wr_node_walk()
in turn once again.
- Again, we reach the last entry in node C, which has a pivot of
0xffff.
3. We then copy the elements to the left of 0x4000 in node B to the big
node via mas_store_b_node(), and insert the new [0x4000, 0xffff] entry
too.
4. We determine whether we have any entries to copy from the right of the
end of the range via - and with r_mas set up at the entry at pivot
0xffff, r_mas.offset <= r_mas.end, and then we DUPLICATE the entry at
pivot 0xffff.
5. BUG! The maple tree is corrupted with a duplicate entry.
This requires a very specific set of circumstances - we must be spanning
the last element in a leaf node, which is the last element in the parent
node.
spanning store across two leaf nodes with a range that ends at that shared
pivot.
A potential solution to this problem would simply be to reset the walk
each time we traverse r_mas, however given the rarity of this situation it
seems that would be rather inefficient.
Instead, this patch detects if the right hand node is populated, i.e. has
anything we need to copy.
We do so by only copying elements from the right of the entry being
inserted when the maximum value present exceeds the last, rather than
basing this on offset position.
The patch also updates some comments and eliminates the unused bool return
value in mas_wr_walk_index().
The work performed in commit f8d112a4e657 ("mm/mmap: avoid zeroing vma
tree in mmap_region()") seems to have made the probability of this event
much more likely, which is the point at which reports started to be
submitted concerning this bug.
The motivation for this change arose from Bert Karwatzki's report of
encountering mm instability after the release of kernel v6.12-rc1 which,
after the use of CONFIG_DEBUG_VM_MAPLE_TREE and similar configuration
options, was identified as maple tree corruption.
After Bert very generously provided his time and ability to reproduce this
event consistently, I was able to finally identify that the issue
discussed in this commit message was occurring for him.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/cover.1728314402.git.lorenzo.stoakes@oracle.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/48b349a2a0f7c76e18772712d0997a5e12ab0a3b.17283144…
Fixes: 54a611b60590 ("Maple Tree: add new data structure")
Signed-off-by: Lorenzo Stoakes <lorenzo.stoakes(a)oracle.com>
Reported-by: Bert Karwatzki <spasswolf(a)web.de>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20241001023402.3374-1-spasswolf@web.de/
Tested-by: Bert Karwatzki <spasswolf(a)web.de>
Reported-by: Mikhail Gavrilov <mikhail.v.gavrilov(a)gmail.com>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/CABXGCsOPwuoNOqSMmAvWO2Fz4TEmPnjFj-b7iF+XFRu1h7…
Acked-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka(a)suse.cz>
Reviewed-by: Liam R. Howlett <Liam.Howlett(a)Oracle.com>
Tested-by: Mikhail Gavrilov <mikhail.v.gavrilov(a)gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Wei Yang <richard.weiyang(a)gmail.com>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy(a)infradead.org>
Cc: Sidhartha Kumar <sidhartha.kumar(a)oracle.com>
Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm(a)linux-foundation.org>
diff --git a/lib/maple_tree.c b/lib/maple_tree.c
index ce7c7a7a8258..3619301dda2e 100644
--- a/lib/maple_tree.c
+++ b/lib/maple_tree.c
@@ -2196,6 +2196,8 @@ static inline void mas_node_or_none(struct ma_state *mas,
/*
* mas_wr_node_walk() - Find the correct offset for the index in the @mas.
+ * If @mas->index cannot be found within the containing
+ * node, we traverse to the last entry in the node.
* @wr_mas: The maple write state
*
* Uses mas_slot_locked() and does not need to worry about dead nodes.
@@ -3532,7 +3534,7 @@ static bool mas_wr_walk(struct ma_wr_state *wr_mas)
return true;
}
-static bool mas_wr_walk_index(struct ma_wr_state *wr_mas)
+static void mas_wr_walk_index(struct ma_wr_state *wr_mas)
{
struct ma_state *mas = wr_mas->mas;
@@ -3541,11 +3543,9 @@ static bool mas_wr_walk_index(struct ma_wr_state *wr_mas)
wr_mas->content = mas_slot_locked(mas, wr_mas->slots,
mas->offset);
if (ma_is_leaf(wr_mas->type))
- return true;
+ return;
mas_wr_walk_traverse(wr_mas);
-
}
- return true;
}
/*
* mas_extend_spanning_null() - Extend a store of a %NULL to include surrounding %NULLs.
@@ -3765,8 +3765,8 @@ static noinline void mas_wr_spanning_store(struct ma_wr_state *wr_mas)
memset(&b_node, 0, sizeof(struct maple_big_node));
/* Copy l_mas and store the value in b_node. */
mas_store_b_node(&l_wr_mas, &b_node, l_mas.end);
- /* Copy r_mas into b_node. */
- if (r_mas.offset <= r_mas.end)
+ /* Copy r_mas into b_node if there is anything to copy. */
+ if (r_mas.max > r_mas.last)
mas_mab_cp(&r_mas, r_mas.offset, r_mas.end,
&b_node, b_node.b_end + 1);
else
Svacer reports redundant comparison in cdns_xfer_msg(). The problem is
present in 5.10 stable release and can be fixed by the following
upstream patch that can be cleanly applied to 5.10 stable branch.
From: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg(a)intel.com>
[ Upstream commit 31db78a4923ef5e2008f2eed321811ca79e7f71b ]
When ieee80211_key_link() is called by ieee80211_gtk_rekey_add()
but returns 0 due to KRACK protection (identical key reinstall),
ieee80211_gtk_rekey_add() will still return a pointer into the
key, in a potential use-after-free. This normally doesn't happen
since it's only called by iwlwifi in case of WoWLAN rekey offload
which has its own KRACK protection, but still better to fix, do
that by returning an error code and converting that to success on
the cfg80211 boundary only, leaving the error for bad callers of
ieee80211_gtk_rekey_add().
Reported-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter(a)linaro.org>
Fixes: fdf7cb4185b6 ("mac80211: accept key reinstall without changing anything")
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg(a)intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org>
[Sherry: bp to fix CVE-2023-52530, resolved minor conflicts in
net/mac80211/cfg.c because of context change due to missing commit
23a5f0af6ff4 ("wifi: mac80211: remove cipher scheme support")
ccdde7c74ffd ("wifi: mac80211: properly implement MLO key handling")]
Signed-off-by: Sherry Yang <sherry.yang(a)oracle.com>
---
net/mac80211/cfg.c | 3 +++
net/mac80211/key.c | 2 +-
2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/net/mac80211/cfg.c b/net/mac80211/cfg.c
index f652982a106b..c54b3be62c0a 100644
--- a/net/mac80211/cfg.c
+++ b/net/mac80211/cfg.c
@@ -511,6 +511,9 @@ static int ieee80211_add_key(struct wiphy *wiphy, struct net_device *dev,
sta->cipher_scheme = cs;
err = ieee80211_key_link(key, sdata, sta);
+ /* KRACK protection, shouldn't happen but just silently accept key */
+ if (err == -EALREADY)
+ err = 0;
out_unlock:
mutex_unlock(&local->sta_mtx);
diff --git a/net/mac80211/key.c b/net/mac80211/key.c
index f695fc80088b..7b427e39831b 100644
--- a/net/mac80211/key.c
+++ b/net/mac80211/key.c
@@ -843,7 +843,7 @@ int ieee80211_key_link(struct ieee80211_key *key,
*/
if (ieee80211_key_identical(sdata, old_key, key)) {
ieee80211_key_free_unused(key);
- ret = 0;
+ ret = -EALREADY;
goto out;
}
--
2.46.0
[ Upstream commit 7c2fd76048e95dd267055b5f5e0a48e6e7c81fd9 ]
On an NVMe namespace that does not support metadata, it is possible to
send an IO command with metadata through io-passthru. This allows issues
like [1] to trigger in the completion code path.
nvme_map_user_request() doesn't check if the namespace supports metadata
before sending it forward. It also allows admin commands with metadata to
be processed as it ignores metadata when bdev == NULL and may report
success.
Reject an IO command with metadata when the NVMe namespace doesn't
support it and reject an admin command if it has metadata.
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/all/mb61pcylvnym8.fsf@amazon.com/
Suggested-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch(a)lst.de>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch(a)lst.de>
Reviewed-by: Sagi Grimberg <sagi(a)grimberg.me>
Reviewed-by: Anuj Gupta <anuj20.g(a)samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Keith Busch <kbusch(a)kernel.org>
[ Minor changes to make it work on 6.1 ]
Signed-off-by: Puranjay Mohan <pjy(a)amazon.com>
---
drivers/nvme/host/ioctl.c | 8 +++++++-
1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/drivers/nvme/host/ioctl.c b/drivers/nvme/host/ioctl.c
index b3e322e4ade38..a02873792890e 100644
--- a/drivers/nvme/host/ioctl.c
+++ b/drivers/nvme/host/ioctl.c
@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@
* Copyright (c) 2011-2014, Intel Corporation.
* Copyright (c) 2017-2021 Christoph Hellwig.
*/
+#include <linux/blk-integrity.h>
#include <linux/ptrace.h> /* for force_successful_syscall_return */
#include <linux/nvme_ioctl.h>
#include <linux/io_uring.h>
@@ -95,10 +96,15 @@ static int nvme_map_user_request(struct request *req, u64 ubuffer,
struct request_queue *q = req->q;
struct nvme_ns *ns = q->queuedata;
struct block_device *bdev = ns ? ns->disk->part0 : NULL;
+ bool supports_metadata = bdev && blk_get_integrity(bdev->bd_disk);
+ bool has_metadata = meta_buffer && meta_len;
struct bio *bio = NULL;
void *meta = NULL;
int ret;
+ if (has_metadata && !supports_metadata)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
if (ioucmd && (ioucmd->flags & IORING_URING_CMD_FIXED)) {
struct iov_iter iter;
@@ -122,7 +128,7 @@ static int nvme_map_user_request(struct request *req, u64 ubuffer,
if (bdev)
bio_set_dev(bio, bdev);
- if (bdev && meta_buffer && meta_len) {
+ if (has_metadata) {
meta = nvme_add_user_metadata(req, meta_buffer, meta_len,
meta_seed);
if (IS_ERR(meta)) {
--
2.40.1
Upstream commit c2368b19807a ("net: devlink: introduce "unregistering"
mark and use it during devlinks iteration") in v6.0 introduced a race
when unregistering a devlink instance that can result in RCU stalls and
in the system completely locking up. Exact details and reproducer can be
found here [1]. The bug was inadvertently fixed in v6.3 by upstream
commit d77278196441 ("devlink: bump the instance index directly when
iterating").
This patchset fixes the bug by backporting the second commit and a
related dependency from v6.3 to v6.1.y while adjusting them to the
devlink file structure in v6.1.y (net/devlink/{core.c,devl_internal.h}
-> net/devlink/leftover.c).
Tested by running the devlink tests under
tools/testing/selftests/drivers/net/netdevsim/ and the reproducer
mentioned in [1].
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/stable/20241001112035.973187-1-idosch@nvidia.com/
Jakub Kicinski (2):
devlink: drop the filter argument from devlinks_xa_find_get
devlink: bump the instance index directly when iterating
net/devlink/leftover.c | 40 ++++++++++------------------------------
1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 30 deletions(-)
--
2.47.0
The patch below does not apply to the 5.15-stable tree.
If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm
tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit
id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>.
To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands:
git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-5.15.y
git checkout FETCH_HEAD
git cherry-pick -x 532b53cebe58f34ce1c0f34d866f5c0e335c53c6
# <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.>
git commit -s
git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2024101412-prowling-snowflake-9fe0@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 5.15.y' HEAD^..
Possible dependencies:
532b53cebe58 ("secretmem: disable memfd_secret() if arch cannot set direct map")
f7c5b1aab5ef ("mm/secretmem: remove reduntant return value")
thanks,
greg k-h
------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------
From 532b53cebe58f34ce1c0f34d866f5c0e335c53c6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Patrick Roy <roypat(a)amazon.co.uk>
Date: Tue, 1 Oct 2024 09:00:41 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] secretmem: disable memfd_secret() if arch cannot set direct
map
Return -ENOSYS from memfd_secret() syscall if !can_set_direct_map(). This
is the case for example on some arm64 configurations, where marking 4k
PTEs in the direct map not present can only be done if the direct map is
set up at 4k granularity in the first place (as ARM's break-before-make
semantics do not easily allow breaking apart large/gigantic pages).
More precisely, on arm64 systems with !can_set_direct_map(),
set_direct_map_invalid_noflush() is a no-op, however it returns success
(0) instead of an error. This means that memfd_secret will seemingly
"work" (e.g. syscall succeeds, you can mmap the fd and fault in pages),
but it does not actually achieve its goal of removing its memory from the
direct map.
Note that with this patch, memfd_secret() will start erroring on systems
where can_set_direct_map() returns false (arm64 with
CONFIG_RODATA_FULL_DEFAULT_ENABLED=n, CONFIG_DEBUG_PAGEALLOC=n and
CONFIG_KFENCE=n), but that still seems better than the current silent
failure. Since CONFIG_RODATA_FULL_DEFAULT_ENABLED defaults to 'y', most
arm64 systems actually have a working memfd_secret() and aren't be
affected.
From going through the iterations of the original memfd_secret patch
series, it seems that disabling the syscall in these scenarios was the
intended behavior [1] (preferred over having
set_direct_map_invalid_noflush return an error as that would result in
SIGBUSes at page-fault time), however the check for it got dropped between
v16 [2] and v17 [3], when secretmem moved away from CMA allocations.
