This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled
Bluetooth: Prevent stack info leak from the EFS element.
to the 4.9-stable tree which can be found at:
http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum…
The filename of the patch is:
bluetooth-prevent-stack-info-leak-from-the-efs-element.patch
and it can be found in the queue-4.9 subdirectory.
If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree,
please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it.
>From 06e7e776ca4d36547e503279aeff996cbb292c16 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Ben Seri <ben(a)armis.com>
Date: Fri, 8 Dec 2017 15:14:47 +0100
Subject: Bluetooth: Prevent stack info leak from the EFS element.
From: Ben Seri <ben(a)armis.com>
commit 06e7e776ca4d36547e503279aeff996cbb292c16 upstream.
In the function l2cap_parse_conf_rsp and in the function
l2cap_parse_conf_req the following variable is declared without
initialization:
struct l2cap_conf_efs efs;
In addition, when parsing input configuration parameters in both of
these functions, the switch case for handling EFS elements may skip the
memcpy call that will write to the efs variable:
...
case L2CAP_CONF_EFS:
if (olen == sizeof(efs))
memcpy(&efs, (void *)val, olen);
...
The olen in the above if is attacker controlled, and regardless of that
if, in both of these functions the efs variable would eventually be
added to the outgoing configuration request that is being built:
l2cap_add_conf_opt(&ptr, L2CAP_CONF_EFS, sizeof(efs), (unsigned long) &efs);
So by sending a configuration request, or response, that contains an
L2CAP_CONF_EFS element, but with an element length that is not
sizeof(efs) - the memcpy to the uninitialized efs variable can be
avoided, and the uninitialized variable would be returned to the
attacker (16 bytes).
This issue has been assigned CVE-2017-1000410
Cc: Marcel Holtmann <marcel(a)holtmann.org>
Cc: Gustavo Padovan <gustavo(a)padovan.org>
Cc: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg(a)gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Seri <ben(a)armis.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org>
---
net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c | 20 +++++++++++---------
1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
--- a/net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c
+++ b/net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c
@@ -3353,9 +3353,10 @@ static int l2cap_parse_conf_req(struct l
break;
case L2CAP_CONF_EFS:
- remote_efs = 1;
- if (olen == sizeof(efs))
+ if (olen == sizeof(efs)) {
+ remote_efs = 1;
memcpy(&efs, (void *) val, olen);
+ }
break;
case L2CAP_CONF_EWS:
@@ -3574,16 +3575,17 @@ static int l2cap_parse_conf_rsp(struct l
break;
case L2CAP_CONF_EFS:
- if (olen == sizeof(efs))
+ if (olen == sizeof(efs)) {
memcpy(&efs, (void *)val, olen);
- if (chan->local_stype != L2CAP_SERV_NOTRAFIC &&
- efs.stype != L2CAP_SERV_NOTRAFIC &&
- efs.stype != chan->local_stype)
- return -ECONNREFUSED;
+ if (chan->local_stype != L2CAP_SERV_NOTRAFIC &&
+ efs.stype != L2CAP_SERV_NOTRAFIC &&
+ efs.stype != chan->local_stype)
+ return -ECONNREFUSED;
- l2cap_add_conf_opt(&ptr, L2CAP_CONF_EFS, sizeof(efs),
- (unsigned long) &efs, endptr - ptr);
+ l2cap_add_conf_opt(&ptr, L2CAP_CONF_EFS, sizeof(efs),
+ (unsigned long) &efs, endptr - ptr);
+ }
break;
case L2CAP_CONF_FCS:
Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from ben(a)armis.com are
queue-4.9/bluetooth-prevent-stack-info-leak-from-the-efs-element.patch
This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled
uas: ignore UAS for Norelsys NS1068(X) chips
to the 4.4-stable tree which can be found at:
http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum…
The filename of the patch is:
uas-ignore-uas-for-norelsys-ns1068-x-chips.patch
and it can be found in the queue-4.4 subdirectory.
If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree,
please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it.
>From 928afc85270753657b5543e052cc270c279a3fe9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Icenowy Zheng <icenowy(a)aosc.io>
Date: Sat, 6 Jan 2018 00:56:44 +0800
Subject: uas: ignore UAS for Norelsys NS1068(X) chips
From: Icenowy Zheng <icenowy(a)aosc.io>
commit 928afc85270753657b5543e052cc270c279a3fe9 upstream.
The UAS mode of Norelsys NS1068(X) is reported to fail to work on
several platforms with the following error message:
xhci-hcd xhci-hcd.0.auto: ERROR Transfer event for unknown stream ring slot 1 ep 8
xhci-hcd xhci-hcd.0.auto: @00000000bf04a400 00000000 00000000 1b000000 01098001
And when trying to mount a partition on the disk the disk will
disconnect from the USB controller, then after re-connecting the device
will be offlined and not working at all.
Falling back to USB mass storage can solve this problem, so ignore UAS
function of this chip.
Signed-off-by: Icenowy Zheng <icenowy(a)aosc.io>
Acked-by: Hans de Goede <hdegoede(a)redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/usb/storage/unusual_uas.h | 7 +++++++
1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
--- a/drivers/usb/storage/unusual_uas.h
+++ b/drivers/usb/storage/unusual_uas.h
@@ -155,6 +155,13 @@ UNUSUAL_DEV(0x2109, 0x0711, 0x0000, 0x99
USB_SC_DEVICE, USB_PR_DEVICE, NULL,
US_FL_NO_ATA_1X),
+/* Reported-by: Icenowy Zheng <icenowy(a)aosc.io> */
+UNUSUAL_DEV(0x2537, 0x1068, 0x0000, 0x9999,
+ "Norelsys",
+ "NS1068X",
+ USB_SC_DEVICE, USB_PR_DEVICE, NULL,
+ US_FL_IGNORE_UAS),
+
/* Reported-by: Takeo Nakayama <javhera(a)gmx.com> */
UNUSUAL_DEV(0x357d, 0x7788, 0x0000, 0x9999,
"JMicron",
Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from icenowy(a)aosc.io are
queue-4.4/uas-ignore-uas-for-norelsys-ns1068-x-chips.patch
This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled
Bluetooth: Prevent stack info leak from the EFS element.
to the 4.4-stable tree which can be found at:
http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum…
The filename of the patch is:
bluetooth-prevent-stack-info-leak-from-the-efs-element.patch
and it can be found in the queue-4.4 subdirectory.
If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree,
please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it.
>From 06e7e776ca4d36547e503279aeff996cbb292c16 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Ben Seri <ben(a)armis.com>
Date: Fri, 8 Dec 2017 15:14:47 +0100
Subject: Bluetooth: Prevent stack info leak from the EFS element.
From: Ben Seri <ben(a)armis.com>
commit 06e7e776ca4d36547e503279aeff996cbb292c16 upstream.
In the function l2cap_parse_conf_rsp and in the function
l2cap_parse_conf_req the following variable is declared without
initialization:
struct l2cap_conf_efs efs;
In addition, when parsing input configuration parameters in both of
these functions, the switch case for handling EFS elements may skip the
memcpy call that will write to the efs variable:
...
case L2CAP_CONF_EFS:
if (olen == sizeof(efs))
memcpy(&efs, (void *)val, olen);
...
The olen in the above if is attacker controlled, and regardless of that
if, in both of these functions the efs variable would eventually be
added to the outgoing configuration request that is being built:
l2cap_add_conf_opt(&ptr, L2CAP_CONF_EFS, sizeof(efs), (unsigned long) &efs);
So by sending a configuration request, or response, that contains an
L2CAP_CONF_EFS element, but with an element length that is not
sizeof(efs) - the memcpy to the uninitialized efs variable can be
avoided, and the uninitialized variable would be returned to the
attacker (16 bytes).
This issue has been assigned CVE-2017-1000410
Cc: Marcel Holtmann <marcel(a)holtmann.org>
Cc: Gustavo Padovan <gustavo(a)padovan.org>
Cc: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg(a)gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Seri <ben(a)armis.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org>
---
net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c | 20 +++++++++++---------
1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
--- a/net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c
+++ b/net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c
@@ -3342,9 +3342,10 @@ static int l2cap_parse_conf_req(struct l
break;
case L2CAP_CONF_EFS:
- remote_efs = 1;
- if (olen == sizeof(efs))
+ if (olen == sizeof(efs)) {
+ remote_efs = 1;
memcpy(&efs, (void *) val, olen);
+ }
break;
case L2CAP_CONF_EWS:
@@ -3563,16 +3564,17 @@ static int l2cap_parse_conf_rsp(struct l
break;
case L2CAP_CONF_EFS:
- if (olen == sizeof(efs))
+ if (olen == sizeof(efs)) {
memcpy(&efs, (void *)val, olen);
- if (chan->local_stype != L2CAP_SERV_NOTRAFIC &&
- efs.stype != L2CAP_SERV_NOTRAFIC &&
- efs.stype != chan->local_stype)
- return -ECONNREFUSED;
+ if (chan->local_stype != L2CAP_SERV_NOTRAFIC &&
+ efs.stype != L2CAP_SERV_NOTRAFIC &&
+ efs.stype != chan->local_stype)
+ return -ECONNREFUSED;
- l2cap_add_conf_opt(&ptr, L2CAP_CONF_EFS, sizeof(efs),
- (unsigned long) &efs, endptr - ptr);
+ l2cap_add_conf_opt(&ptr, L2CAP_CONF_EFS, sizeof(efs),
+ (unsigned long) &efs, endptr - ptr);
+ }
break;
case L2CAP_CONF_FCS:
Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from ben(a)armis.com are
queue-4.4/bluetooth-prevent-stack-info-leak-from-the-efs-element.patch
This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled
e1000e: Fix e1000_check_for_copper_link_ich8lan return value.
to the 4.4-stable tree which can be found at:
http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum…
The filename of the patch is:
e1000e-fix-e1000_check_for_copper_link_ich8lan-return-value.patch
and it can be found in the queue-4.4 subdirectory.
If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree,
please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it.
>From 4110e02eb45ea447ec6f5459c9934de0a273fb91 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Benjamin Poirier <bpoirier(a)suse.com>
Date: Mon, 11 Dec 2017 16:26:40 +0900
Subject: e1000e: Fix e1000_check_for_copper_link_ich8lan return value.
From: Benjamin Poirier <bpoirier(a)suse.com>
commit 4110e02eb45ea447ec6f5459c9934de0a273fb91 upstream.
e1000e_check_for_copper_link() and e1000_check_for_copper_link_ich8lan()
are the two functions that may be assigned to mac.ops.check_for_link when
phy.media_type == e1000_media_type_copper. Commit 19110cfbb34d ("e1000e:
Separate signaling for link check/link up") changed the meaning of the
return value of check_for_link for copper media but only adjusted the first
function. This patch adjusts the second function likewise.
Reported-by: Christian Hesse <list(a)eworm.de>
Reported-by: Gabriel C <nix.or.die(a)gmail.com>
Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=198047
Fixes: 19110cfbb34d ("e1000e: Separate signaling for link check/link up")
Signed-off-by: Benjamin Poirier <bpoirier(a)suse.com>
Tested-by: Aaron Brown <aaron.f.brown(a)intel.com>
Tested-by: Christian Hesse <list(a)eworm.de>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Kirsher <jeffrey.t.kirsher(a)intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/net/ethernet/intel/e1000e/ich8lan.c | 11 ++++++++---
1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/e1000e/ich8lan.c
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/e1000e/ich8lan.c
@@ -1362,6 +1362,9 @@ out:
* Checks to see of the link status of the hardware has changed. If a
* change in link status has been detected, then we read the PHY registers
* to get the current speed/duplex if link exists.
+ *
+ * Returns a negative error code (-E1000_ERR_*) or 0 (link down) or 1 (link
+ * up).
**/
static s32 e1000_check_for_copper_link_ich8lan(struct e1000_hw *hw)
{
@@ -1377,7 +1380,7 @@ static s32 e1000_check_for_copper_link_i
* Change or Rx Sequence Error interrupt.
*/
if (!mac->get_link_status)
- return 0;
+ return 1;
/* First we want to see if the MII Status Register reports
* link. If so, then we want to get the current speed/duplex
@@ -1585,10 +1588,12 @@ static s32 e1000_check_for_copper_link_i
* different link partner.
*/
ret_val = e1000e_config_fc_after_link_up(hw);
- if (ret_val)
+ if (ret_val) {
e_dbg("Error configuring flow control\n");
+ return ret_val;
+ }
- return ret_val;
+ return 1;
}
static s32 e1000_get_variants_ich8lan(struct e1000_adapter *adapter)
Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from bpoirier(a)suse.com are
queue-4.4/e1000e-fix-e1000_check_for_copper_link_ich8lan-return-value.patch
This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled
mux: core: fix double get_device()
to the 4.14-stable tree which can be found at:
http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum…
The filename of the patch is:
mux-core-fix-double-get_device.patch
and it can be found in the queue-4.14 subdirectory.
If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree,
please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it.
>From aa1f10e85b0ab53dee85d8e293c8159d18d293a8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Hans de Goede <hdegoede(a)redhat.com>
Date: Fri, 29 Dec 2017 00:22:54 +0100
Subject: mux: core: fix double get_device()
From: Hans de Goede <hdegoede(a)redhat.com>
commit aa1f10e85b0ab53dee85d8e293c8159d18d293a8 upstream.
class_find_device already does a get_device on the returned device.
So the device returned by of_find_mux_chip_by_node is already referenced
and we should not reference it again (and unref it on error).
Signed-off-by: Hans de Goede <hdegoede(a)redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Rosin <peda(a)axentia.se>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/mux/core.c | 4 +++-
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/drivers/mux/core.c
+++ b/drivers/mux/core.c
@@ -413,6 +413,7 @@ static int of_dev_node_match(struct devi
return dev->of_node == data;
}
+/* Note this function returns a reference to the mux_chip dev. */
static struct mux_chip *of_find_mux_chip_by_node(struct device_node *np)
{
struct device *dev;
@@ -466,6 +467,7 @@ struct mux_control *mux_control_get(stru
(!args.args_count && (mux_chip->controllers > 1))) {
dev_err(dev, "%pOF: wrong #mux-control-cells for %pOF\n",
np, args.np);
+ put_device(&mux_chip->dev);
return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
}
@@ -476,10 +478,10 @@ struct mux_control *mux_control_get(stru
if (controller >= mux_chip->controllers) {
dev_err(dev, "%pOF: bad mux controller %u specified in %pOF\n",
np, controller, args.np);
+ put_device(&mux_chip->dev);
return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
}
- get_device(&mux_chip->dev);
return &mux_chip->mux[controller];
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(mux_control_get);
Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from hdegoede(a)redhat.com are
queue-4.14/uas-ignore-uas-for-norelsys-ns1068-x-chips.patch
queue-4.14/mux-core-fix-double-get_device.patch
This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled
uas: ignore UAS for Norelsys NS1068(X) chips
to the 4.14-stable tree which can be found at:
http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum…
The filename of the patch is:
uas-ignore-uas-for-norelsys-ns1068-x-chips.patch
and it can be found in the queue-4.14 subdirectory.
If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree,
please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it.
>From 928afc85270753657b5543e052cc270c279a3fe9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Icenowy Zheng <icenowy(a)aosc.io>
Date: Sat, 6 Jan 2018 00:56:44 +0800
Subject: uas: ignore UAS for Norelsys NS1068(X) chips
From: Icenowy Zheng <icenowy(a)aosc.io>
commit 928afc85270753657b5543e052cc270c279a3fe9 upstream.
The UAS mode of Norelsys NS1068(X) is reported to fail to work on
several platforms with the following error message:
xhci-hcd xhci-hcd.0.auto: ERROR Transfer event for unknown stream ring slot 1 ep 8
xhci-hcd xhci-hcd.0.auto: @00000000bf04a400 00000000 00000000 1b000000 01098001
And when trying to mount a partition on the disk the disk will
disconnect from the USB controller, then after re-connecting the device
will be offlined and not working at all.
Falling back to USB mass storage can solve this problem, so ignore UAS
function of this chip.
Signed-off-by: Icenowy Zheng <icenowy(a)aosc.io>
Acked-by: Hans de Goede <hdegoede(a)redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/usb/storage/unusual_uas.h | 7 +++++++
1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
--- a/drivers/usb/storage/unusual_uas.h
+++ b/drivers/usb/storage/unusual_uas.h
@@ -156,6 +156,13 @@ UNUSUAL_DEV(0x2109, 0x0711, 0x0000, 0x99
USB_SC_DEVICE, USB_PR_DEVICE, NULL,
US_FL_NO_ATA_1X),
+/* Reported-by: Icenowy Zheng <icenowy(a)aosc.io> */
+UNUSUAL_DEV(0x2537, 0x1068, 0x0000, 0x9999,
+ "Norelsys",
+ "NS1068X",
+ USB_SC_DEVICE, USB_PR_DEVICE, NULL,
+ US_FL_IGNORE_UAS),
+
/* Reported-by: Takeo Nakayama <javhera(a)gmx.com> */
UNUSUAL_DEV(0x357d, 0x7788, 0x0000, 0x9999,
"JMicron",
Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from icenowy(a)aosc.io are
queue-4.14/uas-ignore-uas-for-norelsys-ns1068-x-chips.patch
This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled
kdump: write correct address of mem_section into vmcoreinfo
to the 4.14-stable tree which can be found at:
http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum…
The filename of the patch is:
kdump-write-correct-address-of-mem_section-into-vmcoreinfo.patch
and it can be found in the queue-4.14 subdirectory.
If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree,
please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it.
>From a0b1280368d1e91ab72f849ef095b4f07a39bbf1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov(a)linux.intel.com>
Date: Fri, 12 Jan 2018 16:53:14 -0800
Subject: kdump: write correct address of mem_section into vmcoreinfo
From: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov(a)linux.intel.com>
commit a0b1280368d1e91ab72f849ef095b4f07a39bbf1 upstream.
Depending on configuration mem_section can now be an array or a pointer
to an array allocated dynamically. In most cases, we can continue to
refer to it as 'mem_section' regardless of what it is.
But there's one exception: '&mem_section' means "address of the array"
if mem_section is an array, but if mem_section is a pointer, it would
mean "address of the pointer".
We've stepped onto this in kdump code. VMCOREINFO_SYMBOL(mem_section)
writes down address of pointer into vmcoreinfo, not array as we wanted.
Let's introduce VMCOREINFO_SYMBOL_ARRAY() that would handle the
situation correctly for both cases.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180112162532.35896-1-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel…
Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov(a)linux.intel.com>
Fixes: 83e3c48729d9 ("mm/sparsemem: Allocate mem_section at runtime for CONFIG_SPARSEMEM_EXTREME=y")
Acked-by: Baoquan He <bhe(a)redhat.com>
Acked-by: Dave Young <dyoung(a)redhat.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo(a)redhat.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx(a)linutronix.de>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa(a)zytor.com>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Dave Young <dyoung(a)redhat.com>
Cc: Baoquan He <bhe(a)redhat.com>
Cc: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal(a)redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm(a)linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds(a)linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org>
---
include/linux/crash_core.h | 2 ++
kernel/crash_core.c | 2 +-
2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/include/linux/crash_core.h
+++ b/include/linux/crash_core.h
@@ -42,6 +42,8 @@ phys_addr_t paddr_vmcoreinfo_note(void);
vmcoreinfo_append_str("PAGESIZE=%ld\n", value)
#define VMCOREINFO_SYMBOL(name) \
vmcoreinfo_append_str("SYMBOL(%s)=%lx\n", #name, (unsigned long)&name)
+#define VMCOREINFO_SYMBOL_ARRAY(name) \
+ vmcoreinfo_append_str("SYMBOL(%s)=%lx\n", #name, (unsigned long)name)
#define VMCOREINFO_SIZE(name) \
vmcoreinfo_append_str("SIZE(%s)=%lu\n", #name, \
(unsigned long)sizeof(name))
--- a/kernel/crash_core.c
+++ b/kernel/crash_core.c
@@ -409,7 +409,7 @@ static int __init crash_save_vmcoreinfo_
VMCOREINFO_SYMBOL(contig_page_data);
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_SPARSEMEM
- VMCOREINFO_SYMBOL(mem_section);
+ VMCOREINFO_SYMBOL_ARRAY(mem_section);
VMCOREINFO_LENGTH(mem_section, NR_SECTION_ROOTS);
VMCOREINFO_STRUCT_SIZE(mem_section);
VMCOREINFO_OFFSET(mem_section, section_mem_map);
Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from kirill.shutemov(a)linux.intel.com are
queue-4.14/kdump-write-correct-address-of-mem_section-into-vmcoreinfo.patch
This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled
e1000e: Fix e1000_check_for_copper_link_ich8lan return value.
to the 4.14-stable tree which can be found at:
http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum…
The filename of the patch is:
e1000e-fix-e1000_check_for_copper_link_ich8lan-return-value.patch
and it can be found in the queue-4.14 subdirectory.
If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree,
please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it.
>From 4110e02eb45ea447ec6f5459c9934de0a273fb91 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Benjamin Poirier <bpoirier(a)suse.com>
Date: Mon, 11 Dec 2017 16:26:40 +0900
Subject: e1000e: Fix e1000_check_for_copper_link_ich8lan return value.
From: Benjamin Poirier <bpoirier(a)suse.com>
commit 4110e02eb45ea447ec6f5459c9934de0a273fb91 upstream.
e1000e_check_for_copper_link() and e1000_check_for_copper_link_ich8lan()
are the two functions that may be assigned to mac.ops.check_for_link when
phy.media_type == e1000_media_type_copper. Commit 19110cfbb34d ("e1000e:
Separate signaling for link check/link up") changed the meaning of the
return value of check_for_link for copper media but only adjusted the first
function. This patch adjusts the second function likewise.
Reported-by: Christian Hesse <list(a)eworm.de>
Reported-by: Gabriel C <nix.or.die(a)gmail.com>
Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=198047
Fixes: 19110cfbb34d ("e1000e: Separate signaling for link check/link up")
Signed-off-by: Benjamin Poirier <bpoirier(a)suse.com>
Tested-by: Aaron Brown <aaron.f.brown(a)intel.com>
Tested-by: Christian Hesse <list(a)eworm.de>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Kirsher <jeffrey.t.kirsher(a)intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/net/ethernet/intel/e1000e/ich8lan.c | 11 ++++++++---
1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/e1000e/ich8lan.c
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/e1000e/ich8lan.c
@@ -1367,6 +1367,9 @@ out:
* Checks to see of the link status of the hardware has changed. If a
* change in link status has been detected, then we read the PHY registers
* to get the current speed/duplex if link exists.
+ *
+ * Returns a negative error code (-E1000_ERR_*) or 0 (link down) or 1 (link
+ * up).
**/
static s32 e1000_check_for_copper_link_ich8lan(struct e1000_hw *hw)
{
@@ -1382,7 +1385,7 @@ static s32 e1000_check_for_copper_link_i
* Change or Rx Sequence Error interrupt.
*/
if (!mac->get_link_status)
- return 0;
+ return 1;
/* First we want to see if the MII Status Register reports
* link. If so, then we want to get the current speed/duplex
@@ -1613,10 +1616,12 @@ static s32 e1000_check_for_copper_link_i
* different link partner.
*/
ret_val = e1000e_config_fc_after_link_up(hw);
- if (ret_val)
+ if (ret_val) {
e_dbg("Error configuring flow control\n");
+ return ret_val;
+ }
- return ret_val;
+ return 1;
}
static s32 e1000_get_variants_ich8lan(struct e1000_adapter *adapter)
Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from bpoirier(a)suse.com are
queue-4.14/e1000e-fix-e1000_check_for_copper_link_ich8lan-return-value.patch
This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled
Bluetooth: Prevent stack info leak from the EFS element.
to the 4.14-stable tree which can be found at:
http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum…
The filename of the patch is:
bluetooth-prevent-stack-info-leak-from-the-efs-element.patch
and it can be found in the queue-4.14 subdirectory.
If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree,
please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it.
>From 06e7e776ca4d36547e503279aeff996cbb292c16 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Ben Seri <ben(a)armis.com>
Date: Fri, 8 Dec 2017 15:14:47 +0100
Subject: Bluetooth: Prevent stack info leak from the EFS element.
From: Ben Seri <ben(a)armis.com>
commit 06e7e776ca4d36547e503279aeff996cbb292c16 upstream.
In the function l2cap_parse_conf_rsp and in the function
l2cap_parse_conf_req the following variable is declared without
initialization:
struct l2cap_conf_efs efs;
In addition, when parsing input configuration parameters in both of
these functions, the switch case for handling EFS elements may skip the
memcpy call that will write to the efs variable:
...
case L2CAP_CONF_EFS:
if (olen == sizeof(efs))
memcpy(&efs, (void *)val, olen);
...
The olen in the above if is attacker controlled, and regardless of that
if, in both of these functions the efs variable would eventually be
added to the outgoing configuration request that is being built:
l2cap_add_conf_opt(&ptr, L2CAP_CONF_EFS, sizeof(efs), (unsigned long) &efs);
So by sending a configuration request, or response, that contains an
L2CAP_CONF_EFS element, but with an element length that is not
sizeof(efs) - the memcpy to the uninitialized efs variable can be
avoided, and the uninitialized variable would be returned to the
attacker (16 bytes).
This issue has been assigned CVE-2017-1000410
Cc: Marcel Holtmann <marcel(a)holtmann.org>
Cc: Gustavo Padovan <gustavo(a)padovan.org>
Cc: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg(a)gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Seri <ben(a)armis.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org>
---
net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c | 20 +++++++++++---------
1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
--- a/net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c
+++ b/net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c
@@ -3363,9 +3363,10 @@ static int l2cap_parse_conf_req(struct l
break;
case L2CAP_CONF_EFS:
- remote_efs = 1;
- if (olen == sizeof(efs))
+ if (olen == sizeof(efs)) {
+ remote_efs = 1;
memcpy(&efs, (void *) val, olen);
+ }
break;
case L2CAP_CONF_EWS:
@@ -3584,16 +3585,17 @@ static int l2cap_parse_conf_rsp(struct l
break;
case L2CAP_CONF_EFS:
- if (olen == sizeof(efs))
+ if (olen == sizeof(efs)) {
memcpy(&efs, (void *)val, olen);
- if (chan->local_stype != L2CAP_SERV_NOTRAFIC &&
- efs.stype != L2CAP_SERV_NOTRAFIC &&
- efs.stype != chan->local_stype)
- return -ECONNREFUSED;
+ if (chan->local_stype != L2CAP_SERV_NOTRAFIC &&
+ efs.stype != L2CAP_SERV_NOTRAFIC &&
+ efs.stype != chan->local_stype)
+ return -ECONNREFUSED;
- l2cap_add_conf_opt(&ptr, L2CAP_CONF_EFS, sizeof(efs),
- (unsigned long) &efs, endptr - ptr);
+ l2cap_add_conf_opt(&ptr, L2CAP_CONF_EFS, sizeof(efs),
+ (unsigned long) &efs, endptr - ptr);
+ }
break;
case L2CAP_CONF_FCS:
Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from ben(a)armis.com are
queue-4.14/bluetooth-prevent-stack-info-leak-from-the-efs-element.patch
This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled
apparmor: fix ptrace label match when matching stacked labels
to the 4.14-stable tree which can be found at:
http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum…
The filename of the patch is:
apparmor-fix-ptrace-label-match-when-matching-stacked-labels.patch
and it can be found in the queue-4.14 subdirectory.
If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree,
please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it.
>From 0dda0b3fb255048a221f736c8a2a24c674da8bf3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: John Johansen <john.johansen(a)canonical.com>
Date: Fri, 8 Dec 2017 17:43:18 -0800
Subject: apparmor: fix ptrace label match when matching stacked labels
From: John Johansen <john.johansen(a)canonical.com>
commit 0dda0b3fb255048a221f736c8a2a24c674da8bf3 upstream.
Given a label with a profile stack of
A//&B or A//&C ...
A ptrace rule should be able to specify a generic trace pattern with
a rule like
ptrace trace A//&**,
however this is failing because while the correct label match routine
is called, it is being done post label decomposition so it is always
being done against a profile instead of the stacked label.
To fix this refactor the cross check to pass the full peer label in to
the label_match.
Fixes: 290f458a4f16 ("apparmor: allow ptrace checks to be finer grained than just capability")
Reported-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59(a)google.com>
Tested-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59(a)google.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen(a)canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org>
---
security/apparmor/include/perms.h | 3 ++
security/apparmor/ipc.c | 53 ++++++++++++++++++++++----------------
2 files changed, 35 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-)
--- a/security/apparmor/include/perms.h
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/perms.h
@@ -133,6 +133,9 @@ extern struct aa_perms allperms;
#define xcheck_labels_profiles(L1, L2, FN, args...) \
xcheck_ns_labels((L1), (L2), xcheck_ns_profile_label, (FN), args)
+#define xcheck_labels(L1, L2, P, FN1, FN2) \
+ xcheck(fn_for_each((L1), (P), (FN1)), fn_for_each((L2), (P), (FN2)))
+
void aa_perm_mask_to_str(char *str, const char *chrs, u32 mask);
void aa_audit_perm_names(struct audit_buffer *ab, const char **names, u32 mask);
--- a/security/apparmor/ipc.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/ipc.c
@@ -64,40 +64,48 @@ static void audit_ptrace_cb(struct audit
FLAGS_NONE, GFP_ATOMIC);
}
+/* assumes check for PROFILE_MEDIATES is already done */
/* TODO: conditionals */
static int profile_ptrace_perm(struct aa_profile *profile,
- struct aa_profile *peer, u32 request,
- struct common_audit_data *sa)
+ struct aa_label *peer, u32 request,
+ struct common_audit_data *sa)
{
struct aa_perms perms = { };
- /* need because of peer in cross check */
- if (profile_unconfined(profile) ||
- !PROFILE_MEDIATES(profile, AA_CLASS_PTRACE))
- return 0;
-
- aad(sa)->peer = &peer->label;
- aa_profile_match_label(profile, &peer->label, AA_CLASS_PTRACE, request,
+ aad(sa)->peer = peer;
+ aa_profile_match_label(profile, peer, AA_CLASS_PTRACE, request,
&perms);
aa_apply_modes_to_perms(profile, &perms);
return aa_check_perms(profile, &perms, request, sa, audit_ptrace_cb);
}
-static int cross_ptrace_perm(struct aa_profile *tracer,
- struct aa_profile *tracee, u32 request,
- struct common_audit_data *sa)
+static int profile_tracee_perm(struct aa_profile *tracee,
+ struct aa_label *tracer, u32 request,
+ struct common_audit_data *sa)
{
+ if (profile_unconfined(tracee) || unconfined(tracer) ||
+ !PROFILE_MEDIATES(tracee, AA_CLASS_PTRACE))
+ return 0;
+
+ return profile_ptrace_perm(tracee, tracer, request, sa);
+}
+
+static int profile_tracer_perm(struct aa_profile *tracer,
+ struct aa_label *tracee, u32 request,
+ struct common_audit_data *sa)
+{
+ if (profile_unconfined(tracer))
+ return 0;
+
if (PROFILE_MEDIATES(tracer, AA_CLASS_PTRACE))
- return xcheck(profile_ptrace_perm(tracer, tracee, request, sa),
- profile_ptrace_perm(tracee, tracer,
- request << PTRACE_PERM_SHIFT,
- sa));
- /* policy uses the old style capability check for ptrace */
- if (profile_unconfined(tracer) || tracer == tracee)
+ return profile_ptrace_perm(tracer, tracee, request, sa);
+
+ /* profile uses the old style capability check for ptrace */
+ if (&tracer->label == tracee)
return 0;
aad(sa)->label = &tracer->label;
- aad(sa)->peer = &tracee->label;
+ aad(sa)->peer = tracee;
aad(sa)->request = 0;
aad(sa)->error = aa_capable(&tracer->label, CAP_SYS_PTRACE, 1);
@@ -115,10 +123,13 @@ static int cross_ptrace_perm(struct aa_p
int aa_may_ptrace(struct aa_label *tracer, struct aa_label *tracee,
u32 request)
{
+ struct aa_profile *profile;
+ u32 xrequest = request << PTRACE_PERM_SHIFT;
DEFINE_AUDIT_DATA(sa, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE, OP_PTRACE);
- return xcheck_labels_profiles(tracer, tracee, cross_ptrace_perm,
- request, &sa);
+ return xcheck_labels(tracer, tracee, profile,
+ profile_tracer_perm(profile, tracee, request, &sa),
+ profile_tracee_perm(profile, tracer, xrequest, &sa));
}
Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from john.johansen(a)canonical.com are
queue-4.14/apparmor-fix-ptrace-label-match-when-matching-stacked-labels.patch
This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled
uas: ignore UAS for Norelsys NS1068(X) chips
to the 3.18-stable tree which can be found at:
http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum…
The filename of the patch is:
uas-ignore-uas-for-norelsys-ns1068-x-chips.patch
and it can be found in the queue-3.18 subdirectory.
If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree,
please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it.
>From 928afc85270753657b5543e052cc270c279a3fe9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Icenowy Zheng <icenowy(a)aosc.io>
Date: Sat, 6 Jan 2018 00:56:44 +0800
Subject: uas: ignore UAS for Norelsys NS1068(X) chips
From: Icenowy Zheng <icenowy(a)aosc.io>
commit 928afc85270753657b5543e052cc270c279a3fe9 upstream.
The UAS mode of Norelsys NS1068(X) is reported to fail to work on
several platforms with the following error message:
xhci-hcd xhci-hcd.0.auto: ERROR Transfer event for unknown stream ring slot 1 ep 8
xhci-hcd xhci-hcd.0.auto: @00000000bf04a400 00000000 00000000 1b000000 01098001
And when trying to mount a partition on the disk the disk will
disconnect from the USB controller, then after re-connecting the device
will be offlined and not working at all.
Falling back to USB mass storage can solve this problem, so ignore UAS
function of this chip.
Signed-off-by: Icenowy Zheng <icenowy(a)aosc.io>
Acked-by: Hans de Goede <hdegoede(a)redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/usb/storage/unusual_uas.h | 7 +++++++
1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
--- a/drivers/usb/storage/unusual_uas.h
+++ b/drivers/usb/storage/unusual_uas.h
@@ -153,6 +153,13 @@ UNUSUAL_DEV(0x2109, 0x0711, 0x0000, 0x99
USB_SC_DEVICE, USB_PR_DEVICE, NULL,
US_FL_NO_ATA_1X),
+/* Reported-by: Icenowy Zheng <icenowy(a)aosc.io> */
+UNUSUAL_DEV(0x2537, 0x1068, 0x0000, 0x9999,
+ "Norelsys",
+ "NS1068X",
+ USB_SC_DEVICE, USB_PR_DEVICE, NULL,
+ US_FL_IGNORE_UAS),
+
/* Reported-by: Takeo Nakayama <javhera(a)gmx.com> */
UNUSUAL_DEV(0x357d, 0x7788, 0x0000, 0x9999,
"JMicron",
Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from icenowy(a)aosc.io are
queue-3.18/uas-ignore-uas-for-norelsys-ns1068-x-chips.patch
This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled
e1000e: Fix e1000_check_for_copper_link_ich8lan return value.
to the 3.18-stable tree which can be found at:
http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum…
The filename of the patch is:
e1000e-fix-e1000_check_for_copper_link_ich8lan-return-value.patch
and it can be found in the queue-3.18 subdirectory.
If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree,
please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it.
>From 4110e02eb45ea447ec6f5459c9934de0a273fb91 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Benjamin Poirier <bpoirier(a)suse.com>
Date: Mon, 11 Dec 2017 16:26:40 +0900
Subject: e1000e: Fix e1000_check_for_copper_link_ich8lan return value.
From: Benjamin Poirier <bpoirier(a)suse.com>
commit 4110e02eb45ea447ec6f5459c9934de0a273fb91 upstream.
e1000e_check_for_copper_link() and e1000_check_for_copper_link_ich8lan()
are the two functions that may be assigned to mac.ops.check_for_link when
phy.media_type == e1000_media_type_copper. Commit 19110cfbb34d ("e1000e:
Separate signaling for link check/link up") changed the meaning of the
return value of check_for_link for copper media but only adjusted the first
function. This patch adjusts the second function likewise.
Reported-by: Christian Hesse <list(a)eworm.de>
Reported-by: Gabriel C <nix.or.die(a)gmail.com>
Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=198047
Fixes: 19110cfbb34d ("e1000e: Separate signaling for link check/link up")
Signed-off-by: Benjamin Poirier <bpoirier(a)suse.com>
Tested-by: Aaron Brown <aaron.f.brown(a)intel.com>
Tested-by: Christian Hesse <list(a)eworm.de>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Kirsher <jeffrey.t.kirsher(a)intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/net/ethernet/intel/e1000e/ich8lan.c | 11 ++++++++---
1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/e1000e/ich8lan.c
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/e1000e/ich8lan.c
@@ -1299,6 +1299,9 @@ out:
* Checks to see of the link status of the hardware has changed. If a
* change in link status has been detected, then we read the PHY registers
* to get the current speed/duplex if link exists.
+ *
+ * Returns a negative error code (-E1000_ERR_*) or 0 (link down) or 1 (link
+ * up).
**/
static s32 e1000_check_for_copper_link_ich8lan(struct e1000_hw *hw)
{
@@ -1313,7 +1316,7 @@ static s32 e1000_check_for_copper_link_i
* Change or Rx Sequence Error interrupt.
*/
if (!mac->get_link_status)
- return 0;
+ return 1;
/* First we want to see if the MII Status Register reports
* link. If so, then we want to get the current speed/duplex
@@ -1452,10 +1455,12 @@ static s32 e1000_check_for_copper_link_i
* different link partner.
*/
ret_val = e1000e_config_fc_after_link_up(hw);
- if (ret_val)
+ if (ret_val) {
e_dbg("Error configuring flow control\n");
+ return ret_val;
+ }
- return ret_val;
+ return 1;
}
static s32 e1000_get_variants_ich8lan(struct e1000_adapter *adapter)
Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from bpoirier(a)suse.com are
queue-3.18/e1000e-fix-e1000_check_for_copper_link_ich8lan-return-value.patch
This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled
Bluetooth: Prevent stack info leak from the EFS element.
to the 3.18-stable tree which can be found at:
http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum…
The filename of the patch is:
bluetooth-prevent-stack-info-leak-from-the-efs-element.patch
and it can be found in the queue-3.18 subdirectory.