[1]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20201124164930.GK8537@kernel.org/
[2]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20210121122723.3446-11-rppt@kernel.org/#t
[3]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20201125092208.12544-10-rppt@kernel.org/
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20241001080056.784735-1-roypat@amazon.co.uk
Fixes: 1507f51255c9 ("mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas")
Signed-off-by: Patrick Roy <roypat(a)amazon.co.uk>
Reviewed-by: Mike Rapoport (Microsoft) <rppt(a)kernel.org>
Cc: Alexander Graf <graf(a)amazon.com>
Cc: David Hildenbrand <david(a)redhat.com>
Cc: James Gowans <jgowans(a)amazon.com>
Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm(a)linux-foundation.org>
diff --git a/mm/secretmem.c b/mm/secretmem.c
index 3afb5ad701e1..399552814fd0 100644
--- a/mm/secretmem.c
+++ b/mm/secretmem.c
@@ -238,7 +238,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE1(memfd_secret, unsigned int, flags)
/* make sure local flags do not confict with global fcntl.h */
BUILD_BUG_ON(SECRETMEM_FLAGS_MASK & O_CLOEXEC);
- if (!secretmem_enable)
+ if (!secretmem_enable || !can_set_direct_map())
return -ENOSYS;
if (flags & ~(SECRETMEM_FLAGS_MASK | O_CLOEXEC))
@@ -280,7 +280,7 @@ static struct file_system_type secretmem_fs = {
static int __init secretmem_init(void)
{
- if (!secretmem_enable)
+ if (!secretmem_enable || !can_set_direct_map())
return 0;
secretmem_mnt = kern_mount(&secretmem_fs);
The patch below does not apply to the 6.11-stable tree.
If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm
tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit
id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>.
To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands:
git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-6.11.y
git checkout FETCH_HEAD
git cherry-pick -x 2b0f922323ccfa76219bcaacd35cd50aeaa1359
# <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.>
git commit -s
git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2024101841-keep-coma-4963@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 6.11.y' HEAD^..
Possible dependencies:
thanks,
greg k-h
------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------
From 2b0f922323ccfa76219bcaacd35cd50aeaa13592 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: David Hildenbrand <david(a)redhat.com>
Date: Fri, 11 Oct 2024 12:24:45 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] mm: don't install PMD mappings when THPs are disabled by the
hw/process/vma
We (or rather, readahead logic :) ) might be allocating a THP in the
pagecache and then try mapping it into a process that explicitly disabled
THP: we might end up installing PMD mappings.
This is a problem for s390x KVM, which explicitly remaps all PMD-mapped
THPs to be PTE-mapped in s390_enable_sie()->thp_split_mm(), before
starting the VM.
For example, starting a VM backed on a file system with large folios
supported makes the VM crash when the VM tries accessing such a mapping
using KVM.
Is it also a problem when the HW disabled THP using
TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE_UNSUPPORTED? At least on x86 this would be the case
without X86_FEATURE_PSE.
In the future, we might be able to do better on s390x and only disallow
PMD mappings -- what s390x and likely TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE_UNSUPPORTED
really wants. For now, fix it by essentially performing the same check as
would be done in __thp_vma_allowable_orders() or in shmem code, where this
works as expected, and disallow PMD mappings, making us fallback to PTE
mappings.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20241011102445.934409-3-david@redhat.com
Fixes: 793917d997df ("mm/readahead: Add large folio readahead")
Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <david(a)redhat.com>
Reported-by: Leo Fu <bfu(a)redhat.com>
Tested-by: Thomas Huth <thuth(a)redhat.com>
Cc: Thomas Huth <thuth(a)redhat.com>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy(a)infradead.org>
Cc: Ryan Roberts <ryan.roberts(a)arm.com>
Cc: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger(a)linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Janosch Frank <frankja(a)linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Claudio Imbrenda <imbrenda(a)linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd(a)google.com>
Cc: Kefeng Wang <wangkefeng.wang(a)huawei.com>
Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm(a)linux-foundation.org>
diff --git a/mm/memory.c b/mm/memory.c
index c0869a962ddd..30feedabc932 100644
--- a/mm/memory.c
+++ b/mm/memory.c
@@ -4920,6 +4920,15 @@ vm_fault_t do_set_pmd(struct vm_fault *vmf, struct page *page)
pmd_t entry;
vm_fault_t ret = VM_FAULT_FALLBACK;
+ /*
+ * It is too late to allocate a small folio, we already have a large
+ * folio in the pagecache: especially s390 KVM cannot tolerate any
+ * PMD mappings, but PTE-mapped THP are fine. So let's simply refuse any
+ * PMD mappings if THPs are disabled.
+ */
+ if (thp_disabled_by_hw() || vma_thp_disabled(vma, vma->vm_flags))
+ return ret;
+
if (!thp_vma_suitable_order(vma, haddr, PMD_ORDER))
return ret;
The patch below does not apply to the 6.1-stable tree.
If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm
tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit
id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>.
To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands:
git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-6.1.y
git checkout FETCH_HEAD
git cherry-pick -x 963756aac1f011d904ddd9548ae82286d3a91f96
# <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.>
git commit -s
git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2024101848-lucid-mountain-2cdf@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 6.1.y' HEAD^..
Possible dependencies:
thanks,
greg k-h
------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------
From 963756aac1f011d904ddd9548ae82286d3a91f96 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Kefeng Wang <wangkefeng.wang(a)huawei.com>
Date: Fri, 11 Oct 2024 12:24:44 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] mm: huge_memory: add vma_thp_disabled() and
thp_disabled_by_hw()
Patch series "mm: don't install PMD mappings when THPs are disabled by the
hw/process/vma".
During testing, it was found that we can get PMD mappings in processes
where THP (and more precisely, PMD mappings) are supposed to be disabled.
While it works as expected for anon+shmem, the pagecache is the
problematic bit.
For s390 KVM this currently means that a VM backed by a file located on
filesystem with large folio support can crash when KVM tries accessing the
problematic page, because the readahead logic might decide to use a
PMD-sized THP and faulting it into the page tables will install a PMD
mapping, something that s390 KVM cannot tolerate.
This might also be a problem with HW that does not support PMD mappings,
but I did not try reproducing it.
Fix it by respecting the ways to disable THPs when deciding whether we can
install a PMD mapping. khugepaged should already be taking care of not
collapsing if THPs are effectively disabled for the hw/process/vma.
This patch (of 2):
Add vma_thp_disabled() and thp_disabled_by_hw() helpers to be shared by
shmem_allowable_huge_orders() and __thp_vma_allowable_orders().
[david(a)redhat.com: rename to vma_thp_disabled(), split out thp_disabled_by_hw() ]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20241011102445.934409-2-david@redhat.com
Fixes: 793917d997df ("mm/readahead: Add large folio readahead")
Signed-off-by: Kefeng Wang <wangkefeng.wang(a)huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <david(a)redhat.com>
Reported-by: Leo Fu <bfu(a)redhat.com>
Tested-by: Thomas Huth <thuth(a)redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Ryan Roberts <ryan.roberts(a)arm.com>
Cc: Boqiao Fu <bfu(a)redhat.com>
Cc: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger(a)linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Claudio Imbrenda <imbrenda(a)linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd(a)google.com>
Cc: Janosch Frank <frankja(a)linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy(a)infradead.org>
Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm(a)linux-foundation.org>
diff --git a/include/linux/huge_mm.h b/include/linux/huge_mm.h
index 67d0ab3c3bba..ef5b80e48599 100644
--- a/include/linux/huge_mm.h
+++ b/include/linux/huge_mm.h
@@ -322,6 +322,24 @@ struct thpsize {
(transparent_hugepage_flags & \
(1<<TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE_USE_ZERO_PAGE_FLAG))
+static inline bool vma_thp_disabled(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
+ unsigned long vm_flags)
+{
+ /*
+ * Explicitly disabled through madvise or prctl, or some
+ * architectures may disable THP for some mappings, for
+ * example, s390 kvm.
+ */
+ return (vm_flags & VM_NOHUGEPAGE) ||
+ test_bit(MMF_DISABLE_THP, &vma->vm_mm->flags);
+}
+
+static inline bool thp_disabled_by_hw(void)
+{
+ /* If the hardware/firmware marked hugepage support disabled. */
+ return transparent_hugepage_flags & (1 << TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE_UNSUPPORTED);
+}
+
unsigned long thp_get_unmapped_area(struct file *filp, unsigned long addr,
unsigned long len, unsigned long pgoff, unsigned long flags);
unsigned long thp_get_unmapped_area_vmflags(struct file *filp, unsigned long addr,
diff --git a/mm/huge_memory.c b/mm/huge_memory.c
index 87b49ecc7b1e..2fb328880b50 100644
--- a/mm/huge_memory.c
+++ b/mm/huge_memory.c
@@ -109,18 +109,7 @@ unsigned long __thp_vma_allowable_orders(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
if (!vma->vm_mm) /* vdso */
return 0;
- /*
- * Explicitly disabled through madvise or prctl, or some
- * architectures may disable THP for some mappings, for
- * example, s390 kvm.
- * */
- if ((vm_flags & VM_NOHUGEPAGE) ||
- test_bit(MMF_DISABLE_THP, &vma->vm_mm->flags))
- return 0;
- /*
- * If the hardware/firmware marked hugepage support disabled.
- */
- if (transparent_hugepage_flags & (1 << TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE_UNSUPPORTED))
+ if (thp_disabled_by_hw() || vma_thp_disabled(vma, vm_flags))
return 0;
/* khugepaged doesn't collapse DAX vma, but page fault is fine. */
diff --git a/mm/shmem.c b/mm/shmem.c
index 4f11b5506363..c5adb987b23c 100644
--- a/mm/shmem.c
+++ b/mm/shmem.c
@@ -1664,12 +1664,7 @@ unsigned long shmem_allowable_huge_orders(struct inode *inode,
loff_t i_size;
int order;
- if (vma && ((vm_flags & VM_NOHUGEPAGE) ||
- test_bit(MMF_DISABLE_THP, &vma->vm_mm->flags)))
- return 0;
-
- /* If the hardware/firmware marked hugepage support disabled. */
- if (transparent_hugepage_flags & (1 << TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE_UNSUPPORTED))
+ if (thp_disabled_by_hw() || (vma && vma_thp_disabled(vma, vm_flags)))
return 0;
global_huge = shmem_huge_global_enabled(inode, index, write_end,
The patch below does not apply to the 6.6-stable tree.
If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm
tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit
id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>.
To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands:
git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-6.6.y
git checkout FETCH_HEAD
git cherry-pick -x 963756aac1f011d904ddd9548ae82286d3a91f96
# <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.>
git commit -s
git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2024101842-flatness-osmosis-b08e@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 6.6.y' HEAD^..
Possible dependencies:
thanks,
greg k-h
------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------
From 963756aac1f011d904ddd9548ae82286d3a91f96 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Kefeng Wang <wangkefeng.wang(a)huawei.com>
Date: Fri, 11 Oct 2024 12:24:44 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] mm: huge_memory: add vma_thp_disabled() and
thp_disabled_by_hw()
Patch series "mm: don't install PMD mappings when THPs are disabled by the
hw/process/vma".
During testing, it was found that we can get PMD mappings in processes
where THP (and more precisely, PMD mappings) are supposed to be disabled.
While it works as expected for anon+shmem, the pagecache is the
problematic bit.
For s390 KVM this currently means that a VM backed by a file located on
filesystem with large folio support can crash when KVM tries accessing the
problematic page, because the readahead logic might decide to use a
PMD-sized THP and faulting it into the page tables will install a PMD
mapping, something that s390 KVM cannot tolerate.
This might also be a problem with HW that does not support PMD mappings,
but I did not try reproducing it.
Fix it by respecting the ways to disable THPs when deciding whether we can
install a PMD mapping. khugepaged should already be taking care of not
collapsing if THPs are effectively disabled for the hw/process/vma.
This patch (of 2):
Add vma_thp_disabled() and thp_disabled_by_hw() helpers to be shared by
shmem_allowable_huge_orders() and __thp_vma_allowable_orders().
[david(a)redhat.com: rename to vma_thp_disabled(), split out thp_disabled_by_hw() ]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20241011102445.934409-2-david@redhat.com
Fixes: 793917d997df ("mm/readahead: Add large folio readahead")
Signed-off-by: Kefeng Wang <wangkefeng.wang(a)huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <david(a)redhat.com>
Reported-by: Leo Fu <bfu(a)redhat.com>
Tested-by: Thomas Huth <thuth(a)redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Ryan Roberts <ryan.roberts(a)arm.com>
Cc: Boqiao Fu <bfu(a)redhat.com>
Cc: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger(a)linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Claudio Imbrenda <imbrenda(a)linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd(a)google.com>
Cc: Janosch Frank <frankja(a)linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy(a)infradead.org>
Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm(a)linux-foundation.org>
diff --git a/include/linux/huge_mm.h b/include/linux/huge_mm.h
index 67d0ab3c3bba..ef5b80e48599 100644
--- a/include/linux/huge_mm.h
+++ b/include/linux/huge_mm.h
@@ -322,6 +322,24 @@ struct thpsize {
(transparent_hugepage_flags & \
(1<<TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE_USE_ZERO_PAGE_FLAG))
+static inline bool vma_thp_disabled(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
+ unsigned long vm_flags)
+{
+ /*
+ * Explicitly disabled through madvise or prctl, or some
+ * architectures may disable THP for some mappings, for
+ * example, s390 kvm.