If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree,
please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it.
>From 06e7e776ca4d36547e503279aeff996cbb292c16 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Ben Seri <ben(a)armis.com>
Date: Fri, 8 Dec 2017 15:14:47 +0100
Subject: Bluetooth: Prevent stack info leak from the EFS element.
From: Ben Seri <ben(a)armis.com>
commit 06e7e776ca4d36547e503279aeff996cbb292c16 upstream.
In the function l2cap_parse_conf_rsp and in the function
l2cap_parse_conf_req the following variable is declared without
initialization:
struct l2cap_conf_efs efs;
In addition, when parsing input configuration parameters in both of
these functions, the switch case for handling EFS elements may skip the
memcpy call that will write to the efs variable:
...
case L2CAP_CONF_EFS:
if (olen == sizeof(efs))
memcpy(&efs, (void *)val, olen);
...
The olen in the above if is attacker controlled, and regardless of that
if, in both of these functions the efs variable would eventually be
added to the outgoing configuration request that is being built:
l2cap_add_conf_opt(&ptr, L2CAP_CONF_EFS, sizeof(efs), (unsigned long) &efs);
So by sending a configuration request, or response, that contains an
L2CAP_CONF_EFS element, but with an element length that is not
sizeof(efs) - the memcpy to the uninitialized efs variable can be
avoided, and the uninitialized variable would be returned to the
attacker (16 bytes).
This issue has been assigned CVE-2017-1000410
Cc: Marcel Holtmann <marcel(a)holtmann.org>
Cc: Gustavo Padovan <gustavo(a)padovan.org>
Cc: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg(a)gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Seri <ben(a)armis.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org>
---
net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c | 20 +++++++++++---------
1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
--- a/net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c
+++ b/net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c
@@ -3317,9 +3317,10 @@ static int l2cap_parse_conf_req(struct l
break;
case L2CAP_CONF_EFS:
- remote_efs = 1;
- if (olen == sizeof(efs))
+ if (olen == sizeof(efs)) {
+ remote_efs = 1;
memcpy(&efs, (void *) val, olen);
+ }
break;
case L2CAP_CONF_EWS:
@@ -3538,16 +3539,17 @@ static int l2cap_parse_conf_rsp(struct l
break;
case L2CAP_CONF_EFS:
- if (olen == sizeof(efs))
+ if (olen == sizeof(efs)) {
memcpy(&efs, (void *)val, olen);
- if (chan->local_stype != L2CAP_SERV_NOTRAFIC &&
- efs.stype != L2CAP_SERV_NOTRAFIC &&
- efs.stype != chan->local_stype)
- return -ECONNREFUSED;
+ if (chan->local_stype != L2CAP_SERV_NOTRAFIC &&
+ efs.stype != L2CAP_SERV_NOTRAFIC &&
+ efs.stype != chan->local_stype)
+ return -ECONNREFUSED;
- l2cap_add_conf_opt(&ptr, L2CAP_CONF_EFS, sizeof(efs),
- (unsigned long) &efs, endptr - ptr);
+ l2cap_add_conf_opt(&ptr, L2CAP_CONF_EFS, sizeof(efs),
+ (unsigned long) &efs, endptr - ptr);
+ }
break;
case L2CAP_CONF_FCS:
Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from ben(a)armis.com are
queue-3.18/bluetooth-prevent-stack-info-leak-from-the-efs-element.patch
On 2018/01/10 01:29, rwarsow(a)gmx.de wrote:
> hallo
>
> any chance to get this patch into stable and 4.15 ?
>
> https://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=151297726823919&w=2
>
It was part of the last network pull request and should be included in
the next mainline release as
4110e02eb45e e1000e: Fix e1000_check_for_copper_link_ich8lan return value.
It's needed in stable branches that include commit 19110cfbb34d
("e1000e: Separate signaling for link check/link up"):
linux-4.14.y
linux-4.9.y
linux-4.4.y
linux-4.1.y
linux-3.18.y
The patch below does not apply to the 4.14-stable tree.
If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm
tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit
id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>.
thanks,
greg k-h
------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------
>From 1a3881d305592d947ed47887306919d50112394d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Matthew Garrett <mjg59(a)google.com>
Date: Thu, 11 Jan 2018 13:07:54 -0800
Subject: [PATCH] apparmor: Fix regression in profile conflict logic
The intended behaviour in apparmor profile matching is to flag a
conflict if two profiles match equally well. However, right now a
conflict is generated if another profile has the same match length even
if that profile doesn't actually match. Fix the logic so we only
generate a conflict if the profiles match.
Fixes: 844b8292b631 ("apparmor: ensure that undecidable profile attachments fail")
Cc: Stable <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59(a)google.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen(a)canonical.com>
diff --git a/security/apparmor/domain.c b/security/apparmor/domain.c
index 04ba9d0718ea..6a54d2ffa840 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/domain.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/domain.c
@@ -330,10 +330,7 @@ static struct aa_profile *__attach_match(const char *name,
continue;
if (profile->xmatch) {
- if (profile->xmatch_len == len) {
- conflict = true;
- continue;
- } else if (profile->xmatch_len > len) {
+ if (profile->xmatch_len >= len) {
unsigned int state;
u32 perm;
@@ -342,6 +339,10 @@ static struct aa_profile *__attach_match(const char *name,
perm = dfa_user_allow(profile->xmatch, state);
/* any accepting state means a valid match. */
if (perm & MAY_EXEC) {
+ if (profile->xmatch_len == len) {
+ conflict = true;
+ continue;
+ }
candidate = profile;
len = profile->xmatch_len;
conflict = false;
This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled
usbip: vudc_tx: fix v_send_ret_submit() vulnerability to null xfer buffer
to the 4.9-stable tree which can be found at:
http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum…
The filename of the patch is:
usbip-vudc_tx-fix-v_send_ret_submit-vulnerability-to-null-xfer-buffer.patch
and it can be found in the queue-4.9 subdirectory.
If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree,
please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it.
>From 5fd77a3a0e408c23ab4002a57db980e46bc16e72 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Shuah Khan <shuahkh(a)osg.samsung.com>
Date: Fri, 22 Dec 2017 19:23:47 -0700
Subject: usbip: vudc_tx: fix v_send_ret_submit() vulnerability to null xfer buffer
From: Shuah Khan <shuahkh(a)osg.samsung.com>
commit 5fd77a3a0e408c23ab4002a57db980e46bc16e72 upstream.
v_send_ret_submit() handles urb with a null transfer_buffer, when it
replays a packet with potential malicious data that could contain a
null buffer.
Add a check for the condition when actual_length > 0 and transfer_buffer
is null.
Signed-off-by: Shuah Khan <shuahkh(a)osg.samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/usb/usbip/vudc_tx.c | 11 +++++++++--
1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
--- a/drivers/usb/usbip/vudc_tx.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/usbip/vudc_tx.c
@@ -97,6 +97,13 @@ static int v_send_ret_submit(struct vudc
memset(&pdu_header, 0, sizeof(pdu_header));
memset(&msg, 0, sizeof(msg));
+ if (urb->actual_length > 0 && !urb->transfer_buffer) {
+ dev_err(&udc->gadget.dev,
+ "urb: actual_length %d transfer_buffer null\n",
+ urb->actual_length);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
if (urb_p->type == USB_ENDPOINT_XFER_ISOC)
iovnum = 2 + urb->number_of_packets;
else
@@ -112,8 +119,8 @@ static int v_send_ret_submit(struct vudc
/* 1. setup usbip_header */
setup_ret_submit_pdu(&pdu_header, urb_p);
- usbip_dbg_stub_tx("setup txdata seqnum: %d urb: %p\n",
- pdu_header.base.seqnum, urb);
+ usbip_dbg_stub_tx("setup txdata seqnum: %d\n",
+ pdu_header.base.seqnum);
usbip_header_correct_endian(&pdu_header, 1);
iov[iovnum].iov_base = &pdu_header;
Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from shuahkh(a)osg.samsung.com are
queue-4.9/usbip-fix-vudc_rx-harden-cmd_submit-path-to-handle-malicious-input.patch
queue-4.9/usbip-remove-kernel-addresses-from-usb-device-and-urb-debug-msgs.patch
queue-4.9/usbip-vudc_tx-fix-v_send_ret_submit-vulnerability-to-null-xfer-buffer.patch
This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled
usbip: fix vudc_rx: harden CMD_SUBMIT path to handle malicious input
to the 4.9-stable tree which can be found at:
http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum…
The filename of the patch is:
usbip-fix-vudc_rx-harden-cmd_submit-path-to-handle-malicious-input.patch
and it can be found in the queue-4.9 subdirectory.
If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree,
please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it.
>From b78d830f0049ef1966dc1e0ebd1ec2a594e2cf25 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Shuah Khan <shuahkh(a)osg.samsung.com>
Date: Fri, 22 Dec 2017 19:23:46 -0700
Subject: usbip: fix vudc_rx: harden CMD_SUBMIT path to handle malicious input
From: Shuah Khan <shuahkh(a)osg.samsung.com>
commit b78d830f0049ef1966dc1e0ebd1ec2a594e2cf25 upstream.
Harden CMD_SUBMIT path to handle malicious input that could trigger
large memory allocations. Add checks to validate transfer_buffer_length
and number_of_packets to protect against bad input requesting for
unbounded memory allocations.
Signed-off-by: Shuah Khan <shuahkh(a)osg.samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/usb/usbip/vudc_rx.c | 19 +++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 19 insertions(+)
--- a/drivers/usb/usbip/vudc_rx.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/usbip/vudc_rx.c
@@ -132,6 +132,25 @@ static int v_recv_cmd_submit(struct vudc
urb_p->new = 1;
urb_p->seqnum = pdu->base.seqnum;
+ if (urb_p->ep->type == USB_ENDPOINT_XFER_ISOC) {
+ /* validate packet size and number of packets */
+ unsigned int maxp, packets, bytes;
+
+ maxp = usb_endpoint_maxp(urb_p->ep->desc);
+ maxp *= usb_endpoint_maxp_mult(urb_p->ep->desc);
+ bytes = pdu->u.cmd_submit.transfer_buffer_length;
+ packets = DIV_ROUND_UP(bytes, maxp);
+
+ if (pdu->u.cmd_submit.number_of_packets < 0 ||
+ pdu->u.cmd_submit.number_of_packets > packets) {
+ dev_err(&udc->gadget.dev,
+ "CMD_SUBMIT: isoc invalid num packets %d\n",
+ pdu->u.cmd_submit.number_of_packets);
+ ret = -EMSGSIZE;
+ goto free_urbp;
+ }
+ }
+
ret = alloc_urb_from_cmd(&urb_p->urb, pdu, urb_p->ep->type);
if (ret) {
usbip_event_add(&udc->ud, VUDC_EVENT_ERROR_MALLOC);
Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from shuahkh(a)osg.samsung.com are
queue-4.9/usbip-fix-vudc_rx-harden-cmd_submit-path-to-handle-malicious-input.patch
queue-4.9/usbip-remove-kernel-addresses-from-usb-device-and-urb-debug-msgs.patch
queue-4.9/usbip-vudc_tx-fix-v_send_ret_submit-vulnerability-to-null-xfer-buffer.patch
This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled
USB: serial: cp210x: add new device ID ELV ALC 8xxx
to the 4.9-stable tree which can be found at:
http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum…
The filename of the patch is:
usb-serial-cp210x-add-new-device-id-elv-alc-8xxx.patch
and it can be found in the queue-4.9 subdirectory.
If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree,
please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it.
>From d14ac576d10f865970bb1324d337e5e24d79aaf4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Christian Holl <cyborgx1(a)gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 3 Jan 2018 19:53:02 +0100
Subject: USB: serial: cp210x: add new device ID ELV ALC 8xxx
From: Christian Holl <cyborgx1(a)gmail.com>
commit d14ac576d10f865970bb1324d337e5e24d79aaf4 upstream.
This adds the ELV ALC 8xxx Battery Charging device
to the list of USB IDs of drivers/usb/serial/cp210x.c
Signed-off-by: Christian Holl <cyborgx1(a)gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <johan(a)kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/usb/serial/cp210x.c | 1 +
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
--- a/drivers/usb/serial/cp210x.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/serial/cp210x.c
@@ -172,6 +172,7 @@ static const struct usb_device_id id_tab
{ USB_DEVICE(0x1843, 0x0200) }, /* Vaisala USB Instrument Cable */
{ USB_DEVICE(0x18EF, 0xE00F) }, /* ELV USB-I2C-Interface */
{ USB_DEVICE(0x18EF, 0xE025) }, /* ELV Marble Sound Board 1 */
+ { USB_DEVICE(0x18EF, 0xE030) }, /* ELV ALC 8xxx Battery Charger */
{ USB_DEVICE(0x18EF, 0xE032) }, /* ELV TFD500 Data Logger */
{ USB_DEVICE(0x1901, 0x0190) }, /* GE B850 CP2105 Recorder interface */
{ USB_DEVICE(0x1901, 0x0193) }, /* GE B650 CP2104 PMC interface */
Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from cyborgx1(a)gmail.com are
queue-4.9/usb-serial-cp210x-add-new-device-id-elv-alc-8xxx.patch
This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled
usb: misc: usb3503: make sure reset is low for at least 100us
to the 4.9-stable tree which can be found at:
http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum…
The filename of the patch is:
usb-misc-usb3503-make-sure-reset-is-low-for-at-least-100us.patch
and it can be found in the queue-4.9 subdirectory.
If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree,
please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it.
>From b8626f1dc29d3eee444bfaa92146ec7b291ef41c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Stefan Agner <stefan(a)agner.ch>
Date: Thu, 11 Jan 2018 14:47:40 +0100
Subject: usb: misc: usb3503: make sure reset is low for at least 100us
From: Stefan Agner <stefan(a)agner.ch>
commit b8626f1dc29d3eee444bfaa92146ec7b291ef41c upstream.
When using a GPIO which is high by default, and initialize the
driver in USB Hub mode, initialization fails with:
[ 111.757794] usb3503 0-0008: SP_ILOCK failed (-5)
The reason seems to be that the chip is not properly reset.
Probe does initialize reset low, however some lines later the
code already set it back high, which is not long enouth.
Make sure reset is asserted for at least 100us by inserting a
delay after initializing the reset pin during probe.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Agner <stefan(a)agner.ch>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/usb/misc/usb3503.c | 2 ++
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
--- a/drivers/usb/misc/usb3503.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/misc/usb3503.c
@@ -292,6 +292,8 @@ static int usb3503_probe(struct usb3503
if (gpio_is_valid(hub->gpio_reset)) {
err = devm_gpio_request_one(dev, hub->gpio_reset,
GPIOF_OUT_INIT_LOW, "usb3503 reset");
+ /* Datasheet defines a hardware reset to be at least 100us */
+ usleep_range(100, 10000);
if (err) {
dev_err(dev,
"unable to request GPIO %d as reset pin (%d)\n",
Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from stefan(a)agner.ch are
queue-4.9/usb-misc-usb3503-make-sure-reset-is-low-for-at-least-100us.patch
This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled
USB: serial: cp210x: add IDs for LifeScan OneTouch Verio IQ
to the 4.9-stable tree which can be found at:
http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum…
The filename of the patch is:
usb-serial-cp210x-add-ids-for-lifescan-onetouch-verio-iq.patch
and it can be found in the queue-4.9 subdirectory.
If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree,
please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it.
>From 4307413256ac1e09b8f53e8715af3df9e49beec3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: =?UTF-8?q?Diego=20Elio=20Petten=C3=B2?= <flameeyes(a)flameeyes.eu>
Date: Fri, 29 Dec 2017 09:54:25 +0000
Subject: USB: serial: cp210x: add IDs for LifeScan OneTouch Verio IQ
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
From: Diego Elio Pettenò <flameeyes(a)flameeyes.eu>
commit 4307413256ac1e09b8f53e8715af3df9e49beec3 upstream.
Add IDs for the OneTouch Verio IQ that comes with an embedded
USB-to-serial converter.
Signed-off-by: Diego Elio Pettenò <flameeyes(a)flameeyes.eu>
Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <johan(a)kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/usb/serial/cp210x.c | 1 +
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
--- a/drivers/usb/serial/cp210x.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/serial/cp210x.c
@@ -121,6 +121,7 @@ static const struct usb_device_id id_tab
{ USB_DEVICE(0x10C4, 0x8470) }, /* Juniper Networks BX Series System Console */
{ USB_DEVICE(0x10C4, 0x8477) }, /* Balluff RFID */
{ USB_DEVICE(0x10C4, 0x84B6) }, /* Starizona Hyperion */
+ { USB_DEVICE(0x10C4, 0x85A7) }, /* LifeScan OneTouch Verio IQ */
{ USB_DEVICE(0x10C4, 0x85EA) }, /* AC-Services IBUS-IF */
{ USB_DEVICE(0x10C4, 0x85EB) }, /* AC-Services CIS-IBUS */
{ USB_DEVICE(0x10C4, 0x85F8) }, /* Virtenio Preon32 */
Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from flameeyes(a)flameeyes.eu are
queue-4.9/usb-serial-cp210x-add-ids-for-lifescan-onetouch-verio-iq.patch
This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled
staging: android: ashmem: fix a race condition in ASHMEM_SET_SIZE ioctl
to the 4.9-stable tree which can be found at:
http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum…
The filename of the patch is:
staging-android-ashmem-fix-a-race-condition-in-ashmem_set_size-ioctl.patch
and it can be found in the queue-4.9 subdirectory.
If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree,
please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it.
>From 443064cb0b1fb4569fe0a71209da7625129fb760 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Viktor Slavkovic <viktors(a)google.com>
Date: Mon, 8 Jan 2018 10:43:03 -0800
Subject: staging: android: ashmem: fix a race condition in ASHMEM_SET_SIZE ioctl
From: Viktor Slavkovic <viktors(a)google.com>
commit 443064cb0b1fb4569fe0a71209da7625129fb760 upstream.
A lock-unlock is missing in ASHMEM_SET_SIZE ioctl which can result in a
race condition when mmap is called. After the !asma->file check, before
setting asma->size, asma->file can be set in mmap. That would result in
having different asma->size than the mapped memory size. Combined with
ASHMEM_UNPIN ioctl and shrinker invocation, this can result in memory
corruption.
Signed-off-by: Viktor Slavkovic <viktors(a)google.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/staging/android/ashmem.c | 2 ++
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
--- a/drivers/staging/android/ashmem.c
+++ b/drivers/staging/android/ashmem.c
@@ -774,10 +774,12 @@ static long ashmem_ioctl(struct file *fi
break;
case ASHMEM_SET_SIZE:
ret = -EINVAL;
+ mutex_lock(&ashmem_mutex);
if (!asma->file) {
ret = 0;
asma->size = (size_t)arg;
}
+ mutex_unlock(&ashmem_mutex);
break;
case ASHMEM_GET_SIZE:
ret = asma->size;
Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from viktors(a)google.com are
queue-4.9/staging-android-ashmem-fix-a-race-condition-in-ashmem_set_size-ioctl.patch
This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled
USB: fix usbmon BUG trigger
to the 4.9-stable tree which can be found at:
http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum…
The filename of the patch is:
usb-fix-usbmon-bug-trigger.patch
and it can be found in the queue-4.9 subdirectory.
If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree,
please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it.
>From 46eb14a6e1585d99c1b9f58d0e7389082a5f466b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Pete Zaitcev <zaitcev(a)redhat.com>
Date: Mon, 8 Jan 2018 15:46:41 -0600
Subject: USB: fix usbmon BUG trigger
From: Pete Zaitcev <zaitcev(a)redhat.com>
commit 46eb14a6e1585d99c1b9f58d0e7389082a5f466b upstream.
Automated tests triggered this by opening usbmon and accessing the
mmap while simultaneously resizing the buffers. This bug was with
us since 2006, because typically applications only size the buffers
once and thus avoid racing. Reported by Kirill A. Shutemov.
Reported-by: <syzbot+f9831b881b3e849829fc(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Pete Zaitcev <zaitcev(a)redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/usb/mon/mon_bin.c | 8 +++++++-
1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/drivers/usb/mon/mon_bin.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/mon/mon_bin.c
@@ -1002,7 +1002,9 @@ static long mon_bin_ioctl(struct file *f
break;
case MON_IOCQ_RING_SIZE:
+ mutex_lock(&rp->fetch_lock);
ret = rp->b_size;
+ mutex_unlock(&rp->fetch_lock);
break;
case MON_IOCT_RING_SIZE:
@@ -1229,12 +1231,16 @@ static int mon_bin_vma_fault(struct vm_a
unsigned long offset, chunk_idx;
struct page *pageptr;
+ mutex_lock(&rp->fetch_lock);
offset = vmf->pgoff << PAGE_SHIFT;
- if (offset >= rp->b_size)
+ if (offset >= rp->b_size) {
+ mutex_unlock(&rp->fetch_lock);
return VM_FAULT_SIGBUS;
+ }
chunk_idx = offset / CHUNK_SIZE;
pageptr = rp->b_vec[chunk_idx].pg;
get_page(pageptr);
+ mutex_unlock(&rp->fetch_lock);
vmf->page = pageptr;
return 0;
}
Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from zaitcev(a)redhat.com are
queue-4.9/usb-fix-usbmon-bug-trigger.patch
This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled
USB: serial: cp210x: add new device ID ELV ALC 8xxx
to the 4.4-stable tree which can be found at:
http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum…
The filename of the patch is:
usb-serial-cp210x-add-new-device-id-elv-alc-8xxx.patch
and it can be found in the queue-4.4 subdirectory.
If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree,
please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it.
>From d14ac576d10f865970bb1324d337e5e24d79aaf4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Christian Holl <cyborgx1(a)gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 3 Jan 2018 19:53:02 +0100
Subject: USB: serial: cp210x: add new device ID ELV ALC 8xxx
From: Christian Holl <cyborgx1(a)gmail.com>
commit d14ac576d10f865970bb1324d337e5e24d79aaf4 upstream.
This adds the ELV ALC 8xxx Battery Charging device
to the list of USB IDs of drivers/usb/serial/cp210x.c
Signed-off-by: Christian Holl <cyborgx1(a)gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <johan(a)kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/usb/serial/cp210x.c | 1 +
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
--- a/drivers/usb/serial/cp210x.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/serial/cp210x.c
@@ -171,6 +171,7 @@ static const struct usb_device_id id_tab
{ USB_DEVICE(0x1843, 0x0200) }, /* Vaisala USB Instrument Cable */
{ USB_DEVICE(0x18EF, 0xE00F) }, /* ELV USB-I2C-Interface */
{ USB_DEVICE(0x18EF, 0xE025) }, /* ELV Marble Sound Board 1 */
+ { USB_DEVICE(0x18EF, 0xE030) }, /* ELV ALC 8xxx Battery Charger */
{ USB_DEVICE(0x18EF, 0xE032) }, /* ELV TFD500 Data Logger */
{ USB_DEVICE(0x1901, 0x0190) }, /* GE B850 CP2105 Recorder interface */
{ USB_DEVICE(0x1901, 0x0193) }, /* GE B650 CP2104 PMC interface */
Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from cyborgx1(a)gmail.com are
queue-4.4/usb-serial-cp210x-add-new-device-id-elv-alc-8xxx.patch
This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled
USB: serial: cp210x: add IDs for LifeScan OneTouch Verio IQ
to the 4.4-stable tree which can be found at:
http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum…
The filename of the patch is:
usb-serial-cp210x-add-ids-for-lifescan-onetouch-verio-iq.patch
and it can be found in the queue-4.4 subdirectory.
If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree,
please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it.
>From 4307413256ac1e09b8f53e8715af3df9e49beec3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: =?UTF-8?q?Diego=20Elio=20Petten=C3=B2?= <flameeyes(a)flameeyes.eu>
Date: Fri, 29 Dec 2017 09:54:25 +0000
Subject: USB: serial: cp210x: add IDs for LifeScan OneTouch Verio IQ
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
From: Diego Elio Pettenò <flameeyes(a)flameeyes.eu>
commit 4307413256ac1e09b8f53e8715af3df9e49beec3 upstream.
Add IDs for the OneTouch Verio IQ that comes with an embedded
USB-to-serial converter.
Signed-off-by: Diego Elio Pettenò <flameeyes(a)flameeyes.eu>
Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <johan(a)kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/usb/serial/cp210x.c | 1 +
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
--- a/drivers/usb/serial/cp210x.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/serial/cp210x.c
@@ -120,6 +120,7 @@ static const struct usb_device_id id_tab
{ USB_DEVICE(0x10C4, 0x8470) }, /* Juniper Networks BX Series System Console */
{ USB_DEVICE(0x10C4, 0x8477) }, /* Balluff RFID */
{ USB_DEVICE(0x10C4, 0x84B6) }, /* Starizona Hyperion */
+ { USB_DEVICE(0x10C4, 0x85A7) }, /* LifeScan OneTouch Verio IQ */
{ USB_DEVICE(0x10C4, 0x85EA) }, /* AC-Services IBUS-IF */
{ USB_DEVICE(0x10C4, 0x85EB) }, /* AC-Services CIS-IBUS */
{ USB_DEVICE(0x10C4, 0x85F8) }, /* Virtenio Preon32 */
Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from flameeyes(a)flameeyes.eu are
queue-4.4/usb-serial-cp210x-add-ids-for-lifescan-onetouch-verio-iq.patch
This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled
usb: misc: usb3503: make sure reset is low for at least 100us
to the 4.4-stable tree which can be found at:
http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum…
The filename of the patch is:
usb-misc-usb3503-make-sure-reset-is-low-for-at-least-100us.patch
and it can be found in the queue-4.4 subdirectory.
If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree,
please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it.
>From b8626f1dc29d3eee444bfaa92146ec7b291ef41c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Stefan Agner <stefan(a)agner.ch>
Date: Thu, 11 Jan 2018 14:47:40 +0100
Subject: usb: misc: usb3503: make sure reset is low for at least 100us
From: Stefan Agner <stefan(a)agner.ch>
commit b8626f1dc29d3eee444bfaa92146ec7b291ef41c upstream.
When using a GPIO which is high by default, and initialize the
driver in USB Hub mode, initialization fails with:
[ 111.757794] usb3503 0-0008: SP_ILOCK failed (-5)
The reason seems to be that the chip is not properly reset.
Probe does initialize reset low, however some lines later the
code already set it back high, which is not long enouth.
Make sure reset is asserted for at least 100us by inserting a
delay after initializing the reset pin during probe.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Agner <stefan(a)agner.ch>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/usb/misc/usb3503.c | 2 ++
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
--- a/drivers/usb/misc/usb3503.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/misc/usb3503.c
@@ -292,6 +292,8 @@ static int usb3503_probe(struct usb3503
if (gpio_is_valid(hub->gpio_reset)) {
err = devm_gpio_request_one(dev, hub->gpio_reset,
GPIOF_OUT_INIT_LOW, "usb3503 reset");
+ /* Datasheet defines a hardware reset to be at least 100us */
+ usleep_range(100, 10000);
if (err) {
dev_err(dev,
"unable to request GPIO %d as reset pin (%d)\n",
Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from stefan(a)agner.ch are
queue-4.4/usb-misc-usb3503-make-sure-reset-is-low-for-at-least-100us.patch
This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled
USB: fix usbmon BUG trigger
to the 4.4-stable tree which can be found at:
http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum…
The filename of the patch is:
usb-fix-usbmon-bug-trigger.patch
and it can be found in the queue-4.4 subdirectory.
If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree,
please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it.
>From 46eb14a6e1585d99c1b9f58d0e7389082a5f466b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Pete Zaitcev <zaitcev(a)redhat.com>
Date: Mon, 8 Jan 2018 15:46:41 -0600
Subject: USB: fix usbmon BUG trigger
From: Pete Zaitcev <zaitcev(a)redhat.com>
commit 46eb14a6e1585d99c1b9f58d0e7389082a5f466b upstream.
Automated tests triggered this by opening usbmon and accessing the
mmap while simultaneously resizing the buffers. This bug was with
us since 2006, because typically applications only size the buffers
once and thus avoid racing. Reported by Kirill A. Shutemov.
Reported-by: <syzbot+f9831b881b3e849829fc(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Pete Zaitcev <zaitcev(a)redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/usb/mon/mon_bin.c | 8 +++++++-
1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/drivers/usb/mon/mon_bin.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/mon/mon_bin.c
@@ -1001,7 +1001,9 @@ static long mon_bin_ioctl(struct file *f
break;
case MON_IOCQ_RING_SIZE:
+ mutex_lock(&rp->fetch_lock);
ret = rp->b_size;
+ mutex_unlock(&rp->fetch_lock);
break;
case MON_IOCT_RING_SIZE:
@@ -1228,12 +1230,16 @@ static int mon_bin_vma_fault(struct vm_a
unsigned long offset, chunk_idx;
struct page *pageptr;
+ mutex_lock(&rp->fetch_lock);
offset = vmf->pgoff << PAGE_SHIFT;
- if (offset >= rp->b_size)
+ if (offset >= rp->b_size) {
+ mutex_unlock(&rp->fetch_lock);
return VM_FAULT_SIGBUS;
+ }
chunk_idx = offset / CHUNK_SIZE;
pageptr = rp->b_vec[chunk_idx].pg;
get_page(pageptr);
+ mutex_unlock(&rp->fetch_lock);
vmf->page = pageptr;
return 0;
}
Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from zaitcev(a)redhat.com are
queue-4.4/usb-fix-usbmon-bug-trigger.patch
This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled
staging: android: ashmem: fix a race condition in ASHMEM_SET_SIZE ioctl
to the 4.4-stable tree which can be found at:
http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum…
The filename of the patch is:
staging-android-ashmem-fix-a-race-condition-in-ashmem_set_size-ioctl.patch
and it can be found in the queue-4.4 subdirectory.
If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree,
please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it.
>From 443064cb0b1fb4569fe0a71209da7625129fb760 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Viktor Slavkovic <viktors(a)google.com>
Date: Mon, 8 Jan 2018 10:43:03 -0800
Subject: staging: android: ashmem: fix a race condition in ASHMEM_SET_SIZE ioctl
From: Viktor Slavkovic <viktors(a)google.com>
commit 443064cb0b1fb4569fe0a71209da7625129fb760 upstream.
A lock-unlock is missing in ASHMEM_SET_SIZE ioctl which can result in a
race condition when mmap is called. After the !asma->file check, before
setting asma->size, asma->file can be set in mmap. That would result in
having different asma->size than the mapped memory size. Combined with
ASHMEM_UNPIN ioctl and shrinker invocation, this can result in memory
corruption.
Signed-off-by: Viktor Slavkovic <viktors(a)google.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/staging/android/ashmem.c | 2 ++
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
--- a/drivers/staging/android/ashmem.c
+++ b/drivers/staging/android/ashmem.c
@@ -759,10 +759,12 @@ static long ashmem_ioctl(struct file *fi
break;
case ASHMEM_SET_SIZE:
ret = -EINVAL;
+ mutex_lock(&ashmem_mutex);
if (!asma->file) {
ret = 0;
asma->size = (size_t)arg;
}
+ mutex_unlock(&ashmem_mutex);
break;
case ASHMEM_GET_SIZE:
ret = asma->size;
Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from viktors(a)google.com are
queue-4.4/staging-android-ashmem-fix-a-race-condition-in-ashmem_set_size-ioctl.patch
This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled
usbip: vudc_tx: fix v_send_ret_submit() vulnerability to null xfer buffer
to the 4.14-stable tree which can be found at:
http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum…
The filename of the patch is:
usbip-vudc_tx-fix-v_send_ret_submit-vulnerability-to-null-xfer-buffer.patch
and it can be found in the queue-4.14 subdirectory.
If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree,
please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it.
>From 5fd77a3a0e408c23ab4002a57db980e46bc16e72 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Shuah Khan <shuahkh(a)osg.samsung.com>
Date: Fri, 22 Dec 2017 19:23:47 -0700
Subject: usbip: vudc_tx: fix v_send_ret_submit() vulnerability to null xfer buffer
From: Shuah Khan <shuahkh(a)osg.samsung.com>
commit 5fd77a3a0e408c23ab4002a57db980e46bc16e72 upstream.
v_send_ret_submit() handles urb with a null transfer_buffer, when it
replays a packet with potential malicious data that could contain a
null buffer.
Add a check for the condition when actual_length > 0 and transfer_buffer
is null.
Signed-off-by: Shuah Khan <shuahkh(a)osg.samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/usb/usbip/vudc_tx.c | 11 +++++++++--
1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
--- a/drivers/usb/usbip/vudc_tx.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/usbip/vudc_tx.c
@@ -97,6 +97,13 @@ static int v_send_ret_submit(struct vudc
memset(&pdu_header, 0, sizeof(pdu_header));
memset(&msg, 0, sizeof(msg));
+ if (urb->actual_length > 0 && !urb->transfer_buffer) {
+ dev_err(&udc->gadget.dev,
+ "urb: actual_length %d transfer_buffer null\n",
+ urb->actual_length);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
if (urb_p->type == USB_ENDPOINT_XFER_ISOC)
iovnum = 2 + urb->number_of_packets;
else
@@ -112,8 +119,8 @@ static int v_send_ret_submit(struct vudc
/* 1. setup usbip_header */
setup_ret_submit_pdu(&pdu_header, urb_p);
- usbip_dbg_stub_tx("setup txdata seqnum: %d urb: %p\n",
- pdu_header.base.seqnum, urb);
+ usbip_dbg_stub_tx("setup txdata seqnum: %d\n",
+ pdu_header.base.seqnum);
usbip_header_correct_endian(&pdu_header, 1);
iov[iovnum].iov_base = &pdu_header;
Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from shuahkh(a)osg.samsung.com are
queue-4.14/usbip-fix-vudc_rx-harden-cmd_submit-path-to-handle-malicious-input.patch
queue-4.14/usbip-remove-kernel-addresses-from-usb-device-and-urb-debug-msgs.patch
queue-4.14/usbip-vudc_tx-fix-v_send_ret_submit-vulnerability-to-null-xfer-buffer.patch
This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled
usbip: fix vudc_rx: harden CMD_SUBMIT path to handle malicious input
to the 4.14-stable tree which can be found at:
http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum…
The filename of the patch is:
usbip-fix-vudc_rx-harden-cmd_submit-path-to-handle-malicious-input.patch
and it can be found in the queue-4.14 subdirectory.
If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree,
please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it.
>From b78d830f0049ef1966dc1e0ebd1ec2a594e2cf25 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Shuah Khan <shuahkh(a)osg.samsung.com>
Date: Fri, 22 Dec 2017 19:23:46 -0700
Subject: usbip: fix vudc_rx: harden CMD_SUBMIT path to handle malicious input
From: Shuah Khan <shuahkh(a)osg.samsung.com>
commit b78d830f0049ef1966dc1e0ebd1ec2a594e2cf25 upstream.
Harden CMD_SUBMIT path to handle malicious input that could trigger
large memory allocations. Add checks to validate transfer_buffer_length
and number_of_packets to protect against bad input requesting for
unbounded memory allocations.
Signed-off-by: Shuah Khan <shuahkh(a)osg.samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/usb/usbip/vudc_rx.c | 19 +++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 19 insertions(+)
--- a/drivers/usb/usbip/vudc_rx.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/usbip/vudc_rx.c
@@ -132,6 +132,25 @@ static int v_recv_cmd_submit(struct vudc
urb_p->new = 1;
urb_p->seqnum = pdu->base.seqnum;
+ if (urb_p->ep->type == USB_ENDPOINT_XFER_ISOC) {
+ /* validate packet size and number of packets */
+ unsigned int maxp, packets, bytes;
+
+ maxp = usb_endpoint_maxp(urb_p->ep->desc);
+ maxp *= usb_endpoint_maxp_mult(urb_p->ep->desc);
+ bytes = pdu->u.cmd_submit.transfer_buffer_length;
+ packets = DIV_ROUND_UP(bytes, maxp);
+
+ if (pdu->u.cmd_submit.number_of_packets < 0 ||
+ pdu->u.cmd_submit.number_of_packets > packets) {
+ dev_err(&udc->gadget.dev,
+ "CMD_SUBMIT: isoc invalid num packets %d\n",
+ pdu->u.cmd_submit.number_of_packets);
+ ret = -EMSGSIZE;
+ goto free_urbp;
+ }
+ }
+
ret = alloc_urb_from_cmd(&urb_p->urb, pdu, urb_p->ep->type);
if (ret) {
usbip_event_add(&udc->ud, VUDC_EVENT_ERROR_MALLOC);
Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from shuahkh(a)osg.samsung.com are
queue-4.14/usbip-fix-vudc_rx-harden-cmd_submit-path-to-handle-malicious-input.patch
queue-4.14/usbip-remove-kernel-addresses-from-usb-device-and-urb-debug-msgs.patch
queue-4.14/usbip-vudc_tx-fix-v_send_ret_submit-vulnerability-to-null-xfer-buffer.patch
This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled
USB: serial: cp210x: add IDs for LifeScan OneTouch Verio IQ
to the 4.14-stable tree which can be found at:
http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum…
The filename of the patch is:
usb-serial-cp210x-add-ids-for-lifescan-onetouch-verio-iq.patch
and it can be found in the queue-4.14 subdirectory.
If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree,
please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it.
>From 4307413256ac1e09b8f53e8715af3df9e49beec3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: =?UTF-8?q?Diego=20Elio=20Petten=C3=B2?= <flameeyes(a)flameeyes.eu>
Date: Fri, 29 Dec 2017 09:54:25 +0000
Subject: USB: serial: cp210x: add IDs for LifeScan OneTouch Verio IQ
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
From: Diego Elio Pettenò <flameeyes(a)flameeyes.eu>
commit 4307413256ac1e09b8f53e8715af3df9e49beec3 upstream.