+ */
+ return (vm_flags & VM_NOHUGEPAGE) ||
+ test_bit(MMF_DISABLE_THP, &vma->vm_mm->flags);
+}
+
+static inline bool thp_disabled_by_hw(void)
+{
+ /* If the hardware/firmware marked hugepage support disabled. */
+ return transparent_hugepage_flags & (1 << TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE_UNSUPPORTED);
+}
+
unsigned long thp_get_unmapped_area(struct file *filp, unsigned long addr,
unsigned long len, unsigned long pgoff, unsigned long flags);
unsigned long thp_get_unmapped_area_vmflags(struct file *filp, unsigned long addr,
diff --git a/mm/huge_memory.c b/mm/huge_memory.c
index 87b49ecc7b1e..2fb328880b50 100644
--- a/mm/huge_memory.c
+++ b/mm/huge_memory.c
@@ -109,18 +109,7 @@ unsigned long __thp_vma_allowable_orders(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
if (!vma->vm_mm) /* vdso */
return 0;
- /*
- * Explicitly disabled through madvise or prctl, or some
- * architectures may disable THP for some mappings, for
- * example, s390 kvm.
- * */
- if ((vm_flags & VM_NOHUGEPAGE) ||
- test_bit(MMF_DISABLE_THP, &vma->vm_mm->flags))
- return 0;
- /*
- * If the hardware/firmware marked hugepage support disabled.
- */
- if (transparent_hugepage_flags & (1 << TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE_UNSUPPORTED))
+ if (thp_disabled_by_hw() || vma_thp_disabled(vma, vm_flags))
return 0;
/* khugepaged doesn't collapse DAX vma, but page fault is fine. */
diff --git a/mm/shmem.c b/mm/shmem.c
index 4f11b5506363..c5adb987b23c 100644
--- a/mm/shmem.c
+++ b/mm/shmem.c
@@ -1664,12 +1664,7 @@ unsigned long shmem_allowable_huge_orders(struct inode *inode,
loff_t i_size;
int order;
- if (vma && ((vm_flags & VM_NOHUGEPAGE) ||
- test_bit(MMF_DISABLE_THP, &vma->vm_mm->flags)))
- return 0;
-
- /* If the hardware/firmware marked hugepage support disabled. */
- if (transparent_hugepage_flags & (1 << TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE_UNSUPPORTED))
+ if (thp_disabled_by_hw() || (vma && vma_thp_disabled(vma, vm_flags)))
return 0;
global_huge = shmem_huge_global_enabled(inode, index, write_end,
The patch below does not apply to the 4.19-stable tree.
If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm
tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit
id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>.
To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands:
git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-4.19.y
git checkout FETCH_HEAD
git cherry-pick -x 7528c4fb1237512ee18049f852f014eba80bbe8d
# <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.>
git commit -s
git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2024101858-rewire-vocation-c981@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 4.19.y' HEAD^..
Possible dependencies:
thanks,
greg k-h
------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------
From 7528c4fb1237512ee18049f852f014eba80bbe8d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Liu Shixin <liushixin2(a)huawei.com>
Date: Tue, 15 Oct 2024 09:45:21 +0800
Subject: [PATCH] mm/swapfile: skip HugeTLB pages for unuse_vma
I got a bad pud error and lost a 1GB HugeTLB when calling swapoff. The
problem can be reproduced by the following steps:
1. Allocate an anonymous 1GB HugeTLB and some other anonymous memory.
2. Swapout the above anonymous memory.
3. run swapoff and we will get a bad pud error in kernel message:
mm/pgtable-generic.c:42: bad pud 00000000743d215d(84000001400000e7)
We can tell that pud_clear_bad is called by pud_none_or_clear_bad in
unuse_pud_range() by ftrace. And therefore the HugeTLB pages will never
be freed because we lost it from page table. We can skip HugeTLB pages
for unuse_vma to fix it.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20241015014521.570237-1-liushixin2@huawei.com
Fixes: 0fe6e20b9c4c ("hugetlb, rmap: add reverse mapping for hugepage")
Signed-off-by: Liu Shixin <liushixin2(a)huawei.com>
Acked-by: Muchun Song <muchun.song(a)linux.dev>
Cc: Naoya Horiguchi <nao.horiguchi(a)gmail.com>
Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm(a)linux-foundation.org>
diff --git a/mm/swapfile.c b/mm/swapfile.c
index eb782fcd5627..b0915f3fab31 100644
--- a/mm/swapfile.c
+++ b/mm/swapfile.c
@@ -2313,7 +2313,7 @@ static int unuse_mm(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned int type)
mmap_read_lock(mm);
for_each_vma(vmi, vma) {
- if (vma->anon_vma) {
+ if (vma->anon_vma && !is_vm_hugetlb_page(vma)) {
ret = unuse_vma(vma, type);
if (ret)
break;
The patch below does not apply to the 6.6-stable tree.
If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm
tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit
id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>.
To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands:
git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-6.6.y
git checkout FETCH_HEAD
git cherry-pick -x 37f0b47c5143c2957909ced44fc09ffb118c99f7
# <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.>
git commit -s
git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2024101803-cage-smokiness-cb8b@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 6.6.y' HEAD^..
Possible dependencies:
thanks,
greg k-h
------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------
From 37f0b47c5143c2957909ced44fc09ffb118c99f7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Yang Shi <yang(a)os.amperecomputing.com>
Date: Fri, 11 Oct 2024 18:17:02 -0700
Subject: [PATCH] mm: khugepaged: fix the arguments order in
khugepaged_collapse_file trace point
The "addr" and "is_shmem" arguments have different order in TP_PROTO and
TP_ARGS. This resulted in the incorrect trace result:
text-hugepage-644429 [276] 392092.878683: mm_khugepaged_collapse_file:
mm=0xffff20025d52c440, hpage_pfn=0x200678c00, index=512, addr=1, is_shmem=0,
filename=text-hugepage, nr=512, result=failed
The value of "addr" is wrong because it was treated as bool value, the
type of is_shmem.
Fix the order in TP_PROTO to keep "addr" is before "is_shmem" since the
original patch review suggested this order to achieve best packing.
And use "lx" for "addr" instead of "ld" in TP_printk because address is
typically shown in hex.
After the fix, the trace result looks correct:
text-hugepage-7291 [004] 128.627251: mm_khugepaged_collapse_file:
mm=0xffff0001328f9500, hpage_pfn=0x20016ea00, index=512, addr=0x400000,
is_shmem=0, filename=text-hugepage, nr=512, result=failed
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20241012011702.1084846-1-yang@os.amperecomputing.…
Fixes: 4c9473e87e75 ("mm/khugepaged: add tracepoint to collapse_file()")
Signed-off-by: Yang Shi <yang(a)os.amperecomputing.com>
Cc: Gautam Menghani <gautammenghani201(a)gmail.com>
Cc: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt(a)goodmis.org>
Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> [6.2+]
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm(a)linux-foundation.org>
diff --git a/include/trace/events/huge_memory.h b/include/trace/events/huge_memory.h
index b5f5369b6300..9d5c00b0285c 100644
--- a/include/trace/events/huge_memory.h
+++ b/include/trace/events/huge_memory.h
@@ -208,7 +208,7 @@ TRACE_EVENT(mm_khugepaged_scan_file,
TRACE_EVENT(mm_khugepaged_collapse_file,
TP_PROTO(struct mm_struct *mm, struct folio *new_folio, pgoff_t index,
- bool is_shmem, unsigned long addr, struct file *file,
+ unsigned long addr, bool is_shmem, struct file *file,
int nr, int result),
TP_ARGS(mm, new_folio, index, addr, is_shmem, file, nr, result),
TP_STRUCT__entry(
@@ -233,7 +233,7 @@ TRACE_EVENT(mm_khugepaged_collapse_file,
__entry->result = result;
),
- TP_printk("mm=%p, hpage_pfn=0x%lx, index=%ld, addr=%ld, is_shmem=%d, filename=%s, nr=%d, result=%s",
+ TP_printk("mm=%p, hpage_pfn=0x%lx, index=%ld, addr=%lx, is_shmem=%d, filename=%s, nr=%d, result=%s",
__entry->mm,
__entry->hpfn,
__entry->index,
diff --git a/mm/khugepaged.c b/mm/khugepaged.c
index f9c39898eaff..a420eff92011 100644
--- a/mm/khugepaged.c
+++ b/mm/khugepaged.c
@@ -2227,7 +2227,7 @@ rollback:
folio_put(new_folio);
out:
VM_BUG_ON(!list_empty(&pagelist));
- trace_mm_khugepaged_collapse_file(mm, new_folio, index, is_shmem, addr, file, HPAGE_PMD_NR, result);
+ trace_mm_khugepaged_collapse_file(mm, new_folio, index, addr, is_shmem, file, HPAGE_PMD_NR, result);
return result;
}
Hi Greg, Sasha,
Could you please help to backport the upstream commit
80e9963fb3b5509dfcabe9652d56bf4b35542055 ("irqchip/gic-v3-its: Fix VSYNC
referencing an unmapped VPE on GIC v4.1") to
* 5.10
* 5.15
* 6.1
* 6.6
trees? It can be applied and built (with arm64's defconfig) cleanly on
top of the mentioned stable branches.
Thanks,
Zenghui
The patch below does not apply to the 5.15-stable tree.
If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm
tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit
id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>.
To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands:
git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-5.15.y
git checkout FETCH_HEAD
git cherry-pick -x 5afca7e996c42aed1b4a42d4712817601ba42aff
# <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.>
git commit -s
git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2024101827-regulate-lining-6c3e@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 5.15.y' HEAD^..
Possible dependencies:
thanks,
greg k-h
------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------
From 5afca7e996c42aed1b4a42d4712817601ba42aff Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Paolo Abeni <pabeni(a)redhat.com>
Date: Mon, 14 Oct 2024 16:06:01 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] selftests: mptcp: join: test for prohibited MPC to port-based
endp
Explicitly verify that MPC connection attempts towards a port-based
signal endpoint fail with a reset.
Note that this new test is a bit different from the other ones, not
using 'run_tests'. It is then needed to add the capture capability, and
the picking the right port which have been extracted into three new
helpers. The info about the capture can also be printed from a single
point, which simplifies the exit paths in do_transfer().
The 'Fixes' tag here below is the same as the one from the previous
commit: this patch here is not fixing anything wrong in the selftests,
but it validates the previous fix for an issue introduced by this commit
ID.
Fixes: 1729cf186d8a ("mptcp: create the listening socket for new port")
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
Co-developed-by: Matthieu Baerts (NGI0) <matttbe(a)kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Matthieu Baerts (NGI0) <matttbe(a)kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni(a)redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Mat Martineau <martineau(a)kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Matthieu Baerts (NGI0) <matttbe(a)kernel.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20241014-net-mptcp-mpc-port-endp-v2-2-7faea8e6b6ae…
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba(a)kernel.org>
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/net/mptcp/mptcp_join.sh b/tools/testing/selftests/net/mptcp/mptcp_join.sh
index e8d0a01b4144..c07e2bd3a315 100755
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/net/mptcp/mptcp_join.sh
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/net/mptcp/mptcp_join.sh
@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ tmpfile=""
cout=""
err=""
capout=""
+cappid=""
ns1=""
ns2=""
iptables="iptables"
@@ -887,6 +888,44 @@ check_cestab()
fi
}
+cond_start_capture()
+{
+ local ns="$1"
+
+ :> "$capout"
+
+ if $capture; then
+ local capuser capfile
+ if [ -z $SUDO_USER ]; then
+ capuser=""
+ else
+ capuser="-Z $SUDO_USER"
+ fi
+
+ capfile=$(printf "mp_join-%02u-%s.pcap" "$MPTCP_LIB_TEST_COUNTER" "$ns")
+
+ echo "Capturing traffic for test $MPTCP_LIB_TEST_COUNTER into $capfile"
+ ip netns exec "$ns" tcpdump -i any -s 65535 -B 32768 $capuser -w "$capfile" > "$capout" 2>&1 &
+ cappid=$!
+
+ sleep 1
+ fi
+}
+
+cond_stop_capture()
+{
+ if $capture; then
+ sleep 1
+ kill $cappid
+ cat "$capout"
+ fi
+}
+
+get_port()
+{
+ echo "$((10000 + MPTCP_LIB_TEST_COUNTER - 1))"
+}
+
do_transfer()
{
local listener_ns="$1"
@@ -894,33 +933,17 @@ do_transfer()
local cl_proto="$3"
local srv_proto="$4"
local connect_addr="$5"
+ local port
- local port=$((10000 + MPTCP_LIB_TEST_COUNTER - 1))
- local cappid
local FAILING_LINKS=${FAILING_LINKS:-""}
local fastclose=${fastclose:-""}
local speed=${speed:-"fast"}
+ port=$(get_port)
:> "$cout"
:> "$sout"
- :> "$capout"
- if $capture; then
- local capuser
- if [ -z $SUDO_USER ] ; then
- capuser=""
- else
- capuser="-Z $SUDO_USER"
- fi
-
- capfile=$(printf "mp_join-%02u-%s.pcap" "$MPTCP_LIB_TEST_COUNTER" "${listener_ns}")
-
- echo "Capturing traffic for test $MPTCP_LIB_TEST_COUNTER into $capfile"
- ip netns exec ${listener_ns} tcpdump -i any -s 65535 -B 32768 $capuser -w $capfile > "$capout" 2>&1 &
- cappid=$!