Add IDs for the OneTouch Verio IQ that comes with an embedded
USB-to-serial converter.
Signed-off-by: Diego Elio Pettenò <flameeyes(a)flameeyes.eu>
Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <johan(a)kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/usb/serial/cp210x.c | 1 +
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
--- a/drivers/usb/serial/cp210x.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/serial/cp210x.c
@@ -127,6 +127,7 @@ static const struct usb_device_id id_tab
{ USB_DEVICE(0x10C4, 0x8470) }, /* Juniper Networks BX Series System Console */
{ USB_DEVICE(0x10C4, 0x8477) }, /* Balluff RFID */
{ USB_DEVICE(0x10C4, 0x84B6) }, /* Starizona Hyperion */
+ { USB_DEVICE(0x10C4, 0x85A7) }, /* LifeScan OneTouch Verio IQ */
{ USB_DEVICE(0x10C4, 0x85EA) }, /* AC-Services IBUS-IF */
{ USB_DEVICE(0x10C4, 0x85EB) }, /* AC-Services CIS-IBUS */
{ USB_DEVICE(0x10C4, 0x85F8) }, /* Virtenio Preon32 */
Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from flameeyes(a)flameeyes.eu are
queue-4.14/usb-serial-cp210x-add-ids-for-lifescan-onetouch-verio-iq.patch
This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled
USB: UDC core: fix double-free in usb_add_gadget_udc_release
to the 4.14-stable tree which can be found at:
http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum…
The filename of the patch is:
usb-udc-core-fix-double-free-in-usb_add_gadget_udc_release.patch
and it can be found in the queue-4.14 subdirectory.
If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree,
please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it.
>From 7ae2c3c280db183ca9ada2675c34ec2f7378abfa Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Alan Stern <stern(a)rowland.harvard.edu>
Date: Wed, 3 Jan 2018 12:51:51 -0500
Subject: USB: UDC core: fix double-free in usb_add_gadget_udc_release
From: Alan Stern <stern(a)rowland.harvard.edu>
commit 7ae2c3c280db183ca9ada2675c34ec2f7378abfa upstream.
The error-handling pathways in usb_add_gadget_udc_release() are messed
up. Aside from the uninformative statement labels, they can deallocate
the udc structure after calling put_device(), which is a double-free.
This was observed by KASAN in automatic testing.
This patch cleans up the routine. It preserves the requirement that
when any failure occurs, we call put_device(&gadget->dev).
Signed-off-by: Alan Stern <stern(a)rowland.harvard.edu>
Reported-by: Fengguang Wu <fengguang.wu(a)intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Peter Chen <peter.chen(a)nxp.com>
Acked-by: Felipe Balbi <felipe.balbi(a)linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/usb/gadget/udc/core.c | 28 +++++++++++++---------------
1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
--- a/drivers/usb/gadget/udc/core.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/gadget/udc/core.c
@@ -1158,11 +1158,7 @@ int usb_add_gadget_udc_release(struct de
udc = kzalloc(sizeof(*udc), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!udc)
- goto err1;
-
- ret = device_add(&gadget->dev);
- if (ret)
- goto err2;
+ goto err_put_gadget;
device_initialize(&udc->dev);
udc->dev.release = usb_udc_release;
@@ -1171,7 +1167,11 @@ int usb_add_gadget_udc_release(struct de
udc->dev.parent = parent;
ret = dev_set_name(&udc->dev, "%s", kobject_name(&parent->kobj));
if (ret)
- goto err3;
+ goto err_put_udc;
+
+ ret = device_add(&gadget->dev);
+ if (ret)
+ goto err_put_udc;
udc->gadget = gadget;
gadget->udc = udc;
@@ -1181,7 +1181,7 @@ int usb_add_gadget_udc_release(struct de
ret = device_add(&udc->dev);
if (ret)
- goto err4;
+ goto err_unlist_udc;
usb_gadget_set_state(gadget, USB_STATE_NOTATTACHED);
udc->vbus = true;
@@ -1189,27 +1189,25 @@ int usb_add_gadget_udc_release(struct de
/* pick up one of pending gadget drivers */
ret = check_pending_gadget_drivers(udc);
if (ret)
- goto err5;
+ goto err_del_udc;
mutex_unlock(&udc_lock);
return 0;
-err5:
+ err_del_udc:
device_del(&udc->dev);
-err4:
+ err_unlist_udc:
list_del(&udc->list);
mutex_unlock(&udc_lock);
-err3:
- put_device(&udc->dev);
device_del(&gadget->dev);
-err2:
- kfree(udc);
+ err_put_udc:
+ put_device(&udc->dev);
-err1:
+ err_put_gadget:
put_device(&gadget->dev);
return ret;
}
Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from stern(a)rowland.harvard.edu are
queue-4.14/usb-udc-core-fix-double-free-in-usb_add_gadget_udc_release.patch
This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled
USB: serial: cp210x: add new device ID ELV ALC 8xxx
to the 4.14-stable tree which can be found at:
http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum…
The filename of the patch is:
usb-serial-cp210x-add-new-device-id-elv-alc-8xxx.patch
and it can be found in the queue-4.14 subdirectory.
If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree,
please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it.
>From d14ac576d10f865970bb1324d337e5e24d79aaf4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Christian Holl <cyborgx1(a)gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 3 Jan 2018 19:53:02 +0100
Subject: USB: serial: cp210x: add new device ID ELV ALC 8xxx
From: Christian Holl <cyborgx1(a)gmail.com>
commit d14ac576d10f865970bb1324d337e5e24d79aaf4 upstream.
This adds the ELV ALC 8xxx Battery Charging device
to the list of USB IDs of drivers/usb/serial/cp210x.c
Signed-off-by: Christian Holl <cyborgx1(a)gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <johan(a)kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/usb/serial/cp210x.c | 1 +
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
--- a/drivers/usb/serial/cp210x.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/serial/cp210x.c
@@ -178,6 +178,7 @@ static const struct usb_device_id id_tab
{ USB_DEVICE(0x1843, 0x0200) }, /* Vaisala USB Instrument Cable */
{ USB_DEVICE(0x18EF, 0xE00F) }, /* ELV USB-I2C-Interface */
{ USB_DEVICE(0x18EF, 0xE025) }, /* ELV Marble Sound Board 1 */
+ { USB_DEVICE(0x18EF, 0xE030) }, /* ELV ALC 8xxx Battery Charger */
{ USB_DEVICE(0x18EF, 0xE032) }, /* ELV TFD500 Data Logger */
{ USB_DEVICE(0x1901, 0x0190) }, /* GE B850 CP2105 Recorder interface */
{ USB_DEVICE(0x1901, 0x0193) }, /* GE B650 CP2104 PMC interface */
Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from cyborgx1(a)gmail.com are
queue-4.14/usb-serial-cp210x-add-new-device-id-elv-alc-8xxx.patch
This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled
USB: fix usbmon BUG trigger
to the 4.14-stable tree which can be found at:
http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum…
The filename of the patch is:
usb-fix-usbmon-bug-trigger.patch
and it can be found in the queue-4.14 subdirectory.
If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree,
please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it.
>From 46eb14a6e1585d99c1b9f58d0e7389082a5f466b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Pete Zaitcev <zaitcev(a)redhat.com>
Date: Mon, 8 Jan 2018 15:46:41 -0600
Subject: USB: fix usbmon BUG trigger
From: Pete Zaitcev <zaitcev(a)redhat.com>
commit 46eb14a6e1585d99c1b9f58d0e7389082a5f466b upstream.
Automated tests triggered this by opening usbmon and accessing the
mmap while simultaneously resizing the buffers. This bug was with
us since 2006, because typically applications only size the buffers
once and thus avoid racing. Reported by Kirill A. Shutemov.
Reported-by: <syzbot+f9831b881b3e849829fc(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Pete Zaitcev <zaitcev(a)redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/usb/mon/mon_bin.c | 8 +++++++-
1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/drivers/usb/mon/mon_bin.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/mon/mon_bin.c
@@ -1004,7 +1004,9 @@ static long mon_bin_ioctl(struct file *f
break;
case MON_IOCQ_RING_SIZE:
+ mutex_lock(&rp->fetch_lock);
ret = rp->b_size;
+ mutex_unlock(&rp->fetch_lock);
break;
case MON_IOCT_RING_SIZE:
@@ -1231,12 +1233,16 @@ static int mon_bin_vma_fault(struct vm_f
unsigned long offset, chunk_idx;
struct page *pageptr;
+ mutex_lock(&rp->fetch_lock);
offset = vmf->pgoff << PAGE_SHIFT;
- if (offset >= rp->b_size)
+ if (offset >= rp->b_size) {
+ mutex_unlock(&rp->fetch_lock);
return VM_FAULT_SIGBUS;
+ }
chunk_idx = offset / CHUNK_SIZE;
pageptr = rp->b_vec[chunk_idx].pg;
get_page(pageptr);
+ mutex_unlock(&rp->fetch_lock);
vmf->page = pageptr;
return 0;
}
Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from zaitcev(a)redhat.com are
queue-4.14/usb-fix-usbmon-bug-trigger.patch
This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled
usb: misc: usb3503: make sure reset is low for at least 100us
to the 4.14-stable tree which can be found at:
http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum…
The filename of the patch is:
usb-misc-usb3503-make-sure-reset-is-low-for-at-least-100us.patch
and it can be found in the queue-4.14 subdirectory.
If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree,
please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it.
>From b8626f1dc29d3eee444bfaa92146ec7b291ef41c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Stefan Agner <stefan(a)agner.ch>
Date: Thu, 11 Jan 2018 14:47:40 +0100
Subject: usb: misc: usb3503: make sure reset is low for at least 100us
From: Stefan Agner <stefan(a)agner.ch>
commit b8626f1dc29d3eee444bfaa92146ec7b291ef41c upstream.
When using a GPIO which is high by default, and initialize the
driver in USB Hub mode, initialization fails with:
[ 111.757794] usb3503 0-0008: SP_ILOCK failed (-5)
The reason seems to be that the chip is not properly reset.
Probe does initialize reset low, however some lines later the
code already set it back high, which is not long enouth.
Make sure reset is asserted for at least 100us by inserting a
delay after initializing the reset pin during probe.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Agner <stefan(a)agner.ch>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/usb/misc/usb3503.c | 2 ++
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
--- a/drivers/usb/misc/usb3503.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/misc/usb3503.c
@@ -292,6 +292,8 @@ static int usb3503_probe(struct usb3503
if (gpio_is_valid(hub->gpio_reset)) {
err = devm_gpio_request_one(dev, hub->gpio_reset,
GPIOF_OUT_INIT_LOW, "usb3503 reset");
+ /* Datasheet defines a hardware reset to be at least 100us */
+ usleep_range(100, 10000);
if (err) {
dev_err(dev,
"unable to request GPIO %d as reset pin (%d)\n",
Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from stefan(a)agner.ch are
queue-4.14/usb-misc-usb3503-make-sure-reset-is-low-for-at-least-100us.patch
This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled
staging: android: ashmem: fix a race condition in ASHMEM_SET_SIZE ioctl
to the 4.14-stable tree which can be found at:
http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum…
The filename of the patch is:
staging-android-ashmem-fix-a-race-condition-in-ashmem_set_size-ioctl.patch
and it can be found in the queue-4.14 subdirectory.
If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree,
please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it.
>From 443064cb0b1fb4569fe0a71209da7625129fb760 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Viktor Slavkovic <viktors(a)google.com>
Date: Mon, 8 Jan 2018 10:43:03 -0800
Subject: staging: android: ashmem: fix a race condition in ASHMEM_SET_SIZE ioctl
From: Viktor Slavkovic <viktors(a)google.com>
commit 443064cb0b1fb4569fe0a71209da7625129fb760 upstream.
A lock-unlock is missing in ASHMEM_SET_SIZE ioctl which can result in a
race condition when mmap is called. After the !asma->file check, before
setting asma->size, asma->file can be set in mmap. That would result in
having different asma->size than the mapped memory size. Combined with
ASHMEM_UNPIN ioctl and shrinker invocation, this can result in memory
corruption.
Signed-off-by: Viktor Slavkovic <viktors(a)google.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/staging/android/ashmem.c | 2 ++
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
--- a/drivers/staging/android/ashmem.c
+++ b/drivers/staging/android/ashmem.c
@@ -765,10 +765,12 @@ static long ashmem_ioctl(struct file *fi
break;
case ASHMEM_SET_SIZE:
ret = -EINVAL;
+ mutex_lock(&ashmem_mutex);
if (!asma->file) {
ret = 0;
asma->size = (size_t)arg;
}
+ mutex_unlock(&ashmem_mutex);
break;
case ASHMEM_GET_SIZE:
ret = asma->size;
Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from viktors(a)google.com are
queue-4.14/staging-android-ashmem-fix-a-race-condition-in-ashmem_set_size-ioctl.patch
This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled
usb: misc: usb3503: make sure reset is low for at least 100us
to the 3.18-stable tree which can be found at:
http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum…
The filename of the patch is:
usb-misc-usb3503-make-sure-reset-is-low-for-at-least-100us.patch
and it can be found in the queue-3.18 subdirectory.
If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree,
please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it.
>From b8626f1dc29d3eee444bfaa92146ec7b291ef41c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Stefan Agner <stefan(a)agner.ch>
Date: Thu, 11 Jan 2018 14:47:40 +0100
Subject: usb: misc: usb3503: make sure reset is low for at least 100us
From: Stefan Agner <stefan(a)agner.ch>
commit b8626f1dc29d3eee444bfaa92146ec7b291ef41c upstream.
When using a GPIO which is high by default, and initialize the
driver in USB Hub mode, initialization fails with:
[ 111.757794] usb3503 0-0008: SP_ILOCK failed (-5)
The reason seems to be that the chip is not properly reset.
Probe does initialize reset low, however some lines later the
code already set it back high, which is not long enouth.
Make sure reset is asserted for at least 100us by inserting a
delay after initializing the reset pin during probe.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Agner <stefan(a)agner.ch>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/usb/misc/usb3503.c | 2 ++
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
--- a/drivers/usb/misc/usb3503.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/misc/usb3503.c
@@ -291,6 +291,8 @@ static int usb3503_probe(struct usb3503
if (gpio_is_valid(hub->gpio_reset)) {
err = devm_gpio_request_one(dev, hub->gpio_reset,
GPIOF_OUT_INIT_LOW, "usb3503 reset");
+ /* Datasheet defines a hardware reset to be at least 100us */
+ usleep_range(100, 10000);
if (err) {
dev_err(dev,
"unable to request GPIO %d as reset pin (%d)\n",
Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from stefan(a)agner.ch are
queue-3.18/usb-misc-usb3503-make-sure-reset-is-low-for-at-least-100us.patch
This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled
USB: serial: cp210x: add new device ID ELV ALC 8xxx
to the 3.18-stable tree which can be found at:
http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum…
The filename of the patch is:
usb-serial-cp210x-add-new-device-id-elv-alc-8xxx.patch
and it can be found in the queue-3.18 subdirectory.
If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree,
please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it.
>From d14ac576d10f865970bb1324d337e5e24d79aaf4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Christian Holl <cyborgx1(a)gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 3 Jan 2018 19:53:02 +0100
Subject: USB: serial: cp210x: add new device ID ELV ALC 8xxx
From: Christian Holl <cyborgx1(a)gmail.com>
commit d14ac576d10f865970bb1324d337e5e24d79aaf4 upstream.
This adds the ELV ALC 8xxx Battery Charging device
to the list of USB IDs of drivers/usb/serial/cp210x.c
Signed-off-by: Christian Holl <cyborgx1(a)gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <johan(a)kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/usb/serial/cp210x.c | 1 +
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
--- a/drivers/usb/serial/cp210x.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/serial/cp210x.c
@@ -169,6 +169,7 @@ static const struct usb_device_id id_tab
{ USB_DEVICE(0x1843, 0x0200) }, /* Vaisala USB Instrument Cable */
{ USB_DEVICE(0x18EF, 0xE00F) }, /* ELV USB-I2C-Interface */
{ USB_DEVICE(0x18EF, 0xE025) }, /* ELV Marble Sound Board 1 */
+ { USB_DEVICE(0x18EF, 0xE030) }, /* ELV ALC 8xxx Battery Charger */
{ USB_DEVICE(0x18EF, 0xE032) }, /* ELV TFD500 Data Logger */
{ USB_DEVICE(0x1901, 0x0190) }, /* GE B850 CP2105 Recorder interface */
{ USB_DEVICE(0x1901, 0x0193) }, /* GE B650 CP2104 PMC interface */
Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from cyborgx1(a)gmail.com are
queue-3.18/usb-serial-cp210x-add-new-device-id-elv-alc-8xxx.patch
This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled
USB: serial: cp210x: add IDs for LifeScan OneTouch Verio IQ
to the 3.18-stable tree which can be found at:
http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum…
The filename of the patch is:
usb-serial-cp210x-add-ids-for-lifescan-onetouch-verio-iq.patch
and it can be found in the queue-3.18 subdirectory.
If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree,
please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it.
>From 4307413256ac1e09b8f53e8715af3df9e49beec3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: =?UTF-8?q?Diego=20Elio=20Petten=C3=B2?= <flameeyes(a)flameeyes.eu>
Date: Fri, 29 Dec 2017 09:54:25 +0000
Subject: USB: serial: cp210x: add IDs for LifeScan OneTouch Verio IQ
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
From: Diego Elio Pettenò <flameeyes(a)flameeyes.eu>
commit 4307413256ac1e09b8f53e8715af3df9e49beec3 upstream.
Add IDs for the OneTouch Verio IQ that comes with an embedded
USB-to-serial converter.
Signed-off-by: Diego Elio Pettenò <flameeyes(a)flameeyes.eu>
Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <johan(a)kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/usb/serial/cp210x.c | 1 +
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
--- a/drivers/usb/serial/cp210x.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/serial/cp210x.c
@@ -119,6 +119,7 @@ static const struct usb_device_id id_tab
{ USB_DEVICE(0x10C4, 0x846E) }, /* BEI USB Sensor Interface (VCP) */
{ USB_DEVICE(0x10C4, 0x8477) }, /* Balluff RFID */
{ USB_DEVICE(0x10C4, 0x84B6) }, /* Starizona Hyperion */
+ { USB_DEVICE(0x10C4, 0x85A7) }, /* LifeScan OneTouch Verio IQ */
{ USB_DEVICE(0x10C4, 0x85EA) }, /* AC-Services IBUS-IF */
{ USB_DEVICE(0x10C4, 0x85EB) }, /* AC-Services CIS-IBUS */
{ USB_DEVICE(0x10C4, 0x85F8) }, /* Virtenio Preon32 */
Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from flameeyes(a)flameeyes.eu are
queue-3.18/usb-serial-cp210x-add-ids-for-lifescan-onetouch-verio-iq.patch
This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled
USB: fix usbmon BUG trigger
to the 3.18-stable tree which can be found at:
http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum…
The filename of the patch is:
usb-fix-usbmon-bug-trigger.patch
and it can be found in the queue-3.18 subdirectory.
If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree,
please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it.
>From 46eb14a6e1585d99c1b9f58d0e7389082a5f466b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Pete Zaitcev <zaitcev(a)redhat.com>
Date: Mon, 8 Jan 2018 15:46:41 -0600
Subject: USB: fix usbmon BUG trigger
From: Pete Zaitcev <zaitcev(a)redhat.com>
commit 46eb14a6e1585d99c1b9f58d0e7389082a5f466b upstream.
Automated tests triggered this by opening usbmon and accessing the
mmap while simultaneously resizing the buffers. This bug was with
us since 2006, because typically applications only size the buffers
once and thus avoid racing. Reported by Kirill A. Shutemov.
Reported-by: <syzbot+f9831b881b3e849829fc(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Pete Zaitcev <zaitcev(a)redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/usb/mon/mon_bin.c | 8 +++++++-
1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/drivers/usb/mon/mon_bin.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/mon/mon_bin.c
@@ -1000,7 +1000,9 @@ static long mon_bin_ioctl(struct file *f
break;
case MON_IOCQ_RING_SIZE:
+ mutex_lock(&rp->fetch_lock);
ret = rp->b_size;
+ mutex_unlock(&rp->fetch_lock);
break;
case MON_IOCT_RING_SIZE:
@@ -1227,12 +1229,16 @@ static int mon_bin_vma_fault(struct vm_a
unsigned long offset, chunk_idx;
struct page *pageptr;
+ mutex_lock(&rp->fetch_lock);
offset = vmf->pgoff << PAGE_SHIFT;
- if (offset >= rp->b_size)
+ if (offset >= rp->b_size) {
+ mutex_unlock(&rp->fetch_lock);
return VM_FAULT_SIGBUS;
+ }
chunk_idx = offset / CHUNK_SIZE;
pageptr = rp->b_vec[chunk_idx].pg;
get_page(pageptr);
+ mutex_unlock(&rp->fetch_lock);
vmf->page = pageptr;
return 0;
}
Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from zaitcev(a)redhat.com are
queue-3.18/usb-fix-usbmon-bug-trigger.patch
This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled
staging: android: ashmem: fix a race condition in ASHMEM_SET_SIZE ioctl
to the 3.18-stable tree which can be found at:
http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum…
The filename of the patch is:
staging-android-ashmem-fix-a-race-condition-in-ashmem_set_size-ioctl.patch
and it can be found in the queue-3.18 subdirectory.
If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree,
please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it.
>From 443064cb0b1fb4569fe0a71209da7625129fb760 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Viktor Slavkovic <viktors(a)google.com>
Date: Mon, 8 Jan 2018 10:43:03 -0800
Subject: staging: android: ashmem: fix a race condition in ASHMEM_SET_SIZE ioctl
From: Viktor Slavkovic <viktors(a)google.com>
commit 443064cb0b1fb4569fe0a71209da7625129fb760 upstream.
A lock-unlock is missing in ASHMEM_SET_SIZE ioctl which can result in a
race condition when mmap is called. After the !asma->file check, before
setting asma->size, asma->file can be set in mmap. That would result in
having different asma->size than the mapped memory size. Combined with
ASHMEM_UNPIN ioctl and shrinker invocation, this can result in memory
corruption.
Signed-off-by: Viktor Slavkovic <viktors(a)google.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/staging/android/ashmem.c | 2 ++
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
--- a/drivers/staging/android/ashmem.c
+++ b/drivers/staging/android/ashmem.c
@@ -759,10 +759,12 @@ static long ashmem_ioctl(struct file *fi
break;
case ASHMEM_SET_SIZE:
ret = -EINVAL;
+ mutex_lock(&ashmem_mutex);
if (!asma->file) {
ret = 0;
asma->size = (size_t) arg;
}
+ mutex_unlock(&ashmem_mutex);
break;
case ASHMEM_GET_SIZE:
ret = asma->size;
Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from viktors(a)google.com are
queue-3.18/staging-android-ashmem-fix-a-race-condition-in-ashmem_set_size-ioctl.patch
The patch below does not apply to the 4.9-stable tree.
If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm
tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit
id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>.
thanks,
greg k-h
------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------
>From 7ae2c3c280db183ca9ada2675c34ec2f7378abfa Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Alan Stern <stern(a)rowland.harvard.edu>
Date: Wed, 3 Jan 2018 12:51:51 -0500
Subject: [PATCH] USB: UDC core: fix double-free in usb_add_gadget_udc_release
The error-handling pathways in usb_add_gadget_udc_release() are messed
up. Aside from the uninformative statement labels, they can deallocate
the udc structure after calling put_device(), which is a double-free.
This was observed by KASAN in automatic testing.
This patch cleans up the routine. It preserves the requirement that
when any failure occurs, we call put_device(&gadget->dev).
Signed-off-by: Alan Stern <stern(a)rowland.harvard.edu>
Reported-by: Fengguang Wu <fengguang.wu(a)intel.com>
CC: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Peter Chen <peter.chen(a)nxp.com>
Acked-by: Felipe Balbi <felipe.balbi(a)linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org>
diff --git a/drivers/usb/gadget/udc/core.c b/drivers/usb/gadget/udc/core.c
index 93eff7dec2f5..1b3efb14aec7 100644
--- a/drivers/usb/gadget/udc/core.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/gadget/udc/core.c
@@ -1147,11 +1147,7 @@ int usb_add_gadget_udc_release(struct device *parent, struct usb_gadget *gadget,
udc = kzalloc(sizeof(*udc), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!udc)
- goto err1;
-
- ret = device_add(&gadget->dev);
- if (ret)
- goto err2;
+ goto err_put_gadget;
device_initialize(&udc->dev);
udc->dev.release = usb_udc_release;
@@ -1160,7 +1156,11 @@ int usb_add_gadget_udc_release(struct device *parent, struct usb_gadget *gadget,
udc->dev.parent = parent;
ret = dev_set_name(&udc->dev, "%s", kobject_name(&parent->kobj));
if (ret)
- goto err3;
+ goto err_put_udc;
+
+ ret = device_add(&gadget->dev);
+ if (ret)
+ goto err_put_udc;
udc->gadget = gadget;
gadget->udc = udc;
@@ -1170,7 +1170,7 @@ int usb_add_gadget_udc_release(struct device *parent, struct usb_gadget *gadget,
ret = device_add(&udc->dev);
if (ret)
- goto err4;
+ goto err_unlist_udc;
usb_gadget_set_state(gadget, USB_STATE_NOTATTACHED);
udc->vbus = true;
@@ -1178,27 +1178,25 @@ int usb_add_gadget_udc_release(struct device *parent, struct usb_gadget *gadget,
/* pick up one of pending gadget drivers */
ret = check_pending_gadget_drivers(udc);
if (ret)
- goto err5;
+ goto err_del_udc;
mutex_unlock(&udc_lock);
return 0;
-err5:
+ err_del_udc:
device_del(&udc->dev);
-err4:
+ err_unlist_udc:
list_del(&udc->list);
mutex_unlock(&udc_lock);
-err3:
- put_device(&udc->dev);
device_del(&gadget->dev);
-err2:
- kfree(udc);
+ err_put_udc:
+ put_device(&udc->dev);
-err1:
+ err_put_gadget:
put_device(&gadget->dev);
return ret;
}
Hi,
Fedora got a bug report on 4.14.11 of a panic when booting a
Fedora guest in a CentOS 6 VM, not reproducible with nopti.
The issue is still present as of 4.14.13 as well. The only
report is a panic screenshot
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1532458
I've lost track of all the fixes that have been flying around,
is this a new issue or has a fix not yet made it to stable?
Thanks,
Laura
Hi,
this is a backport of these patches which I did for our kernels:
c237ee5eb33b bpf: add bpf_patch_insn_single helper
3df126f35f88 bpf: don't (ab)use instructions to store state
e245c5c6a565 bpf: move fixup_bpf_calls() function
79741b3bdec0 bpf: refactor fixup_bpf_calls()
8041902dae52 bpf: adjust insn_aux_data when patching insns
b2157399cc98 bpf: prevent out-of-bounds speculation
I offer it here for use in stable 4.4, if there is no better/simpler
backport available yet.
Alexei Starovoitov (4):
bpf: move fixup_bpf_calls() function
bpf: refactor fixup_bpf_calls()
bpf: adjust insn_aux_data when patching insns
bpf: prevent out-of-bounds speculation
Daniel Borkmann (1):
bpf: add bpf_patch_insn_single helper
Jakub Kicinski (1):
bpf: don't (ab)use instructions to store state
include/linux/bpf.h | 2 +
include/linux/filter.h | 3 +
kernel/bpf/arraymap.c | 24 ++++--
kernel/bpf/core.c | 71 ++++++++++++++++
kernel/bpf/syscall.c | 54 ------------
kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 217 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------------
6 files changed, 252 insertions(+), 119 deletions(-)
--
2.15.1
This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled
bpf: prevent out-of-bounds speculation
to the 4.9-stable tree which can be found at:
http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum…
The filename of the patch is:
bpf-prevent-out-of-bounds-speculation.patch
and it can be found in the queue-4.9 subdirectory.
If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree,
please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it.
>From b2157399cc9898260d6031c5bfe45fe137c1fbe7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Alexei Starovoitov <ast(a)kernel.org>
Date: Sun, 7 Jan 2018 17:33:02 -0800
Subject: bpf: prevent out-of-bounds speculation
From: Alexei Starovoitov <ast(a)kernel.org>
commit b2157399cc9898260d6031c5bfe45fe137c1fbe7 upstream.
Under speculation, CPUs may mis-predict branches in bounds checks. Thus,
memory accesses under a bounds check may be speculated even if the
bounds check fails, providing a primitive for building a side channel.
To avoid leaking kernel data round up array-based maps and mask the index
after bounds check, so speculated load with out of bounds index will load
either valid value from the array or zero from the padded area.
Unconditionally mask index for all array types even when max_entries
are not rounded to power of 2 for root user.
When map is created by unpriv user generate a sequence of bpf insns
that includes AND operation to make sure that JITed code includes
the same 'index & index_mask' operation.
If prog_array map is created by unpriv user replace
bpf_tail_call(ctx, map, index);
with
if (index >= max_entries) {
index &= map->index_mask;
bpf_tail_call(ctx, map, index);
}
(along with roundup to power 2) to prevent out-of-bounds speculation.
There is secondary redundant 'if (index >= max_entries)' in the interpreter
and in all JITs, but they can be optimized later if necessary.
Other array-like maps (cpumap, devmap, sockmap, perf_event_array, cgroup_array)
cannot be used by unpriv, so no changes there.
That fixes bpf side of "Variant 1: bounds check bypass (CVE-2017-5753)" on
all architectures with and without JIT.
v2->v3:
Daniel noticed that attack potentially can be crafted via syscall commands
without loading the program, so add masking to those paths as well.
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast(a)kernel.org>
Acked-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend(a)gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel(a)iogearbox.net>
Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby(a)suse.cz>
[ Backported to 4.9 - gregkh ]
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org>
---
include/linux/bpf.h | 2 ++
include/linux/bpf_verifier.h | 5 ++++-
kernel/bpf/arraymap.c | 31 ++++++++++++++++++++++---------
kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 42 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
4 files changed, 67 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
--- a/include/linux/bpf.h
+++ b/include/linux/bpf.h
@@ -43,6 +43,7 @@ struct bpf_map {
u32 max_entries;
u32 map_flags;
u32 pages;
+ bool unpriv_array;
struct user_struct *user;
const struct bpf_map_ops *ops;
struct work_struct work;
@@ -189,6 +190,7 @@ struct bpf_prog_aux {
struct bpf_array {
struct bpf_map map;
u32 elem_size;
+ u32 index_mask;
/* 'ownership' of prog_array is claimed by the first program that
* is going to use this map or by the first program which FD is stored
* in the map to make sure that all callers and callees have the same
--- a/include/linux/bpf_verifier.h
+++ b/include/linux/bpf_verifier.h
@@ -67,7 +67,10 @@ struct bpf_verifier_state_list {
};
struct bpf_insn_aux_data {
- enum bpf_reg_type ptr_type; /* pointer type for load/store insns */
+ union {
+ enum bpf_reg_type ptr_type; /* pointer type for load/store insns */
+ struct bpf_map *map_ptr; /* pointer for call insn into lookup_elem */
+ };
bool seen; /* this insn was processed by the verifier */
};
--- a/kernel/bpf/arraymap.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/arraymap.c
@@ -46,9 +46,10 @@ static int bpf_array_alloc_percpu(struct
static struct bpf_map *array_map_alloc(union bpf_attr *attr)
{
bool percpu = attr->map_type == BPF_MAP_TYPE_PERCPU_ARRAY;
+ u32 elem_size, index_mask, max_entries;
+ bool unpriv = !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN);
struct bpf_array *array;
u64 array_size;
- u32 elem_size;
/* check sanity of attributes */
if (attr->max_entries == 0 || attr->key_size != 4 ||
@@ -63,11 +64,20 @@ static struct bpf_map *array_map_alloc(u
elem_size = round_up(attr->value_size, 8);
+ max_entries = attr->max_entries;
+ index_mask = roundup_pow_of_two(max_entries) - 1;
+
+ if (unpriv)
+ /* round up array size to nearest power of 2,
+ * since cpu will speculate within index_mask limits
+ */
+ max_entries = index_mask + 1;
+
array_size = sizeof(*array);
if (percpu)
- array_size += (u64) attr->max_entries * sizeof(void *);
+ array_size += (u64) max_entries * sizeof(void *);
else
- array_size += (u64) attr->max_entries * elem_size;
+ array_size += (u64) max_entries * elem_size;
/* make sure there is no u32 overflow later in round_up() */
if (array_size >= U32_MAX - PAGE_SIZE)
@@ -77,6 +87,8 @@ static struct bpf_map *array_map_alloc(u
array = bpf_map_area_alloc(array_size);
if (!array)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+ array->index_mask = index_mask;
+ array->map.unpriv_array = unpriv;
/* copy mandatory map attributes */
array->map.map_type = attr->map_type;
@@ -110,7 +122,7 @@ static void *array_map_lookup_elem(struc
if (unlikely(index >= array->map.max_entries))
return NULL;
- return array->value + array->elem_size * index;
+ return array->value + array->elem_size * (index & array->index_mask);
}
/* Called from eBPF program */
@@ -122,7 +134,7 @@ static void *percpu_array_map_lookup_ele
if (unlikely(index >= array->map.max_entries))
return NULL;
- return this_cpu_ptr(array->pptrs[index]);
+ return this_cpu_ptr(array->pptrs[index & array->index_mask]);
}
int bpf_percpu_array_copy(struct bpf_map *map, void *key, void *value)
@@ -142,7 +154,7 @@ int bpf_percpu_array_copy(struct bpf_map
*/
size = round_up(map->value_size, 8);
rcu_read_lock();
- pptr = array->pptrs[index];
+ pptr = array->pptrs[index & array->index_mask];
for_each_possible_cpu(cpu) {
bpf_long_memcpy(value + off, per_cpu_ptr(pptr, cpu), size);
off += size;
@@ -190,10 +202,11 @@ static int array_map_update_elem(struct
return -EEXIST;
if (array->map.map_type == BPF_MAP_TYPE_PERCPU_ARRAY)
- memcpy(this_cpu_ptr(array->pptrs[index]),
+ memcpy(this_cpu_ptr(array->pptrs[index & array->index_mask]),
value, map->value_size);
else
- memcpy(array->value + array->elem_size * index,
+ memcpy(array->value +
+ array->elem_size * (index & array->index_mask),
value, map->value_size);
return 0;
}
@@ -227,7 +240,7 @@ int bpf_percpu_array_update(struct bpf_m
*/
size = round_up(map->value_size, 8);
rcu_read_lock();
- pptr = array->pptrs[index];
+ pptr = array->pptrs[index & array->index_mask];
for_each_possible_cpu(cpu) {
bpf_long_memcpy(per_cpu_ptr(pptr, cpu), value + off, size);
off += size;
--- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
@@ -1187,7 +1187,7 @@ static void clear_all_pkt_pointers(struc
}
}
-static int check_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int func_id)
+static int check_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int func_id, int insn_idx)
{
struct bpf_verifier_state *state = &env->cur_state;
const struct bpf_func_proto *fn = NULL;
@@ -1238,6 +1238,13 @@ static int check_call(struct bpf_verifie
err = check_func_arg(env, BPF_REG_2, fn->arg2_type, &meta);
if (err)
return err;
+ if (func_id == BPF_FUNC_tail_call) {
+ if (meta.map_ptr == NULL) {
+ verbose("verifier bug\n");
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx].map_ptr = meta.map_ptr;
+ }
err = check_func_arg(env, BPF_REG_3, fn->arg3_type, &meta);
if (err)
return err;
@@ -3019,7 +3026,7 @@ static int do_check(struct bpf_verifier_
return -EINVAL;
}
- err = check_call(env, insn->imm);
+ err = check_call(env, insn->imm, insn_idx);
if (err)
return err;
@@ -3372,7 +3379,11 @@ static int fixup_bpf_calls(struct bpf_ve
struct bpf_insn *insn = prog->insnsi;
const struct bpf_func_proto *fn;
const int insn_cnt = prog->len;
- int i;
+ struct bpf_insn insn_buf[16];
+ struct bpf_prog *new_prog;
+ struct bpf_map *map_ptr;
+ int i, cnt, delta = 0;
+
for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++, insn++) {
if (insn->code != (BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL))
@@ -3390,6 +3401,31 @@ static int fixup_bpf_calls(struct bpf_ve
*/
insn->imm = 0;
insn->code |= BPF_X;
+
+ /* instead of changing every JIT dealing with tail_call
+ * emit two extra insns:
+ * if (index >= max_entries) goto out;
+ * index &= array->index_mask;
+ * to avoid out-of-bounds cpu speculation
+ */
+ map_ptr = env->insn_aux_data[i + delta].map_ptr;
+ if (!map_ptr->unpriv_array)
+ continue;
+ insn_buf[0] = BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JGE, BPF_REG_3,
+ map_ptr->max_entries, 2);
+ insn_buf[1] = BPF_ALU32_IMM(BPF_AND, BPF_REG_3,
+ container_of(map_ptr,
+ struct bpf_array,
+ map)->index_mask);
+ insn_buf[2] = *insn;
+ cnt = 3;
+ new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, insn_buf, cnt);
+ if (!new_prog)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ delta += cnt - 1;
+ env->prog = prog = new_prog;
+ insn = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta;
continue;
}
Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from ast(a)kernel.org are
queue-4.9/bpf-refactor-fixup_bpf_calls.patch
queue-4.9/bpf-array-fix-overflow-in-max_entries-and-undefined-behavior-in-index_mask.patch
queue-4.9/bpf-prevent-out-of-bounds-speculation.patch
queue-4.9/bpf-move-fixup_bpf_calls-function.patch
This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled
bpf, array: fix overflow in max_entries and undefined behavior in index_mask
to the 4.9-stable tree which can be found at:
http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum…
The filename of the patch is:
bpf-array-fix-overflow-in-max_entries-and-undefined-behavior-in-index_mask.patch
and it can be found in the queue-4.9 subdirectory.
If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree,
please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it.