-
- sleep 1
- fi
+ cond_start_capture ${listener_ns}
NSTAT_HISTORY=/tmp/${listener_ns}.nstat ip netns exec ${listener_ns} \
nstat -n
@@ -1007,10 +1030,7 @@ do_transfer()
wait $spid
local rets=$?
- if $capture; then
- sleep 1
- kill $cappid
- fi
+ cond_stop_capture
NSTAT_HISTORY=/tmp/${listener_ns}.nstat ip netns exec ${listener_ns} \
nstat | grep Tcp > /tmp/${listener_ns}.out
@@ -1026,7 +1046,6 @@ do_transfer()
ip netns exec ${connector_ns} ss -Menita 1>&2 -o "dport = :$port"
cat /tmp/${connector_ns}.out
- cat "$capout"
return 1
fi
@@ -1043,13 +1062,7 @@ do_transfer()
fi
rets=$?
- if [ $retc -eq 0 ] && [ $rets -eq 0 ];then
- cat "$capout"
- return 0
- fi
-
- cat "$capout"
- return 1
+ [ $retc -eq 0 ] && [ $rets -eq 0 ]
}
make_file()
@@ -2873,6 +2886,32 @@ verify_listener_events()
fail_test
}
+chk_mpc_endp_attempt()
+{
+ local retl=$1
+ local attempts=$2
+
+ print_check "Connect"
+
+ if [ ${retl} = 124 ]; then
+ fail_test "timeout on connect"
+ elif [ ${retl} = 0 ]; then
+ fail_test "unexpected successful connect"
+ else
+ print_ok
+
+ print_check "Attempts"
+ count=$(mptcp_lib_get_counter ${ns1} "MPTcpExtMPCapableEndpAttempt")
+ if [ -z "$count" ]; then
+ print_skip
+ elif [ "$count" != "$attempts" ]; then
+ fail_test "got ${count} MPC attempt[s] on port-based endpoint, expected ${attempts}"
+ else
+ print_ok
+ fi
+ fi
+}
+
add_addr_ports_tests()
{
# signal address with port
@@ -2963,6 +3002,22 @@ add_addr_ports_tests()
chk_join_nr 2 2 2
chk_add_nr 2 2 2
fi
+
+ if reset "port-based signal endpoint must not accept mpc"; then
+ local port retl count
+ port=$(get_port)
+
+ cond_start_capture ${ns1}
+ pm_nl_add_endpoint ${ns1} 10.0.2.1 flags signal port ${port}
+ mptcp_lib_wait_local_port_listen ${ns1} ${port}
+
+ timeout 1 ip netns exec ${ns2} \
+ ./mptcp_connect -t ${timeout_poll} -p $port -s MPTCP 10.0.2.1 >/dev/null 2>&1
+ retl=$?
+ cond_stop_capture
+
+ chk_mpc_endp_attempt ${retl} 1
+ fi
}
syncookies_tests()
The patch below does not apply to the 6.1-stable tree.
If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm
tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit
id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>.
To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands:
git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-6.1.y
git checkout FETCH_HEAD
git cherry-pick -x 5afca7e996c42aed1b4a42d4712817601ba42aff
# <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.>
git commit -s
git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2024101826-outshine-powdered-a548@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 6.1.y' HEAD^..
Possible dependencies:
thanks,
greg k-h
------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------
From 5afca7e996c42aed1b4a42d4712817601ba42aff Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Paolo Abeni <pabeni(a)redhat.com>
Date: Mon, 14 Oct 2024 16:06:01 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] selftests: mptcp: join: test for prohibited MPC to port-based
endp
Explicitly verify that MPC connection attempts towards a port-based
signal endpoint fail with a reset.
Note that this new test is a bit different from the other ones, not
using 'run_tests'. It is then needed to add the capture capability, and
the picking the right port which have been extracted into three new
helpers. The info about the capture can also be printed from a single
point, which simplifies the exit paths in do_transfer().
The 'Fixes' tag here below is the same as the one from the previous
commit: this patch here is not fixing anything wrong in the selftests,
but it validates the previous fix for an issue introduced by this commit
ID.
Fixes: 1729cf186d8a ("mptcp: create the listening socket for new port")
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
Co-developed-by: Matthieu Baerts (NGI0) <matttbe(a)kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Matthieu Baerts (NGI0) <matttbe(a)kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni(a)redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Mat Martineau <martineau(a)kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Matthieu Baerts (NGI0) <matttbe(a)kernel.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20241014-net-mptcp-mpc-port-endp-v2-2-7faea8e6b6ae…
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba(a)kernel.org>
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/net/mptcp/mptcp_join.sh b/tools/testing/selftests/net/mptcp/mptcp_join.sh
index e8d0a01b4144..c07e2bd3a315 100755
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/net/mptcp/mptcp_join.sh
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/net/mptcp/mptcp_join.sh
@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ tmpfile=""
cout=""
err=""
capout=""
+cappid=""
ns1=""
ns2=""
iptables="iptables"
@@ -887,6 +888,44 @@ check_cestab()
fi
}
+cond_start_capture()
+{
+ local ns="$1"
+
+ :> "$capout"
+
+ if $capture; then
+ local capuser capfile
+ if [ -z $SUDO_USER ]; then
+ capuser=""
+ else
+ capuser="-Z $SUDO_USER"
+ fi
+
+ capfile=$(printf "mp_join-%02u-%s.pcap" "$MPTCP_LIB_TEST_COUNTER" "$ns")
+
+ echo "Capturing traffic for test $MPTCP_LIB_TEST_COUNTER into $capfile"
+ ip netns exec "$ns" tcpdump -i any -s 65535 -B 32768 $capuser -w "$capfile" > "$capout" 2>&1 &
+ cappid=$!
+
+ sleep 1
+ fi
+}
+
+cond_stop_capture()
+{
+ if $capture; then
+ sleep 1
+ kill $cappid
+ cat "$capout"
+ fi
+}
+
+get_port()
+{
+ echo "$((10000 + MPTCP_LIB_TEST_COUNTER - 1))"
+}
+
do_transfer()
{
local listener_ns="$1"
@@ -894,33 +933,17 @@ do_transfer()
local cl_proto="$3"
local srv_proto="$4"
local connect_addr="$5"
+ local port
- local port=$((10000 + MPTCP_LIB_TEST_COUNTER - 1))
- local cappid
local FAILING_LINKS=${FAILING_LINKS:-""}
local fastclose=${fastclose:-""}
local speed=${speed:-"fast"}
+ port=$(get_port)
:> "$cout"
:> "$sout"
- :> "$capout"
- if $capture; then
- local capuser
- if [ -z $SUDO_USER ] ; then
- capuser=""
- else
- capuser="-Z $SUDO_USER"
- fi
-
- capfile=$(printf "mp_join-%02u-%s.pcap" "$MPTCP_LIB_TEST_COUNTER" "${listener_ns}")
-
- echo "Capturing traffic for test $MPTCP_LIB_TEST_COUNTER into $capfile"
- ip netns exec ${listener_ns} tcpdump -i any -s 65535 -B 32768 $capuser -w $capfile > "$capout" 2>&1 &
- cappid=$!
-
- sleep 1
- fi
+ cond_start_capture ${listener_ns}
NSTAT_HISTORY=/tmp/${listener_ns}.nstat ip netns exec ${listener_ns} \
nstat -n
@@ -1007,10 +1030,7 @@ do_transfer()
wait $spid
local rets=$?
- if $capture; then
- sleep 1
- kill $cappid
- fi
+ cond_stop_capture
NSTAT_HISTORY=/tmp/${listener_ns}.nstat ip netns exec ${listener_ns} \
nstat | grep Tcp > /tmp/${listener_ns}.out
@@ -1026,7 +1046,6 @@ do_transfer()
ip netns exec ${connector_ns} ss -Menita 1>&2 -o "dport = :$port"
cat /tmp/${connector_ns}.out
- cat "$capout"
return 1
fi
@@ -1043,13 +1062,7 @@ do_transfer()
fi
rets=$?
- if [ $retc -eq 0 ] && [ $rets -eq 0 ];then
- cat "$capout"
- return 0
- fi
-
- cat "$capout"
- return 1
+ [ $retc -eq 0 ] && [ $rets -eq 0 ]
}
make_file()
@@ -2873,6 +2886,32 @@ verify_listener_events()
fail_test
}
+chk_mpc_endp_attempt()
+{
+ local retl=$1
+ local attempts=$2
+
+ print_check "Connect"
+
+ if [ ${retl} = 124 ]; then
+ fail_test "timeout on connect"
+ elif [ ${retl} = 0 ]; then
+ fail_test "unexpected successful connect"
+ else
+ print_ok
+
+ print_check "Attempts"
+ count=$(mptcp_lib_get_counter ${ns1} "MPTcpExtMPCapableEndpAttempt")
+ if [ -z "$count" ]; then
+ print_skip
+ elif [ "$count" != "$attempts" ]; then
+ fail_test "got ${count} MPC attempt[s] on port-based endpoint, expected ${attempts}"
+ else
+ print_ok
+ fi
+ fi
+}
+
add_addr_ports_tests()
{
# signal address with port
@@ -2963,6 +3002,22 @@ add_addr_ports_tests()
chk_join_nr 2 2 2
chk_add_nr 2 2 2
fi
+
+ if reset "port-based signal endpoint must not accept mpc"; then
+ local port retl count
+ port=$(get_port)
+
+ cond_start_capture ${ns1}
+ pm_nl_add_endpoint ${ns1} 10.0.2.1 flags signal port ${port}
+ mptcp_lib_wait_local_port_listen ${ns1} ${port}
+
+ timeout 1 ip netns exec ${ns2} \
+ ./mptcp_connect -t ${timeout_poll} -p $port -s MPTCP 10.0.2.1 >/dev/null 2>&1
+ retl=$?
+ cond_stop_capture
+
+ chk_mpc_endp_attempt ${retl} 1
+ fi
}
syncookies_tests()
The patch below does not apply to the 6.6-stable tree.
If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm
tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit
id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>.
To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands:
git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-6.6.y
git checkout FETCH_HEAD
git cherry-pick -x 5afca7e996c42aed1b4a42d4712817601ba42aff
# <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.>
git commit -s
git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2024101826-algorithm-figure-3cf3@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 6.6.y' HEAD^..
Possible dependencies:
thanks,
greg k-h
------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------
From 5afca7e996c42aed1b4a42d4712817601ba42aff Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Paolo Abeni <pabeni(a)redhat.com>
Date: Mon, 14 Oct 2024 16:06:01 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] selftests: mptcp: join: test for prohibited MPC to port-based
endp
Explicitly verify that MPC connection attempts towards a port-based
signal endpoint fail with a reset.
Note that this new test is a bit different from the other ones, not
using 'run_tests'. It is then needed to add the capture capability, and
the picking the right port which have been extracted into three new
helpers. The info about the capture can also be printed from a single
point, which simplifies the exit paths in do_transfer().
The 'Fixes' tag here below is the same as the one from the previous
commit: this patch here is not fixing anything wrong in the selftests,
but it validates the previous fix for an issue introduced by this commit
ID.
Fixes: 1729cf186d8a ("mptcp: create the listening socket for new port")
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
Co-developed-by: Matthieu Baerts (NGI0) <matttbe(a)kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Matthieu Baerts (NGI0) <matttbe(a)kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni(a)redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Mat Martineau <martineau(a)kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Matthieu Baerts (NGI0) <matttbe(a)kernel.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20241014-net-mptcp-mpc-port-endp-v2-2-7faea8e6b6ae…
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba(a)kernel.org>
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/net/mptcp/mptcp_join.sh b/tools/testing/selftests/net/mptcp/mptcp_join.sh
index e8d0a01b4144..c07e2bd3a315 100755
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/net/mptcp/mptcp_join.sh
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/net/mptcp/mptcp_join.sh
@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ tmpfile=""
cout=""
err=""
capout=""
+cappid=""
ns1=""
ns2=""
iptables="iptables"
@@ -887,6 +888,44 @@ check_cestab()
fi
}
+cond_start_capture()
+{
+ local ns="$1"
+
+ :> "$capout"
+
+ if $capture; then
+ local capuser capfile
+ if [ -z $SUDO_USER ]; then
+ capuser=""
+ else
+ capuser="-Z $SUDO_USER"
+ fi
+
+ capfile=$(printf "mp_join-%02u-%s.pcap" "$MPTCP_LIB_TEST_COUNTER" "$ns")
+
+ echo "Capturing traffic for test $MPTCP_LIB_TEST_COUNTER into $capfile"
+ ip netns exec "$ns" tcpdump -i any -s 65535 -B 32768 $capuser -w "$capfile" > "$capout" 2>&1 &
+ cappid=$!
+
+ sleep 1
+ fi
+}
+
+cond_stop_capture()
+{
+ if $capture; then
+ sleep 1
+ kill $cappid
+ cat "$capout"
+ fi
+}
+
+get_port()
+{
+ echo "$((10000 + MPTCP_LIB_TEST_COUNTER - 1))"
+}
+
do_transfer()
{
local listener_ns="$1"
@@ -894,33 +933,17 @@ do_transfer()
local cl_proto="$3"
local srv_proto="$4"
local connect_addr="$5"
+ local port
- local port=$((10000 + MPTCP_LIB_TEST_COUNTER - 1))
- local cappid
local FAILING_LINKS=${FAILING_LINKS:-""}
local fastclose=${fastclose:-""}
local speed=${speed:-"fast"}
+ port=$(get_port)
:> "$cout"
:> "$sout"
- :> "$capout"
- if $capture; then
- local capuser
- if [ -z $SUDO_USER ] ; then
- capuser=""
- else
- capuser="-Z $SUDO_USER"
- fi
-
- capfile=$(printf "mp_join-%02u-%s.pcap" "$MPTCP_LIB_TEST_COUNTER" "${listener_ns}")
-
- echo "Capturing traffic for test $MPTCP_LIB_TEST_COUNTER into $capfile"
- ip netns exec ${listener_ns} tcpdump -i any -s 65535 -B 32768 $capuser -w $capfile > "$capout" 2>&1 &
- cappid=$!
-
- sleep 1
- fi
+ cond_start_capture ${listener_ns}
NSTAT_HISTORY=/tmp/${listener_ns}.nstat ip netns exec ${listener_ns} \
nstat -n
@@ -1007,10 +1030,7 @@ do_transfer()
wait $spid
local rets=$?
- if $capture; then
- sleep 1
- kill $cappid
- fi
+ cond_stop_capture
NSTAT_HISTORY=/tmp/${listener_ns}.nstat ip netns exec ${listener_ns} \
nstat | grep Tcp > /tmp/${listener_ns}.out
@@ -1026,7 +1046,6 @@ do_transfer()
ip netns exec ${connector_ns} ss -Menita 1>&2 -o "dport = :$port"
cat /tmp/${connector_ns}.out
- cat "$capout"
return 1
fi
@@ -1043,13 +1062,7 @@ do_transfer()
fi
rets=$?
- if [ $retc -eq 0 ] && [ $rets -eq 0 ];then
- cat "$capout"
- return 0
- fi
-
- cat "$capout"
- return 1
+ [ $retc -eq 0 ] && [ $rets -eq 0 ]
}
make_file()
@@ -2873,6 +2886,32 @@ verify_listener_events()
fail_test
}
+chk_mpc_endp_attempt()
+{
+ local retl=$1
+ local attempts=$2
+
+ print_check "Connect"
+
+ if [ ${retl} = 124 ]; then
+ fail_test "timeout on connect"
+ elif [ ${retl} = 0 ]; then
+ fail_test "unexpected successful connect"
+ else
+ print_ok
+
+ print_check "Attempts"
+ count=$(mptcp_lib_get_counter ${ns1} "MPTcpExtMPCapableEndpAttempt")
+ if [ -z "$count" ]; then
+ print_skip
+ elif [ "$count" != "$attempts" ]; then
+ fail_test "got ${count} MPC attempt[s] on port-based endpoint, expected ${attempts}"
+ else
+ print_ok
+ fi
+ fi
+}
+
add_addr_ports_tests()
{
# signal address with port
@@ -2963,6 +3002,22 @@ add_addr_ports_tests()
chk_join_nr 2 2 2
chk_add_nr 2 2 2
fi
+
+ if reset "port-based signal endpoint must not accept mpc"; then
+ local port retl count
+ port=$(get_port)
+
+ cond_start_capture ${ns1}
+ pm_nl_add_endpoint ${ns1} 10.0.2.1 flags signal port ${port}
+ mptcp_lib_wait_local_port_listen ${ns1} ${port}
+
+ timeout 1 ip netns exec ${ns2} \
+ ./mptcp_connect -t ${timeout_poll} -p $port -s MPTCP 10.0.2.1 >/dev/null 2>&1
+ retl=$?
+ cond_stop_capture
+
+ chk_mpc_endp_attempt ${retl} 1
+ fi
}
syncookies_tests()
The patch below does not apply to the 4.19-stable tree.
If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm
tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit
id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>.
To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands:
git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-4.19.y
git checkout FETCH_HEAD
git cherry-pick -x 13f8f1e05f1dc36dbba6cba0ae03354c0dafcde7
# <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.>
git commit -s
git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2024101825-oaf-glaucoma-1d13@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 4.19.y' HEAD^..
Possible dependencies:
thanks,
greg k-h
------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------
From 13f8f1e05f1dc36dbba6cba0ae03354c0dafcde7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland(a)arm.com>
Date: Tue, 8 Oct 2024 16:58:48 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] arm64: probes: Fix uprobes for big-endian kernels
The arm64 uprobes code is broken for big-endian kernels as it doesn't
convert the in-memory instruction encoding (which is always
little-endian) into the kernel's native endianness before analyzing and
simulating instructions. This may result in a few distinct problems:
* The kernel may may erroneously reject probing an instruction which can
safely be probed.
* The kernel may erroneously erroneously permit stepping an
instruction out-of-line when that instruction cannot be stepped
out-of-line safely.
* The kernel may erroneously simulate instruction incorrectly dur to
interpretting the byte-swapped encoding.
The endianness mismatch isn't caught by the compiler or sparse because:
* The arch_uprobe::{insn,ixol} fields are encoded as arrays of u8, so
the compiler and sparse have no idea these contain a little-endian
32-bit value. The core uprobes code populates these with a memcpy()
which similarly does not handle endianness.
* While the uprobe_opcode_t type is an alias for __le32, both
arch_uprobe_analyze_insn() and arch_uprobe_skip_sstep() cast from u8[]
to the similarly-named probe_opcode_t, which is an alias for u32.
Hence there is no endianness conversion warning.
Fix this by changing the arch_uprobe::{insn,ixol} fields to __le32 and
adding the appropriate __le32_to_cpu() conversions prior to consuming
the instruction encoding. The core uprobes copies these fields as opaque
ranges of bytes, and so is unaffected by this change.
At the same time, remove MAX_UINSN_BYTES and consistently use
AARCH64_INSN_SIZE for clarity.
Tested with the following:
| #include <stdio.h>
| #include <stdbool.h>
|
| #define noinline __attribute__((noinline))
|
| static noinline void *adrp_self(void)
| {
| void *addr;
|
| asm volatile(
| " adrp %x0, adrp_self\n"
| " add %x0, %x0, :lo12:adrp_self\n"
| : "=r" (addr));
| }
|
|
| int main(int argc, char *argv)
| {
| void *ptr = adrp_self();
| bool equal = (ptr == adrp_self);
|
| printf("adrp_self => %p\n"
| "adrp_self() => %p\n"
| "%s\n",
| adrp_self, ptr, equal ? "EQUAL" : "NOT EQUAL");
|
| return 0;
| }
.... where the adrp_self() function was compiled to:
| 00000000004007e0 <adrp_self>:
| 4007e0: 90000000 adrp x0, 400000 <__ehdr_start>
| 4007e4: 911f8000 add x0, x0, #0x7e0
| 4007e8: d65f03c0 ret
Before this patch, the ADRP is not recognized, and is assumed to be
steppable, resulting in corruption of the result:
| # ./adrp-self
| adrp_self => 0x4007e0
| adrp_self() => 0x4007e0
| EQUAL
| # echo 'p /root/adrp-self:0x007e0' > /sys/kernel/tracing/uprobe_events
| # echo 1 > /sys/kernel/tracing/events/uprobes/enable
| # ./adrp-self
| adrp_self => 0x4007e0
| adrp_self() => 0xffffffffff7e0
| NOT EQUAL
After this patch, the ADRP is correctly recognized and simulated:
| # ./adrp-self
| adrp_self => 0x4007e0
| adrp_self() => 0x4007e0
| EQUAL
| #
| # echo 'p /root/adrp-self:0x007e0' > /sys/kernel/tracing/uprobe_events
| # echo 1 > /sys/kernel/tracing/events/uprobes/enable
| # ./adrp-self
| adrp_self => 0x4007e0
| adrp_self() => 0x4007e0
| EQUAL
Fixes: 9842ceae9fa8 ("arm64: Add uprobe support")
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland(a)arm.com>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas(a)arm.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will(a)kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241008155851.801546-4-mark.rutland@arm.com
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will(a)kernel.org>
diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/uprobes.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/uprobes.h
index 2b09495499c6..014b02897f8e 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/uprobes.h
+++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/uprobes.h
@@ -10,11 +10,9 @@
#include <asm/insn.h>
#include <asm/probes.h>
-#define MAX_UINSN_BYTES AARCH64_INSN_SIZE
-
#define UPROBE_SWBP_INSN cpu_to_le32(BRK64_OPCODE_UPROBES)
#define UPROBE_SWBP_INSN_SIZE AARCH64_INSN_SIZE
-#define UPROBE_XOL_SLOT_BYTES MAX_UINSN_BYTES
+#define UPROBE_XOL_SLOT_BYTES AARCH64_INSN_SIZE
typedef __le32 uprobe_opcode_t;
@@ -23,8 +21,8 @@ struct arch_uprobe_task {
struct arch_uprobe {
union {
- u8 insn[MAX_UINSN_BYTES];
- u8 ixol[MAX_UINSN_BYTES];
+ __le32 insn;
+ __le32 ixol;
};
struct arch_probe_insn api;
bool simulate;
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/probes/uprobes.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/probes/uprobes.c
index d49aef2657cd..a2f137a595fc 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kernel/probes/uprobes.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/probes/uprobes.c
@@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ int arch_uprobe_analyze_insn(struct arch_uprobe *auprobe, struct mm_struct *mm,
else if (!IS_ALIGNED(addr, AARCH64_INSN_SIZE))
return -EINVAL;
- insn = *(probe_opcode_t *)(&auprobe->insn[0]);
+ insn = le32_to_cpu(auprobe->insn);
switch (arm_probe_decode_insn(insn, &auprobe->api)) {
case INSN_REJECTED:
@@ -108,7 +108,7 @@ bool arch_uprobe_skip_sstep(struct arch_uprobe *auprobe, struct pt_regs *regs)
if (!auprobe->simulate)
return false;
- insn = *(probe_opcode_t *)(&auprobe->insn[0]);
+ insn = le32_to_cpu(auprobe->insn);
addr = instruction_pointer(regs);
if (auprobe->api.handler)
The patch below does not apply to the 5.4-stable tree.
If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm
tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit
id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>.
To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands:
git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-5.4.y
git checkout FETCH_HEAD
git cherry-pick -x 13f8f1e05f1dc36dbba6cba0ae03354c0dafcde7
# <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.>
git commit -s
git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2024101822-deplored-dictator-689d@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 5.4.y' HEAD^..
Possible dependencies:
thanks,
greg k-h
------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------
From 13f8f1e05f1dc36dbba6cba0ae03354c0dafcde7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland(a)arm.com>
Date: Tue, 8 Oct 2024 16:58:48 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] arm64: probes: Fix uprobes for big-endian kernels
The arm64 uprobes code is broken for big-endian kernels as it doesn't
convert the in-memory instruction encoding (which is always
little-endian) into the kernel's native endianness before analyzing and
simulating instructions. This may result in a few distinct problems:
* The kernel may may erroneously reject probing an instruction which can
safely be probed.
* The kernel may erroneously erroneously permit stepping an
instruction out-of-line when that instruction cannot be stepped
out-of-line safely.
* The kernel may erroneously simulate instruction incorrectly dur to
interpretting the byte-swapped encoding.
The endianness mismatch isn't caught by the compiler or sparse because:
* The arch_uprobe::{insn,ixol} fields are encoded as arrays of u8, so
the compiler and sparse have no idea these contain a little-endian
32-bit value. The core uprobes code populates these with a memcpy()
which similarly does not handle endianness.
* While the uprobe_opcode_t type is an alias for __le32, both
arch_uprobe_analyze_insn() and arch_uprobe_skip_sstep() cast from u8[]
to the similarly-named probe_opcode_t, which is an alias for u32.
Hence there is no endianness conversion warning.
Fix this by changing the arch_uprobe::{insn,ixol} fields to __le32 and
adding the appropriate __le32_to_cpu() conversions prior to consuming
the instruction encoding. The core uprobes copies these fields as opaque
ranges of bytes, and so is unaffected by this change.
At the same time, remove MAX_UINSN_BYTES and consistently use
AARCH64_INSN_SIZE for clarity.