>From bbeb6e4323dad9b5e0ee9f60c223dd532e2403b1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daniel Borkmann <daniel(a)iogearbox.net>
Date: Wed, 10 Jan 2018 23:25:05 +0100
Subject: bpf, array: fix overflow in max_entries and undefined behavior in index_mask
From: Daniel Borkmann <daniel(a)iogearbox.net>
commit bbeb6e4323dad9b5e0ee9f60c223dd532e2403b1 upstream.
syzkaller tried to alloc a map with 0xfffffffd entries out of a userns,
and thus unprivileged. With the recently added logic in b2157399cc98
("bpf: prevent out-of-bounds speculation") we round this up to the next
power of two value for max_entries for unprivileged such that we can
apply proper masking into potentially zeroed out map slots.
However, this will generate an index_mask of 0xffffffff, and therefore
a + 1 will let this overflow into new max_entries of 0. This will pass
allocation, etc, and later on map access we still enforce on the original
attr->max_entries value which was 0xfffffffd, therefore triggering GPF
all over the place. Thus bail out on overflow in such case.
Moreover, on 32 bit archs roundup_pow_of_two() can also not be used,
since fls_long(max_entries - 1) can result in 32 and 1UL << 32 in 32 bit
space is undefined. Therefore, do this by hand in a 64 bit variable.
This fixes all the issues triggered by syzkaller's reproducers.
Fixes: b2157399cc98 ("bpf: prevent out-of-bounds speculation")
Reported-by: syzbot+b0efb8e572d01bce1ae0(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Reported-by: syzbot+6c15e9744f75f2364773(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Reported-by: syzbot+d2f5524fb46fd3b312ee(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Reported-by: syzbot+61d23c95395cc90dbc2b(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Reported-by: syzbot+0d363c942452cca68c01(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel(a)iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast(a)kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org>
---
kernel/bpf/arraymap.c | 18 +++++++++++++++---
1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
--- a/kernel/bpf/arraymap.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/arraymap.c
@@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ static struct bpf_map *array_map_alloc(u
u32 elem_size, index_mask, max_entries;
bool unpriv = !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN);
struct bpf_array *array;
- u64 array_size;
+ u64 array_size, mask64;
/* check sanity of attributes */
if (attr->max_entries == 0 || attr->key_size != 4 ||
@@ -65,13 +65,25 @@ static struct bpf_map *array_map_alloc(u
elem_size = round_up(attr->value_size, 8);
max_entries = attr->max_entries;
- index_mask = roundup_pow_of_two(max_entries) - 1;
- if (unpriv)
+ /* On 32 bit archs roundup_pow_of_two() with max_entries that has
+ * upper most bit set in u32 space is undefined behavior due to
+ * resulting 1U << 32, so do it manually here in u64 space.
+ */
+ mask64 = fls_long(max_entries - 1);
+ mask64 = 1ULL << mask64;
+ mask64 -= 1;
+
+ index_mask = mask64;
+ if (unpriv) {
/* round up array size to nearest power of 2,
* since cpu will speculate within index_mask limits
*/
max_entries = index_mask + 1;
+ /* Check for overflows. */
+ if (max_entries < attr->max_entries)
+ return ERR_PTR(-E2BIG);
+ }
array_size = sizeof(*array);
if (percpu)
Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from daniel(a)iogearbox.net are
queue-4.9/bpf-refactor-fixup_bpf_calls.patch
queue-4.9/bpf-array-fix-overflow-in-max_entries-and-undefined-behavior-in-index_mask.patch
queue-4.9/bpf-prevent-out-of-bounds-speculation.patch
queue-4.9/bpf-move-fixup_bpf_calls-function.patch
Depending on configuration mem_section can now be an array or a pointer
to an array allocated dynamically. In most cases, we can continue to refer
to it as 'mem_section' regardless of what it is.
But there's one exception: '&mem_section' means "address of the array" if
mem_section is an array, but if mem_section is a pointer, it would mean
"address of the pointer".
We've stepped onto this in kdump code. VMCOREINFO_SYMBOL(mem_section)
writes down address of pointer into vmcoreinfo, not array as we wanted.
Let's introduce VMCOREINFO_SYMBOL_ARRAY() that would handle the
situation correctly for both cases.
Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov(a)linux.intel.com>
Fixes: 83e3c48729d9 ("mm/sparsemem: Allocate mem_section at runtime for CONFIG_SPARSEMEM_EXTREME=y")
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
Acked-by: Baoquan He <bhe(a)redhat.com>
Acked-by: Dave Young <dyoung(a)redhat.com>
---
include/linux/crash_core.h | 2 ++
kernel/crash_core.c | 2 +-
2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/crash_core.h b/include/linux/crash_core.h
index 06097ef30449..b511f6d24b42 100644
--- a/include/linux/crash_core.h
+++ b/include/linux/crash_core.h
@@ -42,6 +42,8 @@ phys_addr_t paddr_vmcoreinfo_note(void);
vmcoreinfo_append_str("PAGESIZE=%ld\n", value)
#define VMCOREINFO_SYMBOL(name) \
vmcoreinfo_append_str("SYMBOL(%s)=%lx\n", #name, (unsigned long)&name)
+#define VMCOREINFO_SYMBOL_ARRAY(name) \
+ vmcoreinfo_append_str("SYMBOL(%s)=%lx\n", #name, (unsigned long)name)
#define VMCOREINFO_SIZE(name) \
vmcoreinfo_append_str("SIZE(%s)=%lu\n", #name, \
(unsigned long)sizeof(name))
diff --git a/kernel/crash_core.c b/kernel/crash_core.c
index b3663896278e..4f63597c824d 100644
--- a/kernel/crash_core.c
+++ b/kernel/crash_core.c
@@ -410,7 +410,7 @@ static int __init crash_save_vmcoreinfo_init(void)
VMCOREINFO_SYMBOL(contig_page_data);
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_SPARSEMEM
- VMCOREINFO_SYMBOL(mem_section);
+ VMCOREINFO_SYMBOL_ARRAY(mem_section);
VMCOREINFO_LENGTH(mem_section, NR_SECTION_ROOTS);
VMCOREINFO_STRUCT_SIZE(mem_section);
VMCOREINFO_OFFSET(mem_section, section_mem_map);
--
2.15.1
This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled
[PATCH] Revert "can: kvaser_usb: free buf in error paths"
to the 3.18-stable tree which can be found at:
http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum…
The filename of the patch is:
revert-can-kvaser_usb-free-buf-in-error-paths.patch
and it can be found in the queue-3.18 subdirectory.
If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree,
please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it.
>From 66d409a60bcf1504ba6f0021cd0be58d93491197 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org>
Date: Sat, 13 Jan 2018 18:45:25 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] Revert "can: kvaser_usb: free buf in error paths"
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org>
This reverts commit 70d9dccf50152b0d7bfb2697d8c51e9fab9f782c which was
commit 435019b48033138581a6171093b181fc6b4d3d30 upstream.
Jimmy Assarsson asks that it be reverted as it's not correct there.
Reported-by: Jimmy Assarsson <jimmyassarsson(a)gmail.com>
Cc: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl(a)pengutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/net/can/usb/kvaser_usb.c | 2 --
1 file changed, 2 deletions(-)
--- a/drivers/net/can/usb/kvaser_usb.c
+++ b/drivers/net/can/usb/kvaser_usb.c
@@ -602,7 +602,6 @@ static int kvaser_usb_simple_msg_async(s
if (err) {
netdev_err(netdev, "Error transmitting URB\n");
usb_unanchor_urb(urb);
- kfree(buf);
usb_free_urb(urb);
kfree(buf);
return err;
@@ -1389,7 +1388,6 @@ static netdev_tx_t kvaser_usb_start_xmit
atomic_dec(&priv->active_tx_urbs);
usb_unanchor_urb(urb);
- kfree(buf);
stats->tx_dropped++;
Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org are
queue-3.18/kvm-vmx-scrub-hardware-gprs-at-vm-exit.patch
queue-3.18/mips-consistently-handle-buffer-counter-with-ptrace_setregset.patch
queue-3.18/8021q-fix-a-memory-leak-for-vlan-0-device.patch
queue-3.18/crypto-n2-cure-use-after-free.patch
queue-3.18/kernel-signal.c-remove-the-no-longer-needed-signal_unkillable-check-in-complete_signal.patch
queue-3.18/x86-microcode-intel-extend-bdw-late-loading-with-a-revision-check.patch
queue-3.18/kernel-signal.c-protect-the-signal_unkillable-tasks-from-sig_kernel_only-signals.patch
queue-3.18/alsa-pcm-remove-incorrect-snd_bug_on-usages.patch
queue-3.18/iscsi-target-make-task_reassign-use-proper-se_cmd-cmd_kref.patch
queue-3.18/alsa-aloop-fix-inconsistent-format-due-to-incomplete-rule.patch
queue-3.18/mips-disallow-outsized-ptrace_setregset-nt_prfpreg-regset-accesses.patch
queue-3.18/ib-srpt-disable-rdma-access-by-the-initiator.patch
queue-3.18/mips-guard-against-any-partial-write-attempt-with-ptrace_setregset.patch
queue-3.18/fscache-fix-the-default-for-fscache_maybe_release_page.patch
queue-3.18/mips-also-verify-sizeof-elf_fpreg_t-with-ptrace_setregset.patch
queue-3.18/rds-null-pointer-dereference-in-rds_atomic_free_op.patch
queue-3.18/mips-factor-out-nt_prfpreg-regset-access-helpers.patch
queue-3.18/rds-heap-oob-write-in-rds_message_alloc_sgs.patch
queue-3.18/can-gs_usb-fix-return-value-of-the-set_bittiming-callback.patch
queue-3.18/x86-acpi-handle-sci-interrupts-above-legacy-space-gracefully.patch
queue-3.18/kernel-acct.c-fix-the-acct-needcheck-check-in-check_free_space.patch
queue-3.18/sh_eth-fix-sh7757-gether-initialization.patch
queue-3.18/alsa-pcm-add-missing-error-checks-in-oss-emulation-plugin-builder.patch
queue-3.18/target-avoid-early-cmd_t_pre_execute-failures-during-abort_task.patch
queue-3.18/revert-can-kvaser_usb-free-buf-in-error-paths.patch
queue-3.18/net-stmmac-enable-eee-in-mii-gmii-or-rgmii-only.patch
queue-3.18/input-elantech-add-new-icbody-type-15.patch
queue-3.18/kernel-signal.c-protect-the-traced-signal_unkillable-tasks-from-sigkill.patch
queue-3.18/alsa-pcm-abort-properly-at-pending-signal-in-oss-read-write-loops.patch
queue-3.18/perf-core-fix-concurrent-sys_perf_event_open-vs.-move_group-race.patch
queue-3.18/sh_eth-fix-tsu-resource-handling.patch
queue-3.18/alsa-pcm-allow-aborting-mutex-lock-at-oss-read-write-loops.patch
queue-3.18/x86-acpi-reduce-code-duplication-in-mp_override_legacy_irq.patch
queue-3.18/mips-fix-an-fcsr-access-api-regression-with-nt_prfpreg-and-msa.patch
queue-3.18/alsa-aloop-fix-racy-hw-constraints-adjustment.patch
queue-3.18/alsa-aloop-release-cable-upon-open-error-path.patch
queue-3.18/crypto-algapi-fix-null-dereference-in-crypto_remove_spawns.patch
Hi,
This is a repost of my recent 3.18 backports of NT_PRFPREG regset
handling fixes, sent as a series for patch ordering clarity. I've added
`v2' annotation for patch management purposes, retaining original
headings. The patches themselves are unchanged.
Maciej
This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled
MIPS: Guard against any partial write attempt with PTRACE_SETREGSET
to the 3.18-stable tree which can be found at:
http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum…
The filename of the patch is:
mips-guard-against-any-partial-write-attempt-with-ptrace_setregset.patch
and it can be found in the queue-3.18 subdirectory.
If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree,
please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it.
>From dc24d0edf33c3e15099688b6bbdf7bdc24bf6e91 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: "Maciej W. Rozycki" <macro(a)mips.com>
Date: Mon, 11 Dec 2017 22:52:15 +0000
Subject: MIPS: Guard against any partial write attempt with PTRACE_SETREGSET
From: Maciej W. Rozycki <macro(a)mips.com>
commit dc24d0edf33c3e15099688b6bbdf7bdc24bf6e91 upstream.
Complement commit d614fd58a283 ("mips/ptrace: Preserve previous
registers for short regset write") and ensure that no partial register
write attempt is made with PTRACE_SETREGSET, as we do not preinitialize
any temporaries used to hold incoming register data and consequently
random data could be written.
It is the responsibility of the caller, such as `ptrace_regset', to
arrange for writes to span whole registers only, so here we only assert
that it has indeed happened.
Signed-off-by: Maciej W. Rozycki <macro(a)mips.com>
Fixes: 72b22bbad1e7 ("MIPS: Don't assume 64-bit FP registers for FP regset")
Cc: James Hogan <james.hogan(a)mips.com>
Cc: Paul Burton <Paul.Burton(a)mips.com>
Cc: Alex Smith <alex(a)alex-smith.me.uk>
Cc: Dave Martin <Dave.Martin(a)arm.com>
Cc: linux-mips(a)linux-mips.org
Cc: linux-kernel(a)vger.kernel.org
Patchwork: https://patchwork.linux-mips.org/patch/17926/
Signed-off-by: Ralf Baechle <ralf(a)linux-mips.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org>
---
arch/mips/kernel/ptrace.c | 12 +++++++++++-
1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/arch/mips/kernel/ptrace.c
+++ b/arch/mips/kernel/ptrace.c
@@ -497,7 +497,15 @@ static int fpr_set_msa(struct task_struc
return 0;
}
-/* Copy the supplied NT_PRFPREG buffer to the floating-point context. */
+/*
+ * Copy the supplied NT_PRFPREG buffer to the floating-point context.
+ *
+ * We optimize for the case where `count % sizeof(elf_fpreg_t) == 0',
+ * which is supposed to have been guaranteed by the kernel before
+ * calling us, e.g. in `ptrace_regset'. We enforce that requirement,
+ * so that we can safely avoid preinitializing temporaries for
+ * partial register writes.
+ */
static int fpr_set(struct task_struct *target,
const struct user_regset *regset,
unsigned int pos, unsigned int count,
@@ -505,6 +513,8 @@ static int fpr_set(struct task_struct *t
{
int err;
+ BUG_ON(count % sizeof(elf_fpreg_t));
+
/* XXX fcr31 */
if (sizeof(target->thread.fpu.fpr[0]) == sizeof(elf_fpreg_t))
Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from macro(a)mips.com are
queue-3.18/mips-consistently-handle-buffer-counter-with-ptrace_setregset.patch
queue-3.18/mips-disallow-outsized-ptrace_setregset-nt_prfpreg-regset-accesses.patch
queue-3.18/mips-guard-against-any-partial-write-attempt-with-ptrace_setregset.patch
queue-3.18/mips-also-verify-sizeof-elf_fpreg_t-with-ptrace_setregset.patch
queue-3.18/mips-factor-out-nt_prfpreg-regset-access-helpers.patch
queue-3.18/mips-fix-an-fcsr-access-api-regression-with-nt_prfpreg-and-msa.patch
This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled
MIPS: Fix an FCSR access API regression with NT_PRFPREG and MSA
to the 3.18-stable tree which can be found at:
http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum…
The filename of the patch is:
mips-fix-an-fcsr-access-api-regression-with-nt_prfpreg-and-msa.patch
and it can be found in the queue-3.18 subdirectory.
If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree,
please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it.
>From be07a6a1188372b6d19a3307ec33211fc9c9439d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: "Maciej W. Rozycki" <macro(a)mips.com>
Date: Mon, 11 Dec 2017 22:54:33 +0000
Subject: MIPS: Fix an FCSR access API regression with NT_PRFPREG and MSA
From: Maciej W. Rozycki <macro(a)mips.com>
commit be07a6a1188372b6d19a3307ec33211fc9c9439d upstream.
Fix a commit 72b22bbad1e7 ("MIPS: Don't assume 64-bit FP registers for
FP regset") public API regression, then activated by commit 1db1af84d6df
("MIPS: Basic MSA context switching support"), that caused the FCSR
register not to be read or written for CONFIG_CPU_HAS_MSA kernel
configurations (regardless of actual presence or absence of the MSA
feature in a given processor) with ptrace(2) PTRACE_GETREGSET and
PTRACE_SETREGSET requests nor recorded in core dumps.
This is because with !CONFIG_CPU_HAS_MSA configurations the whole of
`elf_fpregset_t' array is bulk-copied as it is, which includes the FCSR
in one half of the last, 33rd slot, whereas with CONFIG_CPU_HAS_MSA
configurations array elements are copied individually, and then only the
leading 32 FGR slots while the remaining slot is ignored.
Correct the code then such that only FGR slots are copied in the
respective !MSA and MSA helpers an then the FCSR slot is handled
separately in common code. Use `ptrace_setfcr31' to update the FCSR
too, so that the read-only mask is respected.
Retrieving a correct value of FCSR is important in debugging not only
for the human to be able to get the right interpretation of the
situation, but for correct operation of GDB as well. This is because
the condition code bits in FSCR are used by GDB to determine the
location to place a breakpoint at when single-stepping through an FPU
branch instruction. If such a breakpoint is placed incorrectly (i.e.
with the condition reversed), then it will be missed, likely causing the
debuggee to run away from the control of GDB and consequently breaking
the process of investigation.
Fortunately GDB continues using the older PTRACE_GETFPREGS ptrace(2)
request which is unaffected, so the regression only really hits with
post-mortem debug sessions using a core dump file, in which case
execution, and consequently single-stepping through branches is not
possible. Of course core files created by buggy kernels out there will
have the value of FCSR recorded clobbered, but such core files cannot be
corrected and the person using them simply will have to be aware that
the value of FCSR retrieved is not reliable.
Which also means we can likely get away without defining a replacement
API which would ensure a correct value of FSCR to be retrieved, or none
at all.
This is based on previous work by Alex Smith, extensively rewritten.
Signed-off-by: Alex Smith <alex(a)alex-smith.me.uk>
Signed-off-by: James Hogan <james.hogan(a)mips.com>
Signed-off-by: Maciej W. Rozycki <macro(a)mips.com>
Fixes: 72b22bbad1e7 ("MIPS: Don't assume 64-bit FP registers for FP regset")
Cc: Paul Burton <Paul.Burton(a)mips.com>
Cc: Dave Martin <Dave.Martin(a)arm.com>
Cc: linux-mips(a)linux-mips.org
Cc: linux-kernel(a)vger.kernel.org
Patchwork: https://patchwork.linux-mips.org/patch/17928/
Signed-off-by: Ralf Baechle <ralf(a)linux-mips.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org>
---
arch/mips/kernel/ptrace.c | 47 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----------
1 file changed, 36 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
--- a/arch/mips/kernel/ptrace.c
+++ b/arch/mips/kernel/ptrace.c
@@ -403,7 +403,7 @@ static int gpr64_set(struct task_struct
/*
* Copy the floating-point context to the supplied NT_PRFPREG buffer,
* !CONFIG_CPU_HAS_MSA variant. FP context's general register slots
- * correspond 1:1 to buffer slots.
+ * correspond 1:1 to buffer slots. Only general registers are copied.
*/
static int fpr_get_fpa(struct task_struct *target,
unsigned int *pos, unsigned int *count,
@@ -411,13 +411,14 @@ static int fpr_get_fpa(struct task_struc
{
return user_regset_copyout(pos, count, kbuf, ubuf,
&target->thread.fpu,
- 0, sizeof(elf_fpregset_t));
+ 0, NUM_FPU_REGS * sizeof(elf_fpreg_t));
}
/*
* Copy the floating-point context to the supplied NT_PRFPREG buffer,
* CONFIG_CPU_HAS_MSA variant. Only lower 64 bits of FP context's
- * general register slots are copied to buffer slots.
+ * general register slots are copied to buffer slots. Only general
+ * registers are copied.
*/
static int fpr_get_msa(struct task_struct *target,
unsigned int *pos, unsigned int *count,
@@ -439,20 +440,29 @@ static int fpr_get_msa(struct task_struc
return 0;
}
-/* Copy the floating-point context to the supplied NT_PRFPREG buffer. */
+/*
+ * Copy the floating-point context to the supplied NT_PRFPREG buffer.
+ * Choose the appropriate helper for general registers, and then copy
+ * the FCSR register separately.
+ */
static int fpr_get(struct task_struct *target,
const struct user_regset *regset,
unsigned int pos, unsigned int count,
void *kbuf, void __user *ubuf)
{
+ const int fcr31_pos = NUM_FPU_REGS * sizeof(elf_fpreg_t);
int err;
- /* XXX fcr31 */
-
if (sizeof(target->thread.fpu.fpr[0]) == sizeof(elf_fpreg_t))
err = fpr_get_fpa(target, &pos, &count, &kbuf, &ubuf);
else
err = fpr_get_msa(target, &pos, &count, &kbuf, &ubuf);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+
+ err = user_regset_copyout(&pos, &count, &kbuf, &ubuf,
+ &target->thread.fpu.fcr31,
+ fcr31_pos, fcr31_pos + sizeof(u32));
return err;
}
@@ -460,7 +470,7 @@ static int fpr_get(struct task_struct *t
/*
* Copy the supplied NT_PRFPREG buffer to the floating-point context,
* !CONFIG_CPU_HAS_MSA variant. Buffer slots correspond 1:1 to FP
- * context's general register slots.
+ * context's general register slots. Only general registers are copied.
*/
static int fpr_set_fpa(struct task_struct *target,
unsigned int *pos, unsigned int *count,
@@ -468,13 +478,14 @@ static int fpr_set_fpa(struct task_struc
{
return user_regset_copyin(pos, count, kbuf, ubuf,
&target->thread.fpu,
- 0, sizeof(elf_fpregset_t));
+ 0, NUM_FPU_REGS * sizeof(elf_fpreg_t));
}
/*
* Copy the supplied NT_PRFPREG buffer to the floating-point context,
* CONFIG_CPU_HAS_MSA variant. Buffer slots are copied to lower 64
- * bits only of FP context's general register slots.
+ * bits only of FP context's general register slots. Only general
+ * registers are copied.
*/
static int fpr_set_msa(struct task_struct *target,
unsigned int *pos, unsigned int *count,
@@ -499,6 +510,8 @@ static int fpr_set_msa(struct task_struc
/*
* Copy the supplied NT_PRFPREG buffer to the floating-point context.
+ * Choose the appropriate helper for general registers, and then copy
+ * the FCSR register separately.
*
* We optimize for the case where `count % sizeof(elf_fpreg_t) == 0',
* which is supposed to have been guaranteed by the kernel before
@@ -511,16 +524,28 @@ static int fpr_set(struct task_struct *t
unsigned int pos, unsigned int count,
const void *kbuf, const void __user *ubuf)
{
+ const int fcr31_pos = NUM_FPU_REGS * sizeof(elf_fpreg_t);
+ u32 fcr31;
int err;
BUG_ON(count % sizeof(elf_fpreg_t));
- /* XXX fcr31 */
-
if (sizeof(target->thread.fpu.fpr[0]) == sizeof(elf_fpreg_t))
err = fpr_set_fpa(target, &pos, &count, &kbuf, &ubuf);
else
err = fpr_set_msa(target, &pos, &count, &kbuf, &ubuf);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+
+ if (count > 0) {
+ err = user_regset_copyin(&pos, &count, &kbuf, &ubuf,
+ &fcr31,
+ fcr31_pos, fcr31_pos + sizeof(u32));
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+
+ target->thread.fpu.fcr31 = fcr31 & ~FPU_CSR_ALL_X;
+ }
return err;
}
Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from macro(a)mips.com are
queue-3.18/mips-consistently-handle-buffer-counter-with-ptrace_setregset.patch
queue-3.18/mips-disallow-outsized-ptrace_setregset-nt_prfpreg-regset-accesses.patch
queue-3.18/mips-guard-against-any-partial-write-attempt-with-ptrace_setregset.patch
queue-3.18/mips-also-verify-sizeof-elf_fpreg_t-with-ptrace_setregset.patch
queue-3.18/mips-factor-out-nt_prfpreg-regset-access-helpers.patch
queue-3.18/mips-fix-an-fcsr-access-api-regression-with-nt_prfpreg-and-msa.patch
This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled
MIPS: Factor out NT_PRFPREG regset access helpers
to the 3.18-stable tree which can be found at:
http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum…
The filename of the patch is:
mips-factor-out-nt_prfpreg-regset-access-helpers.patch
and it can be found in the queue-3.18 subdirectory.
If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree,
please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it.
>From a03fe72572c12e98f4173f8a535f32468e48b6ec Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: "Maciej W. Rozycki" <macro(a)mips.com>
Date: Mon, 11 Dec 2017 22:51:35 +0000
Subject: MIPS: Factor out NT_PRFPREG regset access helpers
From: Maciej W. Rozycki <macro(a)mips.com>
commit a03fe72572c12e98f4173f8a535f32468e48b6ec upstream.
In preparation to fix a commit 72b22bbad1e7 ("MIPS: Don't assume 64-bit
FP registers for FP regset") FCSR access regression factor out
NT_PRFPREG regset access helpers for the non-MSA and the MSA variants
respectively, to avoid having to deal with excessive indentation in the
actual fix.
No functional change, however use `target->thread.fpu.fpr[0]' rather
than `target->thread.fpu.fpr[i]' for FGR holding type size determination
as there's no `i' variable to refer to anymore, and for the factored out
`i' variable declaration use `unsigned int' rather than `unsigned' as
its type, following the common style.
Signed-off-by: Maciej W. Rozycki <macro(a)mips.com>
Fixes: 72b22bbad1e7 ("MIPS: Don't assume 64-bit FP registers for FP regset")
Cc: James Hogan <james.hogan(a)mips.com>
Cc: Paul Burton <Paul.Burton(a)mips.com>
Cc: Alex Smith <alex(a)alex-smith.me.uk>
Cc: Dave Martin <Dave.Martin(a)arm.com>
Cc: linux-mips(a)linux-mips.org
Cc: linux-kernel(a)vger.kernel.org
Patchwork: https://patchwork.linux-mips.org/patch/17925/
Signed-off-by: Ralf Baechle <ralf(a)linux-mips.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org>
---
arch/mips/kernel/ptrace.c | 106 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----------
1 file changed, 82 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-)
--- a/arch/mips/kernel/ptrace.c
+++ b/arch/mips/kernel/ptrace.c
@@ -400,25 +400,36 @@ static int gpr64_set(struct task_struct
#endif /* CONFIG_64BIT */
-static int fpr_get(struct task_struct *target,
- const struct user_regset *regset,
- unsigned int pos, unsigned int count,
- void *kbuf, void __user *ubuf)
+/*
+ * Copy the floating-point context to the supplied NT_PRFPREG buffer,
+ * !CONFIG_CPU_HAS_MSA variant. FP context's general register slots
+ * correspond 1:1 to buffer slots.
+ */
+static int fpr_get_fpa(struct task_struct *target,
+ unsigned int *pos, unsigned int *count,
+ void **kbuf, void __user **ubuf)
{
- unsigned i;
- int err;
- u64 fpr_val;
-
- /* XXX fcr31 */
+ return user_regset_copyout(pos, count, kbuf, ubuf,
+ &target->thread.fpu,
+ 0, sizeof(elf_fpregset_t));
+}
- if (sizeof(target->thread.fpu.fpr[i]) == sizeof(elf_fpreg_t))
- return user_regset_copyout(&pos, &count, &kbuf, &ubuf,
- &target->thread.fpu,
- 0, sizeof(elf_fpregset_t));
+/*
+ * Copy the floating-point context to the supplied NT_PRFPREG buffer,
+ * CONFIG_CPU_HAS_MSA variant. Only lower 64 bits of FP context's
+ * general register slots are copied to buffer slots.
+ */
+static int fpr_get_msa(struct task_struct *target,
+ unsigned int *pos, unsigned int *count,
+ void **kbuf, void __user **ubuf)
+{
+ unsigned int i;
+ u64 fpr_val;
+ int err;
for (i = 0; i < NUM_FPU_REGS; i++) {
fpr_val = get_fpr64(&target->thread.fpu.fpr[i], 0);
- err = user_regset_copyout(&pos, &count, &kbuf, &ubuf,
+ err = user_regset_copyout(pos, count, kbuf, ubuf,
&fpr_val, i * sizeof(elf_fpreg_t),
(i + 1) * sizeof(elf_fpreg_t));
if (err)
@@ -428,25 +439,54 @@ static int fpr_get(struct task_struct *t
return 0;
}
-static int fpr_set(struct task_struct *target,
+/* Copy the floating-point context to the supplied NT_PRFPREG buffer. */
+static int fpr_get(struct task_struct *target,
const struct user_regset *regset,
unsigned int pos, unsigned int count,
- const void *kbuf, const void __user *ubuf)
+ void *kbuf, void __user *ubuf)
{
- unsigned i;
int err;
- u64 fpr_val;
/* XXX fcr31 */
- if (sizeof(target->thread.fpu.fpr[i]) == sizeof(elf_fpreg_t))
- return user_regset_copyin(&pos, &count, &kbuf, &ubuf,
- &target->thread.fpu,
- 0, sizeof(elf_fpregset_t));
+ if (sizeof(target->thread.fpu.fpr[0]) == sizeof(elf_fpreg_t))
+ err = fpr_get_fpa(target, &pos, &count, &kbuf, &ubuf);
+ else
+ err = fpr_get_msa(target, &pos, &count, &kbuf, &ubuf);
+
+ return err;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Copy the supplied NT_PRFPREG buffer to the floating-point context,
+ * !CONFIG_CPU_HAS_MSA variant. Buffer slots correspond 1:1 to FP
+ * context's general register slots.
+ */
+static int fpr_set_fpa(struct task_struct *target,
+ unsigned int *pos, unsigned int *count,
+ const void **kbuf, const void __user **ubuf)
+{
+ return user_regset_copyin(pos, count, kbuf, ubuf,
+ &target->thread.fpu,
+ 0, sizeof(elf_fpregset_t));
+}
+
+/*
+ * Copy the supplied NT_PRFPREG buffer to the floating-point context,
+ * CONFIG_CPU_HAS_MSA variant. Buffer slots are copied to lower 64
+ * bits only of FP context's general register slots.
+ */
+static int fpr_set_msa(struct task_struct *target,
+ unsigned int *pos, unsigned int *count,
+ const void **kbuf, const void __user **ubuf)
+{
+ unsigned int i;
+ u64 fpr_val;
+ int err;
BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(fpr_val) != sizeof(elf_fpreg_t));
- for (i = 0; i < NUM_FPU_REGS && count >= sizeof(elf_fpreg_t); i++) {
- err = user_regset_copyin(&pos, &count, &kbuf, &ubuf,
+ for (i = 0; i < NUM_FPU_REGS && *count >= sizeof(elf_fpreg_t); i++) {
+ err = user_regset_copyin(pos, count, kbuf, ubuf,
&fpr_val, i * sizeof(elf_fpreg_t),
(i + 1) * sizeof(elf_fpreg_t));
if (err)
@@ -457,6 +497,24 @@ static int fpr_set(struct task_struct *t
return 0;
}
+/* Copy the supplied NT_PRFPREG buffer to the floating-point context. */
+static int fpr_set(struct task_struct *target,
+ const struct user_regset *regset,
+ unsigned int pos, unsigned int count,
+ const void *kbuf, const void __user *ubuf)
+{
+ int err;
+
+ /* XXX fcr31 */
+
+ if (sizeof(target->thread.fpu.fpr[0]) == sizeof(elf_fpreg_t))
+ err = fpr_set_fpa(target, &pos, &count, &kbuf, &ubuf);
+ else
+ err = fpr_set_msa(target, &pos, &count, &kbuf, &ubuf);
+
+ return err;
+}
+
enum mips_regset {
REGSET_GPR,
REGSET_FPR,
Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from macro(a)mips.com are
queue-3.18/mips-consistently-handle-buffer-counter-with-ptrace_setregset.patch
queue-3.18/mips-disallow-outsized-ptrace_setregset-nt_prfpreg-regset-accesses.patch
queue-3.18/mips-guard-against-any-partial-write-attempt-with-ptrace_setregset.patch
queue-3.18/mips-also-verify-sizeof-elf_fpreg_t-with-ptrace_setregset.patch
queue-3.18/mips-factor-out-nt_prfpreg-regset-access-helpers.patch
queue-3.18/mips-fix-an-fcsr-access-api-regression-with-nt_prfpreg-and-msa.patch
This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled
MIPS: Disallow outsized PTRACE_SETREGSET NT_PRFPREG regset accesses
to the 3.18-stable tree which can be found at:
http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum…
The filename of the patch is:
mips-disallow-outsized-ptrace_setregset-nt_prfpreg-regset-accesses.patch
and it can be found in the queue-3.18 subdirectory.
If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree,
please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it.
>From c8c5a3a24d395b14447a9a89d61586a913840a3b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: "Maciej W. Rozycki" <macro(a)mips.com>
Date: Mon, 11 Dec 2017 22:56:54 +0000
Subject: MIPS: Disallow outsized PTRACE_SETREGSET NT_PRFPREG regset accesses
From: Maciej W. Rozycki <macro(a)mips.com>
commit c8c5a3a24d395b14447a9a89d61586a913840a3b upstream.
Complement commit c23b3d1a5311 ("MIPS: ptrace: Change GP regset to use
correct core dump register layout") and also reject outsized
PTRACE_SETREGSET requests to the NT_PRFPREG regset, like with the
NT_PRSTATUS regset.
Signed-off-by: Maciej W. Rozycki <macro(a)mips.com>
Fixes: c23b3d1a5311 ("MIPS: ptrace: Change GP regset to use correct core dump register layout")
Cc: James Hogan <james.hogan(a)mips.com>
Cc: Paul Burton <Paul.Burton(a)mips.com>
Cc: Alex Smith <alex(a)alex-smith.me.uk>
Cc: Dave Martin <Dave.Martin(a)arm.com>
Cc: linux-mips(a)linux-mips.org
Cc: linux-kernel(a)vger.kernel.org
Patchwork: https://patchwork.linux-mips.org/patch/17930/
Signed-off-by: Ralf Baechle <ralf(a)linux-mips.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org>
---
arch/mips/kernel/ptrace.c | 3 +++
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
--- a/arch/mips/kernel/ptrace.c
+++ b/arch/mips/kernel/ptrace.c
@@ -530,6 +530,9 @@ static int fpr_set(struct task_struct *t
BUG_ON(count % sizeof(elf_fpreg_t));
+ if (pos + count > sizeof(elf_fpregset_t))
+ return -EIO;
+
if (sizeof(target->thread.fpu.fpr[0]) == sizeof(elf_fpreg_t))
err = fpr_set_fpa(target, &pos, &count, &kbuf, &ubuf);
else
Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from macro(a)mips.com are
queue-3.18/mips-consistently-handle-buffer-counter-with-ptrace_setregset.patch
queue-3.18/mips-disallow-outsized-ptrace_setregset-nt_prfpreg-regset-accesses.patch
queue-3.18/mips-guard-against-any-partial-write-attempt-with-ptrace_setregset.patch
queue-3.18/mips-also-verify-sizeof-elf_fpreg_t-with-ptrace_setregset.patch
queue-3.18/mips-factor-out-nt_prfpreg-regset-access-helpers.patch
queue-3.18/mips-fix-an-fcsr-access-api-regression-with-nt_prfpreg-and-msa.patch
This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled
MIPS: Consistently handle buffer counter with PTRACE_SETREGSET
to the 3.18-stable tree which can be found at:
http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum…
The filename of the patch is:
mips-consistently-handle-buffer-counter-with-ptrace_setregset.patch
and it can be found in the queue-3.18 subdirectory.
If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree,
please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it.
>From 80b3ffce0196ea50068885d085ff981e4b8396f4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: "Maciej W. Rozycki" <macro(a)mips.com>
Date: Mon, 11 Dec 2017 22:53:14 +0000
Subject: MIPS: Consistently handle buffer counter with PTRACE_SETREGSET
From: Maciej W. Rozycki <macro(a)mips.com>
commit 80b3ffce0196ea50068885d085ff981e4b8396f4 upstream.
Update commit d614fd58a283 ("mips/ptrace: Preserve previous registers
for short regset write") bug and consistently consume all data supplied
to `fpr_set_msa' with the ptrace(2) PTRACE_SETREGSET request, such that
a zero data buffer counter is returned where insufficient data has been
given to fill a whole number of FP general registers.
In reality this is not going to happen, as the caller is supposed to
only supply data covering a whole number of registers and it is verified
in `ptrace_regset' and again asserted in `fpr_set', however structuring
code such that the presence of trailing partial FP general register data
causes `fpr_set_msa' to return with a non-zero data buffer counter makes
it appear that this trailing data will be used if there are subsequent
writes made to FP registers, which is going to be the case with the FCSR
once the missing write to that register has been fixed.
Fixes: d614fd58a283 ("mips/ptrace: Preserve previous registers for short regset write")
Signed-off-by: Maciej W. Rozycki <macro(a)mips.com>
Cc: James Hogan <james.hogan(a)mips.com>
Cc: Paul Burton <Paul.Burton(a)mips.com>
Cc: Alex Smith <alex(a)alex-smith.me.uk>
Cc: Dave Martin <Dave.Martin(a)arm.com>
Cc: linux-mips(a)linux-mips.org
Cc: linux-kernel(a)vger.kernel.org
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org # v4.11+
Patchwork: https://patchwork.linux-mips.org/patch/17927/
Signed-off-by: Ralf Baechle <ralf(a)linux-mips.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org>
---
arch/mips/kernel/ptrace.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/arch/mips/kernel/ptrace.c
+++ b/arch/mips/kernel/ptrace.c
@@ -485,7 +485,7 @@ static int fpr_set_msa(struct task_struc
int err;
BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(fpr_val) != sizeof(elf_fpreg_t));
- for (i = 0; i < NUM_FPU_REGS && *count >= sizeof(elf_fpreg_t); i++) {
+ for (i = 0; i < NUM_FPU_REGS && *count > 0; i++) {
err = user_regset_copyin(pos, count, kbuf, ubuf,
&fpr_val, i * sizeof(elf_fpreg_t),
(i + 1) * sizeof(elf_fpreg_t));
Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from macro(a)mips.com are
queue-3.18/mips-consistently-handle-buffer-counter-with-ptrace_setregset.patch
queue-3.18/mips-disallow-outsized-ptrace_setregset-nt_prfpreg-regset-accesses.patch
queue-3.18/mips-guard-against-any-partial-write-attempt-with-ptrace_setregset.patch
queue-3.18/mips-also-verify-sizeof-elf_fpreg_t-with-ptrace_setregset.patch
queue-3.18/mips-factor-out-nt_prfpreg-regset-access-helpers.patch
queue-3.18/mips-fix-an-fcsr-access-api-regression-with-nt_prfpreg-and-msa.patch
This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled
target: Avoid early CMD_T_PRE_EXECUTE failures during ABORT_TASK
to the 4.9-stable tree which can be found at:
http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum…
The filename of the patch is:
target-avoid-early-cmd_t_pre_execute-failures-during-abort_task.patch
and it can be found in the queue-4.9 subdirectory.
If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree,
please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it.
>From 1c21a48055a67ceb693e9c2587824a8de60a217c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Nicholas Bellinger <nab(a)linux-iscsi.org>
Date: Fri, 27 Oct 2017 22:19:26 -0800
Subject: target: Avoid early CMD_T_PRE_EXECUTE failures during ABORT_TASK
From: Nicholas Bellinger <nab(a)linux-iscsi.org>
commit 1c21a48055a67ceb693e9c2587824a8de60a217c upstream.
This patch fixes bug where early se_cmd exceptions that occur
before backend execution can result in use-after-free if/when
a subsequent ABORT_TASK occurs for the same tag.
Since an early se_cmd exception will have had se_cmd added to
se_session->sess_cmd_list via target_get_sess_cmd(), it will
not have CMD_T_COMPLETE set by the usual target_complete_cmd()
backend completion path.
This causes a subsequent ABORT_TASK + __target_check_io_state()
to signal ABORT_TASK should proceed. As core_tmr_abort_task()
executes, it will bring the outstanding se_cmd->cmd_kref count
down to zero releasing se_cmd, after se_cmd has already been
queued with error status into fabric driver response path code.
To address this bug, introduce a CMD_T_PRE_EXECUTE bit that is
set at target_get_sess_cmd() time, and cleared immediately before
backend driver dispatch in target_execute_cmd() once CMD_T_ACTIVE
is set.
Then, check CMD_T_PRE_EXECUTE within __target_check_io_state() to
determine when an early exception has occured, and avoid aborting
this se_cmd since it will have already been queued into fabric
driver response path code.
Reported-by: Donald White <dew(a)datera.io>
Cc: Donald White <dew(a)datera.io>
Cc: Mike Christie <mchristi(a)redhat.com>
Cc: Hannes Reinecke <hare(a)suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Nicholas Bellinger <nab(a)linux-iscsi.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/target/target_core_tmr.c | 9 +++++++++
drivers/target/target_core_transport.c | 2 ++
include/target/target_core_base.h | 1 +
3 files changed, 12 insertions(+)
--- a/drivers/target/target_core_tmr.c
+++ b/drivers/target/target_core_tmr.c
@@ -133,6 +133,15 @@ static bool __target_check_io_state(stru
spin_unlock(&se_cmd->t_state_lock);
return false;
}
+ if (se_cmd->transport_state & CMD_T_PRE_EXECUTE) {
+ if (se_cmd->scsi_status) {
+ pr_debug("Attempted to abort io tag: %llu early failure"
+ " status: 0x%02x\n", se_cmd->tag,
+ se_cmd->scsi_status);
+ spin_unlock(&se_cmd->t_state_lock);
+ return false;
+ }
+ }
if (sess->sess_tearing_down || se_cmd->cmd_wait_set) {
pr_debug("Attempted to abort io tag: %llu already shutdown,"
" skipping\n", se_cmd->tag);
--- a/drivers/target/target_core_transport.c
+++ b/drivers/target/target_core_transport.c
@@ -1939,6 +1939,7 @@ void target_execute_cmd(struct se_cmd *c
}
cmd->t_state = TRANSPORT_PROCESSING;
+ cmd->transport_state &= ~CMD_T_PRE_EXECUTE;
cmd->transport_state |= CMD_T_ACTIVE|CMD_T_BUSY|CMD_T_SENT;
spin_unlock_irq(&cmd->t_state_lock);
@@ -2592,6 +2593,7 @@ int target_get_sess_cmd(struct se_cmd *s
ret = -ESHUTDOWN;
goto out;
}
+ se_cmd->transport_state |= CMD_T_PRE_EXECUTE;
list_add_tail(&se_cmd->se_cmd_list, &se_sess->sess_cmd_list);
out:
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&se_sess->sess_cmd_lock, flags);
--- a/include/target/target_core_base.h
+++ b/include/target/target_core_base.h
@@ -493,6 +493,7 @@ struct se_cmd {
#define CMD_T_BUSY (1 << 9)
#define CMD_T_TAS (1 << 10)
#define CMD_T_FABRIC_STOP (1 << 11)
+#define CMD_T_PRE_EXECUTE (1 << 12)
spinlock_t t_state_lock;
struct kref cmd_kref;
struct completion t_transport_stop_comp;
Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from nab(a)linux-iscsi.org are
queue-4.9/iscsi-target-make-task_reassign-use-proper-se_cmd-cmd_kref.patch
queue-4.9/target-avoid-early-cmd_t_pre_execute-failures-during-abort_task.patch
This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled
iscsi-target: Make TASK_REASSIGN use proper se_cmd->cmd_kref
to the 4.9-stable tree which can be found at:
http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum…
The filename of the patch is:
iscsi-target-make-task_reassign-use-proper-se_cmd-cmd_kref.patch
and it can be found in the queue-4.9 subdirectory.
If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree,
please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it.
>From ae072726f6109bb1c94841d6fb3a82dde298ea85 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Nicholas Bellinger <nab(a)linux-iscsi.org>
Date: Fri, 27 Oct 2017 12:32:59 -0700
Subject: iscsi-target: Make TASK_REASSIGN use proper se_cmd->cmd_kref
From: Nicholas Bellinger <nab(a)linux-iscsi.org>
commit ae072726f6109bb1c94841d6fb3a82dde298ea85 upstream.
Since commit 59b6986dbf fixed a potential NULL pointer dereference
by allocating a se_tmr_req for ISCSI_TM_FUNC_TASK_REASSIGN, the
se_tmr_req is currently leaked by iscsit_free_cmd() because no
iscsi_cmd->se_cmd.se_tfo was associated.
To address this, treat ISCSI_TM_FUNC_TASK_REASSIGN like any other
TMR and call transport_init_se_cmd() + target_get_sess_cmd() to
setup iscsi_cmd->se_cmd.se_tfo with se_cmd->cmd_kref of 2.
This will ensure normal release operation once se_cmd->cmd_kref
reaches zero and target_release_cmd_kref() is invoked, se_tmr_req
will be released via existing target_free_cmd_mem() and
core_tmr_release_req() code.
Reported-by: Donald White <dew(a)datera.io>
Cc: Donald White <dew(a)datera.io>
Cc: Mike Christie <mchristi(a)redhat.com>
Cc: Hannes Reinecke <hare(a)suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Nicholas Bellinger <nab(a)linux-iscsi.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/target/iscsi/iscsi_target.c | 20 +++++++-------------
1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
--- a/drivers/target/iscsi/iscsi_target.c
+++ b/drivers/target/iscsi/iscsi_target.c
@@ -1940,7 +1940,6 @@ iscsit_handle_task_mgt_cmd(struct iscsi_
struct iscsi_tmr_req *tmr_req;
struct iscsi_tm *hdr;
int out_of_order_cmdsn = 0, ret;
- bool sess_ref = false;
u8 function, tcm_function = TMR_UNKNOWN;
hdr = (struct iscsi_tm *) buf;
@@ -1982,18 +1981,17 @@ iscsit_handle_task_mgt_cmd(struct iscsi_
buf);
}
+ transport_init_se_cmd(&cmd->se_cmd, &iscsi_ops,
+ conn->sess->se_sess, 0, DMA_NONE,
+ TCM_SIMPLE_TAG, cmd->sense_buffer + 2);
+
+ target_get_sess_cmd(&cmd->se_cmd, true);
+
/*
* TASK_REASSIGN for ERL=2 / connection stays inside of
* LIO-Target $FABRIC_MOD
*/
if (function != ISCSI_TM_FUNC_TASK_REASSIGN) {
- transport_init_se_cmd(&cmd->se_cmd, &iscsi_ops,
- conn->sess->se_sess, 0, DMA_NONE,
- TCM_SIMPLE_TAG, cmd->sense_buffer + 2);
-
- target_get_sess_cmd(&cmd->se_cmd, true);
- sess_ref = true;
-
switch (function) {
case ISCSI_TM_FUNC_ABORT_TASK:
tcm_function = TMR_ABORT_TASK;
@@ -2132,12 +2130,8 @@ attach:
* For connection recovery, this is also the default action for
* TMR TASK_REASSIGN.
*/
- if (sess_ref) {
- pr_debug("Handle TMR, using sess_ref=true check\n");
- target_put_sess_cmd(&cmd->se_cmd);
- }
-
iscsit_add_cmd_to_response_queue(cmd, conn, cmd->i_state);
+ target_put_sess_cmd(&cmd->se_cmd);
return 0;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(iscsit_handle_task_mgt_cmd);
Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from nab(a)linux-iscsi.org are
queue-4.9/iscsi-target-make-task_reassign-use-proper-se_cmd-cmd_kref.patch
queue-4.9/target-avoid-early-cmd_t_pre_execute-failures-during-abort_task.patch
From: Nicholas Bellinger <nab(a)linux-iscsi.org>
Hi Greg-KH,
Here are two target patches for v4.9.y stable, which did not apply
due to minor context changes.
The series has been cut against v4.9.76. Please apply at your earliest
convenience.
Thank you,
--nab
Nicholas Bellinger (2):
iscsi-target: Make TASK_REASSIGN use proper se_cmd->cmd_kref
target: Avoid early CMD_T_PRE_EXECUTE failures during ABORT_TASK
drivers/target/iscsi/iscsi_target.c | 20 +++++++-------------
drivers/target/target_core_tmr.c | 9 +++++++++
drivers/target/target_core_transport.c | 2 ++
include/target/target_core_base.h | 1 +
4 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
--
1.8.5.3
This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled
target: Avoid early CMD_T_PRE_EXECUTE failures during ABORT_TASK
to the 4.4-stable tree which can be found at:
http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum…
The filename of the patch is:
target-avoid-early-cmd_t_pre_execute-failures-during-abort_task.patch
and it can be found in the queue-4.4 subdirectory.
If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree,
please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it.
>From 1c21a48055a67ceb693e9c2587824a8de60a217c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Nicholas Bellinger <nab(a)linux-iscsi.org>
Date: Fri, 27 Oct 2017 22:19:26 -0800
Subject: target: Avoid early CMD_T_PRE_EXECUTE failures during ABORT_TASK
From: Nicholas Bellinger <nab(a)linux-iscsi.org>
commit 1c21a48055a67ceb693e9c2587824a8de60a217c upstream.
This patch fixes bug where early se_cmd exceptions that occur
before backend execution can result in use-after-free if/when
a subsequent ABORT_TASK occurs for the same tag.
Since an early se_cmd exception will have had se_cmd added to
se_session->sess_cmd_list via target_get_sess_cmd(), it will
not have CMD_T_COMPLETE set by the usual target_complete_cmd()
backend completion path.
This causes a subsequent ABORT_TASK + __target_check_io_state()
to signal ABORT_TASK should proceed. As core_tmr_abort_task()
executes, it will bring the outstanding se_cmd->cmd_kref count
down to zero releasing se_cmd, after se_cmd has already been
queued with error status into fabric driver response path code.
To address this bug, introduce a CMD_T_PRE_EXECUTE bit that is
set at target_get_sess_cmd() time, and cleared immediately before
backend driver dispatch in target_execute_cmd() once CMD_T_ACTIVE
is set.
Then, check CMD_T_PRE_EXECUTE within __target_check_io_state() to
determine when an early exception has occured, and avoid aborting
this se_cmd since it will have already been queued into fabric
driver response path code.
Reported-by: Donald White <dew(a)datera.io>
Cc: Donald White <dew(a)datera.io>
Cc: Mike Christie <mchristi(a)redhat.com>
Cc: Hannes Reinecke <hare(a)suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Nicholas Bellinger <nab(a)linux-iscsi.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/target/target_core_tmr.c | 9 +++++++++
drivers/target/target_core_transport.c | 2 ++
include/target/target_core_base.h | 1 +
3 files changed, 12 insertions(+)
--- a/drivers/target/target_core_tmr.c
+++ b/drivers/target/target_core_tmr.c
@@ -133,6 +133,15 @@ static bool __target_check_io_state(stru
spin_unlock(&se_cmd->t_state_lock);
return false;
}
+ if (se_cmd->transport_state & CMD_T_PRE_EXECUTE) {
+ if (se_cmd->scsi_status) {
+ pr_debug("Attempted to abort io tag: %llu early failure"
+ " status: 0x%02x\n", se_cmd->tag,
+ se_cmd->scsi_status);
+ spin_unlock(&se_cmd->t_state_lock);
+ return false;
+ }
+ }
if (sess->sess_tearing_down || se_cmd->cmd_wait_set) {
pr_debug("Attempted to abort io tag: %llu already shutdown,"
" skipping\n", se_cmd->tag);
--- a/drivers/target/target_core_transport.c
+++ b/drivers/target/target_core_transport.c
@@ -1933,6 +1933,7 @@ void target_execute_cmd(struct se_cmd *c
}
cmd->t_state = TRANSPORT_PROCESSING;
+ cmd->transport_state &= ~CMD_T_PRE_EXECUTE;
cmd->transport_state |= CMD_T_ACTIVE|CMD_T_BUSY|CMD_T_SENT;
spin_unlock_irq(&cmd->t_state_lock);
@@ -2572,6 +2573,7 @@ int target_get_sess_cmd(struct se_cmd *s
ret = -ESHUTDOWN;
goto out;
}
+ se_cmd->transport_state |= CMD_T_PRE_EXECUTE;
list_add_tail(&se_cmd->se_cmd_list, &se_sess->sess_cmd_list);
out:
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&se_sess->sess_cmd_lock, flags);
--- a/include/target/target_core_base.h
+++ b/include/target/target_core_base.h
@@ -496,6 +496,7 @@ struct se_cmd {
#define CMD_T_BUSY (1 << 9)
#define CMD_T_TAS (1 << 10)
#define CMD_T_FABRIC_STOP (1 << 11)
+#define CMD_T_PRE_EXECUTE (1 << 12)
spinlock_t t_state_lock;
struct kref cmd_kref;
struct completion t_transport_stop_comp;
Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from nab(a)linux-iscsi.org are
queue-4.4/iscsi-target-make-task_reassign-use-proper-se_cmd-cmd_kref.patch
queue-4.4/target-avoid-early-cmd_t_pre_execute-failures-during-abort_task.patch
This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled
iscsi-target: Make TASK_REASSIGN use proper se_cmd->cmd_kref
to the 4.4-stable tree which can be found at:
http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum…
The filename of the patch is:
iscsi-target-make-task_reassign-use-proper-se_cmd-cmd_kref.patch
and it can be found in the queue-4.4 subdirectory.
If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree,
please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it.
>From ae072726f6109bb1c94841d6fb3a82dde298ea85 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Nicholas Bellinger <nab(a)linux-iscsi.org>
Date: Fri, 27 Oct 2017 12:32:59 -0700
Subject: iscsi-target: Make TASK_REASSIGN use proper se_cmd->cmd_kref
From: Nicholas Bellinger <nab(a)linux-iscsi.org>
commit ae072726f6109bb1c94841d6fb3a82dde298ea85 upstream.
Since commit 59b6986dbf fixed a potential NULL pointer dereference
by allocating a se_tmr_req for ISCSI_TM_FUNC_TASK_REASSIGN, the
se_tmr_req is currently leaked by iscsit_free_cmd() because no
iscsi_cmd->se_cmd.se_tfo was associated.
To address this, treat ISCSI_TM_FUNC_TASK_REASSIGN like any other
TMR and call transport_init_se_cmd() + target_get_sess_cmd() to
setup iscsi_cmd->se_cmd.se_tfo with se_cmd->cmd_kref of 2.
This will ensure normal release operation once se_cmd->cmd_kref
reaches zero and target_release_cmd_kref() is invoked, se_tmr_req
will be released via existing target_free_cmd_mem() and
core_tmr_release_req() code.
Reported-by: Donald White <dew(a)datera.io>
Cc: Donald White <dew(a)datera.io>
Cc: Mike Christie <mchristi(a)redhat.com>
Cc: Hannes Reinecke <hare(a)suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Nicholas Bellinger <nab(a)linux-iscsi.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/target/iscsi/iscsi_target.c | 20 +++++++-------------
1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
--- a/drivers/target/iscsi/iscsi_target.c
+++ b/drivers/target/iscsi/iscsi_target.c
@@ -1759,7 +1759,6 @@ iscsit_handle_task_mgt_cmd(struct iscsi_
struct iscsi_tmr_req *tmr_req;
struct iscsi_tm *hdr;
int out_of_order_cmdsn = 0, ret;
- bool sess_ref = false;
u8 function, tcm_function = TMR_UNKNOWN;
hdr = (struct iscsi_tm *) buf;
@@ -1801,18 +1800,17 @@ iscsit_handle_task_mgt_cmd(struct iscsi_
buf);
}
+ transport_init_se_cmd(&cmd->se_cmd, &iscsi_ops,
+ conn->sess->se_sess, 0, DMA_NONE,
+ TCM_SIMPLE_TAG, cmd->sense_buffer + 2);
+
+ target_get_sess_cmd(&cmd->se_cmd, true);
+
/*
* TASK_REASSIGN for ERL=2 / connection stays inside of
* LIO-Target $FABRIC_MOD
*/
if (function != ISCSI_TM_FUNC_TASK_REASSIGN) {
- transport_init_se_cmd(&cmd->se_cmd, &iscsi_ops,
- conn->sess->se_sess, 0, DMA_NONE,
- TCM_SIMPLE_TAG, cmd->sense_buffer + 2);
-
- target_get_sess_cmd(&cmd->se_cmd, true);
- sess_ref = true;
-
switch (function) {
case ISCSI_TM_FUNC_ABORT_TASK:
tcm_function = TMR_ABORT_TASK;
@@ -1951,12 +1949,8 @@ attach:
* For connection recovery, this is also the default action for
* TMR TASK_REASSIGN.
*/
- if (sess_ref) {
- pr_debug("Handle TMR, using sess_ref=true check\n");
- target_put_sess_cmd(&cmd->se_cmd);
- }
-
iscsit_add_cmd_to_response_queue(cmd, conn, cmd->i_state);
+ target_put_sess_cmd(&cmd->se_cmd);
return 0;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(iscsit_handle_task_mgt_cmd);
Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from nab(a)linux-iscsi.org are
queue-4.4/iscsi-target-make-task_reassign-use-proper-se_cmd-cmd_kref.patch
queue-4.4/target-avoid-early-cmd_t_pre_execute-failures-during-abort_task.patch
From: Nicholas Bellinger <nab(a)linux-iscsi.org>
Hi Greg-KH,
Here are two target patches for v4.4.y stable, which did not apply
due to minor context changes.
The series has been cut against v4.4.111. Please apply at your earliest
convenience.
Thank you,
--nab
Nicholas Bellinger (2):
iscsi-target: Make TASK_REASSIGN use proper se_cmd->cmd_kref
target: Avoid early CMD_T_PRE_EXECUTE failures during ABORT_TASK
drivers/target/iscsi/iscsi_target.c | 20 +++++++-------------
drivers/target/target_core_tmr.c | 9 +++++++++
drivers/target/target_core_transport.c | 2 ++
include/target/target_core_base.h | 1 +
4 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
--
1.8.5.3
From: Nicholas Bellinger <nab(a)linux-iscsi.org>
Hi Greg-KH,
Here are two target patches for v3.18.y stable, which did not apply
due to minor context changes.
The series has been cut against v3.18.91. Please apply at your earliest
convenience.
Thank you,
--nab
Nicholas Bellinger (2):
iscsi-target: Make TASK_REASSIGN use proper se_cmd->cmd_kref
target: Avoid early CMD_T_PRE_EXECUTE failures during ABORT_TASK
drivers/target/iscsi/iscsi_target.c | 21 +++++++--------------
drivers/target/target_core_tmr.c | 9 +++++++++
drivers/target/target_core_transport.c | 2 ++
include/target/target_core_base.h | 1 +
4 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
--
1.8.5.3
This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled
target: Avoid early CMD_T_PRE_EXECUTE failures during ABORT_TASK
to the 3.18-stable tree which can be found at:
http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum…
The filename of the patch is:
target-avoid-early-cmd_t_pre_execute-failures-during-abort_task.patch
and it can be found in the queue-3.18 subdirectory.
If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree,
please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it.
>From 1c21a48055a67ceb693e9c2587824a8de60a217c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Nicholas Bellinger <nab(a)linux-iscsi.org>
Date: Fri, 27 Oct 2017 22:19:26 -0800
Subject: target: Avoid early CMD_T_PRE_EXECUTE failures during ABORT_TASK
From: Nicholas Bellinger <nab(a)linux-iscsi.org>
commit 1c21a48055a67ceb693e9c2587824a8de60a217c upstream.
This patch fixes bug where early se_cmd exceptions that occur
before backend execution can result in use-after-free if/when
a subsequent ABORT_TASK occurs for the same tag.
Since an early se_cmd exception will have had se_cmd added to
se_session->sess_cmd_list via target_get_sess_cmd(), it will
not have CMD_T_COMPLETE set by the usual target_complete_cmd()
backend completion path.
This causes a subsequent ABORT_TASK + __target_check_io_state()
to signal ABORT_TASK should proceed. As core_tmr_abort_task()
executes, it will bring the outstanding se_cmd->cmd_kref count
down to zero releasing se_cmd, after se_cmd has already been
queued with error status into fabric driver response path code.
To address this bug, introduce a CMD_T_PRE_EXECUTE bit that is
set at target_get_sess_cmd() time, and cleared immediately before
backend driver dispatch in target_execute_cmd() once CMD_T_ACTIVE
is set.
Then, check CMD_T_PRE_EXECUTE within __target_check_io_state() to
determine when an early exception has occured, and avoid aborting
this se_cmd since it will have already been queued into fabric
driver response path code.
Reported-by: Donald White <dew(a)datera.io>
Cc: Donald White <dew(a)datera.io>
Cc: Mike Christie <mchristi(a)redhat.com>
Cc: Hannes Reinecke <hare(a)suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Nicholas Bellinger <nab(a)linux-iscsi.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/target/target_core_tmr.c | 9 +++++++++
drivers/target/target_core_transport.c | 2 ++
include/target/target_core_base.h | 1 +
3 files changed, 12 insertions(+)
--- a/drivers/target/target_core_tmr.c
+++ b/drivers/target/target_core_tmr.c
@@ -137,6 +137,15 @@ static bool __target_check_io_state(stru
spin_unlock(&se_cmd->t_state_lock);
return false;
}
+ if (se_cmd->transport_state & CMD_T_PRE_EXECUTE) {
+ if (se_cmd->scsi_status) {
+ pr_debug("Attempted to abort io tag: %u early failure"
+ " status: 0x%02x\n", se_cmd->se_tfo->get_task_tag(se_cmd),
+ se_cmd->scsi_status);
+ spin_unlock(&se_cmd->t_state_lock);
+ return false;
+ }
+ }
if (sess->sess_tearing_down || se_cmd->cmd_wait_set) {
pr_debug("Attempted to abort io tag: %u already shutdown,"
" skipping\n", se_cmd->se_tfo->get_task_tag(se_cmd));
--- a/drivers/target/target_core_transport.c
+++ b/drivers/target/target_core_transport.c
@@ -1796,6 +1796,7 @@ void target_execute_cmd(struct se_cmd *c
}
cmd->t_state = TRANSPORT_PROCESSING;
+ cmd->transport_state &= ~CMD_T_PRE_EXECUTE;
cmd->transport_state |= CMD_T_ACTIVE|CMD_T_BUSY|CMD_T_SENT;
spin_unlock_irq(&cmd->t_state_lock);
/*
@@ -2436,6 +2437,7 @@ int target_get_sess_cmd(struct se_cmd *s
ret = -ESHUTDOWN;
goto out;
}
+ se_cmd->transport_state |= CMD_T_PRE_EXECUTE;
list_add_tail(&se_cmd->se_cmd_list, &se_sess->sess_cmd_list);
out:
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&se_sess->sess_cmd_lock, flags);
--- a/include/target/target_core_base.h
+++ b/include/target/target_core_base.h
@@ -538,6 +538,7 @@ struct se_cmd {
#define CMD_T_BUSY (1 << 9)
#define CMD_T_TAS (1 << 10)
#define CMD_T_FABRIC_STOP (1 << 11)
+#define CMD_T_PRE_EXECUTE (1 << 12)
spinlock_t t_state_lock;
struct completion t_transport_stop_comp;
Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from nab(a)linux-iscsi.org are
queue-3.18/iscsi-target-make-task_reassign-use-proper-se_cmd-cmd_kref.patch
queue-3.18/target-avoid-early-cmd_t_pre_execute-failures-during-abort_task.patch
This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled
iscsi-target: Make TASK_REASSIGN use proper se_cmd->cmd_kref
to the 3.18-stable tree which can be found at:
http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum…
The filename of the patch is:
iscsi-target-make-task_reassign-use-proper-se_cmd-cmd_kref.patch
and it can be found in the queue-3.18 subdirectory.
If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree,
please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it.
>From ae072726f6109bb1c94841d6fb3a82dde298ea85 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Nicholas Bellinger <nab(a)linux-iscsi.org>
Date: Fri, 27 Oct 2017 12:32:59 -0700
Subject: iscsi-target: Make TASK_REASSIGN use proper se_cmd->cmd_kref
From: Nicholas Bellinger <nab(a)linux-iscsi.org>
commit ae072726f6109bb1c94841d6fb3a82dde298ea85 upstream.
Since commit 59b6986dbf fixed a potential NULL pointer dereference
by allocating a se_tmr_req for ISCSI_TM_FUNC_TASK_REASSIGN, the
se_tmr_req is currently leaked by iscsit_free_cmd() because no
iscsi_cmd->se_cmd.se_tfo was associated.
To address this, treat ISCSI_TM_FUNC_TASK_REASSIGN like any other
TMR and call transport_init_se_cmd() + target_get_sess_cmd() to
setup iscsi_cmd->se_cmd.se_tfo with se_cmd->cmd_kref of 2.
This will ensure normal release operation once se_cmd->cmd_kref
reaches zero and target_release_cmd_kref() is invoked, se_tmr_req
will be released via existing target_free_cmd_mem() and
core_tmr_release_req() code.
Reported-by: Donald White <dew(a)datera.io>
Cc: Donald White <dew(a)datera.io>
Cc: Mike Christie <mchristi(a)redhat.com>
Cc: Hannes Reinecke <hare(a)suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Nicholas Bellinger <nab(a)linux-iscsi.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/target/iscsi/iscsi_target.c | 21 +++++++--------------
1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
--- a/drivers/target/iscsi/iscsi_target.c
+++ b/drivers/target/iscsi/iscsi_target.c
@@ -1750,7 +1750,6 @@ iscsit_handle_task_mgt_cmd(struct iscsi_
struct iscsi_tmr_req *tmr_req;
struct iscsi_tm *hdr;
int out_of_order_cmdsn = 0, ret;
- bool sess_ref = false;
u8 function, tcm_function = TMR_UNKNOWN;
hdr = (struct iscsi_tm *) buf;
@@ -1792,19 +1791,17 @@ iscsit_handle_task_mgt_cmd(struct iscsi_
buf);
}
+ transport_init_se_cmd(&cmd->se_cmd, &lio_target_fabric_configfs->tf_ops,
+ conn->sess->se_sess, 0, DMA_NONE,
+ MSG_SIMPLE_TAG, cmd->sense_buffer + 2);
+
+ target_get_sess_cmd(&cmd->se_cmd, true);
+
/*
* TASK_REASSIGN for ERL=2 / connection stays inside of
* LIO-Target $FABRIC_MOD
*/
if (function != ISCSI_TM_FUNC_TASK_REASSIGN) {
- transport_init_se_cmd(&cmd->se_cmd,
- &lio_target_fabric_configfs->tf_ops,
- conn->sess->se_sess, 0, DMA_NONE,
- MSG_SIMPLE_TAG, cmd->sense_buffer + 2);
-
- target_get_sess_cmd(&cmd->se_cmd, true);
- sess_ref = true;
-
switch (function) {
case ISCSI_TM_FUNC_ABORT_TASK:
tcm_function = TMR_ABORT_TASK;
@@ -1943,12 +1940,8 @@ attach:
* For connection recovery, this is also the default action for
* TMR TASK_REASSIGN.
*/
- if (sess_ref) {
- pr_debug("Handle TMR, using sess_ref=true check\n");
- target_put_sess_cmd(&cmd->se_cmd);
- }
-
iscsit_add_cmd_to_response_queue(cmd, conn, cmd->i_state);
+ target_put_sess_cmd(&cmd->se_cmd);
return 0;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(iscsit_handle_task_mgt_cmd);
Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from nab(a)linux-iscsi.org are
queue-3.18/iscsi-target-make-task_reassign-use-proper-se_cmd-cmd_kref.patch
queue-3.18/target-avoid-early-cmd_t_pre_execute-failures-during-abort_task.patch
This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled
bpf, array: fix overflow in max_entries and undefined behavior in index_mask
to the 4.14-stable tree which can be found at:
http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum…
The filename of the patch is:
bpf-array-fix-overflow-in-max_entries-and-undefined-behavior-in-index_mask.patch
and it can be found in the queue-4.14 subdirectory.
If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree,
please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it.
>From bbeb6e4323dad9b5e0ee9f60c223dd532e2403b1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daniel Borkmann <daniel(a)iogearbox.net>
Date: Wed, 10 Jan 2018 23:25:05 +0100
Subject: bpf, array: fix overflow in max_entries and undefined behavior in index_mask
From: Daniel Borkmann <daniel(a)iogearbox.net>
commit bbeb6e4323dad9b5e0ee9f60c223dd532e2403b1 upstream.
syzkaller tried to alloc a map with 0xfffffffd entries out of a userns,
and thus unprivileged. With the recently added logic in b2157399cc98
("bpf: prevent out-of-bounds speculation") we round this up to the next
power of two value for max_entries for unprivileged such that we can
apply proper masking into potentially zeroed out map slots.
However, this will generate an index_mask of 0xffffffff, and therefore
a + 1 will let this overflow into new max_entries of 0. This will pass
allocation, etc, and later on map access we still enforce on the original
attr->max_entries value which was 0xfffffffd, therefore triggering GPF
all over the place. Thus bail out on overflow in such case.
Moreover, on 32 bit archs roundup_pow_of_two() can also not be used,
since fls_long(max_entries - 1) can result in 32 and 1UL << 32 in 32 bit
space is undefined. Therefore, do this by hand in a 64 bit variable.
This fixes all the issues triggered by syzkaller's reproducers.
Fixes: b2157399cc98 ("bpf: prevent out-of-bounds speculation")
Reported-by: syzbot+b0efb8e572d01bce1ae0(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Reported-by: syzbot+6c15e9744f75f2364773(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Reported-by: syzbot+d2f5524fb46fd3b312ee(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Reported-by: syzbot+61d23c95395cc90dbc2b(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Reported-by: syzbot+0d363c942452cca68c01(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel(a)iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast(a)kernel.org>
Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby(a)suse.cz>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet(a)gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org>
---
kernel/bpf/arraymap.c | 18 +++++++++++++++---
1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
--- a/kernel/bpf/arraymap.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/arraymap.c
@@ -53,7 +53,7 @@ static struct bpf_map *array_map_alloc(u
u32 elem_size, index_mask, max_entries;
bool unpriv = !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN);
struct bpf_array *array;
- u64 array_size;
+ u64 array_size, mask64;
/* check sanity of attributes */
if (attr->max_entries == 0 || attr->key_size != 4 ||
@@ -70,13 +70,25 @@ static struct bpf_map *array_map_alloc(u
elem_size = round_up(attr->value_size, 8);
max_entries = attr->max_entries;
- index_mask = roundup_pow_of_two(max_entries) - 1;
- if (unpriv)
+ /* On 32 bit archs roundup_pow_of_two() with max_entries that has
+ * upper most bit set in u32 space is undefined behavior due to
+ * resulting 1U << 32, so do it manually here in u64 space.
+ */
+ mask64 = fls_long(max_entries - 1);
+ mask64 = 1ULL << mask64;
+ mask64 -= 1;
+
+ index_mask = mask64;
+ if (unpriv) {
/* round up array size to nearest power of 2,
* since cpu will speculate within index_mask limits
*/
max_entries = index_mask + 1;
+ /* Check for overflows. */
+ if (max_entries < attr->max_entries)
+ return ERR_PTR(-E2BIG);
+ }
array_size = sizeof(*array);
if (percpu)
Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from daniel(a)iogearbox.net are
queue-4.14/bpf-array-fix-overflow-in-max_entries-and-undefined-behavior-in-index_mask.patch
queue-4.14/bpf-prevent-out-of-bounds-speculation.patch
queue-4.14/bpf-arsh-is-not-supported-in-32-bit-alu-thus-reject-it.patch
This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled
bpf: arsh is not supported in 32 bit alu thus reject it
to the 4.14-stable tree which can be found at:
http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum…
The filename of the patch is:
bpf-arsh-is-not-supported-in-32-bit-alu-thus-reject-it.patch
and it can be found in the queue-4.14 subdirectory.
If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree,
please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it.
>From 7891a87efc7116590eaba57acc3c422487802c6f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daniel Borkmann <daniel(a)iogearbox.net>
Date: Wed, 10 Jan 2018 20:04:37 +0100
Subject: bpf: arsh is not supported in 32 bit alu thus reject it
From: Daniel Borkmann <daniel(a)iogearbox.net>
commit 7891a87efc7116590eaba57acc3c422487802c6f upstream.
The following snippet was throwing an 'unknown opcode cc' warning
in BPF interpreter:
0: (18) r0 = 0x0
2: (7b) *(u64 *)(r10 -16) = r0
3: (cc) (u32) r0 s>>= (u32) r0
4: (95) exit
Although a number of JITs do support BPF_ALU | BPF_ARSH | BPF_{K,X}
generation, not all of them do and interpreter does neither. We can
leave existing ones and implement it later in bpf-next for the
remaining ones, but reject this properly in verifier for the time
being.
Fixes: 17a5267067f3 ("bpf: verifier (add verifier core)")
Reported-by: syzbot+93c4904c5c70348a6890(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel(a)iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast(a)kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org>
---
kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 5 +++
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_verifier.c | 40 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
2 files changed, 45 insertions(+)
--- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
@@ -2493,6 +2493,11 @@ static int check_alu_op(struct bpf_verif
return -EINVAL;
}
+ if (opcode == BPF_ARSH && BPF_CLASS(insn->code) != BPF_ALU64) {
+ verbose("BPF_ARSH not supported for 32 bit ALU\n");
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
if ((opcode == BPF_LSH || opcode == BPF_RSH ||
opcode == BPF_ARSH) && BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_K) {
int size = BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_ALU64 ? 64 : 32;
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_verifier.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_verifier.c
@@ -273,6 +273,46 @@ static struct bpf_test tests[] = {
.result = REJECT,
},
{
+ "arsh32 on imm",
+ .insns = {
+ BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 1),
+ BPF_ALU32_IMM(BPF_ARSH, BPF_REG_0, 5),
+ BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
+ },
+ .result = REJECT,
+ .errstr = "BPF_ARSH not supported for 32 bit ALU",
+ },
+ {
+ "arsh32 on reg",
+ .insns = {
+ BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 1),
+ BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_1, 5),
+ BPF_ALU32_REG(BPF_ARSH, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_1),
+ BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
+ },
+ .result = REJECT,
+ .errstr = "BPF_ARSH not supported for 32 bit ALU",
+ },
+ {
+ "arsh64 on imm",
+ .insns = {
+ BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 1),
+ BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ARSH, BPF_REG_0, 5),
+ BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
+ },
+ .result = ACCEPT,
+ },
+ {
+ "arsh64 on reg",
+ .insns = {
+ BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 1),
+ BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_1, 5),
+ BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_ARSH, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_1),
+ BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
+ },
+ .result = ACCEPT,
+ },
+ {
"no bpf_exit",
.insns = {
BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_MOV, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_2),
Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from daniel(a)iogearbox.net are
queue-4.14/bpf-array-fix-overflow-in-max_entries-and-undefined-behavior-in-index_mask.patch
queue-4.14/bpf-prevent-out-of-bounds-speculation.patch
queue-4.14/bpf-arsh-is-not-supported-in-32-bit-alu-thus-reject-it.patch
This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled
bpf: refactor fixup_bpf_calls()
to the 4.9-stable tree which can be found at:
http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum…
The filename of the patch is:
bpf-refactor-fixup_bpf_calls.patch
and it can be found in the queue-4.9 subdirectory.
If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree,
please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it.
>From 79741b3bdec01a8628368fbcfccc7d189ed606cb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Alexei Starovoitov <ast(a)fb.com>
Date: Wed, 15 Mar 2017 18:26:40 -0700
Subject: bpf: refactor fixup_bpf_calls()
From: Alexei Starovoitov <ast(a)fb.com>
commit 79741b3bdec01a8628368fbcfccc7d189ed606cb upstream.
reduce indent and make it iterate over instructions similar to
convert_ctx_accesses(). Also convert hard BUG_ON into soft verifier error.