Tested with the following:
| #include <stdio.h>
| #include <stdbool.h>
|
| #define noinline __attribute__((noinline))
|
| static noinline void *adrp_self(void)
| {
| void *addr;
|
| asm volatile(
| " adrp %x0, adrp_self\n"
| " add %x0, %x0, :lo12:adrp_self\n"
| : "=r" (addr));
| }
|
|
| int main(int argc, char *argv)
| {
| void *ptr = adrp_self();
| bool equal = (ptr == adrp_self);
|
| printf("adrp_self => %p\n"
| "adrp_self() => %p\n"
| "%s\n",
| adrp_self, ptr, equal ? "EQUAL" : "NOT EQUAL");
|
| return 0;
| }
.... where the adrp_self() function was compiled to:
| 00000000004007e0 <adrp_self>:
| 4007e0: 90000000 adrp x0, 400000 <__ehdr_start>
| 4007e4: 911f8000 add x0, x0, #0x7e0
| 4007e8: d65f03c0 ret
Before this patch, the ADRP is not recognized, and is assumed to be
steppable, resulting in corruption of the result:
| # ./adrp-self
| adrp_self => 0x4007e0
| adrp_self() => 0x4007e0
| EQUAL
| # echo 'p /root/adrp-self:0x007e0' > /sys/kernel/tracing/uprobe_events
| # echo 1 > /sys/kernel/tracing/events/uprobes/enable
| # ./adrp-self
| adrp_self => 0x4007e0
| adrp_self() => 0xffffffffff7e0
| NOT EQUAL
After this patch, the ADRP is correctly recognized and simulated:
| # ./adrp-self
| adrp_self => 0x4007e0
| adrp_self() => 0x4007e0
| EQUAL
| #
| # echo 'p /root/adrp-self:0x007e0' > /sys/kernel/tracing/uprobe_events
| # echo 1 > /sys/kernel/tracing/events/uprobes/enable
| # ./adrp-self
| adrp_self => 0x4007e0
| adrp_self() => 0x4007e0
| EQUAL
Fixes: 9842ceae9fa8 ("arm64: Add uprobe support")
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland(a)arm.com>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas(a)arm.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will(a)kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241008155851.801546-4-mark.rutland@arm.com
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will(a)kernel.org>
diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/uprobes.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/uprobes.h
index 2b09495499c6..014b02897f8e 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/uprobes.h
+++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/uprobes.h
@@ -10,11 +10,9 @@
#include <asm/insn.h>
#include <asm/probes.h>
-#define MAX_UINSN_BYTES AARCH64_INSN_SIZE
-
#define UPROBE_SWBP_INSN cpu_to_le32(BRK64_OPCODE_UPROBES)
#define UPROBE_SWBP_INSN_SIZE AARCH64_INSN_SIZE
-#define UPROBE_XOL_SLOT_BYTES MAX_UINSN_BYTES
+#define UPROBE_XOL_SLOT_BYTES AARCH64_INSN_SIZE
typedef __le32 uprobe_opcode_t;
@@ -23,8 +21,8 @@ struct arch_uprobe_task {
struct arch_uprobe {
union {
- u8 insn[MAX_UINSN_BYTES];
- u8 ixol[MAX_UINSN_BYTES];
+ __le32 insn;
+ __le32 ixol;
};
struct arch_probe_insn api;
bool simulate;
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/probes/uprobes.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/probes/uprobes.c
index d49aef2657cd..a2f137a595fc 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kernel/probes/uprobes.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/probes/uprobes.c
@@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ int arch_uprobe_analyze_insn(struct arch_uprobe *auprobe, struct mm_struct *mm,
else if (!IS_ALIGNED(addr, AARCH64_INSN_SIZE))
return -EINVAL;
- insn = *(probe_opcode_t *)(&auprobe->insn[0]);
+ insn = le32_to_cpu(auprobe->insn);
switch (arm_probe_decode_insn(insn, &auprobe->api)) {
case INSN_REJECTED:
@@ -108,7 +108,7 @@ bool arch_uprobe_skip_sstep(struct arch_uprobe *auprobe, struct pt_regs *regs)
if (!auprobe->simulate)
return false;
- insn = *(probe_opcode_t *)(&auprobe->insn[0]);
+ insn = le32_to_cpu(auprobe->insn);
addr = instruction_pointer(regs);
if (auprobe->api.handler)
The patch below does not apply to the 5.10-stable tree.
If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm
tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit
id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>.
To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands:
git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-5.10.y
git checkout FETCH_HEAD
git cherry-pick -x 13f8f1e05f1dc36dbba6cba0ae03354c0dafcde7
# <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.>
git commit -s
git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2024101820-delirious-wrongful-e7f1@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 5.10.y' HEAD^..
Possible dependencies:
thanks,
greg k-h
------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------
From 13f8f1e05f1dc36dbba6cba0ae03354c0dafcde7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland(a)arm.com>
Date: Tue, 8 Oct 2024 16:58:48 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] arm64: probes: Fix uprobes for big-endian kernels
The arm64 uprobes code is broken for big-endian kernels as it doesn't
convert the in-memory instruction encoding (which is always
little-endian) into the kernel's native endianness before analyzing and
simulating instructions. This may result in a few distinct problems:
* The kernel may may erroneously reject probing an instruction which can
safely be probed.
* The kernel may erroneously erroneously permit stepping an
instruction out-of-line when that instruction cannot be stepped
out-of-line safely.
* The kernel may erroneously simulate instruction incorrectly dur to
interpretting the byte-swapped encoding.
The endianness mismatch isn't caught by the compiler or sparse because:
* The arch_uprobe::{insn,ixol} fields are encoded as arrays of u8, so
the compiler and sparse have no idea these contain a little-endian
32-bit value. The core uprobes code populates these with a memcpy()
which similarly does not handle endianness.
* While the uprobe_opcode_t type is an alias for __le32, both
arch_uprobe_analyze_insn() and arch_uprobe_skip_sstep() cast from u8[]
to the similarly-named probe_opcode_t, which is an alias for u32.
Hence there is no endianness conversion warning.
Fix this by changing the arch_uprobe::{insn,ixol} fields to __le32 and
adding the appropriate __le32_to_cpu() conversions prior to consuming
the instruction encoding. The core uprobes copies these fields as opaque
ranges of bytes, and so is unaffected by this change.
At the same time, remove MAX_UINSN_BYTES and consistently use
AARCH64_INSN_SIZE for clarity.
Tested with the following:
| #include <stdio.h>
| #include <stdbool.h>
|
| #define noinline __attribute__((noinline))
|
| static noinline void *adrp_self(void)
| {
| void *addr;
|
| asm volatile(
| " adrp %x0, adrp_self\n"
| " add %x0, %x0, :lo12:adrp_self\n"
| : "=r" (addr));
| }
|
|
| int main(int argc, char *argv)
| {
| void *ptr = adrp_self();
| bool equal = (ptr == adrp_self);
|
| printf("adrp_self => %p\n"
| "adrp_self() => %p\n"
| "%s\n",
| adrp_self, ptr, equal ? "EQUAL" : "NOT EQUAL");
|
| return 0;
| }
.... where the adrp_self() function was compiled to:
| 00000000004007e0 <adrp_self>:
| 4007e0: 90000000 adrp x0, 400000 <__ehdr_start>
| 4007e4: 911f8000 add x0, x0, #0x7e0
| 4007e8: d65f03c0 ret
Before this patch, the ADRP is not recognized, and is assumed to be
steppable, resulting in corruption of the result:
| # ./adrp-self
| adrp_self => 0x4007e0
| adrp_self() => 0x4007e0
| EQUAL
| # echo 'p /root/adrp-self:0x007e0' > /sys/kernel/tracing/uprobe_events
| # echo 1 > /sys/kernel/tracing/events/uprobes/enable
| # ./adrp-self
| adrp_self => 0x4007e0
| adrp_self() => 0xffffffffff7e0
| NOT EQUAL
After this patch, the ADRP is correctly recognized and simulated:
| # ./adrp-self
| adrp_self => 0x4007e0
| adrp_self() => 0x4007e0
| EQUAL
| #
| # echo 'p /root/adrp-self:0x007e0' > /sys/kernel/tracing/uprobe_events
| # echo 1 > /sys/kernel/tracing/events/uprobes/enable
| # ./adrp-self
| adrp_self => 0x4007e0
| adrp_self() => 0x4007e0
| EQUAL
Fixes: 9842ceae9fa8 ("arm64: Add uprobe support")
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland(a)arm.com>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas(a)arm.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will(a)kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241008155851.801546-4-mark.rutland@arm.com
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will(a)kernel.org>
diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/uprobes.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/uprobes.h
index 2b09495499c6..014b02897f8e 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/uprobes.h
+++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/uprobes.h
@@ -10,11 +10,9 @@
#include <asm/insn.h>
#include <asm/probes.h>
-#define MAX_UINSN_BYTES AARCH64_INSN_SIZE
-
#define UPROBE_SWBP_INSN cpu_to_le32(BRK64_OPCODE_UPROBES)
#define UPROBE_SWBP_INSN_SIZE AARCH64_INSN_SIZE
-#define UPROBE_XOL_SLOT_BYTES MAX_UINSN_BYTES
+#define UPROBE_XOL_SLOT_BYTES AARCH64_INSN_SIZE
typedef __le32 uprobe_opcode_t;
@@ -23,8 +21,8 @@ struct arch_uprobe_task {
struct arch_uprobe {
union {
- u8 insn[MAX_UINSN_BYTES];
- u8 ixol[MAX_UINSN_BYTES];
+ __le32 insn;
+ __le32 ixol;
};
struct arch_probe_insn api;
bool simulate;
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/probes/uprobes.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/probes/uprobes.c
index d49aef2657cd..a2f137a595fc 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kernel/probes/uprobes.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/probes/uprobes.c
@@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ int arch_uprobe_analyze_insn(struct arch_uprobe *auprobe, struct mm_struct *mm,
else if (!IS_ALIGNED(addr, AARCH64_INSN_SIZE))
return -EINVAL;
- insn = *(probe_opcode_t *)(&auprobe->insn[0]);
+ insn = le32_to_cpu(auprobe->insn);
switch (arm_probe_decode_insn(insn, &auprobe->api)) {
case INSN_REJECTED:
@@ -108,7 +108,7 @@ bool arch_uprobe_skip_sstep(struct arch_uprobe *auprobe, struct pt_regs *regs)
if (!auprobe->simulate)
return false;
- insn = *(probe_opcode_t *)(&auprobe->insn[0]);
+ insn = le32_to_cpu(auprobe->insn);
addr = instruction_pointer(regs);
if (auprobe->api.handler)
The patch below does not apply to the 5.15-stable tree.
If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm
tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit
id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>.
To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands:
git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-5.15.y
git checkout FETCH_HEAD
git cherry-pick -x 13f8f1e05f1dc36dbba6cba0ae03354c0dafcde7
# <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.>
git commit -s
git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2024101818-tying-implement-f714@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 5.15.y' HEAD^..
Possible dependencies:
thanks,
greg k-h
------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------
From 13f8f1e05f1dc36dbba6cba0ae03354c0dafcde7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland(a)arm.com>
Date: Tue, 8 Oct 2024 16:58:48 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] arm64: probes: Fix uprobes for big-endian kernels
The arm64 uprobes code is broken for big-endian kernels as it doesn't
convert the in-memory instruction encoding (which is always
little-endian) into the kernel's native endianness before analyzing and
simulating instructions. This may result in a few distinct problems:
* The kernel may may erroneously reject probing an instruction which can
safely be probed.
* The kernel may erroneously erroneously permit stepping an
instruction out-of-line when that instruction cannot be stepped
out-of-line safely.
* The kernel may erroneously simulate instruction incorrectly dur to
interpretting the byte-swapped encoding.
The endianness mismatch isn't caught by the compiler or sparse because:
* The arch_uprobe::{insn,ixol} fields are encoded as arrays of u8, so
the compiler and sparse have no idea these contain a little-endian
32-bit value. The core uprobes code populates these with a memcpy()
which similarly does not handle endianness.
* While the uprobe_opcode_t type is an alias for __le32, both
arch_uprobe_analyze_insn() and arch_uprobe_skip_sstep() cast from u8[]
to the similarly-named probe_opcode_t, which is an alias for u32.
Hence there is no endianness conversion warning.
Fix this by changing the arch_uprobe::{insn,ixol} fields to __le32 and
adding the appropriate __le32_to_cpu() conversions prior to consuming
the instruction encoding. The core uprobes copies these fields as opaque
ranges of bytes, and so is unaffected by this change.
At the same time, remove MAX_UINSN_BYTES and consistently use
AARCH64_INSN_SIZE for clarity.