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast(a)kernel.org>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel(a)iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem(a)davemloft.net>
Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby(a)suse.cz>
[Backported to 4.9.y - gregkh]
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org>
---
kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 75 +++++++++++++++++++++++---------------------------
1 file changed, 35 insertions(+), 40 deletions(-)
--- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
@@ -3362,55 +3362,50 @@ static int convert_ctx_accesses(struct b
return 0;
}
-/* fixup insn->imm field of bpf_call instructions:
- * if (insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem)
- * insn->imm = bpf_map_lookup_elem - __bpf_call_base;
- * else if (insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_map_update_elem)
- * insn->imm = bpf_map_update_elem - __bpf_call_base;
- * else ...
+/* fixup insn->imm field of bpf_call instructions
*
* this function is called after eBPF program passed verification
*/
-static void fixup_bpf_calls(struct bpf_prog *prog)
+static int fixup_bpf_calls(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
{
+ struct bpf_prog *prog = env->prog;
+ struct bpf_insn *insn = prog->insnsi;
const struct bpf_func_proto *fn;
+ const int insn_cnt = prog->len;
int i;
- for (i = 0; i < prog->len; i++) {
- struct bpf_insn *insn = &prog->insnsi[i];
-
- if (insn->code == (BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL)) {
- /* we reach here when program has bpf_call instructions
- * and it passed bpf_check(), means that
- * ops->get_func_proto must have been supplied, check it
- */
- BUG_ON(!prog->aux->ops->get_func_proto);
-
- if (insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_get_route_realm)
- prog->dst_needed = 1;
- if (insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_get_prandom_u32)
- bpf_user_rnd_init_once();
- if (insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_tail_call) {
- /* mark bpf_tail_call as different opcode
- * to avoid conditional branch in
- * interpeter for every normal call
- * and to prevent accidental JITing by
- * JIT compiler that doesn't support
- * bpf_tail_call yet
- */
- insn->imm = 0;
- insn->code |= BPF_X;
- continue;
- }
+ for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++, insn++) {
+ if (insn->code != (BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL))
+ continue;
+
+ if (insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_get_route_realm)
+ prog->dst_needed = 1;
+ if (insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_get_prandom_u32)
+ bpf_user_rnd_init_once();
+ if (insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_tail_call) {
+ /* mark bpf_tail_call as different opcode to avoid
+ * conditional branch in the interpeter for every normal
+ * call and to prevent accidental JITing by JIT compiler
+ * that doesn't support bpf_tail_call yet
+ */
+ insn->imm = 0;
+ insn->code |= BPF_X;
+ continue;
+ }
- fn = prog->aux->ops->get_func_proto(insn->imm);
- /* all functions that have prototype and verifier allowed
- * programs to call them, must be real in-kernel functions
- */
- BUG_ON(!fn->func);
- insn->imm = fn->func - __bpf_call_base;
+ fn = prog->aux->ops->get_func_proto(insn->imm);
+ /* all functions that have prototype and verifier allowed
+ * programs to call them, must be real in-kernel functions
+ */
+ if (!fn->func) {
+ verbose("kernel subsystem misconfigured func %d\n",
+ insn->imm);
+ return -EFAULT;
}
+ insn->imm = fn->func - __bpf_call_base;
}
+
+ return 0;
}
static void free_states(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
@@ -3515,7 +3510,7 @@ skip_full_check:
ret = convert_ctx_accesses(env);
if (ret == 0)
- fixup_bpf_calls(env->prog);
+ ret = fixup_bpf_calls(env);
if (log_level && log_len >= log_size - 1) {
BUG_ON(log_len >= log_size);
Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from ast(a)fb.com are
queue-4.9/bpf-refactor-fixup_bpf_calls.patch
queue-4.9/bpf-move-fixup_bpf_calls-function.patch
This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled
bpf: move fixup_bpf_calls() function
to the 4.9-stable tree which can be found at:
http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum…
The filename of the patch is:
bpf-move-fixup_bpf_calls-function.patch
and it can be found in the queue-4.9 subdirectory.
If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree,
please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it.
>From e245c5c6a5656e4d61aa7bb08e9694fd6e5b2b9d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Alexei Starovoitov <ast(a)fb.com>
Date: Wed, 15 Mar 2017 18:26:39 -0700
Subject: bpf: move fixup_bpf_calls() function
From: Alexei Starovoitov <ast(a)fb.com>
commit e245c5c6a5656e4d61aa7bb08e9694fd6e5b2b9d upstream.
no functional change.
move fixup_bpf_calls() to verifier.c
it's being refactored in the next patch
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast(a)kernel.org>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel(a)iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem(a)davemloft.net>
Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby(a)suse.cz>
[backported to 4.9 - gregkh]
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org>
---
kernel/bpf/syscall.c | 54 --------------------------------------------------
kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 54 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
2 files changed, 54 insertions(+), 54 deletions(-)
--- a/kernel/bpf/syscall.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/syscall.c
@@ -565,57 +565,6 @@ void bpf_register_prog_type(struct bpf_p
list_add(&tl->list_node, &bpf_prog_types);
}
-/* fixup insn->imm field of bpf_call instructions:
- * if (insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem)
- * insn->imm = bpf_map_lookup_elem - __bpf_call_base;
- * else if (insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_map_update_elem)
- * insn->imm = bpf_map_update_elem - __bpf_call_base;
- * else ...
- *
- * this function is called after eBPF program passed verification
- */
-static void fixup_bpf_calls(struct bpf_prog *prog)
-{
- const struct bpf_func_proto *fn;
- int i;
-
- for (i = 0; i < prog->len; i++) {
- struct bpf_insn *insn = &prog->insnsi[i];
-
- if (insn->code == (BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL)) {
- /* we reach here when program has bpf_call instructions
- * and it passed bpf_check(), means that
- * ops->get_func_proto must have been supplied, check it
- */
- BUG_ON(!prog->aux->ops->get_func_proto);
-
- if (insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_get_route_realm)
- prog->dst_needed = 1;
- if (insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_get_prandom_u32)
- bpf_user_rnd_init_once();
- if (insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_tail_call) {
- /* mark bpf_tail_call as different opcode
- * to avoid conditional branch in
- * interpeter for every normal call
- * and to prevent accidental JITing by
- * JIT compiler that doesn't support
- * bpf_tail_call yet
- */
- insn->imm = 0;
- insn->code |= BPF_X;
- continue;
- }
-
- fn = prog->aux->ops->get_func_proto(insn->imm);
- /* all functions that have prototype and verifier allowed
- * programs to call them, must be real in-kernel functions
- */
- BUG_ON(!fn->func);
- insn->imm = fn->func - __bpf_call_base;
- }
- }
-}
-
/* drop refcnt on maps used by eBPF program and free auxilary data */
static void free_used_maps(struct bpf_prog_aux *aux)
{
@@ -808,9 +757,6 @@ static int bpf_prog_load(union bpf_attr
if (err < 0)
goto free_used_maps;
- /* fixup BPF_CALL->imm field */
- fixup_bpf_calls(prog);
-
/* eBPF program is ready to be JITed */
prog = bpf_prog_select_runtime(prog, &err);
if (err < 0)
--- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
@@ -3362,6 +3362,57 @@ static int convert_ctx_accesses(struct b
return 0;
}
+/* fixup insn->imm field of bpf_call instructions:
+ * if (insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem)
+ * insn->imm = bpf_map_lookup_elem - __bpf_call_base;
+ * else if (insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_map_update_elem)
+ * insn->imm = bpf_map_update_elem - __bpf_call_base;
+ * else ...
+ *
+ * this function is called after eBPF program passed verification
+ */
+static void fixup_bpf_calls(struct bpf_prog *prog)
+{
+ const struct bpf_func_proto *fn;
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < prog->len; i++) {
+ struct bpf_insn *insn = &prog->insnsi[i];
+
+ if (insn->code == (BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL)) {
+ /* we reach here when program has bpf_call instructions
+ * and it passed bpf_check(), means that
+ * ops->get_func_proto must have been supplied, check it
+ */
+ BUG_ON(!prog->aux->ops->get_func_proto);
+
+ if (insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_get_route_realm)
+ prog->dst_needed = 1;
+ if (insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_get_prandom_u32)
+ bpf_user_rnd_init_once();
+ if (insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_tail_call) {
+ /* mark bpf_tail_call as different opcode
+ * to avoid conditional branch in
+ * interpeter for every normal call
+ * and to prevent accidental JITing by
+ * JIT compiler that doesn't support
+ * bpf_tail_call yet
+ */
+ insn->imm = 0;
+ insn->code |= BPF_X;
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ fn = prog->aux->ops->get_func_proto(insn->imm);
+ /* all functions that have prototype and verifier allowed
+ * programs to call them, must be real in-kernel functions
+ */
+ BUG_ON(!fn->func);
+ insn->imm = fn->func - __bpf_call_base;
+ }
+ }
+}
+
static void free_states(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
{
struct bpf_verifier_state_list *sl, *sln;
@@ -3463,6 +3514,9 @@ skip_full_check:
/* program is valid, convert *(u32*)(ctx + off) accesses */
ret = convert_ctx_accesses(env);
+ if (ret == 0)
+ fixup_bpf_calls(env->prog);
+
if (log_level && log_len >= log_size - 1) {
BUG_ON(log_len >= log_size);
/* verifier log exceeded user supplied buffer */
Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from ast(a)fb.com are
queue-4.9/bpf-refactor-fixup_bpf_calls.patch
queue-4.9/bpf-move-fixup_bpf_calls-function.patch
This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled
USB: serial: io_edgeport: fix possible sleep-in-atomic
to my usb git tree which can be found at
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gregkh/usb.git
in the usb-next branch.
The patch will show up in the next release of the linux-next tree
(usually sometime within the next 24 hours during the week.)
The patch will also be merged in the next major kernel release
during the merge window.
If you have any questions about this process, please let me know.
>From c7b8f77872c73f69a16528a9eb87afefcccdc18b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jia-Ju Bai <baijiaju1990(a)gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 13 Dec 2017 20:34:36 +0800
Subject: USB: serial: io_edgeport: fix possible sleep-in-atomic
According to drivers/usb/serial/io_edgeport.c, the driver may sleep
under a spinlock.
The function call path is:
edge_bulk_in_callback (acquire the spinlock)
process_rcvd_data
process_rcvd_status
change_port_settings
send_iosp_ext_cmd
write_cmd_usb
usb_kill_urb --> may sleep
To fix it, the redundant usb_kill_urb() is removed from the error path
after usb_submit_urb() fails.
This possible bug is found by my static analysis tool (DSAC) and checked
by my code review.
Signed-off-by: Jia-Ju Bai <baijiaju1990(a)gmail.com>
Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Cc: stable <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <johan(a)kernel.org>
---
drivers/usb/serial/io_edgeport.c | 1 -
1 file changed, 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/drivers/usb/serial/io_edgeport.c b/drivers/usb/serial/io_edgeport.c
index 219265ce3711..17283f4b4779 100644
--- a/drivers/usb/serial/io_edgeport.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/serial/io_edgeport.c
@@ -2282,7 +2282,6 @@ static int write_cmd_usb(struct edgeport_port *edge_port,
/* something went wrong */
dev_err(dev, "%s - usb_submit_urb(write command) failed, status = %d\n",
__func__, status);
- usb_kill_urb(urb);
usb_free_urb(urb);
atomic_dec(&CmdUrbs);
return status;
--
2.15.1
This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled
bpf: refactor fixup_bpf_calls()
to the 4.4-stable tree which can be found at:
http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum…
The filename of the patch is:
bpf-refactor-fixup_bpf_calls.patch
and it can be found in the queue-4.4 subdirectory.
If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree,
please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it.
>From 79741b3bdec01a8628368fbcfccc7d189ed606cb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Alexei Starovoitov <ast(a)fb.com>
Date: Wed, 15 Mar 2017 18:26:40 -0700
Subject: bpf: refactor fixup_bpf_calls()
From: Alexei Starovoitov <ast(a)fb.com>
commit 79741b3bdec01a8628368fbcfccc7d189ed606cb upstream.
reduce indent and make it iterate over instructions similar to
convert_ctx_accesses(). Also convert hard BUG_ON into soft verifier error.
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast(a)kernel.org>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel(a)iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem(a)davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby(a)suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org>
---
kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 74 ++++++++++++++++++++++----------------------------
1 file changed, 34 insertions(+), 40 deletions(-)
--- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
@@ -2158,57 +2158,51 @@ static int convert_ctx_accesses(struct v
return 0;
}
-/* fixup insn->imm field of bpf_call instructions:
- * if (insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem)
- * insn->imm = bpf_map_lookup_elem - __bpf_call_base;
- * else if (insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_map_update_elem)
- * insn->imm = bpf_map_update_elem - __bpf_call_base;
- * else ...
+/* fixup insn->imm field of bpf_call instructions
*
* this function is called after eBPF program passed verification
*/
-static void fixup_bpf_calls(struct bpf_prog *prog)
+static int fixup_bpf_calls(struct verifier_env *env)
{
+ struct bpf_prog *prog = env->prog;
+ struct bpf_insn *insn = prog->insnsi;
const struct bpf_func_proto *fn;
+ const int insn_cnt = prog->len;
int i;
- for (i = 0; i < prog->len; i++) {
- struct bpf_insn *insn = &prog->insnsi[i];
-
- if (insn->code == (BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL)) {
- /* we reach here when program has bpf_call instructions
- * and it passed bpf_check(), means that
- * ops->get_func_proto must have been supplied, check it
+ for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++, insn++) {
+ if (insn->code != (BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL))
+ continue;
+
+ if (insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_get_route_realm)
+ prog->dst_needed = 1;
+ if (insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_get_prandom_u32)
+ bpf_user_rnd_init_once();
+ if (insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_tail_call) {
+ /* mark bpf_tail_call as different opcode to avoid
+ * conditional branch in the interpeter for every normal
+ * call and to prevent accidental JITing by JIT compiler
+ * that doesn't support bpf_tail_call yet
*/
- BUG_ON(!prog->aux->ops->get_func_proto);
-
- if (insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_get_route_realm)
- prog->dst_needed = 1;
- if (insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_get_prandom_u32)
- bpf_user_rnd_init_once();
- if (insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_tail_call) {
- /* mark bpf_tail_call as different opcode
- * to avoid conditional branch in
- * interpeter for every normal call
- * and to prevent accidental JITing by
- * JIT compiler that doesn't support
- * bpf_tail_call yet
- */
- insn->imm = 0;
- insn->code |= BPF_X;
- continue;
- }
+ insn->imm = 0;
+ insn->code |= BPF_X;
+ continue;
+ }
- fn = prog->aux->ops->get_func_proto(insn->imm);
- /* all functions that have prototype and verifier allowed
- * programs to call them, must be real in-kernel functions
- */
- BUG_ON(!fn->func);
- insn->imm = fn->func - __bpf_call_base;
+ fn = prog->aux->ops->get_func_proto(insn->imm);
+ /* all functions that have prototype and verifier allowed
+ * programs to call them, must be real in-kernel functions
+ */
+ if (!fn->func) {
+ verbose("kernel subsystem misconfigured func %d\n",
+ insn->imm);
+ return -EFAULT;
}
+ insn->imm = fn->func - __bpf_call_base;
}
-}
+ return 0;
+}
static void free_states(struct verifier_env *env)
{
@@ -2309,7 +2303,7 @@ skip_full_check:
ret = convert_ctx_accesses(env);
if (ret == 0)
- fixup_bpf_calls(env->prog);
+ ret = fixup_bpf_calls(env);
if (log_level && log_len >= log_size - 1) {
BUG_ON(log_len >= log_size);
Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from ast(a)fb.com are
queue-4.4/bpf-adjust-insn_aux_data-when-patching-insns.patch
queue-4.4/bpf-refactor-fixup_bpf_calls.patch
queue-4.4/bpf-move-fixup_bpf_calls-function.patch
This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled
bpf: prevent out-of-bounds speculation
to the 4.4-stable tree which can be found at:
http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum…
The filename of the patch is:
bpf-prevent-out-of-bounds-speculation.patch
and it can be found in the queue-4.4 subdirectory.
If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree,
please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it.
>From b2157399cc9898260d6031c5bfe45fe137c1fbe7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Alexei Starovoitov <ast(a)kernel.org>
Date: Sun, 7 Jan 2018 17:33:02 -0800
Subject: bpf: prevent out-of-bounds speculation
From: Alexei Starovoitov <ast(a)kernel.org>
commit b2157399cc9898260d6031c5bfe45fe137c1fbe7 upstream.
Under speculation, CPUs may mis-predict branches in bounds checks. Thus,
memory accesses under a bounds check may be speculated even if the
bounds check fails, providing a primitive for building a side channel.
To avoid leaking kernel data round up array-based maps and mask the index
after bounds check, so speculated load with out of bounds index will load
either valid value from the array or zero from the padded area.
Unconditionally mask index for all array types even when max_entries
are not rounded to power of 2 for root user.
When map is created by unpriv user generate a sequence of bpf insns
that includes AND operation to make sure that JITed code includes
the same 'index & index_mask' operation.
If prog_array map is created by unpriv user replace
bpf_tail_call(ctx, map, index);
with
if (index >= max_entries) {
index &= map->index_mask;
bpf_tail_call(ctx, map, index);
}
(along with roundup to power 2) to prevent out-of-bounds speculation.
There is secondary redundant 'if (index >= max_entries)' in the interpreter
and in all JITs, but they can be optimized later if necessary.
Other array-like maps (cpumap, devmap, sockmap, perf_event_array, cgroup_array)
cannot be used by unpriv, so no changes there.
That fixes bpf side of "Variant 1: bounds check bypass (CVE-2017-5753)" on
all architectures with and without JIT.
v2->v3:
Daniel noticed that attack potentially can be crafted via syscall commands
without loading the program, so add masking to those paths as well.
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast(a)kernel.org>
Acked-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend(a)gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel(a)iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby(a)suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org>
---
include/linux/bpf.h | 2 ++
kernel/bpf/arraymap.c | 24 +++++++++++++++++++-----
kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 46 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----
3 files changed, 63 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
--- a/include/linux/bpf.h
+++ b/include/linux/bpf.h
@@ -37,6 +37,7 @@ struct bpf_map {
u32 value_size;
u32 max_entries;
u32 pages;
+ bool unpriv_array;
struct user_struct *user;
const struct bpf_map_ops *ops;
struct work_struct work;
@@ -141,6 +142,7 @@ struct bpf_prog_aux {
struct bpf_array {
struct bpf_map map;
u32 elem_size;
+ u32 index_mask;
/* 'ownership' of prog_array is claimed by the first program that
* is going to use this map or by the first program which FD is stored
* in the map to make sure that all callers and callees have the same
--- a/kernel/bpf/arraymap.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/arraymap.c
@@ -20,8 +20,9 @@
/* Called from syscall */
static struct bpf_map *array_map_alloc(union bpf_attr *attr)
{
+ u32 elem_size, array_size, index_mask, max_entries;
+ bool unpriv = !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN);
struct bpf_array *array;
- u32 elem_size, array_size;
/* check sanity of attributes */
if (attr->max_entries == 0 || attr->key_size != 4 ||
@@ -36,12 +37,21 @@ static struct bpf_map *array_map_alloc(u
elem_size = round_up(attr->value_size, 8);
+ max_entries = attr->max_entries;
+ index_mask = roundup_pow_of_two(max_entries) - 1;
+
+ if (unpriv)
+ /* round up array size to nearest power of 2,
+ * since cpu will speculate within index_mask limits
+ */
+ max_entries = index_mask + 1;
+
/* check round_up into zero and u32 overflow */
if (elem_size == 0 ||
- attr->max_entries > (U32_MAX - PAGE_SIZE - sizeof(*array)) / elem_size)
+ max_entries > (U32_MAX - PAGE_SIZE - sizeof(*array)) / elem_size)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
- array_size = sizeof(*array) + attr->max_entries * elem_size;
+ array_size = sizeof(*array) + max_entries * elem_size;
/* allocate all map elements and zero-initialize them */
array = kzalloc(array_size, GFP_USER | __GFP_NOWARN);
@@ -50,6 +60,8 @@ static struct bpf_map *array_map_alloc(u
if (!array)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
}
+ array->index_mask = index_mask;
+ array->map.unpriv_array = unpriv;
/* copy mandatory map attributes */
array->map.key_size = attr->key_size;
@@ -70,7 +82,7 @@ static void *array_map_lookup_elem(struc
if (index >= array->map.max_entries)
return NULL;
- return array->value + array->elem_size * index;
+ return array->value + array->elem_size * (index & array->index_mask);
}
/* Called from syscall */
@@ -111,7 +123,9 @@ static int array_map_update_elem(struct
/* all elements already exist */
return -EEXIST;
- memcpy(array->value + array->elem_size * index, value, map->value_size);
+ memcpy(array->value +
+ array->elem_size * (index & array->index_mask),
+ value, map->value_size);
return 0;
}
--- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
@@ -187,7 +187,10 @@ struct verifier_stack_elem {
};
struct bpf_insn_aux_data {
- enum bpf_reg_type ptr_type; /* pointer type for load/store insns */
+ union {
+ enum bpf_reg_type ptr_type; /* pointer type for load/store insns */
+ struct bpf_map *map_ptr; /* pointer for call insn into lookup_elem */
+ };
};
#define MAX_USED_MAPS 64 /* max number of maps accessed by one eBPF program */
@@ -950,7 +953,7 @@ error:
return -EINVAL;
}
-static int check_call(struct verifier_env *env, int func_id)
+static int check_call(struct verifier_env *env, int func_id, int insn_idx)
{
struct verifier_state *state = &env->cur_state;
const struct bpf_func_proto *fn = NULL;
@@ -986,6 +989,13 @@ static int check_call(struct verifier_en
err = check_func_arg(env, BPF_REG_2, fn->arg2_type, &map);
if (err)
return err;
+ if (func_id == BPF_FUNC_tail_call) {
+ if (map == NULL) {
+ verbose("verifier bug\n");
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx].map_ptr = map;
+ }
err = check_func_arg(env, BPF_REG_3, fn->arg3_type, &map);
if (err)
return err;
@@ -1911,7 +1921,7 @@ static int do_check(struct verifier_env
return -EINVAL;
}
- err = check_call(env, insn->imm);
+ err = check_call(env, insn->imm, insn_idx);
if (err)
return err;
@@ -2202,7 +2212,10 @@ static int fixup_bpf_calls(struct verifi
struct bpf_insn *insn = prog->insnsi;
const struct bpf_func_proto *fn;
const int insn_cnt = prog->len;
- int i;
+ struct bpf_insn insn_buf[16];
+ struct bpf_prog *new_prog;
+ struct bpf_map *map_ptr;
+ int i, cnt, delta = 0;
for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++, insn++) {
if (insn->code != (BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL))
@@ -2220,6 +2233,31 @@ static int fixup_bpf_calls(struct verifi
*/
insn->imm = 0;
insn->code |= BPF_X;
+
+ /* instead of changing every JIT dealing with tail_call
+ * emit two extra insns:
+ * if (index >= max_entries) goto out;
+ * index &= array->index_mask;
+ * to avoid out-of-bounds cpu speculation
+ */
+ map_ptr = env->insn_aux_data[i + delta].map_ptr;
+ if (!map_ptr->unpriv_array)
+ continue;
+ insn_buf[0] = BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JGE, BPF_REG_3,
+ map_ptr->max_entries, 2);
+ insn_buf[1] = BPF_ALU32_IMM(BPF_AND, BPF_REG_3,
+ container_of(map_ptr,
+ struct bpf_array,
+ map)->index_mask);
+ insn_buf[2] = *insn;
+ cnt = 3;
+ new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, insn_buf, cnt);
+ if (!new_prog)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ delta += cnt - 1;
+ env->prog = prog = new_prog;
+ insn = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta;
continue;
}
Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from ast(a)kernel.org are
queue-4.4/bpf-adjust-insn_aux_data-when-patching-insns.patch
queue-4.4/bpf-refactor-fixup_bpf_calls.patch
queue-4.4/bpf-array-fix-overflow-in-max_entries-and-undefined-behavior-in-index_mask.patch
queue-4.4/bpf-don-t-ab-use-instructions-to-store-state.patch
queue-4.4/bpf-prevent-out-of-bounds-speculation.patch
queue-4.4/bpf-add-bpf_patch_insn_single-helper.patch
queue-4.4/bpf-move-fixup_bpf_calls-function.patch
This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled
bpf: move fixup_bpf_calls() function
to the 4.4-stable tree which can be found at:
http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum…
The filename of the patch is:
bpf-move-fixup_bpf_calls-function.patch
and it can be found in the queue-4.4 subdirectory.
If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree,
please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it.
>From e245c5c6a5656e4d61aa7bb08e9694fd6e5b2b9d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Alexei Starovoitov <ast(a)fb.com>
Date: Wed, 15 Mar 2017 18:26:39 -0700
Subject: bpf: move fixup_bpf_calls() function
From: Alexei Starovoitov <ast(a)fb.com>
commit e245c5c6a5656e4d61aa7bb08e9694fd6e5b2b9d upstream.
no functional change.
move fixup_bpf_calls() to verifier.c
it's being refactored in the next patch
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast(a)kernel.org>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel(a)iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem(a)davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby(a)suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org>
---
kernel/bpf/syscall.c | 54 -------------------------------------------------
kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 55 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
2 files changed, 55 insertions(+), 54 deletions(-)
--- a/kernel/bpf/syscall.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/syscall.c
@@ -447,57 +447,6 @@ void bpf_register_prog_type(struct bpf_p
list_add(&tl->list_node, &bpf_prog_types);
}
-/* fixup insn->imm field of bpf_call instructions:
- * if (insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem)
- * insn->imm = bpf_map_lookup_elem - __bpf_call_base;
- * else if (insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_map_update_elem)
- * insn->imm = bpf_map_update_elem - __bpf_call_base;
- * else ...
- *
- * this function is called after eBPF program passed verification
- */
-static void fixup_bpf_calls(struct bpf_prog *prog)
-{
- const struct bpf_func_proto *fn;
- int i;
-
- for (i = 0; i < prog->len; i++) {
- struct bpf_insn *insn = &prog->insnsi[i];
-
- if (insn->code == (BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL)) {
- /* we reach here when program has bpf_call instructions
- * and it passed bpf_check(), means that
- * ops->get_func_proto must have been supplied, check it
- */
- BUG_ON(!prog->aux->ops->get_func_proto);
-
- if (insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_get_route_realm)
- prog->dst_needed = 1;
- if (insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_get_prandom_u32)
- bpf_user_rnd_init_once();
- if (insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_tail_call) {
- /* mark bpf_tail_call as different opcode
- * to avoid conditional branch in
- * interpeter for every normal call
- * and to prevent accidental JITing by
- * JIT compiler that doesn't support
- * bpf_tail_call yet
- */
- insn->imm = 0;
- insn->code |= BPF_X;
- continue;
- }
-
- fn = prog->aux->ops->get_func_proto(insn->imm);
- /* all functions that have prototype and verifier allowed
- * programs to call them, must be real in-kernel functions
- */
- BUG_ON(!fn->func);
- insn->imm = fn->func - __bpf_call_base;
- }
- }
-}
-
/* drop refcnt on maps used by eBPF program and free auxilary data */
static void free_used_maps(struct bpf_prog_aux *aux)
{
@@ -680,9 +629,6 @@ static int bpf_prog_load(union bpf_attr
if (err < 0)
goto free_used_maps;
- /* fixup BPF_CALL->imm field */
- fixup_bpf_calls(prog);
-
/* eBPF program is ready to be JITed */
err = bpf_prog_select_runtime(prog);
if (err < 0)
--- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
@@ -2158,6 +2158,58 @@ static int convert_ctx_accesses(struct v
return 0;
}
+/* fixup insn->imm field of bpf_call instructions:
+ * if (insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem)
+ * insn->imm = bpf_map_lookup_elem - __bpf_call_base;
+ * else if (insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_map_update_elem)
+ * insn->imm = bpf_map_update_elem - __bpf_call_base;
+ * else ...
+ *
+ * this function is called after eBPF program passed verification
+ */
+static void fixup_bpf_calls(struct bpf_prog *prog)
+{
+ const struct bpf_func_proto *fn;
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < prog->len; i++) {
+ struct bpf_insn *insn = &prog->insnsi[i];
+
+ if (insn->code == (BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL)) {
+ /* we reach here when program has bpf_call instructions
+ * and it passed bpf_check(), means that
+ * ops->get_func_proto must have been supplied, check it
+ */
+ BUG_ON(!prog->aux->ops->get_func_proto);
+
+ if (insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_get_route_realm)
+ prog->dst_needed = 1;
+ if (insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_get_prandom_u32)
+ bpf_user_rnd_init_once();
+ if (insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_tail_call) {
+ /* mark bpf_tail_call as different opcode
+ * to avoid conditional branch in
+ * interpeter for every normal call
+ * and to prevent accidental JITing by
+ * JIT compiler that doesn't support
+ * bpf_tail_call yet
+ */
+ insn->imm = 0;
+ insn->code |= BPF_X;
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ fn = prog->aux->ops->get_func_proto(insn->imm);
+ /* all functions that have prototype and verifier allowed
+ * programs to call them, must be real in-kernel functions
+ */
+ BUG_ON(!fn->func);
+ insn->imm = fn->func - __bpf_call_base;
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+
static void free_states(struct verifier_env *env)
{
struct verifier_state_list *sl, *sln;
@@ -2256,6 +2308,9 @@ skip_full_check:
/* program is valid, convert *(u32*)(ctx + off) accesses */
ret = convert_ctx_accesses(env);
+ if (ret == 0)
+ fixup_bpf_calls(env->prog);
+
if (log_level && log_len >= log_size - 1) {
BUG_ON(log_len >= log_size);
/* verifier log exceeded user supplied buffer */
Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from ast(a)fb.com are
queue-4.4/bpf-adjust-insn_aux_data-when-patching-insns.patch
queue-4.4/bpf-refactor-fixup_bpf_calls.patch
queue-4.4/bpf-move-fixup_bpf_calls-function.patch
This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled
bpf: don't (ab)use instructions to store state
to the 4.4-stable tree which can be found at:
http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum…
The filename of the patch is:
bpf-don-t-ab-use-instructions-to-store-state.patch
and it can be found in the queue-4.4 subdirectory.
If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree,
please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it.
>From 3df126f35f88dc76eea33769f85a3c3bb8ce6c6b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski(a)netronome.com>
Date: Wed, 21 Sep 2016 11:43:56 +0100
Subject: bpf: don't (ab)use instructions to store state
From: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski(a)netronome.com>
commit 3df126f35f88dc76eea33769f85a3c3bb8ce6c6b upstream.
Storing state in reserved fields of instructions makes
it impossible to run verifier on programs already
marked as read-only. Allocate and use an array of
per-instruction state instead.
While touching the error path rename and move existing
jump target.
Suggested-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast(a)kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski(a)netronome.com>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast(a)kernel.org>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel(a)iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem(a)davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby(a)suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org>
---
kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 67 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------------------
1 file changed, 39 insertions(+), 28 deletions(-)
--- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
@@ -186,6 +186,10 @@ struct verifier_stack_elem {
struct verifier_stack_elem *next;
};
+struct bpf_insn_aux_data {
+ enum bpf_reg_type ptr_type; /* pointer type for load/store insns */
+};
+
#define MAX_USED_MAPS 64 /* max number of maps accessed by one eBPF program */
/* single container for all structs
@@ -200,6 +204,7 @@ struct verifier_env {
struct bpf_map *used_maps[MAX_USED_MAPS]; /* array of map's used by eBPF program */
u32 used_map_cnt; /* number of used maps */
bool allow_ptr_leaks;
+ struct bpf_insn_aux_data *insn_aux_data; /* array of per-insn state */
};
/* verbose verifier prints what it's seeing
@@ -1784,7 +1789,7 @@ static int do_check(struct verifier_env
return err;
} else if (class == BPF_LDX) {
- enum bpf_reg_type src_reg_type;
+ enum bpf_reg_type *prev_src_type, src_reg_type;
/* check for reserved fields is already done */
@@ -1813,16 +1818,18 @@ static int do_check(struct verifier_env
continue;
}
- if (insn->imm == 0) {
+ prev_src_type = &env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx].ptr_type;
+
+ if (*prev_src_type == NOT_INIT) {
/* saw a valid insn
* dst_reg = *(u32 *)(src_reg + off)
- * use reserved 'imm' field to mark this insn
+ * save type to validate intersecting paths
*/
- insn->imm = src_reg_type;
+ *prev_src_type = src_reg_type;
- } else if (src_reg_type != insn->imm &&
+ } else if (src_reg_type != *prev_src_type &&
(src_reg_type == PTR_TO_CTX ||
- insn->imm == PTR_TO_CTX)) {
+ *prev_src_type == PTR_TO_CTX)) {
/* ABuser program is trying to use the same insn
* dst_reg = *(u32*) (src_reg + off)
* with different pointer types:
@@ -1835,7 +1842,7 @@ static int do_check(struct verifier_env
}
} else if (class == BPF_STX) {
- enum bpf_reg_type dst_reg_type;
+ enum bpf_reg_type *prev_dst_type, dst_reg_type;
if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_XADD) {
err = check_xadd(env, insn);
@@ -1863,11 +1870,13 @@ static int do_check(struct verifier_env
if (err)
return err;
- if (insn->imm == 0) {
- insn->imm = dst_reg_type;
- } else if (dst_reg_type != insn->imm &&
+ prev_dst_type = &env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx].ptr_type;
+
+ if (*prev_dst_type == NOT_INIT) {
+ *prev_dst_type = dst_reg_type;
+ } else if (dst_reg_type != *prev_dst_type &&
(dst_reg_type == PTR_TO_CTX ||
- insn->imm == PTR_TO_CTX)) {
+ *prev_dst_type == PTR_TO_CTX)) {
verbose("same insn cannot be used with different pointers\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
@@ -2104,17 +2113,17 @@ static void convert_pseudo_ld_imm64(stru
static int convert_ctx_accesses(struct verifier_env *env)
{
struct bpf_insn *insn = env->prog->insnsi;
- int insn_cnt = env->prog->len;
+ const int insn_cnt = env->prog->len;
struct bpf_insn insn_buf[16];
struct bpf_prog *new_prog;
enum bpf_access_type type;
- int i;
+ int i, delta = 0;
if (!env->prog->aux->ops->convert_ctx_access)
return 0;
for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++, insn++) {
- u32 insn_delta, cnt;
+ u32 cnt;
if (insn->code == (BPF_LDX | BPF_MEM | BPF_W))
type = BPF_READ;
@@ -2123,11 +2132,8 @@ static int convert_ctx_accesses(struct v
else
continue;
- if (insn->imm != PTR_TO_CTX) {
- /* clear internal mark */
- insn->imm = 0;
+ if (env->insn_aux_data[i].ptr_type != PTR_TO_CTX)
continue;
- }
cnt = env->prog->aux->ops->
convert_ctx_access(type, insn->dst_reg, insn->src_reg,
@@ -2137,18 +2143,16 @@ static int convert_ctx_accesses(struct v
return -EINVAL;
}
- new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_single(env->prog, i, insn_buf, cnt);
+ new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_single(env->prog, i + delta, insn_buf,
+ cnt);
if (!new_prog)
return -ENOMEM;
- insn_delta = cnt - 1;
+ delta += cnt - 1;
/* keep walking new program and skip insns we just inserted */
env->prog = new_prog;
- insn = new_prog->insnsi + i + insn_delta;
-
- insn_cnt += insn_delta;
- i += insn_delta;
+ insn = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta;
}
return 0;
@@ -2192,6 +2196,11 @@ int bpf_check(struct bpf_prog **prog, un
if (!env)
return -ENOMEM;
+ env->insn_aux_data = vzalloc(sizeof(struct bpf_insn_aux_data) *
+ (*prog)->len);
+ ret = -ENOMEM;
+ if (!env->insn_aux_data)
+ goto err_free_env;
env->prog = *prog;
/* grab the mutex to protect few globals used by verifier */
@@ -2210,12 +2219,12 @@ int bpf_check(struct bpf_prog **prog, un
/* log_* values have to be sane */
if (log_size < 128 || log_size > UINT_MAX >> 8 ||
log_level == 0 || log_ubuf == NULL)
- goto free_env;
+ goto err_unlock;
ret = -ENOMEM;
log_buf = vmalloc(log_size);
if (!log_buf)
- goto free_env;
+ goto err_unlock;
} else {
log_level = 0;
}
@@ -2284,14 +2293,16 @@ skip_full_check:
free_log_buf:
if (log_level)
vfree(log_buf);
-free_env:
if (!env->prog->aux->used_maps)
/* if we didn't copy map pointers into bpf_prog_info, release
* them now. Otherwise free_bpf_prog_info() will release them.
*/
release_maps(env);
*prog = env->prog;
- kfree(env);
+err_unlock:
mutex_unlock(&bpf_verifier_lock);
+ vfree(env->insn_aux_data);
+err_free_env:
+ kfree(env);
return ret;
}
Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from jakub.kicinski(a)netronome.com are
queue-4.4/bpf-don-t-ab-use-instructions-to-store-state.patch
This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled
bpf: adjust insn_aux_data when patching insns
to the 4.4-stable tree which can be found at:
http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum…
The filename of the patch is:
bpf-adjust-insn_aux_data-when-patching-insns.patch
and it can be found in the queue-4.4 subdirectory.
If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree,
please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it.
>From 8041902dae5299c1f194ba42d14383f734631009 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Alexei Starovoitov <ast(a)fb.com>
Date: Wed, 15 Mar 2017 18:26:41 -0700
Subject: bpf: adjust insn_aux_data when patching insns
From: Alexei Starovoitov <ast(a)fb.com>
commit 8041902dae5299c1f194ba42d14383f734631009 upstream.
convert_ctx_accesses() replaces single bpf instruction with a set of
instructions. Adjust corresponding insn_aux_data while patching.