Tested with the following:
| #include <stdio.h>
| #include <stdbool.h>
|
| #define noinline __attribute__((noinline))
|
| static noinline void *adrp_self(void)
| {
| void *addr;
|
| asm volatile(
| " adrp %x0, adrp_self\n"
| " add %x0, %x0, :lo12:adrp_self\n"
| : "=r" (addr));
| }
|
|
| int main(int argc, char *argv)
| {
| void *ptr = adrp_self();
| bool equal = (ptr == adrp_self);
|
| printf("adrp_self => %p\n"
| "adrp_self() => %p\n"
| "%s\n",
| adrp_self, ptr, equal ? "EQUAL" : "NOT EQUAL");
|
| return 0;
| }
.... where the adrp_self() function was compiled to:
| 00000000004007e0 <adrp_self>:
| 4007e0: 90000000 adrp x0, 400000 <__ehdr_start>
| 4007e4: 911f8000 add x0, x0, #0x7e0
| 4007e8: d65f03c0 ret
Before this patch, the ADRP is not recognized, and is assumed to be
steppable, resulting in corruption of the result:
| # ./adrp-self
| adrp_self => 0x4007e0
| adrp_self() => 0x4007e0
| EQUAL
| # echo 'p /root/adrp-self:0x007e0' > /sys/kernel/tracing/uprobe_events
| # echo 1 > /sys/kernel/tracing/events/uprobes/enable
| # ./adrp-self
| adrp_self => 0x4007e0
| adrp_self() => 0xffffffffff7e0
| NOT EQUAL
After this patch, the ADRP is correctly recognized and simulated:
| # ./adrp-self
| adrp_self => 0x4007e0
| adrp_self() => 0x4007e0
| EQUAL
| #
| # echo 'p /root/adrp-self:0x007e0' > /sys/kernel/tracing/uprobe_events
| # echo 1 > /sys/kernel/tracing/events/uprobes/enable
| # ./adrp-self
| adrp_self => 0x4007e0
| adrp_self() => 0x4007e0
| EQUAL
Fixes: 9842ceae9fa8 ("arm64: Add uprobe support")
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland(a)arm.com>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas(a)arm.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will(a)kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241008155851.801546-4-mark.rutland@arm.com
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will(a)kernel.org>
diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/uprobes.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/uprobes.h
index 2b09495499c6..014b02897f8e 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/uprobes.h
+++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/uprobes.h
@@ -10,11 +10,9 @@
#include <asm/insn.h>
#include <asm/probes.h>
-#define MAX_UINSN_BYTES AARCH64_INSN_SIZE
-
#define UPROBE_SWBP_INSN cpu_to_le32(BRK64_OPCODE_UPROBES)
#define UPROBE_SWBP_INSN_SIZE AARCH64_INSN_SIZE
-#define UPROBE_XOL_SLOT_BYTES MAX_UINSN_BYTES
+#define UPROBE_XOL_SLOT_BYTES AARCH64_INSN_SIZE
typedef __le32 uprobe_opcode_t;
@@ -23,8 +21,8 @@ struct arch_uprobe_task {
struct arch_uprobe {
union {
- u8 insn[MAX_UINSN_BYTES];
- u8 ixol[MAX_UINSN_BYTES];
+ __le32 insn;
+ __le32 ixol;
};
struct arch_probe_insn api;
bool simulate;
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/probes/uprobes.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/probes/uprobes.c
index d49aef2657cd..a2f137a595fc 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kernel/probes/uprobes.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/probes/uprobes.c
@@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ int arch_uprobe_analyze_insn(struct arch_uprobe *auprobe, struct mm_struct *mm,
else if (!IS_ALIGNED(addr, AARCH64_INSN_SIZE))
return -EINVAL;
- insn = *(probe_opcode_t *)(&auprobe->insn[0]);
+ insn = le32_to_cpu(auprobe->insn);
switch (arm_probe_decode_insn(insn, &auprobe->api)) {
case INSN_REJECTED:
@@ -108,7 +108,7 @@ bool arch_uprobe_skip_sstep(struct arch_uprobe *auprobe, struct pt_regs *regs)
if (!auprobe->simulate)
return false;
- insn = *(probe_opcode_t *)(&auprobe->insn[0]);
+ insn = le32_to_cpu(auprobe->insn);
addr = instruction_pointer(regs);
if (auprobe->api.handler)
The patch below does not apply to the 6.1-stable tree.
If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm
tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit
id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>.
To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands:
git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-6.1.y
git checkout FETCH_HEAD
git cherry-pick -x 13f8f1e05f1dc36dbba6cba0ae03354c0dafcde7
# <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.>
git commit -s
git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2024101815-chapped-decibel-91ed@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 6.1.y' HEAD^..
Possible dependencies:
thanks,
greg k-h
------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------
From 13f8f1e05f1dc36dbba6cba0ae03354c0dafcde7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland(a)arm.com>
Date: Tue, 8 Oct 2024 16:58:48 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] arm64: probes: Fix uprobes for big-endian kernels
The arm64 uprobes code is broken for big-endian kernels as it doesn't
convert the in-memory instruction encoding (which is always
little-endian) into the kernel's native endianness before analyzing and
simulating instructions. This may result in a few distinct problems:
* The kernel may may erroneously reject probing an instruction which can
safely be probed.
* The kernel may erroneously erroneously permit stepping an
instruction out-of-line when that instruction cannot be stepped
out-of-line safely.
* The kernel may erroneously simulate instruction incorrectly dur to
interpretting the byte-swapped encoding.
The endianness mismatch isn't caught by the compiler or sparse because:
* The arch_uprobe::{insn,ixol} fields are encoded as arrays of u8, so
the compiler and sparse have no idea these contain a little-endian
32-bit value. The core uprobes code populates these with a memcpy()
which similarly does not handle endianness.
* While the uprobe_opcode_t type is an alias for __le32, both
arch_uprobe_analyze_insn() and arch_uprobe_skip_sstep() cast from u8[]
to the similarly-named probe_opcode_t, which is an alias for u32.
Hence there is no endianness conversion warning.
Fix this by changing the arch_uprobe::{insn,ixol} fields to __le32 and
adding the appropriate __le32_to_cpu() conversions prior to consuming
the instruction encoding. The core uprobes copies these fields as opaque
ranges of bytes, and so is unaffected by this change.
At the same time, remove MAX_UINSN_BYTES and consistently use
AARCH64_INSN_SIZE for clarity.
Tested with the following:
| #include <stdio.h>
| #include <stdbool.h>
|
| #define noinline __attribute__((noinline))
|
| static noinline void *adrp_self(void)
| {
| void *addr;
|
| asm volatile(
| " adrp %x0, adrp_self\n"
| " add %x0, %x0, :lo12:adrp_self\n"
| : "=r" (addr));
| }
|
|
| int main(int argc, char *argv)
| {
| void *ptr = adrp_self();
| bool equal = (ptr == adrp_self);
|
| printf("adrp_self => %p\n"
| "adrp_self() => %p\n"
| "%s\n",
| adrp_self, ptr, equal ? "EQUAL" : "NOT EQUAL");
|
| return 0;
| }
.... where the adrp_self() function was compiled to:
| 00000000004007e0 <adrp_self>:
| 4007e0: 90000000 adrp x0, 400000 <__ehdr_start>
| 4007e4: 911f8000 add x0, x0, #0x7e0
| 4007e8: d65f03c0 ret
Before this patch, the ADRP is not recognized, and is assumed to be
steppable, resulting in corruption of the result:
| # ./adrp-self
| adrp_self => 0x4007e0
| adrp_self() => 0x4007e0
| EQUAL
| # echo 'p /root/adrp-self:0x007e0' > /sys/kernel/tracing/uprobe_events
| # echo 1 > /sys/kernel/tracing/events/uprobes/enable
| # ./adrp-self
| adrp_self => 0x4007e0
| adrp_self() => 0xffffffffff7e0
| NOT EQUAL
After this patch, the ADRP is correctly recognized and simulated:
| # ./adrp-self
| adrp_self => 0x4007e0
| adrp_self() => 0x4007e0
| EQUAL
| #
| # echo 'p /root/adrp-self:0x007e0' > /sys/kernel/tracing/uprobe_events
| # echo 1 > /sys/kernel/tracing/events/uprobes/enable
| # ./adrp-self
| adrp_self => 0x4007e0
| adrp_self() => 0x4007e0
| EQUAL
Fixes: 9842ceae9fa8 ("arm64: Add uprobe support")
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland(a)arm.com>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas(a)arm.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will(a)kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241008155851.801546-4-mark.rutland@arm.com
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will(a)kernel.org>
diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/uprobes.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/uprobes.h
index 2b09495499c6..014b02897f8e 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/uprobes.h
+++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/uprobes.h
@@ -10,11 +10,9 @@
#include <asm/insn.h>
#include <asm/probes.h>
-#define MAX_UINSN_BYTES AARCH64_INSN_SIZE
-
#define UPROBE_SWBP_INSN cpu_to_le32(BRK64_OPCODE_UPROBES)
#define UPROBE_SWBP_INSN_SIZE AARCH64_INSN_SIZE
-#define UPROBE_XOL_SLOT_BYTES MAX_UINSN_BYTES
+#define UPROBE_XOL_SLOT_BYTES AARCH64_INSN_SIZE
typedef __le32 uprobe_opcode_t;
@@ -23,8 +21,8 @@ struct arch_uprobe_task {
struct arch_uprobe {
union {
- u8 insn[MAX_UINSN_BYTES];
- u8 ixol[MAX_UINSN_BYTES];
+ __le32 insn;
+ __le32 ixol;
};
struct arch_probe_insn api;
bool simulate;
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/probes/uprobes.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/probes/uprobes.c
index d49aef2657cd..a2f137a595fc 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kernel/probes/uprobes.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/probes/uprobes.c
@@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ int arch_uprobe_analyze_insn(struct arch_uprobe *auprobe, struct mm_struct *mm,
else if (!IS_ALIGNED(addr, AARCH64_INSN_SIZE))
return -EINVAL;
- insn = *(probe_opcode_t *)(&auprobe->insn[0]);
+ insn = le32_to_cpu(auprobe->insn);
switch (arm_probe_decode_insn(insn, &auprobe->api)) {
case INSN_REJECTED:
@@ -108,7 +108,7 @@ bool arch_uprobe_skip_sstep(struct arch_uprobe *auprobe, struct pt_regs *regs)
if (!auprobe->simulate)
return false;
- insn = *(probe_opcode_t *)(&auprobe->insn[0]);
+ insn = le32_to_cpu(auprobe->insn);
addr = instruction_pointer(regs);
if (auprobe->api.handler)
As detected by Coverity, the error check logic at get_ctrl() is
broken: if ptr_to_user() fails to fill a control due to an error,
no errors are returned and v4l2_g_ctrl() returns success on a
failed operation, which may cause applications to fail.
Add an error check at get_ctrl() and ensure that it will
be returned to userspace without filling the control value if
get_ctrl() fails.
Fixes: 71c689dc2e73 ("media: v4l2-ctrls: split up into four source files")
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab+huawei(a)kernel.org>
---
drivers/media/v4l2-core/v4l2-ctrls-api.c | 16 +++++++++++-----
1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/media/v4l2-core/v4l2-ctrls-api.c b/drivers/media/v4l2-core/v4l2-ctrls-api.c
index e5a364efd5e6..a0de7eeaf085 100644
--- a/drivers/media/v4l2-core/v4l2-ctrls-api.c
+++ b/drivers/media/v4l2-core/v4l2-ctrls-api.c
@@ -753,9 +753,10 @@ static int get_ctrl(struct v4l2_ctrl *ctrl, struct v4l2_ext_control *c)
for (i = 0; i < master->ncontrols; i++)
cur_to_new(master->cluster[i]);
ret = call_op(master, g_volatile_ctrl);
- new_to_user(c, ctrl);
+ if (!ret)
+ ret = new_to_user(c, ctrl);
} else {
- cur_to_user(c, ctrl);
+ ret = cur_to_user(c, ctrl);
}
v4l2_ctrl_unlock(master);
return ret;
@@ -770,7 +771,10 @@ int v4l2_g_ctrl(struct v4l2_ctrl_handler *hdl, struct v4l2_control *control)
if (!ctrl || !ctrl->is_int)
return -EINVAL;
ret = get_ctrl(ctrl, &c);
- control->value = c.value;
+
+ if (!ret)
+ control->value = c.value;
+
return ret;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(v4l2_g_ctrl);
@@ -811,10 +815,12 @@ static int set_ctrl_lock(struct v4l2_fh *fh, struct v4l2_ctrl *ctrl,
int ret;
v4l2_ctrl_lock(ctrl);
- user_to_new(c, ctrl);
+ ret = user_to_new(c, ctrl);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
ret = set_ctrl(fh, ctrl, 0);
if (!ret)
- cur_to_user(c, ctrl);
+ ret = cur_to_user(c, ctrl);
v4l2_ctrl_unlock(ctrl);
return ret;
}
--
2.47.0
As reported by Coverity, the logic at tpg_precalculate_line()
blindly rescales the buffer even when scaled_witdh is equal to
zero. If this ever happens, this will cause a division by zero.
Instead, add a WARN_ON_ONCE() to trigger such cases and return
without doing any precalculation.
Fixes: 63881df94d3e ("[media] vivid: add the Test Pattern Generator")
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab+huawei(a)kernel.org>
---
drivers/media/common/v4l2-tpg/v4l2-tpg-core.c | 3 +++
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
diff --git a/drivers/media/common/v4l2-tpg/v4l2-tpg-core.c b/drivers/media/common/v4l2-tpg/v4l2-tpg-core.c
index c86343a4d0bf..940bfbf275ce 100644
--- a/drivers/media/common/v4l2-tpg/v4l2-tpg-core.c
+++ b/drivers/media/common/v4l2-tpg/v4l2-tpg-core.c
@@ -1795,6 +1795,9 @@ static void tpg_precalculate_line(struct tpg_data *tpg)
unsigned p;
unsigned x;
+ if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!tpg->src_width || !tpg->scaled_width))
+ return;
+
switch (tpg->pattern) {
case TPG_PAT_GREEN:
contrast = TPG_COLOR_100_RED;
--
2.47.0
In loongson_sysconf, The "core" of cores_per_node and cores_per_package
stands for a logical core, which means in a SMT system it stands for a
thread indeed. This information is gotten from SMBIOS Type4 Structure,
so in order to get a correct cores_per_package for both SMT and non-SMT
systems in parse_cpu_table() we should use SMBIOS_THREAD_PACKAGE_OFFSET
instead of SMBIOS_CORE_PACKAGE_OFFSET.