It's needed to make sure subsequent 'for(all insn)' loops
have matching insn and insn_aux_data.
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast(a)kernel.org>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel(a)iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem(a)davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby(a)suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org>
---
kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 40 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
1 file changed, 37 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
--- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
@@ -2107,6 +2107,41 @@ static void convert_pseudo_ld_imm64(stru
insn->src_reg = 0;
}
+/* single env->prog->insni[off] instruction was replaced with the range
+ * insni[off, off + cnt). Adjust corresponding insn_aux_data by copying
+ * [0, off) and [off, end) to new locations, so the patched range stays zero
+ */
+static int adjust_insn_aux_data(struct verifier_env *env, u32 prog_len,
+ u32 off, u32 cnt)
+{
+ struct bpf_insn_aux_data *new_data, *old_data = env->insn_aux_data;
+
+ if (cnt == 1)
+ return 0;
+ new_data = vzalloc(sizeof(struct bpf_insn_aux_data) * prog_len);
+ if (!new_data)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ memcpy(new_data, old_data, sizeof(struct bpf_insn_aux_data) * off);
+ memcpy(new_data + off + cnt - 1, old_data + off,
+ sizeof(struct bpf_insn_aux_data) * (prog_len - off - cnt + 1));
+ env->insn_aux_data = new_data;
+ vfree(old_data);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static struct bpf_prog *bpf_patch_insn_data(struct verifier_env *env, u32 off,
+ const struct bpf_insn *patch, u32 len)
+{
+ struct bpf_prog *new_prog;
+
+ new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_single(env->prog, off, patch, len);
+ if (!new_prog)
+ return NULL;
+ if (adjust_insn_aux_data(env, new_prog->len, off, len))
+ return NULL;
+ return new_prog;
+}
+
/* convert load instructions that access fields of 'struct __sk_buff'
* into sequence of instructions that access fields of 'struct sk_buff'
*/
@@ -2132,7 +2167,7 @@ static int convert_ctx_accesses(struct v
else
continue;
- if (env->insn_aux_data[i].ptr_type != PTR_TO_CTX)
+ if (env->insn_aux_data[i + delta].ptr_type != PTR_TO_CTX)
continue;
cnt = env->prog->aux->ops->
@@ -2143,8 +2178,7 @@ static int convert_ctx_accesses(struct v
return -EINVAL;
}
- new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_single(env->prog, i + delta, insn_buf,
- cnt);
+ new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, insn_buf, cnt);
if (!new_prog)
return -ENOMEM;
Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from ast(a)fb.com are
queue-4.4/bpf-adjust-insn_aux_data-when-patching-insns.patch
queue-4.4/bpf-refactor-fixup_bpf_calls.patch
queue-4.4/bpf-move-fixup_bpf_calls-function.patch
This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled
x86/microcode/intel: Extend BDW late-loading with a revision check
to the 4.9-stable tree which can be found at:
http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum…
The filename of the patch is:
x86-microcode-intel-extend-bdw-late-loading-with-a-revision-check.patch
and it can be found in the queue-4.9 subdirectory.
If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree,
please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it.
>From b94b7373317164402ff7728d10f7023127a02b60 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jia Zhang <qianyue.zj(a)alibaba-inc.com>
Date: Mon, 1 Jan 2018 10:04:47 +0800
Subject: x86/microcode/intel: Extend BDW late-loading with a revision check
From: Jia Zhang <qianyue.zj(a)alibaba-inc.com>
commit b94b7373317164402ff7728d10f7023127a02b60 upstream.
Instead of blacklisting all model 79 CPUs when attempting a late
microcode loading, limit that only to CPUs with microcode revisions <
0x0b000021 because only on those late loading may cause a system hang.
For such processors either:
a) a BIOS update which might contain a newer microcode revision
or
b) the early microcode loading method
should be considered.
Processors with revisions 0x0b000021 or higher will not experience such
hangs.
For more details, see erratum BDF90 in document #334165 (Intel Xeon
Processor E7-8800/4800 v4 Product Family Specification Update) from
September 2017.
[ bp: Heavily massage commit message and pr_* statements. ]
Fixes: 723f2828a98c ("x86/microcode/intel: Disable late loading on model 79")
Signed-off-by: Jia Zhang <qianyue.zj(a)alibaba-inc.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp(a)suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx(a)linutronix.de>
Acked-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck(a)intel.com>
Cc: x86-ml <x86(a)kernel.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1514772287-92959-1-git-send-email-qianyue.zj@aliba…
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org>
---
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/microcode/intel.c | 13 +++++++++++--
1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/microcode/intel.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/microcode/intel.c
@@ -1051,8 +1051,17 @@ static bool is_blacklisted(unsigned int
{
struct cpuinfo_x86 *c = &cpu_data(cpu);
- if (c->x86 == 6 && c->x86_model == INTEL_FAM6_BROADWELL_X) {
- pr_err_once("late loading on model 79 is disabled.\n");
+ /*
+ * Late loading on model 79 with microcode revision less than 0x0b000021
+ * may result in a system hang. This behavior is documented in item
+ * BDF90, #334165 (Intel Xeon Processor E7-8800/4800 v4 Product Family).
+ */
+ if (c->x86 == 6 &&
+ c->x86_model == INTEL_FAM6_BROADWELL_X &&
+ c->x86_mask == 0x01 &&
+ c->microcode < 0x0b000021) {
+ pr_err_once("Erratum BDF90: late loading with revision < 0x0b000021 (0x%x) disabled.\n", c->microcode);
+ pr_err_once("Please consider either early loading through initrd/built-in or a potential BIOS update.\n");
return true;
}
Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from qianyue.zj(a)alibaba-inc.com are
queue-4.9/x86-microcode-intel-extend-bdw-late-loading-with-a-revision-check.patch
This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled
rbd: set max_segments to USHRT_MAX
to the 4.9-stable tree which can be found at:
http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum…
The filename of the patch is:
rbd-set-max_segments-to-ushrt_max.patch
and it can be found in the queue-4.9 subdirectory.
If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree,
please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it.
>From 21acdf45f4958135940f0b4767185cf911d4b010 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov(a)gmail.com>
Date: Thu, 21 Dec 2017 15:35:11 +0100
Subject: rbd: set max_segments to USHRT_MAX
From: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov(a)gmail.com>
commit 21acdf45f4958135940f0b4767185cf911d4b010 upstream.
Commit d3834fefcfe5 ("rbd: bump queue_max_segments") bumped
max_segments (unsigned short) to max_hw_sectors (unsigned int).
max_hw_sectors is set to the number of 512-byte sectors in an object
and overflows unsigned short for 32M (largest possible) objects, making
the block layer resort to handing us single segment (i.e. single page
or even smaller) bios in that case.
Fixes: d3834fefcfe5 ("rbd: bump queue_max_segments")
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov(a)gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Alex Elder <elder(a)linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/block/rbd.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/drivers/block/rbd.c
+++ b/drivers/block/rbd.c
@@ -4511,7 +4511,7 @@ static int rbd_init_disk(struct rbd_devi
segment_size = rbd_obj_bytes(&rbd_dev->header);
blk_queue_max_hw_sectors(q, segment_size / SECTOR_SIZE);
q->limits.max_sectors = queue_max_hw_sectors(q);
- blk_queue_max_segments(q, segment_size / SECTOR_SIZE);
+ blk_queue_max_segments(q, USHRT_MAX);
blk_queue_max_segment_size(q, segment_size);
blk_queue_io_min(q, segment_size);
blk_queue_io_opt(q, segment_size);
Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from idryomov(a)gmail.com are
queue-4.9/rbd-set-max_segments-to-ushrt_max.patch
This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled
KVM: x86: Add memory barrier on vmcs field lookup
to the 4.9-stable tree which can be found at:
http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum…
The filename of the patch is:
kvm-x86-add-memory-barrier-on-vmcs-field-lookup.patch
and it can be found in the queue-4.9 subdirectory.
If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree,
please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it.
>From 75f139aaf896d6fdeec2e468ddfa4b2fe469bf40 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Andrew Honig <ahonig(a)google.com>
Date: Wed, 10 Jan 2018 10:12:03 -0800
Subject: KVM: x86: Add memory barrier on vmcs field lookup
From: Andrew Honig <ahonig(a)google.com>
commit 75f139aaf896d6fdeec2e468ddfa4b2fe469bf40 upstream.
This adds a memory barrier when performing a lookup into
the vmcs_field_to_offset_table. This is related to
CVE-2017-5753.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Honig <ahonig(a)google.com>
Reviewed-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson(a)google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini(a)redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org>
---
arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c | 12 ++++++++++--
1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
@@ -857,8 +857,16 @@ static inline short vmcs_field_to_offset
{
BUILD_BUG_ON(ARRAY_SIZE(vmcs_field_to_offset_table) > SHRT_MAX);
- if (field >= ARRAY_SIZE(vmcs_field_to_offset_table) ||
- vmcs_field_to_offset_table[field] == 0)
+ if (field >= ARRAY_SIZE(vmcs_field_to_offset_table))
+ return -ENOENT;
+
+ /*
+ * FIXME: Mitigation for CVE-2017-5753. To be replaced with a
+ * generic mechanism.
+ */
+ asm("lfence");
+
+ if (vmcs_field_to_offset_table[field] == 0)
return -ENOENT;
return vmcs_field_to_offset_table[field];
Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from ahonig(a)google.com are
queue-4.9/kvm-vmx-scrub-hardware-gprs-at-vm-exit.patch
queue-4.9/kvm-x86-add-memory-barrier-on-vmcs-field-lookup.patch
This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled
drm/vmwgfx: Potential off by one in vmw_view_add()
to the 4.9-stable tree which can be found at:
http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum…
The filename of the patch is:
drm-vmwgfx-potential-off-by-one-in-vmw_view_add.patch
and it can be found in the queue-4.9 subdirectory.
If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree,
please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it.
>From 0d9cac0ca0429830c40fe1a4e50e60f6221fd7b6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter(a)oracle.com>
Date: Wed, 10 Jan 2018 12:40:04 +0300
Subject: drm/vmwgfx: Potential off by one in vmw_view_add()
From: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter(a)oracle.com>
commit 0d9cac0ca0429830c40fe1a4e50e60f6221fd7b6 upstream.
The vmw_view_cmd_to_type() function returns vmw_view_max (3) on error.
It's one element beyond the end of the vmw_view_cotables[] table.
My read on this is that it's possible to hit this failure. header->id
comes from vmw_cmd_check() and it's a user controlled number between
1040 and 1225 so we can hit that error. But I don't have the hardware
to test this code.
Fixes: d80efd5cb3de ("drm/vmwgfx: Initial DX support")
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter(a)oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Hellstrom <thellstrom(a)vmware.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/vmwgfx_execbuf.c | 2 ++
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
--- a/drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/vmwgfx_execbuf.c
+++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/vmwgfx_execbuf.c
@@ -2729,6 +2729,8 @@ static int vmw_cmd_dx_view_define(struct
}
view_type = vmw_view_cmd_to_type(header->id);
+ if (view_type == vmw_view_max)
+ return -EINVAL;
cmd = container_of(header, typeof(*cmd), header);
ret = vmw_cmd_res_check(dev_priv, sw_context, vmw_res_surface,
user_surface_converter,
Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from dan.carpenter(a)oracle.com are
queue-4.9/drm-vmwgfx-potential-off-by-one-in-vmw_view_add.patch
This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled
crypto: algapi - fix NULL dereference in crypto_remove_spawns()
to the 4.9-stable tree which can be found at:
http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum…
The filename of the patch is:
crypto-algapi-fix-null-dereference-in-crypto_remove_spawns.patch
and it can be found in the queue-4.9 subdirectory.
If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree,
please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it.
>From 9a00674213a3f00394f4e3221b88f2d21fc05789 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers(a)google.com>
Date: Fri, 29 Dec 2017 14:30:19 -0600
Subject: crypto: algapi - fix NULL dereference in crypto_remove_spawns()
From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers(a)google.com>
commit 9a00674213a3f00394f4e3221b88f2d21fc05789 upstream.
syzkaller triggered a NULL pointer dereference in crypto_remove_spawns()
via a program that repeatedly and concurrently requests AEADs
"authenc(cmac(des3_ede-asm),pcbc-aes-aesni)" and hashes "cmac(des3_ede)"
through AF_ALG, where the hashes are requested as "untested"
(CRYPTO_ALG_TESTED is set in ->salg_mask but clear in ->salg_feat; this
causes the template to be instantiated for every request).
Although AF_ALG users really shouldn't be able to request an "untested"
algorithm, the NULL pointer dereference is actually caused by a
longstanding race condition where crypto_remove_spawns() can encounter
an instance which has had spawn(s) "grabbed" but hasn't yet been
registered, resulting in ->cra_users still being NULL.
We probably should properly initialize ->cra_users earlier, but that
would require updating many templates individually. For now just fix
the bug in a simple way that can easily be backported: make
crypto_remove_spawns() treat a NULL ->cra_users list as empty.
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller(a)googlegroups.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers(a)google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert(a)gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org>
---
crypto/algapi.c | 12 ++++++++++++
1 file changed, 12 insertions(+)
--- a/crypto/algapi.c
+++ b/crypto/algapi.c
@@ -167,6 +167,18 @@ void crypto_remove_spawns(struct crypto_
spawn->alg = NULL;
spawns = &inst->alg.cra_users;
+
+ /*
+ * We may encounter an unregistered instance here, since
+ * an instance's spawns are set up prior to the instance
+ * being registered. An unregistered instance will have
+ * NULL ->cra_users.next, since ->cra_users isn't
+ * properly initialized until registration. But an
+ * unregistered instance cannot have any users, so treat
+ * it the same as ->cra_users being empty.
+ */
+ if (spawns->next == NULL)
+ break;
}
} while ((spawns = crypto_more_spawns(alg, &stack, &top,
&secondary_spawns)));
Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from ebiggers(a)google.com are
queue-4.9/crypto-algapi-fix-null-dereference-in-crypto_remove_spawns.patch
This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled
x86/microcode/intel: Extend BDW late-loading with a revision check
to the 4.4-stable tree which can be found at:
http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum…
The filename of the patch is:
x86-microcode-intel-extend-bdw-late-loading-with-a-revision-check.patch
and it can be found in the queue-4.4 subdirectory.
If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree,
please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it.
>From b94b7373317164402ff7728d10f7023127a02b60 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jia Zhang <qianyue.zj(a)alibaba-inc.com>
Date: Mon, 1 Jan 2018 10:04:47 +0800
Subject: x86/microcode/intel: Extend BDW late-loading with a revision check
From: Jia Zhang <qianyue.zj(a)alibaba-inc.com>
commit b94b7373317164402ff7728d10f7023127a02b60 upstream.
Instead of blacklisting all model 79 CPUs when attempting a late
microcode loading, limit that only to CPUs with microcode revisions <
0x0b000021 because only on those late loading may cause a system hang.
For such processors either:
a) a BIOS update which might contain a newer microcode revision
or
b) the early microcode loading method
should be considered.
Processors with revisions 0x0b000021 or higher will not experience such
hangs.
For more details, see erratum BDF90 in document #334165 (Intel Xeon
Processor E7-8800/4800 v4 Product Family Specification Update) from
September 2017.
[ bp: Heavily massage commit message and pr_* statements. ]
Fixes: 723f2828a98c ("x86/microcode/intel: Disable late loading on model 79")
Signed-off-by: Jia Zhang <qianyue.zj(a)alibaba-inc.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp(a)suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx(a)linutronix.de>
Acked-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck(a)intel.com>
Cc: x86-ml <x86(a)kernel.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1514772287-92959-1-git-send-email-qianyue.zj@aliba…
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org>
---
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/microcode/intel.c | 14 +++++++++++---
1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/microcode/intel.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/microcode/intel.c
@@ -994,9 +994,17 @@ static bool is_blacklisted(unsigned int
{
struct cpuinfo_x86 *c = &cpu_data(cpu);
- if (c->x86 == 6 && c->x86_model == 79) {
- pr_err_once("late loading on model 79 is disabled.\n");
- return true;
+ /*
+ * Late loading on model 79 with microcode revision less than 0x0b000021
+ * may result in a system hang. This behavior is documented in item
+ * BDF90, #334165 (Intel Xeon Processor E7-8800/4800 v4 Product Family).
+ */
+ if (c->x86 == 6 &&
+ c->x86_model == 79 &&
+ c->x86_mask == 0x01 &&
+ c->microcode < 0x0b000021) {
+ pr_err_once("Erratum BDF90: late loading with revision < 0x0b000021 (0x%x) disabled.\n", c->microcode);
+ pr_err_once("Please consider either early loading through initrd/built-in or a potential BIOS update.\n");
}
return false;
Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from qianyue.zj(a)alibaba-inc.com are
queue-4.4/x86-microcode-intel-extend-bdw-late-loading-with-a-revision-check.patch
This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled
rbd: set max_segments to USHRT_MAX
to the 4.4-stable tree which can be found at:
http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum…
The filename of the patch is:
rbd-set-max_segments-to-ushrt_max.patch
and it can be found in the queue-4.4 subdirectory.
If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree,
please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it.
>From 21acdf45f4958135940f0b4767185cf911d4b010 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov(a)gmail.com>
Date: Thu, 21 Dec 2017 15:35:11 +0100
Subject: rbd: set max_segments to USHRT_MAX
From: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov(a)gmail.com>
commit 21acdf45f4958135940f0b4767185cf911d4b010 upstream.
Commit d3834fefcfe5 ("rbd: bump queue_max_segments") bumped
max_segments (unsigned short) to max_hw_sectors (unsigned int).
max_hw_sectors is set to the number of 512-byte sectors in an object
and overflows unsigned short for 32M (largest possible) objects, making
the block layer resort to handing us single segment (i.e. single page
or even smaller) bios in that case.
Fixes: d3834fefcfe5 ("rbd: bump queue_max_segments")
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov(a)gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Alex Elder <elder(a)linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/block/rbd.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/drivers/block/rbd.c
+++ b/drivers/block/rbd.c
@@ -3767,7 +3767,7 @@ static int rbd_init_disk(struct rbd_devi
segment_size = rbd_obj_bytes(&rbd_dev->header);
blk_queue_max_hw_sectors(q, segment_size / SECTOR_SIZE);
q->limits.max_sectors = queue_max_hw_sectors(q);
- blk_queue_max_segments(q, segment_size / SECTOR_SIZE);
+ blk_queue_max_segments(q, USHRT_MAX);
blk_queue_max_segment_size(q, segment_size);
blk_queue_io_min(q, segment_size);
blk_queue_io_opt(q, segment_size);
Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from idryomov(a)gmail.com are
queue-4.4/rbd-set-max_segments-to-ushrt_max.patch
This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled
KVM: x86: Add memory barrier on vmcs field lookup
to the 4.4-stable tree which can be found at:
http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum…
The filename of the patch is:
kvm-x86-add-memory-barrier-on-vmcs-field-lookup.patch
and it can be found in the queue-4.4 subdirectory.
If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree,
please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it.
>From 75f139aaf896d6fdeec2e468ddfa4b2fe469bf40 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Andrew Honig <ahonig(a)google.com>
Date: Wed, 10 Jan 2018 10:12:03 -0800
Subject: KVM: x86: Add memory barrier on vmcs field lookup
From: Andrew Honig <ahonig(a)google.com>
commit 75f139aaf896d6fdeec2e468ddfa4b2fe469bf40 upstream.
This adds a memory barrier when performing a lookup into
the vmcs_field_to_offset_table. This is related to
CVE-2017-5753.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Honig <ahonig(a)google.com>
Reviewed-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson(a)google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini(a)redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org>
---
arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c | 12 ++++++++++--
1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
@@ -828,8 +828,16 @@ static inline short vmcs_field_to_offset
{
BUILD_BUG_ON(ARRAY_SIZE(vmcs_field_to_offset_table) > SHRT_MAX);
- if (field >= ARRAY_SIZE(vmcs_field_to_offset_table) ||
- vmcs_field_to_offset_table[field] == 0)
+ if (field >= ARRAY_SIZE(vmcs_field_to_offset_table))
+ return -ENOENT;
+
+ /*
+ * FIXME: Mitigation for CVE-2017-5753. To be replaced with a
+ * generic mechanism.
+ */
+ asm("lfence");
+
+ if (vmcs_field_to_offset_table[field] == 0)
return -ENOENT;
return vmcs_field_to_offset_table[field];
Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from ahonig(a)google.com are
queue-4.4/kvm-vmx-scrub-hardware-gprs-at-vm-exit.patch
queue-4.4/kvm-x86-add-memory-barrier-on-vmcs-field-lookup.patch
This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled
drm/vmwgfx: Potential off by one in vmw_view_add()
to the 4.4-stable tree which can be found at:
http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum…
The filename of the patch is:
drm-vmwgfx-potential-off-by-one-in-vmw_view_add.patch
and it can be found in the queue-4.4 subdirectory.
If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree,
please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it.
>From 0d9cac0ca0429830c40fe1a4e50e60f6221fd7b6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter(a)oracle.com>
Date: Wed, 10 Jan 2018 12:40:04 +0300
Subject: drm/vmwgfx: Potential off by one in vmw_view_add()
From: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter(a)oracle.com>
commit 0d9cac0ca0429830c40fe1a4e50e60f6221fd7b6 upstream.
The vmw_view_cmd_to_type() function returns vmw_view_max (3) on error.
It's one element beyond the end of the vmw_view_cotables[] table.
My read on this is that it's possible to hit this failure. header->id
comes from vmw_cmd_check() and it's a user controlled number between
1040 and 1225 so we can hit that error. But I don't have the hardware
to test this code.
Fixes: d80efd5cb3de ("drm/vmwgfx: Initial DX support")
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter(a)oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Hellstrom <thellstrom(a)vmware.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/vmwgfx_execbuf.c | 2 ++
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
--- a/drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/vmwgfx_execbuf.c
+++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/vmwgfx_execbuf.c
@@ -2678,6 +2678,8 @@ static int vmw_cmd_dx_view_define(struct
}
view_type = vmw_view_cmd_to_type(header->id);
+ if (view_type == vmw_view_max)
+ return -EINVAL;
cmd = container_of(header, typeof(*cmd), header);
ret = vmw_cmd_res_check(dev_priv, sw_context, vmw_res_surface,
user_surface_converter,
Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from dan.carpenter(a)oracle.com are
queue-4.4/drm-vmwgfx-potential-off-by-one-in-vmw_view_add.patch
This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled
crypto: algapi - fix NULL dereference in crypto_remove_spawns()
to the 4.4-stable tree which can be found at:
http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum…
The filename of the patch is:
crypto-algapi-fix-null-dereference-in-crypto_remove_spawns.patch
and it can be found in the queue-4.4 subdirectory.
If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree,
please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it.
>From 9a00674213a3f00394f4e3221b88f2d21fc05789 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers(a)google.com>
Date: Fri, 29 Dec 2017 14:30:19 -0600
Subject: crypto: algapi - fix NULL dereference in crypto_remove_spawns()
From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers(a)google.com>
commit 9a00674213a3f00394f4e3221b88f2d21fc05789 upstream.
syzkaller triggered a NULL pointer dereference in crypto_remove_spawns()
via a program that repeatedly and concurrently requests AEADs
"authenc(cmac(des3_ede-asm),pcbc-aes-aesni)" and hashes "cmac(des3_ede)"
through AF_ALG, where the hashes are requested as "untested"
(CRYPTO_ALG_TESTED is set in ->salg_mask but clear in ->salg_feat; this
causes the template to be instantiated for every request).
Although AF_ALG users really shouldn't be able to request an "untested"
algorithm, the NULL pointer dereference is actually caused by a
longstanding race condition where crypto_remove_spawns() can encounter
an instance which has had spawn(s) "grabbed" but hasn't yet been
registered, resulting in ->cra_users still being NULL.
We probably should properly initialize ->cra_users earlier, but that
would require updating many templates individually. For now just fix
the bug in a simple way that can easily be backported: make
crypto_remove_spawns() treat a NULL ->cra_users list as empty.
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller(a)googlegroups.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers(a)google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert(a)gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org>
---
crypto/algapi.c | 12 ++++++++++++
1 file changed, 12 insertions(+)
--- a/crypto/algapi.c
+++ b/crypto/algapi.c
@@ -168,6 +168,18 @@ void crypto_remove_spawns(struct crypto_
spawn->alg = NULL;
spawns = &inst->alg.cra_users;
+
+ /*
+ * We may encounter an unregistered instance here, since
+ * an instance's spawns are set up prior to the instance
+ * being registered. An unregistered instance will have
+ * NULL ->cra_users.next, since ->cra_users isn't
+ * properly initialized until registration. But an
+ * unregistered instance cannot have any users, so treat
+ * it the same as ->cra_users being empty.
+ */
+ if (spawns->next == NULL)
+ break;
}
} while ((spawns = crypto_more_spawns(alg, &stack, &top,
&secondary_spawns)));
Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from ebiggers(a)google.com are
queue-4.4/crypto-algapi-fix-null-dereference-in-crypto_remove_spawns.patch
This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled
bpf: add bpf_patch_insn_single helper
to the 4.4-stable tree which can be found at:
http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum…
The filename of the patch is:
bpf-add-bpf_patch_insn_single-helper.patch
and it can be found in the queue-4.4 subdirectory.
If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree,
please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it.
>From c237ee5eb33bf19fe0591c04ff8db19da7323a83 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daniel Borkmann <daniel(a)iogearbox.net>
Date: Fri, 13 May 2016 19:08:30 +0200
Subject: bpf: add bpf_patch_insn_single helper
From: Daniel Borkmann <daniel(a)iogearbox.net>
commit c237ee5eb33bf19fe0591c04ff8db19da7323a83 upstream.
Move the functionality to patch instructions out of the verifier
code and into the core as the new bpf_patch_insn_single() helper
will be needed later on for blinding as well. No changes in
functionality.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel(a)iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast(a)kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem(a)davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby(a)suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org>
diff --git a/include/linux/filter.h b/include/linux/filter.h
index 4ff0e647598f..c4aae496f376 100644
--- a/include/linux/filter.h
+++ b/include/linux/filter.h
@@ -495,6 +495,9 @@ u64 __bpf_call_base(u64 r1, u64 r2, u64 r3, u64 r4, u64 r5);
void bpf_int_jit_compile(struct bpf_prog *fp);
bool bpf_helper_changes_skb_data(void *func);
+struct bpf_prog *bpf_patch_insn_single(struct bpf_prog *prog, u32 off,
+ const struct bpf_insn *patch, u32 len);
+
#ifdef CONFIG_BPF_JIT
extern int bpf_jit_enable;
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/core.c b/kernel/bpf/core.c
index 5313d09d4b62..49b5538a5301 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/core.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/core.c
@@ -136,6 +136,77 @@ void __bpf_prog_free(struct bpf_prog *fp)
vfree(fp);
}
+static bool bpf_is_jmp_and_has_target(const struct bpf_insn *insn)
+{
+ return BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_JMP &&
+ /* Call and Exit are both special jumps with no
+ * target inside the BPF instruction image.
+ */
+ BPF_OP(insn->code) != BPF_CALL &&
+ BPF_OP(insn->code) != BPF_EXIT;
+}
+
+static void bpf_adj_branches(struct bpf_prog *prog, u32 pos, u32 delta)
+{
+ struct bpf_insn *insn = prog->insnsi;
+ u32 i, insn_cnt = prog->len;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++, insn++) {
+ if (!bpf_is_jmp_and_has_target(insn))
+ continue;
+
+ /* Adjust offset of jmps if we cross boundaries. */
+ if (i < pos && i + insn->off + 1 > pos)
+ insn->off += delta;
+ else if (i > pos + delta && i + insn->off + 1 <= pos + delta)
+ insn->off -= delta;
+ }
+}
+
+struct bpf_prog *bpf_patch_insn_single(struct bpf_prog *prog, u32 off,
+ const struct bpf_insn *patch, u32 len)
+{
+ u32 insn_adj_cnt, insn_rest, insn_delta = len - 1;
+ struct bpf_prog *prog_adj;
+
+ /* Since our patchlet doesn't expand the image, we're done. */
+ if (insn_delta == 0) {
+ memcpy(prog->insnsi + off, patch, sizeof(*patch));
+ return prog;
+ }
+
+ insn_adj_cnt = prog->len + insn_delta;
+
+ /* Several new instructions need to be inserted. Make room
+ * for them. Likely, there's no need for a new allocation as
+ * last page could have large enough tailroom.
+ */
+ prog_adj = bpf_prog_realloc(prog, bpf_prog_size(insn_adj_cnt),
+ GFP_USER);
+ if (!prog_adj)
+ return NULL;
+
+ prog_adj->len = insn_adj_cnt;
+
+ /* Patching happens in 3 steps:
+ *
+ * 1) Move over tail of insnsi from next instruction onwards,
+ * so we can patch the single target insn with one or more
+ * new ones (patching is always from 1 to n insns, n > 0).
+ * 2) Inject new instructions at the target location.
+ * 3) Adjust branch offsets if necessary.
+ */
+ insn_rest = insn_adj_cnt - off - len;
+
+ memmove(prog_adj->insnsi + off + len, prog_adj->insnsi + off + 1,
+ sizeof(*patch) * insn_rest);
+ memcpy(prog_adj->insnsi + off, patch, sizeof(*patch) * len);
+
+ bpf_adj_branches(prog_adj, off, insn_delta);
+
+ return prog_adj;
+}
+
#ifdef CONFIG_BPF_JIT
struct bpf_binary_header *
bpf_jit_binary_alloc(unsigned int proglen, u8 **image_ptr,
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
index 84bff68cf80e..a08d66215245 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
@@ -2587,26 +2587,6 @@ static void convert_pseudo_ld_imm64(struct verifier_env *env)
insn->src_reg = 0;
}
-static void adjust_branches(struct bpf_prog *prog, int pos, int delta)
-{
- struct bpf_insn *insn = prog->insnsi;
- int insn_cnt = prog->len;
- int i;
-
- for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++, insn++) {
- if (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) != BPF_JMP ||
- BPF_OP(insn->code) == BPF_CALL ||
- BPF_OP(insn->code) == BPF_EXIT)
- continue;
-
- /* adjust offset of jmps if necessary */
- if (i < pos && i + insn->off + 1 > pos)
- insn->off += delta;
- else if (i > pos + delta && i + insn->off + 1 <= pos + delta)
- insn->off -= delta;
- }
-}
-
/* convert load instructions that access fields of 'struct __sk_buff'
* into sequence of instructions that access fields of 'struct sk_buff'
*/
@@ -2616,14 +2596,15 @@ static int convert_ctx_accesses(struct verifier_env *env)
int insn_cnt = env->prog->len;
struct bpf_insn insn_buf[16];
struct bpf_prog *new_prog;
- u32 cnt;
- int i;
enum bpf_access_type type;
+ int i;
if (!env->prog->aux->ops->convert_ctx_access)
return 0;
for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++, insn++) {
+ u32 insn_delta, cnt;
+
if (insn->code == (BPF_LDX | BPF_MEM | BPF_W))
type = BPF_READ;
else if (insn->code == (BPF_STX | BPF_MEM | BPF_W))
@@ -2645,34 +2626,18 @@ static int convert_ctx_accesses(struct verifier_env *env)
return -EINVAL;
}
- if (cnt == 1) {
- memcpy(insn, insn_buf, sizeof(*insn));
- continue;
- }
-
- /* several new insns need to be inserted. Make room for them */
- insn_cnt += cnt - 1;
- new_prog = bpf_prog_realloc(env->prog,
- bpf_prog_size(insn_cnt),
- GFP_USER);
+ new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_single(env->prog, i, insn_buf, cnt);
if (!new_prog)
return -ENOMEM;
- new_prog->len = insn_cnt;
-
- memmove(new_prog->insnsi + i + cnt, new_prog->insns + i + 1,
- sizeof(*insn) * (insn_cnt - i - cnt));
-
- /* copy substitute insns in place of load instruction */
- memcpy(new_prog->insnsi + i, insn_buf, sizeof(*insn) * cnt);
-
- /* adjust branches in the whole program */
- adjust_branches(new_prog, i, cnt - 1);
+ insn_delta = cnt - 1;
/* keep walking new program and skip insns we just inserted */
env->prog = new_prog;
- insn = new_prog->insnsi + i + cnt - 1;
- i += cnt - 1;
+ insn = new_prog->insnsi + i + insn_delta;
+
+ insn_cnt += insn_delta;
+ i += insn_delta;
}
return 0;
Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from daniel(a)iogearbox.net are
queue-4.4/bpf-add-bpf_patch_insn_single-helper.patch
This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled
x86/microcode/intel: Extend BDW late-loading with a revision check
to the 4.14-stable tree which can be found at:
http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum…
The filename of the patch is:
x86-microcode-intel-extend-bdw-late-loading-with-a-revision-check.patch
and it can be found in the queue-4.14 subdirectory.
If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree,
please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it.
>From b94b7373317164402ff7728d10f7023127a02b60 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jia Zhang <qianyue.zj(a)alibaba-inc.com>
Date: Mon, 1 Jan 2018 10:04:47 +0800
Subject: x86/microcode/intel: Extend BDW late-loading with a revision check
From: Jia Zhang <qianyue.zj(a)alibaba-inc.com>
commit b94b7373317164402ff7728d10f7023127a02b60 upstream.
Instead of blacklisting all model 79 CPUs when attempting a late
microcode loading, limit that only to CPUs with microcode revisions <
0x0b000021 because only on those late loading may cause a system hang.
For such processors either:
a) a BIOS update which might contain a newer microcode revision
or
b) the early microcode loading method
should be considered.
Processors with revisions 0x0b000021 or higher will not experience such
hangs.
For more details, see erratum BDF90 in document #334165 (Intel Xeon
Processor E7-8800/4800 v4 Product Family Specification Update) from
September 2017.
[ bp: Heavily massage commit message and pr_* statements. ]
Fixes: 723f2828a98c ("x86/microcode/intel: Disable late loading on model 79")
Signed-off-by: Jia Zhang <qianyue.zj(a)alibaba-inc.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp(a)suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx(a)linutronix.de>
Acked-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck(a)intel.com>
Cc: x86-ml <x86(a)kernel.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1514772287-92959-1-git-send-email-qianyue.zj@aliba…
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org>
---
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/microcode/intel.c | 13 +++++++++++--
1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/microcode/intel.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/microcode/intel.c
@@ -910,8 +910,17 @@ static bool is_blacklisted(unsigned int
{
struct cpuinfo_x86 *c = &cpu_data(cpu);
- if (c->x86 == 6 && c->x86_model == INTEL_FAM6_BROADWELL_X) {
- pr_err_once("late loading on model 79 is disabled.\n");
+ /*
+ * Late loading on model 79 with microcode revision less than 0x0b000021
+ * may result in a system hang. This behavior is documented in item
+ * BDF90, #334165 (Intel Xeon Processor E7-8800/4800 v4 Product Family).
+ */
+ if (c->x86 == 6 &&
+ c->x86_model == INTEL_FAM6_BROADWELL_X &&
+ c->x86_mask == 0x01 &&
+ c->microcode < 0x0b000021) {
+ pr_err_once("Erratum BDF90: late loading with revision < 0x0b000021 (0x%x) disabled.\n", c->microcode);
+ pr_err_once("Please consider either early loading through initrd/built-in or a potential BIOS update.\n");
return true;
}
Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from qianyue.zj(a)alibaba-inc.com are
queue-4.14/x86-microcode-intel-extend-bdw-late-loading-with-a-revision-check.patch
This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled
rbd: set max_segments to USHRT_MAX
to the 4.14-stable tree which can be found at:
http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum…
The filename of the patch is:
rbd-set-max_segments-to-ushrt_max.patch
and it can be found in the queue-4.14 subdirectory.
If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree,
please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it.
>From 21acdf45f4958135940f0b4767185cf911d4b010 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov(a)gmail.com>
Date: Thu, 21 Dec 2017 15:35:11 +0100
Subject: rbd: set max_segments to USHRT_MAX
From: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov(a)gmail.com>
commit 21acdf45f4958135940f0b4767185cf911d4b010 upstream.
Commit d3834fefcfe5 ("rbd: bump queue_max_segments") bumped
max_segments (unsigned short) to max_hw_sectors (unsigned int).
max_hw_sectors is set to the number of 512-byte sectors in an object
and overflows unsigned short for 32M (largest possible) objects, making
the block layer resort to handing us single segment (i.e. single page
or even smaller) bios in that case.
Fixes: d3834fefcfe5 ("rbd: bump queue_max_segments")
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov(a)gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Alex Elder <elder(a)linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/block/rbd.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/drivers/block/rbd.c
+++ b/drivers/block/rbd.c
@@ -4421,7 +4421,7 @@ static int rbd_init_disk(struct rbd_devi
segment_size = rbd_obj_bytes(&rbd_dev->header);
blk_queue_max_hw_sectors(q, segment_size / SECTOR_SIZE);
q->limits.max_sectors = queue_max_hw_sectors(q);
- blk_queue_max_segments(q, segment_size / SECTOR_SIZE);
+ blk_queue_max_segments(q, USHRT_MAX);
blk_queue_max_segment_size(q, segment_size);
blk_queue_io_min(q, segment_size);
blk_queue_io_opt(q, segment_size);
Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from idryomov(a)gmail.com are
queue-4.14/rbd-reacquire-lock-should-update-lock-owner-client-id.patch
queue-4.14/rbd-set-max_segments-to-ushrt_max.patch
This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled
rbd: reacquire lock should update lock owner client id
to the 4.14-stable tree which can be found at:
http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum…
The filename of the patch is:
rbd-reacquire-lock-should-update-lock-owner-client-id.patch
and it can be found in the queue-4.14 subdirectory.
If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree,
please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it.
>From edd8ca8015800b354453b891d38960f3a474b7e4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Florian Margaine <florian(a)platform.sh>
Date: Wed, 13 Dec 2017 16:43:59 +0100
Subject: rbd: reacquire lock should update lock owner client id
From: Florian Margaine <florian(a)platform.sh>
commit edd8ca8015800b354453b891d38960f3a474b7e4 upstream.
Otherwise, future operations on this RBD using exclusive-lock are
going to require the lock from a non-existent client id.
Fixes: 14bb211d324d ("rbd: support updating the lock cookie without releasing the lock")
Link: http://tracker.ceph.com/issues/19929
Signed-off-by: Florian Margaine <florian(a)platform.sh>
[idryomov(a)gmail.com: rbd_set_owner_cid() call, __rbd_lock() helper]
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov(a)gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/block/rbd.c | 16 +++++++++++-----
1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
--- a/drivers/block/rbd.c
+++ b/drivers/block/rbd.c
@@ -3074,13 +3074,21 @@ static void format_lock_cookie(struct rb
mutex_unlock(&rbd_dev->watch_mutex);
}
+static void __rbd_lock(struct rbd_device *rbd_dev, const char *cookie)
+{
+ struct rbd_client_id cid = rbd_get_cid(rbd_dev);
+
+ strcpy(rbd_dev->lock_cookie, cookie);
+ rbd_set_owner_cid(rbd_dev, &cid);
+ queue_work(rbd_dev->task_wq, &rbd_dev->acquired_lock_work);
+}
+
/*
* lock_rwsem must be held for write
*/
static int rbd_lock(struct rbd_device *rbd_dev)
{
struct ceph_osd_client *osdc = &rbd_dev->rbd_client->client->osdc;
- struct rbd_client_id cid = rbd_get_cid(rbd_dev);
char cookie[32];
int ret;
@@ -3095,9 +3103,7 @@ static int rbd_lock(struct rbd_device *r
return ret;
rbd_dev->lock_state = RBD_LOCK_STATE_LOCKED;
- strcpy(rbd_dev->lock_cookie, cookie);
- rbd_set_owner_cid(rbd_dev, &cid);
- queue_work(rbd_dev->task_wq, &rbd_dev->acquired_lock_work);
+ __rbd_lock(rbd_dev, cookie);
return 0;
}
@@ -3883,7 +3889,7 @@ static void rbd_reacquire_lock(struct rb
queue_delayed_work(rbd_dev->task_wq,
&rbd_dev->lock_dwork, 0);
} else {
- strcpy(rbd_dev->lock_cookie, cookie);
+ __rbd_lock(rbd_dev, cookie);
}
}
Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from florian(a)platform.sh are
queue-4.14/rbd-reacquire-lock-should-update-lock-owner-client-id.patch
This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled
mmc: renesas_sdhi: Add MODULE_LICENSE
to the 4.14-stable tree which can be found at:
http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum…
The filename of the patch is:
mmc-renesas_sdhi-add-module_license.patch
and it can be found in the queue-4.14 subdirectory.
If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree,
please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it.
>From 967a6a07e95c58eb9c1581d22a1d9c2d1929843f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Masaharu Hayakawa <masaharu.hayakawa.ry(a)renesas.com>
Date: Wed, 13 Dec 2017 11:33:00 +0900
Subject: mmc: renesas_sdhi: Add MODULE_LICENSE
From: Masaharu Hayakawa <masaharu.hayakawa.ry(a)renesas.com>
commit 967a6a07e95c58eb9c1581d22a1d9c2d1929843f upstream.
The following error occurs when loading renesas_sdhi_core.c module,
so add MODULE_LICENSE("GPL v2").
renesas_sdhi_core: module license 'unspecified' taints kernel.
Signed-off-by: Masaharu Hayakawa <masaharu.hayakawa.ry(a)renesas.com>
Fixes: 9d08428afb72 ("mmc: renesas-sdhi: make renesas_sdhi_sys_dmac main module file")
[Shimoda: Added Fixes tag and Cc to the stable ML]
Signed-off-by: Yoshihiro Shimoda <yoshihiro.shimoda.uh(a)renesas.com>
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <horms+renesas(a)verge.net.au>
Acked-by: Wolfram Sang <wsa+renesas(a)sang-engineering.com>
Signed-off-by: Ulf Hansson <ulf.hansson(a)linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/mmc/host/renesas_sdhi_core.c | 3 +++
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
--- a/drivers/mmc/host/renesas_sdhi_core.c
+++ b/drivers/mmc/host/renesas_sdhi_core.c
@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@
#include <linux/kernel.h>
#include <linux/clk.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/module.h>
#include <linux/of_device.h>
#include <linux/platform_device.h>
#include <linux/mmc/host.h>
@@ -667,3 +668,5 @@ int renesas_sdhi_remove(struct platform_
return 0;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(renesas_sdhi_remove);
+
+MODULE_LICENSE("GPL v2");
Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from masaharu.hayakawa.ry(a)renesas.com are
queue-4.14/mmc-renesas_sdhi-add-module_license.patch
This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled
KVM: x86: Add memory barrier on vmcs field lookup
to the 4.14-stable tree which can be found at:
http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum…
The filename of the patch is:
kvm-x86-add-memory-barrier-on-vmcs-field-lookup.patch
and it can be found in the queue-4.14 subdirectory.
If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree,
please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it.
>From 75f139aaf896d6fdeec2e468ddfa4b2fe469bf40 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Andrew Honig <ahonig(a)google.com>
Date: Wed, 10 Jan 2018 10:12:03 -0800
Subject: KVM: x86: Add memory barrier on vmcs field lookup
From: Andrew Honig <ahonig(a)google.com>
commit 75f139aaf896d6fdeec2e468ddfa4b2fe469bf40 upstream.
This adds a memory barrier when performing a lookup into
the vmcs_field_to_offset_table. This is related to
CVE-2017-5753.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Honig <ahonig(a)google.com>
Reviewed-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson(a)google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini(a)redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org>
---
arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c | 12 ++++++++++--
1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
@@ -888,8 +888,16 @@ static inline short vmcs_field_to_offset
{
BUILD_BUG_ON(ARRAY_SIZE(vmcs_field_to_offset_table) > SHRT_MAX);
- if (field >= ARRAY_SIZE(vmcs_field_to_offset_table) ||
- vmcs_field_to_offset_table[field] == 0)
+ if (field >= ARRAY_SIZE(vmcs_field_to_offset_table))
+ return -ENOENT;
+
+ /*
+ * FIXME: Mitigation for CVE-2017-5753. To be replaced with a
+ * generic mechanism.
+ */
+ asm("lfence");
+
+ if (vmcs_field_to_offset_table[field] == 0)
return -ENOENT;
return vmcs_field_to_offset_table[field];
Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from ahonig(a)google.com are
queue-4.14/kvm-vmx-scrub-hardware-gprs-at-vm-exit.patch
queue-4.14/kvm-x86-add-memory-barrier-on-vmcs-field-lookup.patch
This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled
KVM: PPC: Book3S PR: Fix WIMG handling under pHyp
to the 4.14-stable tree which can be found at:
http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum…
The filename of the patch is:
kvm-ppc-book3s-pr-fix-wimg-handling-under-phyp.patch
and it can be found in the queue-4.14 subdirectory.
If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree,
please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it.
>From 6c7d47c33ed323f14f2a3b8de925e831dbaa4e69 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Alexey Kardashevskiy <aik(a)ozlabs.ru>
Date: Wed, 22 Nov 2017 14:42:21 +1100
Subject: KVM: PPC: Book3S PR: Fix WIMG handling under pHyp
From: Alexey Kardashevskiy <aik(a)ozlabs.ru>
commit 6c7d47c33ed323f14f2a3b8de925e831dbaa4e69 upstream.
Commit 96df226 ("KVM: PPC: Book3S PR: Preserve storage control bits")
added code to preserve WIMG bits but it missed 2 special cases:
- a magic page in kvmppc_mmu_book3s_64_xlate() and
- guest real mode in kvmppc_handle_pagefault().
For these ptes, WIMG was 0 and pHyp failed on these causing a guest to
stop in the very beginning at NIP=0x100 (due to bd9166ffe "KVM: PPC:
Book3S PR: Exit KVM on failed mapping").
According to LoPAPR v1.1 14.5.4.1.2 H_ENTER:
The hypervisor checks that the WIMG bits within the PTE are appropriate
for the physical page number else H_Parameter return. (For System Memory
pages WIMG=0010, or, 1110 if the SAO option is enabled, and for IO pages
WIMG=01**.)
This hence initializes WIMG to non-zero value HPTE_R_M (0x10), as expected
by pHyp.
[paulus(a)ozlabs.org - fix compile for 32-bit]
Fixes: 96df226 "KVM: PPC: Book3S PR: Preserve storage control bits"
Signed-off-by: Alexey Kardashevskiy <aik(a)ozlabs.ru>
Tested-by: Ruediger Oertel <ro(a)suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Greg Kurz <groug(a)kaod.org>
Tested-by: Greg Kurz <groug(a)kaod.org>
Signed-off-by: Paul Mackerras <paulus(a)ozlabs.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org>
---
arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_64_mmu.c | 1 +
arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_pr.c | 2 ++
2 files changed, 3 insertions(+)
--- a/arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_64_mmu.c
+++ b/arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_64_mmu.c
@@ -235,6 +235,7 @@ static int kvmppc_mmu_book3s_64_xlate(st
gpte->may_read = true;
gpte->may_write = true;
gpte->page_size = MMU_PAGE_4K;
+ gpte->wimg = HPTE_R_M;
return 0;
}
--- a/arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_pr.c
+++ b/arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_pr.c
@@ -60,6 +60,7 @@ static void kvmppc_giveup_fac(struct kvm
#define MSR_USER32 MSR_USER
#define MSR_USER64 MSR_USER
#define HW_PAGE_SIZE PAGE_SIZE
+#define HPTE_R_M _PAGE_COHERENT
#endif
static bool kvmppc_is_split_real(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
@@ -557,6 +558,7 @@ int kvmppc_handle_pagefault(struct kvm_r
pte.eaddr = eaddr;
pte.vpage = eaddr >> 12;
pte.page_size = MMU_PAGE_64K;
+ pte.wimg = HPTE_R_M;
}
switch (kvmppc_get_msr(vcpu) & (MSR_DR|MSR_IR)) {
Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from aik(a)ozlabs.ru are
queue-4.14/kvm-ppc-book3s-pr-fix-wimg-handling-under-phyp.patch
This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled
KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: Fix use after free in case of multiple resize requests
to the 4.14-stable tree which can be found at:
http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum…
The filename of the patch is:
kvm-ppc-book3s-hv-fix-use-after-free-in-case-of-multiple-resize-requests.patch
and it can be found in the queue-4.14 subdirectory.
If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree,
please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it.
>From 4ed11aeefda439c76ddae3ceebcfa4fad111f149 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Serhii Popovych <spopovyc(a)redhat.com>
Date: Mon, 4 Dec 2017 09:36:42 -0500
Subject: KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: Fix use after free in case of multiple resize requests
From: Serhii Popovych <spopovyc(a)redhat.com>
commit 4ed11aeefda439c76ddae3ceebcfa4fad111f149 upstream.
When serving multiple resize requests following could happen:
CPU0 CPU1
---- ----
kvm_vm_ioctl_resize_hpt_prepare(1);
-> schedule_work()
/* system_rq might be busy: delay */
kvm_vm_ioctl_resize_hpt_prepare(2);
mutex_lock();
if (resize) {
...
release_hpt_resize();
}
... resize_hpt_prepare_work()
-> schedule_work() {
mutex_unlock() /* resize->kvm could be wrong */
struct kvm *kvm = resize->kvm;
mutex_lock(&kvm->lock); <<<< UAF
...
}
i.e. a second resize request with different order could be started by
kvm_vm_ioctl_resize_hpt_prepare(), causing the previous request to be
free()d when there's still an active worker thread which will try to
access it. This leads to a use after free in point marked with UAF on
the diagram above.
To prevent this from happening, instead of unconditionally releasing a
pre-existing resize structure from the prepare ioctl(), we check if
the existing structure has an in-progress worker. We do that by
checking if the resize->error == -EBUSY, which is safe because the
resize->error field is protected by the kvm->lock. If there is an
active worker, instead of releasing, we mark the structure as stale by
unlinking it from kvm_struct.
In the worker thread we check for a stale structure (with kvm->lock
held), and in that case abort, releasing the stale structure ourself.
We make the check both before and the actual allocation. Strictly,
only the check afterwards is needed, the check before is an
optimization: if the structure happens to become stale before the
worker thread is dispatched, rather than during the allocation, it
means we can avoid allocating then immediately freeing a potentially
substantial amount of memory.
This fixes following or similar host kernel crash message:
[ 635.277361] Unable to handle kernel paging request for data at address 0x00000000
[ 635.277438] Faulting instruction address: 0xc00000000052f568
[ 635.277446] Oops: Kernel access of bad area, sig: 11 [#1]
[ 635.277451] SMP NR_CPUS=2048 NUMA PowerNV
[ 635.277470] Modules linked in: xt_CHECKSUM iptable_mangle ipt_MASQUERADE
nf_nat_masquerade_ipv4 iptable_nat nf_nat_ipv4 nf_nat nf_conntrack_ipv4
nf_defrag_ipv4 xt_conntrack nf_conntrack ipt_REJECT nf_reject_ipv4 tun bridge stp llc
ebtable_filter ebtables ip6table_filter ip6_tables iptable_filter nfsv3 nfs_acl nfs
lockd grace fscache kvm_hv kvm rpcrdma sunrpc ib_isert iscsi_target_mod ib_iser libiscsi
scsi_transport_iscsi ib_srpt target_core_mod ext4 ib_srp scsi_transport_srp
ib_ipoib mbcache jbd2 rdma_ucm ib_ucm ib_uverbs ib_umad rdma_cm ib_cm iw_cm ocrdma(T)
ib_core ses enclosure scsi_transport_sas sg shpchp leds_powernv ibmpowernv i2c_opal
i2c_core powernv_rng ipmi_powernv ipmi_devintf ipmi_msghandler ip_tables xfs
libcrc32c sr_mod sd_mod cdrom lpfc nvme_fc(T) nvme_fabrics nvme_core ipr nvmet_fc(T)
tg3 nvmet libata be2net crc_t10dif crct10dif_generic scsi_transport_fc ptp scsi_tgt
pps_core crct10dif_common dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log dm_mod
[ 635.278687] CPU: 40 PID: 749 Comm: kworker/40:1 Tainted: G
------------ T 3.10.0.bz1510771+ #1
[ 635.278782] Workqueue: events resize_hpt_prepare_work [kvm_hv]
[ 635.278851] task: c0000007e6840000 ti: c0000007e9180000 task.ti: c0000007e9180000
[ 635.278919] NIP: c00000000052f568 LR: c0000000009ea310 CTR: c0000000009ea4f0
[ 635.278988] REGS: c0000007e91837f0 TRAP: 0300 Tainted: G
------------ T (3.10.0.bz1510771+)
[ 635.279077] MSR: 9000000100009033 <SF,HV,EE,ME,IR,DR,RI,LE> CR: 24002022 XER:
00000000
[ 635.279248] CFAR: c000000000009368 DAR: 0000000000000000 DSISR: 40000000 SOFTE: 1
GPR00: c0000000009ea310 c0000007e9183a70 c000000001250b00 c0000007e9183b10
GPR04: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 c0000007e9183650 0000000000000000
GPR08: c0000007ffff7b80 00000000ffffffff 0000000080000028 d00000000d2529a0
GPR12: 0000000000002200 c000000007b56800 c000000000120028 c0000007f135bb40
GPR16: 0000000000000000 c000000005c1e018 c000000005c1e018 0000000000000000
GPR20: 0000000000000001 c0000000011bf778 0000000000000001 fffffffffffffef7
GPR24: 0000000000000000 c000000f1e262e50 0000000000000002 c0000007e9180000
GPR28: c000000f1e262e4c c000000f1e262e50 0000000000000000 c0000007e9183b10
[ 635.280149] NIP [c00000000052f568] __list_add+0x38/0x110
[ 635.280197] LR [c0000000009ea310] __mutex_lock_slowpath+0xe0/0x2c0
[ 635.280253] Call Trace:
[ 635.280277] [c0000007e9183af0] [c0000000009ea310] __mutex_lock_slowpath+0xe0/0x2c0
[ 635.280356] [c0000007e9183b70] [c0000000009ea554] mutex_lock+0x64/0x70
[ 635.280426] [c0000007e9183ba0] [d00000000d24da04]
resize_hpt_prepare_work+0xe4/0x1c0 [kvm_hv]
[ 635.280507] [c0000007e9183c40] [c000000000113c0c] process_one_work+0x1dc/0x680
[ 635.280587] [c0000007e9183ce0] [c000000000114250] worker_thread+0x1a0/0x520
[ 635.280655] [c0000007e9183d80] [c00000000012010c] kthread+0xec/0x100
[ 635.280724] [c0000007e9183e30] [c00000000000a4b8] ret_from_kernel_thread+0x5c/0xa4
[ 635.280814] Instruction dump:
[ 635.280880] 7c0802a6 fba1ffe8 fbc1fff0 7cbd2b78 fbe1fff8 7c9e2378 7c7f1b78
f8010010
[ 635.281099] f821ff81 e8a50008 7fa52040 40de00b8 <e8be0000> 7fbd2840 40de008c
7fbff040
[ 635.281324] ---[ end trace b628b73449719b9d ]---
Fixes: b5baa6877315 ("KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: KVM-HV HPT resizing implementation")
Signed-off-by: Serhii Popovych <spopovyc(a)redhat.com>
[dwg: Replaced BUG_ON()s with WARN_ONs() and reworded commit message
for clarity]
Signed-off-by: David Gibson <david(a)gibson.dropbear.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Paul Mackerras <paulus(a)ozlabs.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org>
---
arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_64_mmu_hv.c | 54 ++++++++++++++++++++++++------------
1 file changed, 37 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)
--- a/arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_64_mmu_hv.c
+++ b/arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_64_mmu_hv.c
@@ -1430,16 +1430,20 @@ static void resize_hpt_pivot(struct kvm_
static void resize_hpt_release(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_resize_hpt *resize)
{
- BUG_ON(kvm->arch.resize_hpt != resize);
+ if (WARN_ON(!mutex_is_locked(&kvm->lock)))
+ return;
if (!resize)
return;
- if (resize->hpt.virt)
- kvmppc_free_hpt(&resize->hpt);
+ if (resize->error != -EBUSY) {
+ if (resize->hpt.virt)
+ kvmppc_free_hpt(&resize->hpt);
+ kfree(resize);
+ }
- kvm->arch.resize_hpt = NULL;
- kfree(resize);
+ if (kvm->arch.resize_hpt == resize)
+ kvm->arch.resize_hpt = NULL;
}
static void resize_hpt_prepare_work(struct work_struct *work)
@@ -1448,26 +1452,42 @@ static void resize_hpt_prepare_work(stru
struct kvm_resize_hpt,
work);
struct kvm *kvm = resize->kvm;
- int err;
+ int err = 0;
if (WARN_ON(resize->error != -EBUSY))
return;
- resize_hpt_debug(resize, "resize_hpt_prepare_work(): order = %d\n",
- resize->order);
-
- err = resize_hpt_allocate(resize);
-
- /* We have strict assumption about -EBUSY
- * when preparing for HPT resize.
- */
- if (WARN_ON(err == -EBUSY))
- err = -EINPROGRESS;
-
mutex_lock(&kvm->lock);
+ /* Request is still current? */
+ if (kvm->arch.resize_hpt == resize) {
+ /* We may request large allocations here:
+ * do not sleep with kvm->lock held for a while.
+ */
+ mutex_unlock(&kvm->lock);
+
+ resize_hpt_debug(resize, "resize_hpt_prepare_work(): order = %d\n",
+ resize->order);
+
+ err = resize_hpt_allocate(resize);
+
+ /* We have strict assumption about -EBUSY
+ * when preparing for HPT resize.
+ */
+ if (WARN_ON(err == -EBUSY))
+ err = -EINPROGRESS;
+
+ mutex_lock(&kvm->lock);
+ /* It is possible that kvm->arch.resize_hpt != resize
+ * after we grab kvm->lock again.
+ */
+ }
+
resize->error = err;
+ if (kvm->arch.resize_hpt != resize)
+ resize_hpt_release(kvm, resize);
+
mutex_unlock(&kvm->lock);
}
Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from spopovyc(a)redhat.com are
queue-4.14/kvm-ppc-book3s-hv-drop-prepare_done-from-struct-kvm_resize_hpt.patch
queue-4.14/kvm-ppc-book3s-hv-fix-use-after-free-in-case-of-multiple-resize-requests.patch
This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled
KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: Drop prepare_done from struct kvm_resize_hpt
to the 4.14-stable tree which can be found at:
http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum…
The filename of the patch is:
kvm-ppc-book3s-hv-drop-prepare_done-from-struct-kvm_resize_hpt.patch
and it can be found in the queue-4.14 subdirectory.
If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree,
please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it.
>From 3073774e638ef18d222465fe92bfc8fccb90d288 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Serhii Popovych <spopovyc(a)redhat.com>
Date: Mon, 4 Dec 2017 09:36:41 -0500
Subject: KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: Drop prepare_done from struct kvm_resize_hpt
From: Serhii Popovych <spopovyc(a)redhat.com>
commit 3073774e638ef18d222465fe92bfc8fccb90d288 upstream.
Currently the kvm_resize_hpt structure has two fields relevant to the
state of an ongoing resize: 'prepare_done', which indicates whether
the worker thread has completed or not, and 'error' which indicates
whether it was successful or not.
Since the success/failure isn't known until completion, this is
confusingly redundant. This patch consolidates the information into
just the 'error' value: -EBUSY indicates the worked is still in
progress, other negative values indicate (completed) failure, 0
indicates successful completion.
As a bonus this reduces size of struct kvm_resize_hpt by
__alignof__(struct kvm_hpt_info) and saves few bytes of code.
While there correct comment in struct kvm_resize_hpt which references
a non-existent semaphore (leftover from an early draft).
Assert with WARN_ON() in case of HPT allocation thread work runs more
than once for resize request or resize_hpt_allocate() returns -EBUSY
that is treated specially.
Change comparison against zero to make checkpatch.pl happy.
Signed-off-by: Serhii Popovych <spopovyc(a)redhat.com>
[dwg: Changed BUG_ON()s to WARN_ON()s and altered commit message for
clarity]
Signed-off-by: David Gibson <david(a)gibson.dropbear.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Paul Mackerras <paulus(a)ozlabs.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org>
---
arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_64_mmu_hv.c | 44 ++++++++++++++++++++++--------------
1 file changed, 27 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)
--- a/arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_64_mmu_hv.c
+++ b/arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_64_mmu_hv.c
@@ -65,11 +65,17 @@ struct kvm_resize_hpt {
u32 order;
/* These fields protected by kvm->lock */
+
+ /* Possible values and their usage:
+ * <0 an error occurred during allocation,
+ * -EBUSY allocation is in the progress,
+ * 0 allocation made successfuly.
+ */
int error;
- bool prepare_done;
- /* Private to the work thread, until prepare_done is true,
- * then protected by kvm->resize_hpt_sem */
+ /* Private to the work thread, until error != -EBUSY,
+ * then protected by kvm->lock.
+ */
struct kvm_hpt_info hpt;
};
@@ -1444,15 +1450,23 @@ static void resize_hpt_prepare_work(stru
struct kvm *kvm = resize->kvm;
int err;
+ if (WARN_ON(resize->error != -EBUSY))
+ return;
+
resize_hpt_debug(resize, "resize_hpt_prepare_work(): order = %d\n",
resize->order);
err = resize_hpt_allocate(resize);
+ /* We have strict assumption about -EBUSY
+ * when preparing for HPT resize.
+ */
+ if (WARN_ON(err == -EBUSY))
+ err = -EINPROGRESS;
+
mutex_lock(&kvm->lock);
resize->error = err;
- resize->prepare_done = true;
mutex_unlock(&kvm->lock);
}
@@ -1477,14 +1491,12 @@ long kvm_vm_ioctl_resize_hpt_prepare(str
if (resize) {
if (resize->order == shift) {
- /* Suitable resize in progress */
- if (resize->prepare_done) {
- ret = resize->error;
- if (ret != 0)
- resize_hpt_release(kvm, resize);
- } else {
+ /* Suitable resize in progress? */
+ ret = resize->error;
+ if (ret == -EBUSY)
ret = 100; /* estimated time in ms */
- }
+ else if (ret)
+ resize_hpt_release(kvm, resize);
goto out;
}
@@ -1504,6 +1516,8 @@ long kvm_vm_ioctl_resize_hpt_prepare(str
ret = -ENOMEM;
goto out;
}
+
+ resize->error = -EBUSY;
resize->order = shift;
resize->kvm = kvm;
INIT_WORK(&resize->work, resize_hpt_prepare_work);
@@ -1558,16 +1572,12 @@ long kvm_vm_ioctl_resize_hpt_commit(stru
if (!resize || (resize->order != shift))
goto out;
- ret = -EBUSY;
- if (!resize->prepare_done)
- goto out;
-
ret = resize->error;
- if (ret != 0)
+ if (ret)
goto out;
ret = resize_hpt_rehash(resize);
- if (ret != 0)
+ if (ret)
goto out;
resize_hpt_pivot(resize);
Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from spopovyc(a)redhat.com are
queue-4.14/kvm-ppc-book3s-hv-drop-prepare_done-from-struct-kvm_resize_hpt.patch
queue-4.14/kvm-ppc-book3s-hv-fix-use-after-free-in-case-of-multiple-resize-requests.patch
This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled
KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: Always flush TLB in kvmppc_alloc_reset_hpt()
to the 4.14-stable tree which can be found at:
http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum…
The filename of the patch is:
kvm-ppc-book3s-hv-always-flush-tlb-in-kvmppc_alloc_reset_hpt.patch
and it can be found in the queue-4.14 subdirectory.
If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree,
please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it.
>From ecba8297aafd50db6ae867e90844eead1611ef1c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: David Gibson <david(a)gibson.dropbear.id.au>
Date: Wed, 10 Jan 2018 17:04:39 +1100
Subject: KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: Always flush TLB in kvmppc_alloc_reset_hpt()
From: David Gibson <david(a)gibson.dropbear.id.au>
commit ecba8297aafd50db6ae867e90844eead1611ef1c upstream.
The KVM_PPC_ALLOCATE_HTAB ioctl(), implemented by kvmppc_alloc_reset_hpt()
is supposed to completely clear and reset a guest's Hashed Page Table (HPT)
allocating or re-allocating it if necessary.
In the case where an HPT of the right size already exists and it just
zeroes it, it forces a TLB flush on all guest CPUs, to remove any stale TLB
entries loaded from the old HPT.
However, that situation can arise when the HPT is resizing as well - or
even when switching from an RPT to HPT - so those cases need a TLB flush as
well.
So, move the TLB flush to trigger in all cases except for errors.
Fixes: f98a8bf9ee20 ("KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: Allow KVM_PPC_ALLOCATE_HTAB ioctl() to change HPT size")
Signed-off-by: David Gibson <david(a)gibson.dropbear.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Paul Mackerras <paulus(a)ozlabs.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org>
---
arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_64_mmu_hv.c | 6 ++++--
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
--- a/arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_64_mmu_hv.c
+++ b/arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_64_mmu_hv.c
@@ -165,8 +165,6 @@ long kvmppc_alloc_reset_hpt(struct kvm *
* Reset all the reverse-mapping chains for all memslots
*/
kvmppc_rmap_reset(kvm);
- /* Ensure that each vcpu will flush its TLB on next entry. */
- cpumask_setall(&kvm->arch.need_tlb_flush);
err = 0;
goto out;
}
@@ -182,6 +180,10 @@ long kvmppc_alloc_reset_hpt(struct kvm *
kvmppc_set_hpt(kvm, &info);
out:
+ if (err == 0)
+ /* Ensure that each vcpu will flush its TLB on next entry. */
+ cpumask_setall(&kvm->arch.need_tlb_flush);
+
mutex_unlock(&kvm->lock);
return err;
}
Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from david(a)gibson.dropbear.id.au are
queue-4.14/kvm-ppc-book3s-hv-always-flush-tlb-in-kvmppc_alloc_reset_hpt.patch
queue-4.14/kvm-ppc-book3s-hv-drop-prepare_done-from-struct-kvm_resize_hpt.patch
queue-4.14/kvm-ppc-book3s-hv-fix-use-after-free-in-case-of-multiple-resize-requests.patch
This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled
iwlwifi: pcie: fix DMA memory mapping / unmapping
to the 4.14-stable tree which can be found at:
http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum…
The filename of the patch is:
iwlwifi-pcie-fix-dma-memory-mapping-unmapping.patch
and it can be found in the queue-4.14 subdirectory.
If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree,
please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it.
>From 943309d4aad6732b905f3f500e6e17e33c211494 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Emmanuel Grumbach <emmanuel.grumbach(a)intel.com>
Date: Thu, 4 Jan 2018 09:19:13 +0200
Subject: iwlwifi: pcie: fix DMA memory mapping / unmapping
From: Emmanuel Grumbach <emmanuel.grumbach(a)intel.com>
commit 943309d4aad6732b905f3f500e6e17e33c211494 upstream.
22000 devices (previously referenced as A000) can support
short transmit queues. This means that we have less DMA
descriptors (TFD) for those shorter queues.
Previous devices must still have 256 TFDs for each queue
even if those 256 TFDs point to fewer buffers.
When I introduced support for the short queues for 22000
I broke older devices by assuming that they can also have
less TFDs in their queues. This led to several problems:
1) the payload of the commands weren't unmapped properly
which caused the SWIOTLB to complain at some point.
2) the hardware could get confused and we get hardware
crashes.
The corresponding bugzilla entries are:
https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=198201https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=198265
Fixes: 4ecab5616023 ("iwlwifi: pcie: support short Tx queues for A000 device family")
Reviewed-by: Sharon, Sara <sara.sharon(a)intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Emmanuel Grumbach <emmanuel.grumbach(a)intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo <kvalo(a)codeaurora.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/net/wireless/intel/iwlwifi/pcie/internal.h | 10 +++++++---
drivers/net/wireless/intel/iwlwifi/pcie/tx-gen2.c | 11 +++--------
drivers/net/wireless/intel/iwlwifi/pcie/tx.c | 8 ++++----
3 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
--- a/drivers/net/wireless/intel/iwlwifi/pcie/internal.h
+++ b/drivers/net/wireless/intel/iwlwifi/pcie/internal.h
@@ -666,11 +666,15 @@ static inline u8 iwl_pcie_get_cmd_index(
return index & (q->n_window - 1);
}
-static inline void *iwl_pcie_get_tfd(struct iwl_trans_pcie *trans_pcie,
+static inline void *iwl_pcie_get_tfd(struct iwl_trans *trans,
struct iwl_txq *txq, int idx)
{
- return txq->tfds + trans_pcie->tfd_size * iwl_pcie_get_cmd_index(txq,
- idx);
+ struct iwl_trans_pcie *trans_pcie = IWL_TRANS_GET_PCIE_TRANS(trans);
+
+ if (trans->cfg->use_tfh)
+ idx = iwl_pcie_get_cmd_index(txq, idx);
+
+ return txq->tfds + trans_pcie->tfd_size * idx;
}
static inline void iwl_enable_rfkill_int(struct iwl_trans *trans)
--- a/drivers/net/wireless/intel/iwlwifi/pcie/tx-gen2.c
+++ b/drivers/net/wireless/intel/iwlwifi/pcie/tx-gen2.c
@@ -171,8 +171,6 @@ static void iwl_pcie_gen2_tfd_unmap(stru
static void iwl_pcie_gen2_free_tfd(struct iwl_trans *trans, struct iwl_txq *txq)
{
- struct iwl_trans_pcie *trans_pcie = IWL_TRANS_GET_PCIE_TRANS(trans);
-
/* rd_ptr is bounded by TFD_QUEUE_SIZE_MAX and
* idx is bounded by n_window
*/
@@ -181,7 +179,7 @@ static void iwl_pcie_gen2_free_tfd(struc
lockdep_assert_held(&txq->lock);
iwl_pcie_gen2_tfd_unmap(trans, &txq->entries[idx].meta,
- iwl_pcie_get_tfd(trans_pcie, txq, idx));
+ iwl_pcie_get_tfd(trans, txq, idx));
/* free SKB */
if (txq->entries) {
@@ -367,11 +365,9 @@ struct iwl_tfh_tfd *iwl_pcie_gen2_build_
struct sk_buff *skb,
struct iwl_cmd_meta *out_meta)
{
- struct iwl_trans_pcie *trans_pcie = IWL_TRANS_GET_PCIE_TRANS(trans);
struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)skb->data;
int idx = iwl_pcie_get_cmd_index(txq, txq->write_ptr);
- struct iwl_tfh_tfd *tfd =
- iwl_pcie_get_tfd(trans_pcie, txq, idx);
+ struct iwl_tfh_tfd *tfd = iwl_pcie_get_tfd(trans, txq, idx);
dma_addr_t tb_phys;
bool amsdu;
int i, len, tb1_len, tb2_len, hdr_len;
@@ -568,8 +564,7 @@ static int iwl_pcie_gen2_enqueue_hcmd(st
u8 group_id = iwl_cmd_groupid(cmd->id);
const u8 *cmddata[IWL_MAX_CMD_TBS_PER_TFD];
u16 cmdlen[IWL_MAX_CMD_TBS_PER_TFD];
- struct iwl_tfh_tfd *tfd =
- iwl_pcie_get_tfd(trans_pcie, txq, txq->write_ptr);
+ struct iwl_tfh_tfd *tfd = iwl_pcie_get_tfd(trans, txq, txq->write_ptr);
memset(tfd, 0, sizeof(*tfd));
--- a/drivers/net/wireless/intel/iwlwifi/pcie/tx.c
+++ b/drivers/net/wireless/intel/iwlwifi/pcie/tx.c
@@ -373,7 +373,7 @@ static void iwl_pcie_tfd_unmap(struct iw
{
struct iwl_trans_pcie *trans_pcie = IWL_TRANS_GET_PCIE_TRANS(trans);
int i, num_tbs;
- void *tfd = iwl_pcie_get_tfd(trans_pcie, txq, index);
+ void *tfd = iwl_pcie_get_tfd(trans, txq, index);
/* Sanity check on number of chunks */
num_tbs = iwl_pcie_tfd_get_num_tbs(trans, tfd);
@@ -1999,7 +1999,7 @@ static int iwl_fill_data_tbs(struct iwl_
}
trace_iwlwifi_dev_tx(trans->dev, skb,
- iwl_pcie_get_tfd(trans_pcie, txq, txq->write_ptr),
+ iwl_pcie_get_tfd(trans, txq, txq->write_ptr),
trans_pcie->tfd_size,
&dev_cmd->hdr, IWL_FIRST_TB_SIZE + tb1_len,
hdr_len);
@@ -2073,7 +2073,7 @@ static int iwl_fill_data_tbs_amsdu(struc
IEEE80211_CCMP_HDR_LEN : 0;
trace_iwlwifi_dev_tx(trans->dev, skb,
- iwl_pcie_get_tfd(trans_pcie, txq, txq->write_ptr),
+ iwl_pcie_get_tfd(trans, txq, txq->write_ptr),
trans_pcie->tfd_size,
&dev_cmd->hdr, IWL_FIRST_TB_SIZE + tb1_len, 0);
@@ -2406,7 +2406,7 @@ int iwl_trans_pcie_tx(struct iwl_trans *
memcpy(&txq->first_tb_bufs[txq->write_ptr], &dev_cmd->hdr,
IWL_FIRST_TB_SIZE);
- tfd = iwl_pcie_get_tfd(trans_pcie, txq, txq->write_ptr);
+ tfd = iwl_pcie_get_tfd(trans, txq, txq->write_ptr);
/* Set up entry for this TFD in Tx byte-count array */
iwl_pcie_txq_update_byte_cnt_tbl(trans, txq, le16_to_cpu(tx_cmd->len),
iwl_pcie_tfd_get_num_tbs(trans, tfd));
Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from emmanuel.grumbach(a)intel.com are
queue-4.14/iwlwifi-pcie-fix-dma-memory-mapping-unmapping.patch
This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled
drm/vmwgfx: Potential off by one in vmw_view_add()
to the 4.14-stable tree which can be found at:
http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum…
The filename of the patch is:
drm-vmwgfx-potential-off-by-one-in-vmw_view_add.patch
and it can be found in the queue-4.14 subdirectory.
If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree,
please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it.
>From 0d9cac0ca0429830c40fe1a4e50e60f6221fd7b6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter(a)oracle.com>
Date: Wed, 10 Jan 2018 12:40:04 +0300
Subject: drm/vmwgfx: Potential off by one in vmw_view_add()
From: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter(a)oracle.com>
commit 0d9cac0ca0429830c40fe1a4e50e60f6221fd7b6 upstream.
The vmw_view_cmd_to_type() function returns vmw_view_max (3) on error.
It's one element beyond the end of the vmw_view_cotables[] table.
My read on this is that it's possible to hit this failure. header->id
comes from vmw_cmd_check() and it's a user controlled number between
1040 and 1225 so we can hit that error. But I don't have the hardware
to test this code.
Fixes: d80efd5cb3de ("drm/vmwgfx: Initial DX support")
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter(a)oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Hellstrom <thellstrom(a)vmware.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/vmwgfx_execbuf.c | 2 ++
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
--- a/drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/vmwgfx_execbuf.c
+++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/vmwgfx_execbuf.c
@@ -2731,6 +2731,8 @@ static int vmw_cmd_dx_view_define(struct
}
view_type = vmw_view_cmd_to_type(header->id);
+ if (view_type == vmw_view_max)
+ return -EINVAL;
cmd = container_of(header, typeof(*cmd), header);
ret = vmw_cmd_res_check(dev_priv, sw_context, vmw_res_surface,
user_surface_converter,
Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from dan.carpenter(a)oracle.com are
queue-4.14/drm-vmwgfx-potential-off-by-one-in-vmw_view_add.patch