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Chao Li <lichao(a)loongson.cn>
Tested-by: Chao Li <lichao(a)loongson.cn>
Signed-off-by: Huacai Chen <chenhuacai(a)loongson.cn>
---
arch/loongarch/kernel/setup.c | 3 ++-
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/arch/loongarch/kernel/setup.c b/arch/loongarch/kernel/setup.c
index 00e307203ddb..cbd3c09a93c1 100644
--- a/arch/loongarch/kernel/setup.c
+++ b/arch/loongarch/kernel/setup.c
@@ -55,6 +55,7 @@
#define SMBIOS_FREQHIGH_OFFSET 0x17
#define SMBIOS_FREQLOW_MASK 0xFF
#define SMBIOS_CORE_PACKAGE_OFFSET 0x23
+#define SMBIOS_THREAD_PACKAGE_OFFSET 0x25
#define LOONGSON_EFI_ENABLE (1 << 3)
unsigned long fw_arg0, fw_arg1, fw_arg2;
@@ -125,7 +126,7 @@ static void __init parse_cpu_table(const struct dmi_header *dm)
cpu_clock_freq = freq_temp * 1000000;
loongson_sysconf.cpuname = (void *)dmi_string_parse(dm, dmi_data[16]);
- loongson_sysconf.cores_per_package = *(dmi_data + SMBIOS_CORE_PACKAGE_OFFSET);
+ loongson_sysconf.cores_per_package = *(dmi_data + SMBIOS_THREAD_PACKAGE_OFFSET);
pr_info("CpuClock = %llu\n", cpu_clock_freq);
}
--
2.43.5
diff --git a/arch/loongarch/include/asm/bootinfo.h b/arch/loongarch/include/asm/bootinfo.h
index 6d5846dd075c..7657e016233f 100644
--- a/arch/loongarch/include/asm/bootinfo.h
+++ b/arch/loongarch/include/asm/bootinfo.h
@@ -26,6 +26,10 @@ struct loongson_board_info {
#define NR_WORDS DIV_ROUND_UP(NR_CPUS, BITS_PER_LONG)
+/*
+ * The "core" of cores_per_node and cores_per_package stands for a
+ * logical core, which means in a SMT system it stands for a thread.
+ */
struct loongson_system_configuration {
int nr_cpus;
int nr_nodes;
Hi, Conor
> On Thu, Oct 17, 2024 at 05:49:56AM +0000, Changhuang Liang wrote:
> > Hi, Conor,
> >
> > > Hi, Conor
> > >
> > > Thanks for your patch.
> > >
> > > > From: Conor Dooley <conor.dooley(a)microchip.com>
> > > >
> > > > Aurelien reported probe failures due to the csi node being enabled
> > > > without having a camera attached to it. A camera was in the
> > > > initial submissions, but was removed from the dts, as it had not
> > > > actually been present on the board, but was from an addon board
> > > > used by the developer
> > > of the relevant drivers.
> > > > The non-camera pipeline nodes were not disabled when this happened
> > > > and the probe failures are problematic for Debian. Disable them.
> > > >
> > > > CC: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
> > > > Fixes: 28ecaaa5af192 ("riscv: dts: starfive: jh7110: Add camera
> > > > subsystem
> > > > nodes")
> > >
> > > Here you write it in 13 characters, should be "Fixes: 28ecaaa5af19 ..."
> > >
> >
> > After fixing this:
> > Reviewed-by: Changhuang Liang <changhuang.liang(a)starfivetech.com>
>
> Ye, I know it was 13 not 12. I don't think that's a problem though.
Okay, that's fine.
Best Regards,
Changhuang
The patch titled
Subject: resource,kexec: walk_system_ram_res_rev must retain resource flags
has been added to the -mm mm-hotfixes-unstable branch. Its filename is
resourcekexec-walk_system_ram_res_rev-must-retain-resource-flags.patch
This patch will shortly appear at
https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/25-new.git/tree/patche…
This patch will later appear in the mm-hotfixes-unstable branch at
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm
Before you just go and hit "reply", please:
a) Consider who else should be cc'ed
b) Prefer to cc a suitable mailing list as well
c) Ideally: find the original patch on the mailing list and do a
reply-to-all to that, adding suitable additional cc's
*** Remember to use Documentation/process/submit-checklist.rst when testing your code ***
The -mm tree is included into linux-next via the mm-everything
branch at git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm
and is updated there every 2-3 working days
------------------------------------------------------
From: Gregory Price <gourry(a)gourry.net>
Subject: resource,kexec: walk_system_ram_res_rev must retain resource flags
Date: Thu, 17 Oct 2024 15:03:47 -0400
walk_system_ram_res_rev() erroneously discards resource flags when passing
the information to the callback.
This causes systems with IORESOURCE_SYSRAM_DRIVER_MANAGED memory to have
these resources selected during kexec to store kexec buffers if that
memory happens to be at placed above normal system ram.
This leads to undefined behavior after reboot. If the kexec buffer is
never touched, nothing happens. If the kexec buffer is touched, it could
lead to a crash (like below) or undefined behavior.
Tested on a system with CXL memory expanders with driver managed memory,
TPM enabled, and CONFIG_IMA_KEXEC=y. Adding printk's showed the flags
were being discarded and as a result the check for
IORESOURCE_SYSRAM_DRIVER_MANAGED passes.
find_next_iomem_res: name(System RAM (kmem))
start(10000000000)
end(1034fffffff)
flags(83000200)
locate_mem_hole_top_down: start(10000000000) end(1034fffffff) flags(0)
[.] BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffff89834ffff000
[.] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
[.] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
[.] PGD c04c8bf067 P4D c04c8bf067 PUD c04c8be067 PMD 0
[.] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP
[.] RIP: 0010:ima_restore_measurement_list+0x95/0x4b0
[.] RSP: 0018:ffffc900000d3a80 EFLAGS: 00010286
[.] RAX: 0000000000001000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: ffff89834ffff000
[.] RDX: 0000000000000018 RSI: ffff89834ffff000 RDI: ffff89834ffff018
[.] RBP: ffffc900000d3ba0 R08: 0000000000000020 R09: ffff888132b8a900
[.] R10: 4000000000000000 R11: 000000003a616d69 R12: 0000000000000000
[.] R13: ffffffff8404ac28 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffff89834ffff000
[.] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff893d44640000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[.] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[.] ata5: SATA link down (SStatus 0 SControl 300)
[.] CR2: ffff89834ffff000 CR3: 000001034d00f001 CR4: 0000000000770ef0
[.] PKRU: 55555554
[.] Call Trace:
[.] <TASK>
[.] ? __die+0x78/0xc0
[.] ? page_fault_oops+0x2a8/0x3a0
[.] ? exc_page_fault+0x84/0x130
[.] ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x22/0x30
[.] ? ima_restore_measurement_list+0x95/0x4b0
[.] ? template_desc_init_fields+0x317/0x410
[.] ? crypto_alloc_tfm_node+0x9c/0xc0
[.] ? init_ima_lsm+0x30/0x30
[.] ima_load_kexec_buffer+0x72/0xa0
[.] ima_init+0x44/0xa0
[.] __initstub__kmod_ima__373_1201_init_ima7+0x1e/0xb0
[.] ? init_ima_lsm+0x30/0x30
[.] do_one_initcall+0xad/0x200
[.] ? idr_alloc_cyclic+0xaa/0x110
[.] ? new_slab+0x12c/0x420
[.] ? new_slab+0x12c/0x420
[.] ? number+0x12a/0x430
[.] ? sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0xa/0x80
[.] ? asm_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x16/0x20
[.] ? parse_args+0xd4/0x380
[.] ? parse_args+0x14b/0x380
[.] kernel_init_freeable+0x1c1/0x2b0
[.] ? rest_init+0xb0/0xb0
[.] kernel_init+0x16/0x1a0
[.] ret_from_fork+0x2f/0x40
[.] ? rest_init+0xb0/0xb0
[.] ret_from_fork_asm+0x11/0x20
[.] </TASK>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20231114091658.228030-1-bhe@redhat.com/
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20241017190347.5578-1-gourry@gourry.net
Fixes: 7acf164b259d ("resource: add walk_system_ram_res_rev()")
Signed-off-by: Gregory Price <gourry(a)gourry.net>
Cc: AKASHI Takahiro <takahiro.akashi(a)linaro.org>
Cc: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko(a)linux.intel.com>
Cc: Baoquan he <bhe(a)redhat.com>
Cc: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas(a)google.com>
Cc: "Huang, Ying" <ying.huang(a)intel.com>
Cc: Ilpo J��rvinen <ilpo.jarvinen(a)linux.intel.com>
Cc: Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg(a)linux.intel.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx(a)linutronix.de>
Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm(a)linux-foundation.org>
---
kernel/resource.c | 4 +---
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 3 deletions(-)
--- a/kernel/resource.c~resourcekexec-walk_system_ram_res_rev-must-retain-resource-flags
+++ a/kernel/resource.c
@@ -459,9 +459,7 @@ int walk_system_ram_res_rev(u64 start, u
rams_size += 16;
}
- rams[i].start = res.start;
- rams[i++].end = res.end;
-
+ rams[i++] = res;
start = res.end + 1;
}
_
Patches currently in -mm which might be from gourry(a)gourry.net are
resourcekexec-walk_system_ram_res_rev-must-retain-resource-flags.patch
The patch titled
Subject: nilfs2: fix kernel bug due to missing clearing of checked flag
has been added to the -mm mm-hotfixes-unstable branch. Its filename is
nilfs2-fix-kernel-bug-due-to-missing-clearing-of-checked-flag.patch
This patch will shortly appear at
https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/25-new.git/tree/patche…
This patch will later appear in the mm-hotfixes-unstable branch at
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm
Before you just go and hit "reply", please:
a) Consider who else should be cc'ed
b) Prefer to cc a suitable mailing list as well
c) Ideally: find the original patch on the mailing list and do a
reply-to-all to that, adding suitable additional cc's
*** Remember to use Documentation/process/submit-checklist.rst when testing your code ***
The -mm tree is included into linux-next via the mm-everything
branch at git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm
and is updated there every 2-3 working days
------------------------------------------------------
From: Ryusuke Konishi <konishi.ryusuke(a)gmail.com>
Subject: nilfs2: fix kernel bug due to missing clearing of checked flag
Date: Fri, 18 Oct 2024 04:33:10 +0900
Syzbot reported that in directory operations after nilfs2 detects
filesystem corruption and degrades to read-only,
__block_write_begin_int(), which is called to prepare block writes, may
fail the BUG_ON check for accesses exceeding the folio/page size,
triggering a kernel bug.
This was found to be because the "checked" flag of a page/folio was not
cleared when it was discarded by nilfs2's own routine, which causes the
sanity check of directory entries to be skipped when the directory
page/folio is reloaded. So, fix that.
This was necessary when the use of nilfs2's own page discard routine was
applied to more than just metadata files.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20241017193359.5051-1-konishi.ryusuke@gmail.com
Fixes: 8c26c4e2694a ("nilfs2: fix issue with flush kernel thread after remount in RO mode because of driver's internal error or metadata corruption")
Signed-off-by: Ryusuke Konishi <konishi.ryusuke(a)gmail.com>
Reported-by: syzbot+d6ca2daf692c7a82f959(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=d6ca2daf692c7a82f959
Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm(a)linux-foundation.org>
---
fs/nilfs2/page.c | 1 +
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
--- a/fs/nilfs2/page.c~nilfs2-fix-kernel-bug-due-to-missing-clearing-of-checked-flag
+++ a/fs/nilfs2/page.c
@@ -401,6 +401,7 @@ void nilfs_clear_folio_dirty(struct foli
folio_clear_uptodate(folio);
folio_clear_mappedtodisk(folio);
+ folio_clear_checked(folio);
head = folio_buffers(folio);
if (head) {
_
Patches currently in -mm which might be from konishi.ryusuke(a)gmail.com are
nilfs2-fix-kernel-bug-due-to-missing-clearing-of-buffer-delay-flag.patch
nilfs2-fix-kernel-bug-due-to-missing-clearing-of-checked-flag.patch
If some remap_pfn_range() calls succeeded before one failed, we still have
buffer pages mapped into the userspace page tables when we drop the buffer
reference with comedi_buf_map_put(bm). The userspace mappings are only
cleaned up later in the mmap error path.
Fix it by explicitly flushing all mappings in our VMA on the error path.
See commit 79a61cc3fc04 ("mm: avoid leaving partial pfn mappings around in
error case").
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
Fixes: ed9eccbe8970 ("Staging: add comedi core")
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh(a)google.com>
---
Note: compile-tested only; I don't actually have comedi hardware, and I
don't know anything about comedi.
---
Changes in v2:
- only do the zapping in the pfnmap path (Ian Abbott)
- use zap_vma_ptes() instead of zap_page_range_single() (Ian Abbott)
- Link to v1: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241014-comedi-tlb-v1-1-4b699144b438@google.com
---
drivers/comedi/comedi_fops.c | 10 ++++++++++
1 file changed, 10 insertions(+)
diff --git a/drivers/comedi/comedi_fops.c b/drivers/comedi/comedi_fops.c
index 1b481731df96..68e5301e6281 100644
--- a/drivers/comedi/comedi_fops.c
+++ b/drivers/comedi/comedi_fops.c
@@ -2407,6 +2407,16 @@ static int comedi_mmap(struct file *file, struct vm_area_struct *vma)
start += PAGE_SIZE;
}
+
+ /*
+ * Leaving behind a partial mapping of a buffer we're about to
+ * drop is unsafe, see remap_pfn_range_notrack().
+ * We need to zap the range here ourselves instead of relying
+ * on the automatic zapping in remap_pfn_range() because we call
+ * remap_pfn_range() in a loop.
+ */
+ if (retval)
+ zap_vma_ptes(vma, vma->vm_start, size);
}
if (retval == 0) {
---
base-commit: 6485cf5ea253d40d507cd71253c9568c5470cd27
change-id: 20241014-comedi-tlb-400246505961
--
Jann Horn <jannh(a)google.com>